J. M. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) THE order of detention has been challenged by the petitioner principally on two grounds viz. that the grounds upon which the order is based and which were furnished to the detenue are vague and indefinite and therefore the detenue was not in a position to make an effective representation and secondly that several of the grounds were false and therefore the order passed by the District Magistrate was mala fide. it was submitted on these grounds that the order of detention should be declared illegal and the detenue should be set at liberty. ( 2 ) SECTION 3 of the Preventive Detention Act inter alia states that the State Government may if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order it is necessary so to do make an order directing that such a person be detained. Section 3 thus gives wide powers to the executive to detain a person without any trial on the appropriate authority being satisfied that such detention is necessary. Thus the power to pass the order of detention depends on the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate authority. The satisfaction required under section 3 being a subjective one it is obvious that it is not subject to the subjective test of a judicial tribunal. ( 3 ) UNDER section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court however has the power to issue directions in the nature of a habeas corpus whenever it thinks fit directing inter alia a person detained either in public or private custody within the limits of its appellate criminal jurisdiction to be set at liberty. Though the power of the High Court Is expressed in this section in wide terms sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of the section restricts these powers by providing that such a person can be ordered to be set at liberty if he is illegally or improperly detained. The power given to the High Court under section 491 is to issue a direction to have the person detained brought before it for the purpose of investigating whether he is being detained under a proper authority or not. The power given to the High Court under section 491 is to issue a direction to have the person detained brought before it for the purpose of investigating whether he is being detained under a proper authority or not. Upon such a detained person being brought before the High Court the authority who has detained him has to show that he has been detained under a valid authority or power. Once that is shown the onus shifts on to the detenue to show that his detention is either illegal or improper. ( 4 ) SINCE the power to pass the order under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act depends on the satisfaction of the appropriate authority sufficiency of the grounds on which such satisfaction is or purports to be founded cannot obviously be challenged in a court of law. However those grounds must have a probative value and must not be extraneous to the scope and purpose of the Act under which the detention has been ordered. The order nevertheless can be challenged on the ground of its being mala fide which strictly speaking is the same thing as showing that though the order on the face of it appears to be within the scope and purpose of the Act. in reality it is not and the Act has been used merely as a cloak for detaining wrongfully the individual concerned. ( 5 ) AN application under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being one for the court to test whether a person has been illegally or improperly detained the High Court in such a proceeding is not entitled to inquire into the truth of the facts set out as grounds of detention communicated to the detenue. Consequently the propriety or the reasonableness of the satisfaction of the authority on which an order under section 3 of the Act is based cannot be challenged. But that does not mean that the High Court can in no circumstances examine those grounds. The High Court is in fact entitled for the purpose of testing whether the detenue is illegally or impro perly detained to examine the grounds to see if they pertain to the object that the legislature had in mind while enacting the statute under which it has conferred the power on the executive. The High Court is in fact entitled for the purpose of testing whether the detenue is illegally or impro perly detained to examine the grounds to see if they pertain to the object that the legislature had in mind while enacting the statute under which it has conferred the power on the executive. While examining the grounds the High Court must be satisfied that those grounds have a rational connection with such object. In the case before us the relevant object under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act is the maintenance of public order. In Machindar Shivaji vs. The King A. I. R 1950 F. D. 129 it was observed that the responsibility for making a detention order rests on the provincial executive as the alone are entrusted with the duty of maintaining public peace and it would be serious derogation from that responsibility if the Court were to substitute its judgment for the satisfaction of the executive authority and to that end undertake an investigation of the sufficiency of the materials on which such satisfaction is grounded. It is true that in that case the Federal Court was dealing with section 2 of the Public Safety Act and not with section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act But while making those observations Their Lordships of the Federal Court were concerned with the word satisfied occurring in section 2 of the Public Safety Act and which is in substance the same as occurring in section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act. Similarly in B. N. Mukerjee vs. The State I. L. R. 1951 Nag. 1 the Full Bench of the High Court of Nagpur held that a reasonable apprehension on the part of the authority concerned that the detenue if not detained would act in a way prejudicial to the maintenance of Public order i. e. the basis of all detention orders and if there is no reasonable foundation for that apprehension or that apprehension does not in fact exist then the detention under section 3 Of the Act cannot be justified. Thus it is the apprehension in the mind of the authority that the detenue will act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which is the basis of such a detention order. Thus it is the apprehension in the mind of the authority that the detenue will act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which is the basis of such a detention order. Consequently once the authority is satisfied on the materials avialable to it it is not for the High Court to examine the order as an appellate authority or to institute an investigation into the truth or otherwise of the facts on which such satisfaction is based. As Lord Finlay in Rex. vs. Halliday 1917 A. C. 260 at page 269 said a court is the least appropriate tribunal to investigate the question