Mishrimal v. State of Rajasthan — 1960 DIGILAW 300 (RAJ)

SARJOO PROSAD, C.J.—This is a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India presented by 65 tax-payers of the Municipal Board, Jalore. They have prayed that an appropriate writ be issued quashing the order of the Collector dated 28th July, 1960, whereby he suspended the implementation of various resolutions of the Board, and also for a suitable direction to the Government of Rajasthan to decide the question of disqualification of two members of the said Board. 2. The last general elections to the Municipal Board, Jalore, were held in the month of May, 1958. The strength of the Board is 8 elected and 2 nominated members. On 7th August, 1958, Shri Ugam See Modi, respondent No. 5, was elected Chairman and the Board commenced functioning from 9th August, 1958. The Board worked well, but it is said that early in 1959 the Chairman came into conflict with a Minister in the State of Rajasthan and this conflict projected itself in the functioning of the Board. A vote of no-confidence was tabled against Shri Modi on 14th May, 1959. It is alleged that under some understanding between the parties interested Shri Modi agreed to resign and the motion of no-confidence was not pressed. Eventually Shri Modi also withdrew his resignation and as held by this Court in Writ Petition No. 319 of 1960 he continues to be the Chairman of the Board. 3. The alleged conflict apparently has given rise to two factions in the Board : the one headed by Shri Modi, the Chairman, consists of 4 members, while the opposition consists of 6 members—one seat remaining vacant due to a member having resigned. According to the petitioners the hostility between the two groups has paralised the efficiency of the Board and retarded its functioning in ensuring the civic amenities of the town. Of the 5 members in the opposition Sarva Shri Nihal Chand and Nath Mal, according to the petitioners, suffer from disqualifications under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 ( Act No. 38 of 1959—hereinafter called the Act). These members became disqualified when the Act came into force on 17th October, 1959. Of the 5 members in the opposition Sarva Shri Nihal Chand and Nath Mal, according to the petitioners, suffer from disqualifications under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 ( Act No. 38 of 1959—hereinafter called the Act). These members became disqualified when the Act came into force on 17th October, 1959. The petitioner No. 1 on 22nd February, 1960, reported to the Government of Rajasthan that Shri Nihal Chand on his own showing was dismissed from the Chief Court of Jodhpur in 1934 and, therefore, had become disqualified to serve as a member of the Board under sec. 26(iii) of the Act. The petitioners submit that the matter has been pending since then for about the last eight months and the Government has taken no action thereon. Another report was submitted to the Government regarding the disqualification suffered by Shri Nath Mal on account of his being a proprietor or Mahavir Printing Press which has been undertaking printing job for the Board and receiving payments therefor, notwithstanding the fact that the proprietor is a. member of the said Board. A notice to show cause, the petitioners allege, has been served upon Shri Nath Mal, but it is a mere eye-wash. The petitioners further submit that the inaction or tardy action regarding Shri Nihal Chands disqualification and that of Shri Nath Mal are due to the tact that these two members were useful in seeking to oust the Chairman Shri Modi. 4. On 18th July, 1960, a general meeting of the Board took place. All the 9 members were present. The petitioner No. 1 and some of the citizens of the town were a so present as on lookers. At the meeting a dispute arose regarding confirmation of the minutes of the previous meeting and it is alleged that the opposition group of 5 members adopted an obstructive attitude. The Chairman held that in view of the ruling of this Court (Deodutt Sharma Vs. Collector, Ajmer—1960 Rajasthan Law Weekly, 420) he was entitled to declare and he declared that these two members Sarva Shri Nihal Chand and Nath Mal were not entitled to vote as they stood disqualified even though the Government had not disqualified them. After the above declaration the meeting degenerated into a pandemonium and the Chairman finding himself unable to transact any further business dismissed the meeting and left the Board. After the above declaration the meeting degenerated into a pandemonium and the Chairman finding himself unable to transact any further business dismissed the meeting and left the Board. The day following on 19th July, 1960, a special general meeting is said to have been called by the Chairman for transacting the agenda which had remained unfinished on the 18th and for certain other items. The 3 members in the opposition group refused to take notice and did not attend. The Chairman and 3 other members met on the 19th July and passed a number of resolutions including the one relating to lighting in the town, promotion of a girls school in Jalore and also for legal action against sarva Shri Nihal Chand and Nath Mal with a view to exclude their continued obstruction in business of the Board, 5. It appears that the Collector of Jalore was approached by the 5 opposition members who represented to him that the proceedings of the meeting of the 19th July, 1960, were 1 legal because they had not been given any notice of the said meeting or its agenda. On 26th July 1960, the Collector purporting to exercise his powers under sec. 285 of the Act passed the order under challenge which suspended all the resolutions passed on the 18th and 19th July save one, and on 16th August, 1960, the petitioners presented this writ petition. 