ORDER These two revisions by Bhanwarlal and Laxmansingh are directed against the same judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Bikaner dated 30th September, 1958 convicting both of them under section 304-A I. P. C. and sentencing them to 1 3/4 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 501/-each in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months and under S. 337 I. P. C. to three months rigorous imprisonment. Both the sentences are to run concurrently. 2. The case relates to a highway collision which took place on 18th November, 1956 at about 9 A. M. on the Gajner road at a distance of 8 miles from Kolayat and 24 miles from Bikaner between Bus No. RJZ 59 driven by Bhanwarlal and RJF 163 driven by Laxmansingh. It appears that Bus No. RJZ 59 was going from Bikaner to Kolayat and the other Bus No. RJF 163 was going from Kolayat to Bikaner and while they were passing each other their bodies collided and the impact was so strong that a number of persons travelling by these buses died and received grievous injuries. In Bus No. RJZ 59 one person died and four received simple injuries. In Bus No. RJF 163 three persons died on the spot, one more died in the hospital on the night of the accident and four persons received grievous as well as simple injuries. After the accident Bus No. RJZ 59 stopped at a distance of 165 paces and RJF 163 at a distance of 35 paces. The width of the road where the accident took place is 24'. Near the place of the accident there is a culvert where the width of the road is only 21'. The mechanical examination of these buses revealed that both hand and foot brakes of Bus No. RJZ 59 were not in working order while the foot brake of Bus No. RJF 163 was out of order. Finding of the courts below is that both of them were driving the buses at a fast speed and lost control of the vehicles they were driving which resulted in this accident. 3. Learned counsel appearing for Bhanwarlal took exception to a common judgment having been delivered by the learned Sessions Judge. Finding of the courts below is that both of them were driving the buses at a fast speed and lost control of the vehicles they were driving which resulted in this accident. 3. Learned counsel appearing for Bhanwarlal took exception to a common judgment having been delivered by the learned Sessions Judge. His objection was that the learned Sessions Judge did not go through the record of his case at all and based his findings on the evidence recorded in the other case i.e., of Laxmansingh. He has pointed out that the learned Judge's observations that none of the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined was not correct in his case. This criticism appears to be true and therefore instead of sending the case back, I have allowed him to place the entire evidence before me. On going through it, I find that no prejudice has been caused to him by a common decision of the case by the learned Sessions Judge. In fact the evidence in both cases was of the same persons. 4. On the merits of the case learned counsel for Bhanwarlal urged that the finding of the courts below that the petitioner was driving the bus at a fast speed is not correct and the prosecution has failed to prove that the accident was due to any rash and negligent act of the petitioner. According to him it was only a case of error of judgment inasmuch as the petitioner honestly believed that he will pass by the other bus and in fact one third part of the bus i.e., upto the seat of the driver went through and it is only the part in the rear of the driver's seat that hit against the side of the other bus. In this connection he has relied upon In Re, Ganesan, AIR 1950 Mad 71 ; H. W. Smith v. Emperor, AIR 1926 Cal 300; Kanji Juma Khoja v. Emperor, AIR 1938 Sind 100; Ram Sewak v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Oudh 391; Emperor v. Akbar Ali, AIR 1936 Oudh 400; Chamman Lal v. The State, AIR 1954 All 186 and State Government, M. P. v. Bhawanesh Kumar, AIR 1958 Madh-Pra 205. Charlesworth in his book on the Law of Negligence, Second Edition has quoted the well known definition of negligence as given by Alderson, B.- "Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do". In Halsburry's Laws of England Third Edition Volume 28 what constitutes negligence has been thus analysed : "Negligence is a specific tort and in any given circumstances is the failure to exercise that care which the circumstances demand. What amounts to negligence depends on the facts of each particular case and the categories of negligence are never closed. It may consist in omitting to do something which ought to be done or in doing something which ought to be done either in a different manner or not at all. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which can be reasonably foreseen to be likely to cause physical injury to persons or property. The degree of care required in the particular case depends on the accompanying circumstances, and may vary according to the amount of the risk to be encountered and to the magnitude of the prospective injury." The degree of rashness and negligence on the part of the accused required to be proved in criminal cases should be of such a nature that an inference about the commission of a crime may be safely made against him. Simple lack of care which may give rise to civil liability will not be enough for the purposes of establishing the guilt of the accused under S. 304-A. In the case of In re, Nidamarti Nagabhushanam, 7 Mad HC 119 Holloway, J., said : "Culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal consequences may follow, but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening; the imputability arises from acting despite the consciousness. Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him, and that, if he had, he would have had the consciousness." The imputability arises from the neglect of the civil duty of circumspection". Straight, J., in Empress of India v. Idu Beg, ILR 3 All 776 observed as follows : "Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury, but without the intention to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted." 5. Whether the accused in a particular case acted rashly and negligently will depend upon the facts of that particular case. Therefore, the cases relied upon by the learned counsel do not lend much assistance in the decision of the case in hand as they have been decided on their own facts. The mere fact that an accident has taken place or that some lives have been lost or some persons have received injuries will not lead to any presumption of rash or negligent act on the part of the driver but will have to be established like any other fact. In this case the facts which are established on record are that the road where the accident took place was 24' wide, 12' of this road was tarred while the remaining was metalled. It has been proved that at the time of the accident RJZ 59 was 7' on the tarred road and bus No. RJF 163 5' on the tarred road. It is also evident that while these buses passed each other the space between the two was so small that a slight deviation caused this accident. It is also proved that both the hand and foot brakes of the bus driven by Bhanwarlal were out of order. It is also evident that while these buses passed each other the space between the two