JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J. This appeal is by a person who had already been held by the High Court of Indore to be nothing more than a sub-tenant by operation of the law contained in Indore Government Circular No. 13 of 1908, and on that basis been ordered to be evicted in a suit by the landlord-plaintiff-respondent. The suit was resisted unsuccessfully by the sub-tenant on two main grounds; firstly, he was a transferee without the permission of the appropriate authority, and as such, a sub-tenant by operation of statute; that law not having provided any particular procedure for ejecting him, the procedure actually adopted on the basis of a notice to quit was not sufficient; secondly, though this is an agricultural tenancy the principles contained in section 106, Transfer of Property Act would be applicable on grounds of equity and reasonableness; but actually, the landlord-tenant had noticed this sub-tenant to quit within four days though there was a standing crop. Both the lower Courts having rejected this defence, the subtenant came up in second appeal. Stated thus, it was a straightforward case; but there are two complications; first, one of a very general nature and the second, particular to this appeal. When this second appeal was pending, the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessees Protection Act (29 of 1955) was enacted. Under that Act (and the very similar Act, Madhya Bharat Muafi and Inam Tenants and Sub-tenants Protection Act, 32 of 1954) pending legal proceedings of all kinds for the eviction of the Ryotwari sub-lessees from Ryotwari lands (and the tenant, sub-tenants and ordinary tenants from the Inam lands) were to stand stayed subject to certain provisions regarding wilful waste and deposit of rent by the tenant or sub-tenant concerned. Accordingly, this appeal, like a very large number of similar proceedings, was stayed. In this case, the delivery of possession not having already taken place in accordance with the decree of the lower Courts, the sub-tenant-appellant continued in possession. The Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessees Protection Act as well as the Muafi and Inam Tenants and Sub-tenants Protection Act, has been repealed by the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (20 of 1959) which came into force on the 2nd October 1969. Thereupon, all these proceedings were posted for hearing on merits. The Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessees Protection Act as well as the Muafi and Inam Tenants and Sub-tenants Protection Act, has been repealed by the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (20 of 1959) which came into force on the 2nd October 1969. Thereupon, all these proceedings were posted for hearing on merits. Now, the plea raised in all these cases is that the sub-tenant concerned is a person who at the commencement of the Code was actually holding, in the Madhya Bharat region, the land as Ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessees Protection Act. (In case of the tenants, sub-tenants and ordinary tenants of Muafi and Inam lands, the same argument is made to the effect that at the commencement of the Code they are actually holding in the Madhya Bharat region some inam land as tenant, sub-tenant or ordinary tenant). Accordingly, it is urged in this case, that the appellant-sub-tenant has already acquired by the operation of section 185(i)(ii)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, the rights of an occupancy tenant under the Code, and as such is no more liable to eviction at the instance of his erstwhile superior landlord, namely, the Ryotwari tenant. This is a very general argument and has to be examined in this appeal with reference to the sub-tenants of Ryotwari tenancy. (In an appropriate case, will also be examined the similar question with reference to the tenant, sub-tenant or ordinary tenant of any inam land but it does not arise in this case). One more complication special to this case is that the plaintiff Ryotwari tenant died during the pendency of the proceedings. Upon this, one Bhuwansingh a minor through his best friend, has sought substitution in place of the respondent as being the son by adoption. The appellant has, for the limited purpose of the litigation, agreed to the substitution. Bhuwansingh being a claimant in any event to the estate of the deceased plaintiff-respondent. He, however, urges that there has been no adoption, at least no valid adoption, and therefore, he himself being the sister's son of the plaintiff's husband Umraosingh, has inherited the estate and as such, the litigation cannot proceed any further, the rights of the landlord tenant and the lessee sub-tenant having merged in him. He, however, urges that there has been no adoption, at least no valid adoption, and therefore, he himself being the sister's son of the plaintiff's husband Umraosingh, has inherited the estate and as such, the litigation cannot proceed any further, the rights of the landlord tenant and the lessee sub-tenant having merged in him. Thus, we have to consider the general question set out in paragraph 3 above, the question as to the position of Bhuwansingh (para. 4), and thirdly, the merits of the suit as it was fought in the lower Courts. In regard to Bhuwansingh, all that has to be noted here is, that he has come up with ostensible