6. Shri Ugam See Modi, respondent No. 5, the Chairman of the Board, has filed an answer to the petition. He has generally supported the petitioners case and has further submitted that the opposition group of 5 members took away the rough notes of the proceedings of the meeting of 18th July, 1960, from the office of the Board and also the minute book of the proceedings: that the Director of Local Bodies, Rajasthan, Jaipur, who was approached regarding the disqualification of the two members expressed his helplessness in the matter which led the Chairman to act 111 accordance with the law laid down by Dave J. in Deodutts case: that on account of the suspension of the resolutions of the 19th July, two-third of the town remained in darkness because the Collector suspended even the resolution for funds to be expended on lighting. 7. The respondents Nos. 7. The respondents Nos. 3 and 4 Sarva Shri Nathmal and Nithalchand in their counter affidavit have alleged that the working of the Chairman being undemocratic the Board could not function properly. They have denied the alleged conflict between the Chairman and Shri Nathu Ram Mirdha, a Minister of the State, and claimed that the vote of no-confidence was not pursued against the Chairman because he had given assurance to resign and because of the resignation submitted by him he automatically ceased to be the Chairman of the Board. They have also supported the order passed by the Collector as being perfectly legal and necessitated by the unauthorised conduct of the Chairman. It is further alleged that though Nihal Chand, respondent No. 3, was discharged from service by the former Jodhpur State, it was not on account of any misconduct: and, therefore, he was not disqualified under sec.26 (iii) of the Act. These respondents on the contrary took the plea that the Government of Rajasthan has been siding with the Chairman as no enquiry has been made against him inspite of many complaints. They further admit that the relations between the Chairman and the respondent No. 4 had been strained and there is litigation going on between them. While admitting also that certain orders have been passed by the Chairman on Shri Nathmal respondent No. 3 who is a proprietor of Mahavir Printing Press, it is pleaded that it does not amount to any disqualification under sec. 26 (xii) of the Act. Regarding the incident which happened in the meeting of the 18th July, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 all ge that the majority refused to confirm the minute of the previous meeting as they were incorrect and unauthorised and thereupon the Chairman left the meeting and went away. The remaining members who were then in quorum continued the meeting, considered the unfinished agenda and passed resolutions and drew up the minutes. It is admitted, however, that the Chairman made attempts to restrain the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 from exercising their rights of vote but he was not allowed to do so. They further say that the resolutions passed by the Chairman and his party in the meeting of 19th July, 1960, were entirely unauthorised and illegal. It is admitted, however, that the Chairman made attempts to restrain the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 from exercising their rights of vote but he was not allowed to do so. They further say that the resolutions passed by the Chairman and his party in the meeting of 19th July, 1960, were entirely unauthorised and illegal. They have also contested the petitioners locus standi and their right to move this Court on the ground that their proper remedy was to move the Government. The respondents Nos. 3 and 4 have also alleged that they had instituted a civil suit challenging the legality of order No. 210 dated 30th March, 1960, passed by the Chairman disqualifying respondent No. 4; and that the said suit has been decreed by the Munsif, Jalore, who issued a perpetual injunction against the respondent No. 5. The said decree is pending in appeal before the Senior Civil Judge, Jalore. This important fact having been concealed by the petitioners their petition should be dismissed on that account. The State of Rajasthan and the Collector have also filed a reply. They have pleaded justification for the order passed by the Collector on the authority of the law and submitted that since the enquiry was pending, they wished to keep their minds open. According to them the Collector has been authorised by the State Government under notification No. F.4 (34)/LSG/A/59-lV dated 31st December, 1959, to exercise powers under sec. 285 of the Act. 9. We have heard Shri V.P. Tyagi on behalf of the petitioners, Shri Kan Singh, Government Advocate on behalf of the State and Collector, Shri Bhargava on behalf of respondent No. 5 Shri Ugam See Modi and Shri Hastimal on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4. 10. Before we examine the petitioners contentions on merits it will be proper to consider the preliminary objections raised by the learned Government Advocate and partly supported by Shri Hastimal. These are:— (1) That the present petitioners have no locus standi to move this Court because none of their legal rights has been infringed. (2) That the Board is a necessary party to these proceedings and in its absence the present petition must fail, The learned Government Advocate relied upon State of Orissa Vs. Madan Gopal (1) and the State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. G.C. Mandawar (2). 