whether circumstances of suspicion exist warranting the restraint in a person. Therefore where a person who has been detained under the Preventive Detention Act applies to the High Court under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure all that can be seen in the proceedings would be whether the grounds communicated are connected with the order of preventive detention and whether the order made by the District Magistrate is made bona fide or mala fide. The question of correctness of the grounds of detention cannot be inquired into by the High Court. In Mohd. Athar Rizvi vs. The State A. I. R. 1951 Allahabad 456 the question arose whether the grounds of detention of the applicant. viz. that the disclosure in Pakistan by him of the secrets which the applicant had in his possession was likely to affect the security of the State was the one which the High Court could enquire. It was held that the question whether the secrets in the possession of the applicant which could be declosed in Pakistan were such that they would not affect the security of the State cannot be inquired into in the proceedings. Mr. Justice Bhargava in that case stated that since Art. 21 of Constitution permits deprivation of liberty by procedure established by law it was obvious that the discretion of deciding what the procedure should be and to what extent it needs to be prescibed has been given entirely to the legislature. Obviously it cannot be necessary that every detailed step of the procedure need be mentioned. While empowering the authorities to make an order of detention on being satisfied that one of the conditions laid down in sec. Obviously it cannot be necessary that every detailed step of the procedure need be mentioned. While empowering the authorities to make an order of detention on being satisfied that one of the conditions laid down in sec. 3 of the Act exists the legislature has not laid down by what process that satisfaction is to be arrived at by the relevant authority. It is entirely at the discretion of the authority in making the order to satisfy itself in that behalf by whether means may be available to it. The question whether activities which are made the grounds for detention would in fact affect the public order or not is not again a question which can be gone into in proceeding under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. All that can be gone into is to see whether the grounds communicated to the detenue have a connection with the order made and whether the order is bona fide or mala fide. The question of the correctness of the grounds also cannot be inquired into by the High Court in such a proceeding. The Preventive Detention Act has itself set up a forum under section 9 where the truth of the grounds can be gone into. As we have pointed out the Advisory Board has already examined the grounds as also representation made by the detenue and has come to the conclusion that the grounds are correct and on their decision the State Government has confirmed the order under section 11 (1) of the Act. A Habeas Corpus Bench of the High Court has no doubt the right to consider the question of jurisdiction of the authority or the question whether that authority applied its mind properly to the question of detention but it is not open to the High Court to go in to the question whether the authority on merits was justified to pass the order. That is the sole resonsibility imposed by the legislature on the authority and unless that authority acts for instance mala fide or in abuse or fraud of the Act or the object and scope of the Act the High Court is not entitled to interfere with the order of detention. ( 6 ) ARTICLE 22 (5) of the Constitution confers two rights upon the detenue whose liberty has been deprived of. ( 6 ) ARTICLE 22 (5) of the Constitution confers two rights upon the detenue whose liberty has been deprived of. The first part of clause (5) of that article gives a right to the detained person to be furnished with the grounds on which the order has been made. The second right given to such a person is of being afforded the earliest opportunity if making a representation against the order. It is obvious that the grounds for making the order as mentioned above are the grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to made the order. These grounds must therefore be in existence when the order is made. But the question whether such grounds can give rise to the satisfaction required for making the order is as observed above beyond the scope of the inquiry under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the other hand the question whether the vagueness or indefiniteness of the statement furnished to the detained person is such as to deprive or preclude him of the earliest opportunity to make a representation to the authority is a matter within the jurisdiction of the High Court and subject to the decision of the High Court. As observed in State of Bombay vs. Atma Ram A. I. R. 1951 Bom. 157 the conferment of the right to make a representation necessarily carries with it the obligation on the part of the detaining authority to furnish grounds and the right given to the detained persons to have an earliest opportunity to make the representation. The test to be applied in respect of the contents of the grounds for the two purposes is quite different. For the first the test is whether it is sufficient to satisfy the authority and for the second the test is whether it is sufficient to enable the detained person to make the representation at the earliest opportunity. In order therefore to challenge the order of detention on the ground that the ground furnished to the detained person are vague of indefinite it would be necessary for the detenue to show that the vagueness or the indefiniteness of the grounds furnished to him either embarrassed him or affected his right of making an effective representation to the authority concerned. ( 7 ) IT was suggested by Mr. ( 7 ) IT was suggested by Mr. Barot in the course of his arguments that the order of detention passed against the petitioner was also bad on the ground that it was made mala fide. As we have said the High Court cannot enter into the question whether the statements made in the grounds were true or not. The High Court however has the jurisdiction to go into the question whether the order was made mala fide. Where the detenue alleges that the order is made mala fide the burden of establishing the mala fides is upon him. The facts proved by the petitioner must amount to proof of mala fides. If the High Court however is satisfied that the order in question is passed in conformity with the provisions of the Act and is not outside the scope or the object and purpose of the Act no question of mala fide would arise. In other words it must mean that it is not in abuse or fraud of the powers conferred on the authority concerned by the Legislature. (See Dayanand Modi vs. The State of Bihar A. I. R. 1951 Patna 47 ). Petition Dismissed .