S. T. DESAI, N. M. MIABHOY, J. ( 1 ) A question of some importance has been raised before us on this petition and the question relates to the interpretation of the provision imposing. time-limit for issuance of a notice under section 34 of the Income-tax A2ct. A notice under that section was served on the petitioner on 2-4-1958 intimating that his income for assessment year 1949-50 had escaped assessment and the competence of the Income-tax Officer to issue the same is challenged on the ground that the notice was served after the expiry of the statutory period of eight years. The petitioner is a resident of the former Gondal State which become a part of Saurashtra on 1st April 1 48 The State of Saurashtra pro promulgated Ordinance (IX of 1949) dated 19/03/1949 where by income-tax was imposed in that States as there in laid down. The petitioner was doing business in the name of Messrs. Indian Industries at Gondal and was also carrying on business at Rajkot For the assessment year 1949-50 he was assessed under the Saurashtra Income-tax Ordinance by the Income-tax Officer Madhya Saurashtra Circle Rajkot The State of Saurashtra became a part of the State of Bombay after the Constitution came into operation on 26/01/1950. The Indian Finance Act 1950 was enacted by the Central Parliament and received assent of the President on 31/03/1950. The integration of the State of Saurashtra with the Union of India came into effect on and from 1/04/1950. It is not now disputed before us that the present case is governed by the Indian Income-tax Act. But what is disputed is that the notice served on the petitioner under sec. 34 of the Act is beyond the period of limitation prescribed in that section. It is not necessary therefore to discuss the applicability of the Indian Income-tax Act to the case of the assessee or to refer to section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act which extended the Indian Income-tax Act to the State of Saurashtra ( 2 ) THE Income-tax Officer Ward-B Rajkot issued a notice on the petitioner on 24/03/1958 intimating that he had reason to believe that the income of the assessee for the year 1949-50 had escaped assessment and he therefore intended to re-open the same and by that notice he also required the petitioner to make a new return for the assessment year 1949-50. The notice which was issued on 24/03/1958 was served on the petitioner on 2/04/1958. These two dates as we shall presently point out have material bearing on the contention pressed before us by Mr. Hiralal Shah learned Counsel for the Petitioner. On receipt of the notice the petitioner carried on some correspondence with the Department and in that correspondence he raised two contentions. One contention was that the Income-tax Officer who issued the notice was not the officer duly authorized to do so. That point of authority of the Income-tax Officer has been raised in the petition but Mr. Shah has not pressed it before us in view of certain Notification to which our attention has been drawn by the learned Advocate General who appears for the Revenue. ( 3 ) THE other point and one which has been strenuously urged before us by learned Counsel is that the notice is bad and inoperative as it was given after expiry of eight years which is the period of limitation for the same laid down in section 34. A notice served on an assessee under sub_section (1) of section 34 after eight years for any year if eight years have elapsed after the expiry of that year it is urged would be beyond the period prescribed by the section and therefore beyond the competence of the Income-tax Officer. It will be convenient to set out here the relevant part of section 34 (1) and the first Proviso to that Subsection. "34 (1) if (a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year in come profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for that year or have been under-assessed or assessed at too low a rate or have been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act or excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed or (b ). . . . . he may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time and in cases year serve on the assessee or if the assessee is a company on the falling under clause (b) at any time within four years of the end of that principal officer thereof a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22 and may proceed to assess or re-assess such income profits or gains or recomputed the loss or depreciation allowance and the provisions of this Act shall so far as may be apply accordingly as if the notice were issued under that sub-section:- Provided that the Income-Tax Officer shall not issue a notice under clause (a) of sub-section (1) (i) for any year prior to the year ending on the 31st day of March 1941 unless the income profits or gains chargeable to income-tax which (ii) for any year if eight years have elapsed after the expiry of that year have escaped assessment or have been under-assessed or assessed at too low a rate or have been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act or the loss or depreciation allowance which has been computed in excess amount to or are likely to amount to one lakh of rupees or more in the aggregate either for that year or for that year and any other year or years after which or after each of which eight years have elapsed not being a year or years ending before the 31st day of March 1941 (iii) for any year unless he has recorded his reasons for doing so and in any case falling under clause (ii) unless the Central Board of Revenue and in any other case the Commissioner is satisfied on such reasons recorded that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice. " ( 4 ) NOW the argument on behalf of the petitioner is that in the substantive part the section lays down that the Income-tax Officer shall serve the notice on the assessee and the proviso states that he shall not issue the notice if eight years have expired after the year assessment for which is to be reopened and therefore the notice must not only be issued but also be served within the statutory period of eight years. The argument has proceeded that the notice having been served on the assessee after 31/03/1958 is outside the time-limit and therefore invalid and inoperative. ( 5 ) IN the substance and in effect therefore the argument requires us to equate the expression issue in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 34 with the expression serve in substantive part of that