JUDGMENT Bhargava, J. 1. This is a Plaintiff's appeal arising out of the petition made to the Additional District Judge, Betul, for judicial separation under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the 'Act'). 2. The petition is grounded on two incidents of cruelty alleged to have taken place in the year 1950 and 1955 with a further averment that the Defendant-Respondent persisted in various acts of beating the Plaintiff during the course of her stay with him. Details of the two incidents are given by the Plaintiff as under: (i) That in the year 1950 when the Appellant and cooked rice, the Respondent on the allegation that it was not properly cooked, pierced a hot Koncha (an edged instrument used for cooking) into her both the legs and when the injuries started bleeding, chillies were put in the injured pans. She suffered from those injuries for six months at her father's house. (ii) That on assurances of good behaviour being given by the brother of her husband to the Panchas of the village, she returned to reside with the Respondent and lived with him for about 4 years. Then in the year 1955 on the false allegation that she had sold some pulses belonging to the Respondent, she was kicked and beaten by him, the result being that one of her fingers was fractured. On these allegations, the Appellant desired judicial separation expressing grave apprehension with regard to her safety in living with the Respondent. 3. The Respondent denied these acts of cruelty imputed to him and offered to keep the Appellant happily with him. 4. The lower Court did not record a very clear finding with regard to the incident of the year 1950, but took the view that it must be taken to have been condoned because after the alleged incident, the parties lived together for about four years and the incident was forgiven and forgotten. With regard to the second incident of the year 1955, the lower Court found the Plaintiff's version to be correct but did not take a serious view of the injury and treated it as an isolated act which did not entitle her to ask for judicial separation. With regard to the general allegation that the Respondent used to beat the Appellant, no express finding was recorded by the lower Court. With regard to the general allegation that the Respondent used to beat the Appellant, no express finding was recorded by the lower Court. It came to the conclusion that the Petitioner was not entitled to judicial separation and, therefore, dismissed the petition. Hence, this appeal. 5. The main contention of Shri J.V. Jakatdar, learned Counsel for the Appellant, before us is that the lower Court erred in concluding that 'cruelly' within the meaning of Section 10(b) of the Act was not established. He further urged that the issue No. (1) as cast by the lower Court placed on the Plaintiff heavier burden than was contemplated by law by incorporating the words "inhuman cruelty" instead of the words 'cruelty' in that issue. He also stressed that the lower Court was wrong in raising the plea of condonation and deciding the case on that basis when no such plea was taken in the written statement. 6. Shri Y.S. Dharmadhikari on behalf of the Respondent urged that the findings of the lower Court holding that the injuries, stated above, were caused in the year 1950 and 1955 by the Respondent, were incorrect. His further contention was that even though the plea of condonation was not expressly raised, it was the duty of the Court under Section 23 of the Act to see that any of the grounds for granting relief existed and the Petitioner was not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief. It was pointed out that this duty was there according to the language of Section 23 of the Act whether the proceedings were contentious or not. It was further urged that the cause of action was alleged in the petition to be of the year 1955 and the petition was filed on 1-1-1958. Due to this delay in filing the petition, it was contended that the Petitioner was not entitled to any relief. 7. It would be convenient to take up the ground of delay first. It has been urgued on behalf of the Respondent that the last specific act of cruelty that is alleged is of the year 1955 and the petition was filed in the month of January 1958. 7. It would be convenient to take up the ground of delay first. It has been urgued on behalf of the Respondent that the last specific act of cruelty that is alleged is of the year 1955 and the petition was filed in the month of January 1958. It has been emphasized by him that under Section 23(b) of the Act, if there has been unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceedings, this itself constitutes a ground not to give relief. It is true that unreasonable delay in presenting the petition for divorce or judicial separation constitutes bar to the giving of relief under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act but before the relief can be denied, the delay must be shown to be unnecessary or improper. In other words, it ought to be shown that the delay was culpable. In the written statement, no objection was raised with regard to the delay being unnecessary or improper. No questions were put to the Petitioner to explain the same. There may be various reasons due to which the Petitioner might have been required to delay the commencement of the proceedings. There are decided cases which show that the Petitioner's want of means and the poverty of the Petitioner would not be regarded as unnecessary or improper delay. Unwillingness to involve the members of the family in family difficulties; regard for their feelings; consideration of the honour and prestige of the family; fear of scandal and desire to avoid a final break-up if possible; reasonable hope of reconciliation are some of the factors which may properly be taken into consideration by the Court when they are relied upon for purposes of showing that the delay was not unnecessary or improper. The question of delay cannot be decided in abstract. It has to be decided with reference to the existing facts and circumstances, as those facts and circumstances have not been examined at all in the instant case due to the want of plea of Respondent in this behalf. We are, therefore, of the view that the point of delay cannot be stressed too much in this case and merely on the ground of delay which we are unable to find to be unnecessary or improper, relief to the Petitioner be refused if she is entitled to such relief on merits. 