title to the properties of the plaintiff-respondent as the son by adoption the transaction being reduced to writing and registered as a deed of adoption. Whether, in spite of it, Bhuwansingh has really not got the status he claims, and whether in that event, the appellant Raghunathsingh would take the estate of the plaintiff-respondent, are questions altogether outside the scope of this suit. It is a well established principle that the mere fact of the substitution of any claimant does not in any manner finally make him the, heir to the deceased litigant or fetter the other party to the litigation from questioning his claim in an appropriate proceeding. The legal representative brought on record is for the limited purpose of conducting the litigation. It is, therefore, left open to Raghunath Singh if he considers fit, to get the dispute between him and Bhuwansingh in regard to the succession to the estate of Gangabai, cleared in a separate litigation. The general question mentioned in paragraph 3 has to be studied in the light of the history of the legislation in this regard. No doubt, the provisions of a statute have, as far as possible, to be interpreted in the light of the actual words; but when they are either ambiguous, or have themselves been made to refer to a particular context, then the context is not only relevant but at times becomes conclusive. Here, for example, the Legislature had been contemplating for long a complete code in regard to land revenue, landlord-tenant relationship, and other allied matters. Here, for example, the Legislature had been contemplating for long a complete code in regard to land revenue, landlord-tenant relationship, and other allied matters. What was contained in a number of enactments in each of the regions which became the State of Madhya Bharat and subsequently the State of Madhya Pradesh, has now been reduced to one complete Code. But it has taken years to investigate the problem and in the interval, the Legislature was anxious that nobody should secure the advantage that may frustrate what might ultimately be done for the protection of certain classes of cultivators. So, two enactments were made in 1054 and 1955 respectively; though, they are not worked in precisely the same language and, in fact, refer to two different genera of actual cultivators of agricultural land, their purpose was to stall-at whatever stage it stood-the litigation in regard to ejectment of these persons. Section 4 of the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessees Protection Act as well as section 4 of the Madhya Bharat Muafi and Inam Tenants and Sub-tenants Protection Act, stall "all suits, proceedings and execution of decrees or orders and other proceedings for the eviction of tenants, sub-tenants etc.". There are provisos which do not affect the main purpose, but which are calculated, on the one hand to save the property from wilful waste in the manner specified in section 94, Civil Procedure Code, and on the other, to secure to the immediate landlord, the rent payable by the tenant or sub-tenant concerned. It has been argued at the bar on behalf of the present appellant that these two enactments not only stay proceedings, but also grant a status of permanency, or at least, a status leas precarious than that of the sub-tenant to the persons affected by them. But an examination of the wording of section 4 of both the enactments does not support this view. The Legislature has not intended and has not provided for a promotion of these persons to something less precarious. At the termination of these two Acts, the tenants or sub-tenants concerned were in no better and no worse a position than where they were at the commencement. If they were precarious tenants at the commencement, they were still so in exactly the same manner at their termination. At the termination of these two Acts, the tenants or sub-tenants concerned were in no better and no worse a position than where they were at the commencement. If they were precarious tenants at the commencement, they were still so in exactly the same manner at their termination. If they were tenants on notice, being sued for eviction, in other words, tenants on sufferance; they continued as tenants on sufferance under the protecting statutes. Coming to the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, it has been pointed out on behalf of the landlord-respondent that pre-existing disputes should be governed by the appropriate Law in force at that time unless there is something to the contrary in the Code itself. This is a sound principle contained in section 261 of the Code, which is broadly similar to sections 5 and 6 of the General Clauses Act. Thus, it is for the appellant to show that he has acquired a status under the Code, which he did not have before, and which the Ryotwari Sub-lessees Protection Act has not granted to him. For this, the appellant relies upon the wording of section 185(1)(ii)(b) and emphasizes the fact that he is not merely a ryotwari sub-lessee or sub-tenant as generally understood, but "a ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in the Ryotwari Sub-lessees Protection Act". Further, he urges that the phrase "as defined.....etc." should be interpreted not merely with reference to the definition proper in section 2(b) of that Act, but understood as the sub-lessee governed by and benefited