sub-section support of this argument Mr. Shah has leaned heavily on a decision of Chief Justice Chagla and Mr. Justice Tendolkar in Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay South Bombay vs. D. V. Ghurve (1957) 59 Bombay Law Reporter 433 He has in particular drawn our attention to certain observation of the learned Chief Justice where he has stated that it was more appropriate that the expression issued used in the first part of the first proviso to section 34 (3) of the Income-tax Act should be equated with the expression serve used in section 34 (1) of the Act Unquestionably the expression issued has been used in the first part of the first proviso to section 34 (3) and the expression serve is used in section 34 (1) of the Act. Unquestionably again the two expression issued and serve have been there held to be such as could be equated one with the other. But it does not follow from that decision nor could it possibly have been intended in that decision to suggest that the expression issue in the first proviso to sec. 34 (1) could be equated with the expression serve and that for the obvious reason that this proviso did not and could not apply to that case and had not to be considered when that decision was given Even so it is urged that the decision in that case supports the contention of the petitioner when he asks us to equate the expression issue in the initial part of the proviso to sec. 34 (1) with the expression serve in the substantive part of that sub-section. In that decision the notice that came up for consideration was in respect of escaped income for the year 1943-44 and had been issued on 20/03/1952 and served on the assessee on 16/04/1952 and the notice had to be examined by applying the law prior to the amendments made in the section in 1956. The language of sec. In that decision the notice that came up for consideration was in respect of escaped income for the year 1943-44 and had been issued on 20/03/1952 and served on the assessee on 16/04/1952 and the notice had to be examined by applying the law prior to the amendments made in the section in 1956. The language of sec. 34 (1) which we have set out above is now different in a material respect from the language of sec. 34 (1) as it stood prior to the amending Act of 1956. Moreover the proviso which we have set out above was not part of sec. 34 and had not to be considered by the Court in that case. It is not necessary to set out the language of sec. 34 (1) (a) as it stood prior to its amendment in 1956 as nothing turns on the same. The crucial change is in the words which prior to that amendment followed upon Clause (b) of sec. 34 (1) and we shall only set out the same:- ". . he may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time within eight years and in cases falling under clause (b) at any time within four years of the end of that year serve on the assessee a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22 and may proceed to assess. " ( 6 ) IT is significant to note that in terms express and explicit that latter part of sec. 34 (1) laid down that in a case falling under clause (a) the notice had to be served on the assessee at any time within eight years. The relevant and material part of sec. 34 (1) after the amendment of 1956 it will be noticed leaves out the word within eight years and it is these words which have been left out in the section as amended which make all the difference and go to defeat the argument of Mr. Shah. It was necessary in a case to be determined by applying sec. 34 (1) prior to the amendment of 1956 that the notice in a case falling under clause (a) of the sub-section should be served on the assessee within eight years of the end of the year of which assessment was intended to be reopened. Shah. It was necessary in a case to be determined by applying sec. 34 (1) prior to the amendment of 1956 that the notice in a case falling under clause (a) of the sub-section should be served on the assessee within eight years of the end of the year of which assessment was intended to be reopened. It will be seen from the dates relating to that case that the notice under consideration though it was issued on 20/03/1952 i. e. within eight years of the end of the relevant year had in fact been served on the assessee on 16/04/1952 that is after eight years of the relevant year 1943-44. The decision of their Lordships in that case turned primarily and principally on the crucial words Sat any time within eight years. . . of the end of that year. An argument however was there urged on behalf of the Revenue that the assessment had in fact been completed within eight years as required by sec. 34 (3 ). Here also we may point out there is an amendment in the language of the section but it is not necessary to discuss the same and it will suffice to state that the first proviso to section 34 (3) considered in that case ruled that where a notice under sub-sec. (1) had been issued within the time therein limited the assessment to be made in pursuance of such notice must be made before the expiry of one year from the date of the service of the notice even if such period exceeded the period of eight years or four years as the case may be It was in negativing the argument advanced by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the Revenue that the Court expressed the view that the expression issue in the proviso to sub-sec. (3) should be equated with the expression serve. It is true that the expression issue in the proviso to sub-section (3) of sec. 34 has been interpreted in that decision of the Bombay High Court relied on by Mr. Shah. It is also true that as far as possible the same expression should receive the same interpretation in the other parts of the same section. It is true that the expression issue in the proviso to sub-section (3) of sec. 34 has been interpreted in that decision of the Bombay High Court relied on by Mr. Shah. It is also true that as far as possible the same expression should receive the same interpretation in the other parts of the same section. But the Court in that case was considering the expression issue as used in section 34 (3) and in a different context and different collocation and that decision is therefore clearly distinguishable. Any opinion of the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Tendolkar would be considered by this Court with the greatest respect but the provision which we are called upon to construe was not the provision which they had to examine. Not only that