8. We are, therefore, of the view that the point of delay cannot be stressed too much in this case and merely on the ground of delay which we are unable to find to be unnecessary or improper, relief to the Petitioner be refused if she is entitled to such relief on merits. 8. As regards the question of condonation; the learned lower Court came to the conclusion that the incident of 1950, referred to above, was condoned by the Petitioner because she voluntarily resumed cohabitation with the Respondent afterwards and admittedly lived with him for a period of about four years. It is true that the plea of condonation was not pressed in the written statement. It is also correct that no questions were put to the Petitioner or any other witness examined on her behalf in this connection. As to whether an act was condoned or not is essentially a question of fact. In the absence of proper questions being put to the Petitioner, it is difficult to come to a definite finding on this plea but so far as the instant case is concerned, we are assuming the condonation as pleaded by the Respondent and would examine the facts on that basis. 9. The doctrine of condonation in substance rules that a petition for judicial separation founded on cruelty shall be dismissed unless the Court is satisfied that the Petitioner has not in any manner condoned the act. The general accepted meaning of this term is "forgiveness and reinstatement with knowledge of all material facts", but it is recognized that condonation is always coupled with an implied condition of the offending spouse being in future of good behaviour. To quote the observations of Lord Simon in the case of Henderson v. Henderson (1949) A.C. 49 - It is clearly established that this forgiveness is conditional-conditional on the condoned spouse thereafter fulfilling in all respects the obligations of marriage so that if any matrimonial offence is afterwards committed by him or her-whether or not the same as that condoned and whether or not in itself a ground for divorce or judicial separation-the condonation ceases to have effect. The offence condoned and all its consequences are for all purposes revived It is this characteristic of revival of the condoned offence which invited the observation that the expression 'forgiveness' is misleading as an interpretation of condonation (sic) it is only conditional and that the real import of condonation is a conditional waiver of the right of the injured spouse to take matrimonial proceedings... The necessary legal implication, therefore, is that if any matrimonial offence is afterwards committed, the condonation ceases to have effect. In Mulla's book on Hindu Law (12th edn.) at page 884 under the heading 'Revival of Matrimonial Offence', it has been observed: The phrase "matrimonial offence" used in this context in relation to the future conduct of the condoned spouse is not to be understood as a statutory expression but merely as one used compendiously to include any violation of the obligations of marriage though mostly the future acts complained of are of the nature of adultery, cruelty or desertion. It is not necessary, therefore, that this subsequent matrimonial offence need be such as would of itself give adequate ground for divorce or judical separation. Thus for instance where the condoned offence was adultery it will not be incumbent on the forgiving spouse to establish an act or acts of adultery but proof of gross misconduct falling short of adultery will suffice. And commission by the condoned spouse of a matrimonial offence less than legal cruelty will be sufficient to condone adultery if the conduct complained of is such as, if persisted in, will make married life together impossible. Language is to be met with that even slight acts of matrimonial wrong doing by the condoned spouse may be sufficient to revive the condoned offence and that of the more serious the original offence the less grave need be the subsequent matters. These statements are, of course, unexceptionable but they must be understood in their proper context and as giving no more than a comperative idea of the matter. A good deal less may be sufficient but the matter must be approached with great care and caution. These statements are, of course, unexceptionable but they must be understood in their proper context and as giving no more than a comperative idea of the matter. A good deal less may be sufficient but the matter must be approached with great care and caution. In case, for instance, of condoned cruelty of a serious nature, when the law speaks of condonation and revival, it means that the offence is condoned on the condition that there shall be in future a proper compliance with the matrimonial decencies and duties, and a person who goes back to live with his or her spouse goes back on that implied condition alone...... The result is that the mere fact that the incident of 1950 was condonded would not entitle the Respondent to misbehave subsequently in the year 1955 or on any other occasion and if he is proved to have done so, the condonation loses all its effect and the previous act would be revived. 