ORDER H.R. Krishnan, J. This is an application in revision under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, filed by the tenant from the appellate order of the District Court, itself setting aside the order of the Rent Controller fixing as fair rent under section 9 of the Accommodation Control Act, a sum less than the rent which the petitioner had contracted to pay the landlord. The questions for decision here are, first, whether the application in revision lies at all, in other words, whether the "Court of the District Judge" mentioned in section 12 of the Accommodation Control Act, is the same as the District Court mentioned in the Civil Procedure Code, this being only an additional power given to it under the new statute, or if it is a separate Court or authority outside the Civil Procedure Code, and as such not directly subordinate to the High Court; secondly, whether the appellate Court had jurisdiction to refuse to consider the prayer itself for fair rent on the ground that in the rent agreement, the tenant had written that he himself considered the rate to be proper and legal: thirdly, whether the appellate Court's consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties is self-contained and complete or if it is only half hearted and coloured by its decision that the suit should be dismissed because of the tenant's own agreement. The facts of the case are simple. The petitioner is the tenant in a house owned by the opposite party and had actually contracted to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 24-10-0. There was the usual kirayanama or a rent paper in which he states- I enquired and found that the rent of Rs. 24-10-0 is lawful and proper in accordance with the law of Samvat year 2006. Accordingly, I agree to pay this rent and I would not question it any more...... All the same, he went to the Rent Controller with a suit under section 9 of the Accommodation Control Act for the fixation of fair rent which, he now suggested, should be Rs. 8-8-0 because the rent on 1-1-1911 was Rs. 5 per month. After due enquiry, the Rent Controller disposed of the suit with a decision that the fair rent should be Rs. 10-4-0. 8-8-0 because the rent on 1-1-1911 was Rs. 5 per month. After due enquiry, the Rent Controller disposed of the suit with a decision that the fair rent should be Rs. 10-4-0. From that the landlord-opposite party went up in appeal questioning the competency of the suit, in face of the petitioner's own admission in the Kirayanama, and further suggesting on the merits also, that the notional rent on 1-1-1951 was Rs. 15 which with 70 per cent, increase would come up something more than Rs. 24-10-0. The learned appellate Court, who was no other than the Court of the District Judge, held that the admission, already quoted, disentitled the tenant from questioning the rent. It also considered certain parts of the evidence in a manner which will be described presently. It held that the order of the Rent Controller was not correct, and dismissed the tenant's suit. From this the tenant has come up in revision on the assumption that the Court of the District Judge hearing appeals under section 12 of the Accommodation Control Act, is no other than the Court of the District Judge mentioned in Civil Procedure Code; secondly, he urges that the admission in kirayanama is no bar to his questioning the fairness of the agreed rent, the purpose of the Act being to protect the tenant from entering into such contracts in their pressing need for accommodation. Thirdly, he urges that the appellate Court's consideration of the evidence is offhand and incomplete as he has not even referred to the plaintiff's (petitioner's) evidence: this is also coloured by the findings he has already reached in regard to the effect of the admission. This Court being incompetent to consider the facts in course of a revision application, the prayer is that the case might be remanded with a direction that the appellate Court should examine the merits free from any prepossessions regarding the effect of the admissions in the Kirayanama. The landlord-opposite party, has for his part, urged firstly that the Court of the District Judge hearing appeals under section 12 of the Act is not a Court subordinate to the High Court, but a separate tribunal created by statute; so, no application in revision would lie. The landlord-opposite party, has for his part, urged firstly that the Court of the District Judge hearing appeals under section 12 of the Act is not a Court subordinate to the High Court, but a separate tribunal created by statute; so, no application in revision would lie. It may be that an application under Article 227 lies, but then other considerations would arise, and, in any event, the present application is not one under that Article. Secondly, the reply is that the Act confers certain benefits solely for the protection of the tenant there being no public policy behind it. So it was open to the tenant to contract himself out of the benefit, and once he had done so, he could not change his mind and go to the Rent Controller. Thirdly, it is argued that the appellate Court's analysis of the facts is complete and independent of the finding in regard to "the admission. These findings are that of fact and cannot be challenged within revision. The first question is of general importance. Nowadays there are a number of statutes creating independent tribunals for this or that purpose, which are not civil Courts directly subordinate to the High Court. Appeals are often provided from the order of the statutory tribunals or authorities, "to the Court of the District Judge", or "some such Court or Judge". Those laws also have provisions that the statutory tribunal would, for certain specified purposes, have the same power as the civil Court in the Code of Civil Procedure, implying thereby that for other purposes they are not governed by the Civil Procedure Code. Out of such Acts, two will be mentioned in the present judgment-the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act and the Madhya Bharat Payment of Wages Act, which is not other than the Payment of Wages Act of 1936 with a few amendments of no bearing on the present question. In the Madhya Bharat High Court, there were some conflicting rulings but recently a single Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 486 of 1957 decided on 2-12-1958, held that "the Court of the District Judge" hearing appeals under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court and as such subject to revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 12 of the M.B. Accommodation Control Act is similar, and can properly be considered to have similar effect. It is urged, however, on behalf of the opposite party-landlord that while section 12 of the Accommodation Control Act provides that the appellate decision was to be final, section 17 does not say so in be many words. There are two reasons why I do not find any force in this argument. Firstly, both section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act and section 12 of the Accommodation Control Act, provide in effect that the appellate Court's order shall be "final". Section 12 says so, while section 17(2) indicates this: ............save as provided in sub-section (1), (i.e. appellate provision) any direction by the authority, shall be final. Secondly, the mention of the word "final" in any section dealing with an appeal, does not exclude the revisional powers of the superior Court if it is otherwise competent. All that it excludes is, further