but we are here though dealing with the same section concerned with provisions which have been materially modified and altered by the law-maker. It is not a question merely of some modification of little importance in the section as it stood. ( 7 ) WE are here called upon to construe a very important proviso which was incorporated in the section for the first time in 1956 and which engrafted some important limitative provisions on the power of the Income tax Officer to issue a notice under section 34 (1) (a ). We have before us a provision which in terms states that the notice contemplated by section 34 in a case falling under clause (a) may be served on the assessee at any time. Therefore there is nothing in this part of the section which can be said to lend the slightest support to the argument of Mr. Shah. Indeed it goes a long way to negative that argument. Mr. Shah had therefore to fall back on the sheer argument that the expression issue in the initial words of the proviso should be equated with the expression serve notwithstanding the amendments in the section and the insertion of the new proviso to sub-section (1 ). The decision so strenuously relied on in support of the petitioners case cannot advance the argument canvassed before us as the expressions issue and serve had there to be read in a wholly different context. The decision so strenuously relied on in support of the petitioners case cannot advance the argument canvassed before us as the expressions issue and serve had there to be read in a wholly different context. In the context and collocation before us we must read the words as used correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly and in the present context there is nothing to show that we should prefer the loose and inexact meaning of these words by an impermissible equation. As they now stand after the amendments of 1956 the relevant parts of the section relating to time-limit seem to us to be pain and certain and we do not read in them any uncertainty or obscurity. We have to read this expression issue in the initial part of the Proviso in the context and the setting in which it finds place. Then again the Proviso must be read as a whole and in a manner as would give fullest effect to all the sub-clauses of the Proviso and what is more important in the collocation of and in a manner harmonious with the substantive part of the section which states that the notice may in any such case be served at any time. These considerations are sufficient to show that the notice served on the petitioner was valid and effective. ( 8 ) A feeble attempt was made by Mr. Shah to rely on clause (ii) of the proviso. It was suggested that the words in the beginning of that sub-clause for any year if eight years have elapsed after the expiry of that year refer to the expiry of the accounting year of the assessee and not the assessment year. In our judgment there is no warrant for this contention. Reading of sec. 34 as a whole as well as the meaning of the expression year in the present context and the present setting necessarily lead to the conclusion that the year contemplated is the assessment year and not the accounting year or the previous year of the assessee. ( 9 ) THE scheme and the object of these limitative provisions of section 34 even if it were necessary to examine the same go to support the conclusion reached by us. Confining our observations to clause (a) of sec. ( 9 ) THE scheme and the object of these limitative provisions of section 34 even if it were necessary to examine the same go to support the conclusion reached by us. Confining our observations to clause (a) of sec. 34 the scheme of that sub-section is that if Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that any income has escaped assessment in cases falling under the same he may at any time serve the requisite notice on the assessee and proceed to assess such escaped income. The proviso engrafts certain safeguards on that rule. Clause (a) puts an embargo of time on the exercise of the very wide power conferred on the Income-tax Officer. Obviously there had to be a limit to the exercise of this power in case of old assessments and some reasonable limit had to be prescribed and the limit enacted by the Legislature is that assessment for any year prior to the 31st of March 1941 is not to be disturbed. Clause (ii) of the proviso is intended to lay down another safeguard against the exercise of the wide power conferred on the Income-tax Officer. In case of any year later than 1941 the question may arise of assessment of escaped income after 10 or 15 or even more years. Such cases would not be covered by clause (i ). The Legislature has divided such cases of escaped income by reference to the amount of escaped income. The power to issue a notice in case of any such year can only be exercised if the amount of income which has escaped assessment or in respect of which excessive relief has been granted or excessive depreciation granted amounts or is likely to amount to rupees one lakh or more in the aggregate. Where it is not likely to amount to one lakh of rupees or more i. e. is less than one lakh of rupees the time-limit of eight years would operate. In such a case the matter would be governed by the initial words of the proviso read with the first part of clause (ii) for any year if eight years have elapsed after the expiry of that year with the result that in any such case the Income-tax Officer would not have the power to issue any notice under clause (a) of sub-section (1 ). Clause (iii) of the Proviso imposes a further safeguard against any arbitrary exercise by an Income-tax Officer of the power conferred on him by section 34. In any case the Income-tax Officer must record his reasons and in every case falling under clause (ii) i. e. where he wants to issue a notice under clause (ii) he must get the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue and in any other case that of the Commissioner that it is a fit case for issuance of such notice. ( 10 ) THE learned Advocate General has drawn our attention to a decision of Mr. Justice D. N. Sinha in Debi Dutt Moody v. Belan and others reported in 35 Income Tax Reports 781. The learned Judge has there taken the same view which we are taking in this case. ( 11 ) FOR all these reasons the contentions urged before us must be negatived. ( 12 ) IN the result the petition will stand dismissed and the rule will be discharged with costs. Costs are fixed at Rs. 200. 00. Rule Discharged. .