10. Then remains the important question as to whether the acts of cruelty that are alleged, have been proved or not, and if proved, whether they are of sufficient magnitude to entitle the Petitioner to the relief prayed for. 11. The Petitioner has examined herself as A. W. 2. She has deposed in details with regard to both the incidents of the years 1950 and 1955 in paragraphs 1 to 3 of her statement. In para 4, she had clearly expressed her intention that she would not like to go to her husband because if she went there, he would kill her. With regard to the second incident, she is corroborated by the evidence of her uncle Bhimrao (A. W. 3) and Rama (A. W. 4), her father. With regard to the second incident, corroborative evidence has been furnished by Namved (A.W. 1) who had seen the injury on the finger of the Petitioner at the instance of her father, Rama, and Jairam (A. W. 5). Jairam has deposed that Petitioner had told him that she was beaten by her husband and had desired him to convey to her father Rama, this fact and accordingly, he stated the fact to her father, Rama has corroborated this testimony and said that on learning from him, he had gone to the house of the Respondent and brought his daughter, that is, the Petitioner back. Nandlal (A. W.-7) is an important witness. He used to supply milk to the Respondent at the relevant time in 1955. He has deposed that he had heard the cries of the Petitioner and had seen the Respondent beating her when she lay on the ground. Bhadu (A.W.6) has given evidence on this point that the Respondent had gone to Umraoti village to fetch his wife, the Petitioner, but she was not sent with him. Afterwards the Respondent's brother Shanker went to fetch her and she was sent with him. She was so sent because the residents of the village suggested that she should be sent and Shanker, the brother of the Respondent, had stated that he would see that there as no repetition of those things subsequently. This incident, he deposed, took place about 3 or 4 years before the data of his deposition (His statement was recorded in Court on 1-9-1958). This was precisely the story of reconciliation which is stated by the Petitioner, her uncle and father. 12. With regard to the testimony of witnesses about the first incident, the comment of Shri Dharmadhikari is that no independent witness has been produced and, therefore, it cannot be held that the incident was satisfactorily proved, the standard of proof in all cases pertaining to matrimonial offences being a very strict standard of proof. With regard to the second incident, he has commented the evidence produced by the Petitioner as being unreliable because in some details there is inconsistency between the testimony of the Petitioner, herself and her father, Rama, and other witnesses. 13. On behalf of the Respondent, in all five witnesses have been examined including the Respondent himself. The evidence adduced by the Respondent is of a negative nature. All these witnesses have come forward to state that the Petitioner was living happily at the house of the Respondent and there were no instances of mar pit. The denial of the Respondent in the witness-box loses all its force when it is seen that he admitted that one of the fingers of the Petitioner was not straight. He has, however, explained this fact by saying that the finger was in the same condition even before the marriage. It is pertinent to note that the injury to the finger was clearly specified in her petition by the Petitioner. The Respondent contended himself by merely denying it. He has, however, explained this fact by saying that the finger was in the same condition even before the marriage. It is pertinent to note that the injury to the finger was clearly specified in her petition by the Petitioner. The Respondent contended himself by merely denying it. He did not then suggest that the injury was not a fresh one having been caused in the year 1955 but existed from the "period much anterior to this. The conduct of the Respondent points out that the relations between him and the Petitioner were strained. He has admitted in cross-examination that the Petitioner was not sent with him when he went to fetch her from his father-in-law's place. He was then required to send his brother Shanker with whom she was sent subsequently. The lower Court also did not believe the denial of the Respondent in the witness-box. 14. The standard of proof in a case of matrimonial offence of cruelty is required to be very clear and satisfactory and the evidence must preponderate in favour of the Petitioner. This is what is indicated by applying the strict test of proof to evidence adduced in such cases. Applying this test and considering all the circumstances of the case we are of the view that both the incidents alleged by the Petitioner are proved and there is nothing to disbelieve her statement when she further says that she was mal-treated and beaten on many occasions when she was living with her husband. The evidence furnished by the Respondent's witnesses is of a negative character. The evidence of the Petitioner's witnesses is borne out from the natural probabilities and circumstances of the case. There is no reason to disbelieve the statements of the father and uncle of the Petitioner, with regard to the first incident, mainly on the ground of their relationship. They were the persons who in the natural course of things would be best able to know as to how was the Petitioner treated by the Respondent. It would be significant to note that the name of the vaidya who treated the Petitioner after the incident of the year 1950 was brought out in cross-examination by the Respondent but he was not called to contradict what was established by the other evidence. It would be significant to note that the name of the vaidya who treated the Petitioner after the incident of the year 1950 was brought out in cross-examination by the Respondent but he was not called to contradict what was established by the other evidence. The incident of the year 1955 is proved by the testimony of independent witnesses also apart from the statement of the Petitioner herself and her father and uncle. 