appeal or other occasion to reagitate the question as of right by the aggrieved party. A revisional power being discretionary, is not incompatible with a provision in statute that the order sought to be revised will be final. Thus in all cases where the statute creates a special tribunal or authority and provides that appeals from that authority shall lie to the Court of the District Judge, it would be proper to assume that the latter is no other than the District Judge's Court under the Code of Civil Procedure and as such subordinate to the High Court unless there is something in the enactment itself to the contrary. The ruling Kiron Chandra v. Kalidas Chatterji AIR 1943 Cal 247 though cited by the non-applicant as being against this view, really supports it most effectively. In the Bengal Act (unlike in the M.B. Accommodation Control Act) the appeal lies to "the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court of Calcutta or to the District Judge". Here it is to "the Court of the District Judge": When a statute provides that a particular matter shall be determined by a Court and not by an individual Judge, the officer presiding over the Court must be deemed to exercise his jurisdiction as a Court and not as person designate. But in view of the wording of the para. Here it is to "the Court of the District Judge": When a statute provides that a particular matter shall be determined by a Court and not by an individual Judge, the officer presiding over the Court must be deemed to exercise his jurisdiction as a Court and not as person designate. But in view of the wording of the para. 12 of the Bengal House Rent Control Order, The District Judge in exercising the powers under para. 19, Bengal House Rent Control Order, does not act as a Court and consequently his orders are not revisable by the High Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. In this connection, the ruling reported in National Sewing Thread Co., Ltd. v. James Chandwick and Bros., Ltd. AIR 1953 SC 357 also throws light. Under section 75 of the Trade Marks Act of 1940, the High Court is empowered to hear appeals from the orders of the Registrar of Trade Marks. The question arose whether an order by the High Court in appeal would be subject to the provisions of the Letters Patent just like the orders and judgments of the High Court under the general law. It was held to be so, as there was nothing in that statute debarring the High Court from hearing appeals under section 76 according to rules under which all other appeals are heard, or from framing rules for the exercise of that jurisdiction in the usual manner. Similarly there is nothing in the M.B. Accommodation Control Act or as for that matter, in the Payment of Wages Act, indicating that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of the District Judge is to be exercised in a manner different from its appellate jurisdiction in the Code of Civil Procedure. I, therefore, conclude that the District Judge hearing appeals under section 12 of the Accommodation Act is subordinate to the High Court, and as such subject to revisional jurisdiction under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. The primary basis of the appellate decision is that the tenant having himself stated that he had considered the matter and had found that the rent he was agreeing to, was in accordance with the Accommodation Control Act, he had debarred himself from seeking the assistance of the Rent Controller under section 9. The primary basis of the appellate decision is that the tenant having himself stated that he had considered the matter and had found that the rent he was agreeing to, was in accordance with the Accommodation Control Act, he had debarred himself from seeking the assistance of the Rent Controller under section 9. Two rulings respectively, S. Raja Chetty v. Jagannathdas AIR 1950 Mad 284 and T.K. Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, Quillon District Court AIR 1953 TC 205 has also been cited. The view taken by the learned appellate Court is far-reaching and calls for a detailed examination. In principle, these two rulings are undoubtedly correct. When a protection is for the benefit of a party, and there are no implications of a public policy, it can certainly waive it. In the Madras case, for example, the landlord, who was entitled to take certain steps against the tenant after default for one month, agreed to take those steps after two months. In the Travancore-Cochin case, the tenant agreed that on the termination of a period, the landlord, who was the Receiver of Court, could proceed straightway. The latter is of no significance anyway, because the principle of notice in such cases is both under the Transfer of Property Act and on general principles of equity and good conscience, not absolute but subject to contract. The point to note is that there is not a single authority placed where a tenant having contracted himself out of the benefit given by the statute in his favour, was prevented from seeking it at a later stage. The accommodation control laws, which are generally analogous to the moneylending and interest laws, are based upon two principles. Firstly, that the landlord (and the moneylender, as the case may be), is by the very nature of things, is in a position to dominate the will and the interest of the tenant (and the borrower) who is under hard pressure; secondly, that in public policy the operation of a laissez faire should be restricted in favour of the tenant (and the borrower). It is not for this Court to decide whether the basic principles are sound, and the policy is really for the benefit of the public as whole; that is within the province of the Legislature. It is not for this Court to decide whether the basic principles are sound, and the policy is really for the benefit of the public as whole; that is within the province of the Legislature. The result is that it is necessary to protect the tenant (and the borrower) from his own choice and contract; simply by writing that he has considered the matter and has found that the rent (or the rate of interest) is proper and legal, he cannot put himself outside the protection of the statute, which is based on the theory that, as the weaker party, he is not to be trusted to enter into any such contract. If the Courts assume from such recitals that the contract is fair and legal, then nothing would be easier for the dominant party, that is, the landlord (or the creditor) to defeat the purpose and policy of the law by getting such recitals noted in every such agreement. A similar question arose in the decision reported in Woman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. AIR 1959 SC 689 wherein it was held that by enforcing such a contract we reach in result the infraction of a statutory provision which cannot be condoned by a contract or conduct of any party. Section 9 of the Accommodation Control Act provides expressly that "the rent payable may be contracted rent hut in any case shall not exceed the rent calculated on the basis of the reasonable annual rent". The tenant is entitled to invite the Rent Controller to decide the latter, and it is no answer to say that he has himself decided it at an earlier stage. In fact the law is based on the assumption that he cannot be trusted to decide for himself what is the reasonable rent. Thus the protection is not one solely for the tenant, but one based on a deliberate policy. Thus the basic principle upon which the appellate authority has dismissed the suit for fair rent cann Application allowed