by that Act. This is a case where the legislative history sheds considerable light on the real purport of statute. The Protection Act was passed with a view to keeping the sub-tenant on the land while the Legislature was working out some ways of giving him a permanent status. If it was not intending to do something in this regard in the near future, after due consideration of all the relevant circumstances, there was obviously no sense in stalling all judicial proceedings in respect of the ejectment of the sub-lessee. When the Protection Act itself gives nothing more than time, it will be legitimate to infer that the Legislature was intending to do something at the end of the period. Ultimately, the effect of an enactment would be deduced from its language. When the Protection Act itself gives nothing more than time, it will be legitimate to infer that the Legislature was intending to do something at the end of the period. Ultimately, the effect of an enactment would be deduced from its language. But when the language itself calls for a detailed and somewhat elaborate examination, then the purpose behind the language is relevant for arriving at its true meaning. Thus, it is argued on behalf of the appellant that the sub-lessee "as defined in the Protection Act" is really the sub-lessee of whom the Legislature was thinking when it enacted for his protection and that sub-lessee is no other than the man who was being proceeded against for ejectment, with or without, any other relief being sought. It is not merely the sub-lessee who is barely defined in section 2(b) (which definition is almost trite and not helpful to either party), but the sub-lessee whose ejectment is being sought in the judicial proceedings that have been stalled by section 4 of that Act. This does not depend only upon the addition of the phrase "as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-lessees Protection Act", but on the general context. The Code, following the said Act, can be properly understood to do something to which the Act itself was only the first step. If it is merely a case of a sub-lessee properly so called, considered without reference to any special context, the question would be, whether at the commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, the appellant is a sub-lessee at all. A sub-lessee is one to whom the lessee has sub-let his land. Sub-letting is not merely a single act at a particular moment, but one that continues, with the consent or the acquiescence of the lessor as an essential ingredient. If a lessee has sub-let his land for a term and at the end of the term has in a clear and unequivocal manner called upon the sub-lessee to vacate, then the element of consent is wanting; in other words, the sub-lessee is no more than one on sufferance, because the lessee who is immediately above him cannot drive him out and take possession till he moves a law Court. Such a man is not even a sub-lessee holding over; because, holding over also requires consent on the part of the lessee. Such a man is not even a sub-lessee holding over; because, holding over also requires consent on the part of the lessee. A trespasser is one who came without the consent of the owner, and a sub-lessee on sufferance is one who came in with the consent all right, but does not vacate at the end of the term on being called upon to do so; the lessor is obliged to tolerate him on the property, pending the legal steps. Normally, such a person is not a Ryotwari sub-lessee. The point here is there is something in the context; if it was intended to grant the right of occupancy tenant to a person who is a sub-tenant in the proper sense of the term, then it was not necessary to make a reference to the Protection Act or as for that matter, to enact the Protection Act at all. It is unthinkable that the Legislature should have taken all the trouble of enacting the Protection Act just that upon the enactment of the Code the matter may revert and the sub-lessee might vacate without having received any benefit except, of course, the time element as a result of these enactments. Thus, in view of the special wording of the provision and even more, the special context, I would hold that it was intended that section 185 should benefit even the Ryotwari sub-lessees who had already been sued for ejectment before the commencement of the Act. But, it is essential that the person should be holding the land. In other words, if at the commencement of the Act, the sub-lessee concerned had already been ejected in execution of a decree, he will not get the benefit of section 185, even though he may have been actively prosecuting his appeal at the relevant period. This is because at the commencement of the Act he is not on the land. This does involve the possibility of apparent arbitrariness. This is because at the commencement of the Act he is not on the land. This does involve the possibility of apparent arbitrariness. A sub lessee who has appealed from the ejectment decree will get the benefit of this section, if the ejectment has not factually materialized either because the decree-holder has not already levied execution or because the appellate Court has stayed it; but, the same benefit will not be available to another, who, by the date of the commencement of the Protection Act has not either appealed or having appealed, has not yet succeeded