15. The last question that remains to be answered is as to whether the incidents of 1950 and 1955 amount to 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 10(b) of the act, and are sufficient to entitle the Petitioner to relief. The accepted legal meaning of the expression "cruelty" in England and India, which is rather difficult to define, has been "conduct of such a Character as to have caused danger to life, limb or health (bodily or mental) or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger". (See Russell v. Russell 1897 A. C. 395, and Foster v. Foster (1928) Oudh 114, and Kallen v. Kallen A.I.R. 1933 Lah 728. Section 10(b) of the Act prescribes a criterion or test which emphasizes that the treatment which amounts to cruelty must be such as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the injured spouse that continued living with the other spouse will be harmful or injurious. Without attempting to define 'cruelty' this clause in effect lays down that to amount to cruelty there must be such wilful treatment of the Petitioner which causes suffering in body or mind either as an actual fact or by way of apprehension in such a manner as to render the continued living together of spouses harmful or injurious having regard to the circumstances of each case. Even a single act of violence may be such a grievious nature as by itself to satisfy the test of cruelty. On the other hand, isolated act of assault committed at the spur of the moment and on some real or fancied provocation may not amount to cruel treatment. Vide G.C. Foster v. A.B. Foster A.I.R. 1928 Oudh 114. The correct test would be not to view these assaults as isolated facts but they should be noticed in proper setting. Due allowance has to be made for the ordinary habits, education and the standard of living of the parties concerned. Vide G.C. Foster v. A.B. Foster A.I.R. 1928 Oudh 114. The correct test would be not to view these assaults as isolated facts but they should be noticed in proper setting. Due allowance has to be made for the ordinary habits, education and the standard of living of the parties concerned. It may be that as a general rule a single act of physical violence could not be sufficient to meet the test but coupled with other minor acts of cruelty it may be sufficient to invite a conclusion of cruelty. Similarly, particular acts in themselves may not be enough to warrant a conclusion of violence but cumulatively they may have the effect of establishing the degree of apprehended harm or injury that is required by the clause. Conduct constituting cruelty must be such that it can be said to have been calculatedly directed to harm the petitioning spouse. As has been observed in Mulla's Hindu Law, the Court has to take into account the ordinary weaknesses and failings and shortcomings as well as the strength of human nature and the test laid down in this clause cannot be satisfied unless grave and substantial causes are shown. 16. Applying this test to the facts of this case, it would be seen that the incidents on which the petition is grounded are, to say the least, of a serious nature. In the first incident, a sharp edged instrument was repeatedly used to infect injuries from which the Petitioner suffered for about six months. This act, as we have already said, should be deemed to have been condoned when the Petitioner went to live with the Respondent on persuation of Shanker, the brother of the Respondent, and the panchas of the village but again in the year 1955, the beating which was given to her resulted in causing a grave injury to her finger. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there is no reasonable apprehension of the life, limb or health due to the wilful action of the Respondent. Having laced these ordeals before if, the Petitioner now apprehends the same or graver type of trouble in future she cannot be held to be wrong and her fears cannot be held to be unjustified. 17. The claim for maintenance pendente lite made in the application by the Petitioner was expressly given up by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Having laced these ordeals before if, the Petitioner now apprehends the same or graver type of trouble in future she cannot be held to be wrong and her fears cannot be held to be unjustified. 17. The claim for maintenance pendente lite made in the application by the Petitioner was expressly given up by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider this part of the claim. 18. The result is that the appeal succeeds. The order passed by the lower Court is set aside. Instead, a decree for judicial separation as prayed for in the petition is passed in favour of the Petitioner and against the Respondent. Considering the entire circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs as incurred.