ORDER A.H. Khan, J. 1. This is a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India and is directed against an order of the Revenue Board, dismissing the revision of the petitioner. 2. The facts of the case giving rise to this petition are that Mst. Kesar Bai, the non-petitioner filed an application before the Tehsildar for the eviction of the petitioner under Sec. 76 of the M. B. Tenancy Act, alleging that the petitioner was a sub-lessee and since he is not handing back the possession of the land, he must be treated as a trespasser and as such be evicted. The Tehsildar held that the petitioner was a trespasser and ordered that the non-petitioner be placed in possession of the land in dispute, of which she was a Maurusi tenant. Against this order the petitioner filed successive appeals before the S.D.O. and the Additional Commissioner. They were all dismissed. He then filed a revision before the Revenue Board which was also dismissed. 3. The petitioner resisted the claim of Mst. Kesar Bai on the ground that according to Sec. 38 of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act he is entitled to become a Pakka tenant. 4. In the first place, the petitioner had not hitherto made any deposit and as such he cannot claim the benefit of section 38 (2) of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act. 5. Secondly, according to the Proviso the Clause 2 of Sec. 38 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition Act, even if he were to deposit an amount with the Tehsildar, he is not entitled to become a Pakka tenant, because according to Section 74 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, he is a sub-lessee of a disabled person namely, the non-petitioner, who is a widow. He thus remains a sub-tenant and he cannot avail himself of the benefit of Section 38 (2) of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act. 6. Mr. Dixit, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that according to the proviso to Clause 2 of Sec. 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, even if he remains a sub-tenant, he is not liable to be evicted. In other words he contends that the sub-tenancy is perpetuated in eternity. But I am afraid that this position is not tenable. Dixit, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that according to the proviso to Clause 2 of Sec. 38 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, even if he remains a sub-tenant, he is not liable to be evicted. In other words he contends that the sub-tenancy is perpetuated in eternity. But I am afraid that this position is not tenable. According to Section 75 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act a sub-tenant is liable to be evicted. If the disabled person, cannot avail himself or herself of the benefit given, then the benefit is as good as not. The interpretation sought to be put by Mr. Dixit nullities the benefit conferred on a disabled person. Moreover, it is nowhere stated that a sub tenant shall always remain a sub-tenant of a disabled person. 7. In ground No. 3 of the petition. It is said that if the sub-tenant is evicted, his right as a sub tenant would be taken away and that it would be against Art. 13 of the Constitution of India. But reference to Art. 13 is entirely out of place. If the law conferred some right on a sub-tenant, then the law can also take it away. 8. For reasons stated above the interpretation put upon the relevant sections of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue & Tenancy Act and Sec. 38 of the M. B. Zamindari by the Board is correct and there is no force in the petition. The petition is disallowed with Rs. 50 as costs to the non-petitioner. Shivdayal J.- 9. I his petition arises out of a decree for ejectment of a subtenant under section 10 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (hereinafter called the Tenancy Act). 10. Shri Dixit first contends that the petitioner was entitled to the conferral of pakka tenancy rights on depositing compensation under section 38 of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act (hereinafter called the Abolition Act) and until the time given in that section does not expire (that is, upto October 2, 196o, by virtue of the Madhya Pradesh Tenancy Act, which has come into force and has extended the time upto that date), the petitioner, who was admittedly a sub-tenant under the Qanoon Mal cannot be ejected. The argument is that the provisions of section 38 of the Abolition Act override those of sections 75 and 76 of the Tenancy Act. That argument deserves no consideration because the petitioner is a sub-tenant of a widow (a disabled person within the meaning of section 74 of the Tenancy Act) and the proviso to section 68 (2) of the Abolition Act deprives him of the benefit of the last mentioned section. 11. Learned counsel then shifts ground and urges that by virtue of the said proviso a sub-tenant who was so under the Qanoon Mal remains a sub-tenant so that he continues to be entitled to the same rights and liable to the same obligations as under the provisions of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior. On this hypothesis it is maintained that since under section 252 of the Qanoon Mal a sub-tenant was not liable to be ejected so long as he continued to pay rent to the Maurusi tenant, he cannot de ejected even after the commencement of the Tenancy Act. This contention must be rejected because the status, together with the rights and liabilities of every tenant and sub-tenant, altered on October 2, 1951 owing to legislative changes. On the commencement of the Abolition Act the petitioner became a subtenant under the Tenancy Act and sections 75 and 76 of this Act became applicable to him. Once the respondent got over section 38 (2) of the Abolition Act and made out a case under the proviso to that section, her rights under section 75 and section 76 of the Tenancy Act governed their relationship and he became liable to be ejected on fulfillment of the requirements under section 76. If the petitioners argument is accepted it leads to an anomaly. A sub-tenant of a disabled person becomes essentially a pucca tenant in perpetuity without being required to pay any compensation to the ex-Maurusi tenant, while he could not acquire that status without such payment if the tenant from whom he derived sub-tenancy was not a disabled person. This will be an impossible construction which the legislature could not be supposed to have intended. 12. This will be an impossible construction which the legislature could not be supposed to have intended. 12. Lastly, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that in the above interpretation sections 75 and 76 of the Tenancy Act read with the proviso to section 38(2) of the Tenancy Act offend against Art 31 of the Constitution and become ultra vires under Art 13, because they deprive the petitioner of his property, that is, his right that he could not be ejected under the previsions of the Qanoon Mal. It is true that the petitioner is being deprived of that right, but the legislature has power to take away vested rights by express legislation. And even if such deprivation is not subject to any payment of compensation to the petitioner, the law is still good and cannot be challenged before us on that ground alone because it is saved by Article 31 (2-A) of the Constitution. 13. In the result I agree with my learned brother that this petition must be dismissed and the respondent must be allowed Rs. 50/- as costs. Petition dismissed