in getting the ejectment stayed by the appellate Court. But when protective legislation of this nature is being enacted for the benefit of a particular class, it does happen that certain individual members do not get the benefit. But that does not throw any doubt on the purpose of that litigation or one for the enactment of which the Protection Act is a preliminary step. I would, therefore, hold that on this ground the appellant who is a sub-tenant benefited by the Protection Act and who, by virtue of the stay order dated 8-9-1955 (confirmed on 21-12-1955), is still holding the land, becomes under section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Code, an occupancy tenant and as such is not liable to ejectment. On this ground alone, the appeal will have to be allowed. It is necessary briefly to deal with the other grounds also. The appellant was originally a purchaser of these lands; but having failed to obtain the prior permission of the appropriate authority, he was hit by a clause in the Indore Government Revenue Circular No. 13 of 1908 which made the purchasers without permission just sub-tenants and nothing more. In fact, this is concluded by the earlier decision of the Indore High Court. But this sub-tenant, now urges that he was a sub-tenant of a peculiar species created by statutes; and so long as statute did not provide for a special manner of ejecting him, he could not be ejected. It is difficult to accept this contention. A sub-tenant is not a novel conception, and when an incomplete statute like Circular No. 13 of 1908, does not define it, it should be understood either in its dictionary meaning, or in the meaning given to it in the general statute or Code on such relationship. It is difficult to accept this contention. A sub-tenant is not a novel conception, and when an incomplete statute like Circular No. 13 of 1908, does not define it, it should be understood either in its dictionary meaning, or in the meaning given to it in the general statute or Code on such relationship. He is a precarious holder, and can be ejected at the end of the agricultural year, or as soon as he has removed the last crop of the agricultural year, and the land has become quite vacant. The next contention is that the notice calling upon him to quit "within four days", and that too in the middle of an agricultural year, was invalid and therefore the landlord (tenant) cannot eject the sub-tenant even now, after so many years. This is to overstate the sub-tenant's case. This is an agricultural tenancy, and section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act or the corresponding section in the corresponding Indore enactment, does not apply in terms. However, broadly speaking, the equitable principle contained in it may apply. Where a particular statutory provision applied in terms, the parties can invite the Court to decide, whether it is mandatory or directory, and in the former event, apply it to the letter whatever the consequences. But where a statute as such has no application, but the Court still acts on its principles on the ground of equity and good conscience, it should only see whether there is substantial compliance. It is, as if they are applicable as broadly directory principles. Here, the landlord became very impatient as soon as he succeeded in obtaining a decision from the High Court of the Indore State that Raghunathsingh was no more than a sub-tenant and was liable to ejectment as such. From his position this is perfectly understandable because quite a number of years had already elapsed. Thereupon he served a notice calling upon the sub-tenant to leave within four days and that too in the middle of the agricultural year. It would have been highly inequitable even in a ease like this, for the landlord actually to eject a sub-tenant in the middle of the agricultural year when there was a standing crop. But this was long ago and 13 agricultural years have come and gone since the notice was served. It would have been highly inequitable even in a ease like this, for the landlord actually to eject a sub-tenant in the middle of the agricultural year when there was a standing crop. But this was long ago and 13 agricultural years have come and gone since the notice was served. Thus, applying the principle substantially and in a commonsense manner, the sub-tenant was liable to ejectment certainly not within four days of the notice period, but at the end of any agricultural year following it. Quite a number of years having followed, there is nothing more to be paid about this at this stage. The result of the discussion is that on merits of the appeal as it was filed, the sub-tenant-appellant had no case and the decree for ejecting him would have been maintained. However, in view of the new enactment-section 185 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code-he has now acquired under statute, the rights of an occupancy tenant, and as such cannot be ejected. What other benefits he or the tenant just above him will get at this stage will depend upon the statute. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and the decree of the lower Court is set aside. In view of the special circumstances of the case, the landlord-tenant who is the plaintiff-respondent, will get the cost upto the first appellate Court, while in this Court, the parties will bear their own costs. Appeal allowed