was so small that a slight deviation caused this accident. It is also proved that both the hand and foot brakes of the bus driven by Bhanwarlal were out of order. It is further proved that after the accident this bus stopped at a distance of 165 paces from the place of accident. Though it may be true that the prosecution evidence with regard to the speed of the bus may only be an estimate of the witnesses yet the fact that it stopped at a distance of 165 paces after the accident shows that the speed before the accident was excessive. It is not the case of the accused that after the accident he had accelarated the speed to run away from the place of the accident. It can therefore, be safely inferred that the speed of buses before and after the accident was the same. It is also proved that there was a little slope towards Kolayat where RJZ 59 was going. When two buses are approaching each other from opposite directions, it is the duty of the drivers to observe the rule of the road and to keep to his side of the road leaving sufficient space for the other to pass by safely. If they instead drive the buses in the middle of the road and do not deflect their course even on seeing the approaching bus from the opposite direction they would certainly be acting negligently because there is always a danger of the buses swerving a little on either side. In Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 28, Third Edition it has been stated at page 66 that : "Drivers of vehicles or riders should keep well to the left side of the highway unless they are about to overtake another vehicle or to turn to the right. In Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 28, Third Edition it has been stated at page 66 that : "Drivers of vehicles or riders should keep well to the left side of the highway unless they are about to overtake another vehicle or to turn to the right. If two motor vehicles collide in the centre of the road, the inference is, in the absence of evidence enabling the court to draw any other conclusion, that the drivers of both were equally to blame, and it is not a proper decision to hold that, in the absence of evidence enabling the blame to be fixed upon one driver or the other, no sufficient case has been established against either." In Charlesworth's Law of Negligence at page 76 it is stated that : "the rule of the road is that if two vehicles are approaching each other from opposite directions each must go on the left or near side of the road for the purpose of allowing the other to pass. Failure to observe this rule is prima facie evidence of negligence." It is evident that Bhanwarlal petitioner was driving on the wrong side of the centre of the road. The road was straight where the accident took place and he must have seen the approaching bus from the opposite direction and on seeing it he should have drawn in to the left side of the road. If he did not do so and continued driving the bus in the center of the road he was acting in a manner which a prudent driver would not do. He did not even slow down the bus when it was nearing the other Bus. He should have driven the bus at a slow speed and if the situation so required, should have even stopped the bus specially when both the brakes of the bus were not working in order to avoid risk of a collision. Driving a bus when both its brakes are out of order is itself a negligent act. It is the duty of the drivers to drive their vehicles in such a way that the lives of its occupants are not aposed to danger. They should drive the vehicles at such a speed that they may be able to pull up at the time of emergency. It is the duty of the drivers to drive their vehicles in such a way that the lives of its occupants are not aposed to danger. They should drive the vehicles at such a speed that they may be able to pull up at the time of emergency. In my opinion this is a case where the petitioner not only failed to take the necessary precautions which the circumstances of the case required but acted rashly and negligently in driving the bus with defective brakes at a fast speed on the wrong side of the centre of road when another bus was approaching it from the opposite direction and not keeping to his left side and thus running the risk of colliding with the other bus. By his rash and negligent act he was exposing the occupants of the bus to a great danger. No different conclusion can be reached on these facts. The conviction of the petitioner under Sec. 304-A and Sec. 337, I. P. C. is correct. But in view of the heavy amount of fine imposed, sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 501/-under section 304-A will meet the ends of justice. Sentence under Sec. 337, I. P. C. is maintained. ? the sentences are to run concurrently. REVISION NO. 5 OF 1960 (LAXMANSINGH V. STATE). 6. As regards Laxmansingh petitioner it is proved that his bus was 5' on the tarred road. He must have seen the bus approaching from the apposite direction as the road was straight. On seeing the approaching bus it was his duty to have kept the bus on the left side of the road; but he continued driving it in the centre of the road. It earlier appears that after the accident his bus stopped at a distance of 35 paces although it was in the climb. It is also proved that the foot brake of his was out of order. It may be true that he was not on the wrong side of the centre of the road, but he must have seen that the bus coming from the opposite direction was on the wrong side of the centre of the road. In these circumstances he should not have persisted in his course and should have deflected his bus to the left side so that the chances of collision could have been eliminated. In these circumstances he should not have persisted in his course and should have deflected his bus to the left side so that the chances of collision could have been eliminated. As observed in the case of Bhanwarlal's revision there was a failure on his part to observe the rule of the road and that is prima facie evidence of negligence. There is no doubt that the accident took place due to his rash and negligent driving but the degree of negligence and rashness in his case is not so high as in the case of Bhanwarlal. His conviction under section 304-A and Sec. 337 is therefore, correct; but having regard to the circumstances of the case a sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 501/- under Sec. 304-A will meet the ends of justice. Sentence under Sec. 337 is maintained. Both sentences are to run concurrently. 7. The result therefore, is that Bhanwarlal's revision is partly allowed, his conviction under section 304-A and Sec. 337, I. P. C. is maintained but his sentence under Sec. 304-A is reduced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 501/-in default to undergo three months further rigorous imprisonment. Sentence under Sec. 337 is maintained. Both sentences are to run concurrently. Laxmansingh's revision is partly allowed. His conviction under Sec. 304-A I. P. C. is maintained but his sentence under this section is reduced to six mouths rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 501/- in default to undergo three months further rigorous imprisonment. Conviction and sentence under Sec. 337, I. P. C. is maintained. Both sentences will run concurrently. The petitioners are on bail and they shall surrender to it.