11. (2) That the Board is a necessary party to these proceedings and in its absence the present petition must fail, The learned Government Advocate relied upon State of Orissa Vs. Madan Gopal (1) and the State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. G.C. Mandawar (2). 11. In the first case which relates to the cancellation of mining leases by the State of Orissa, the High Court granted interim relief till a suit was instituted by the petitioners. On an appeal the Supreme Court held that Article 226 could not be used for the mere purpose of giving interim relief as the only and final relief on the application as the High Court had purported to do. In the course of the judgment the Supreme Court observed as follows:— "The language of the Article shows that the issuing of writs or directions by the Court is founded only on its decision that a right of the aggrieved party under Part III of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights) has been infringed. It can also issue writs or give similar directions for any other purpose. The concluding words of Art.226 have to be read in the context of what precedes the same. Therefore the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under this Article." 12. In the second case some Government servants of the State of Madhya Pradesh complained that the dearness allowance which was being granted to the Union servants within the territory of the State was higher than that which was being given to the servants of the State. They complained that it amounted to discrimination. The Supreme Court observed that Rule 44 of the Fundamental Rules confers no right on the Government servants to the grant of dearness allowance. The Court also observed that because the sources of authority for the two statutes were different, Article 14 of the Constitution can have no application. The learned Government Advocate on the basis of these two precedents has urged that unless there is a legal right in the petitioners the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court could not be invoked by them under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Government Advocate on the basis of these two precedents has urged that unless there is a legal right in the petitioners the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court could not be invoked by them under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As a general proposition of law it cannot be disputed that unless there is an infraction actual or threatened of some legal right of the applicant or the applicant has direct interest in the enforcement of some legal right he cannot invoke the aid of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The short question, therefore, is whether the petitioners in the instant case have any legal right residing in them so far as the subject matter of this controversy is concerned. A reference to the Act would go to show that the residents of the various wards in a municipal Board are the electors who return the members of the Board. These elected members go to compose a Municipal Board and the Board inter alia has certain primary and secondary functions which are to be discharged by it towards the citizens residing within the limits of the Board. There are a number of duties thus cast by the Act on the Board which is its creature with corresponding legal rights in the citizens or electors and they can in appropriate cases evidently enforce these rights. As a logical corollary, whoever interferes in the performance of these can also be made answerable to the electors and rate-payers who have a right to see that the Board functions in accordance with the law. It is in our opinion incorrect to say that the petitioners as electors and ratepayers of Jalore are strangers to the complaint with which they have come to this Court. They have thus every right to agitate against any unauthorised interference with the proper functioning of the Board in providing for their civic amenities. 13. The next objection is sought to be supported on the authority of the Supreme Court decision in Charanjitlal Vs. Union of India(4). In this case an ordinary share-holder of Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd., prayed for a writ of mandamus and certain other reliefs under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1950. Union of India(4). In this case an ordinary share-holder of Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd., prayed for a writ of mandamus and certain other reliefs under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1950. Their Lordships observed as follows:— "The company and the shareholders are in law separate entities, and if the allegation is made that any property belonging to the company has been taken possession of without compensation or the right enjoyed by the company under Art. 19(1) (f) has been infringed, it would be for the company to come forward to assert or vindicate its own rights and not for any individual shareholder to do so." On this analogy the learned Government Advocate argued that the electors who created the Board were distinct from the Board which has an independent entity of its own and the petitioners therefore cannot assail the actions of the Board without making the Board a party. In our opinion this objection has no substance. A Municipal Board is essentially different from a company. A Board is a creature of the statute and is invested with powers of taxation, punishment, regulation and so on. In fact it discharges several governmental functions subject to limitations provided by the law. Under Art. 12 of the Constitution it is included in the definition of "State itself. A company, on the other hand, is the outcome of a contract which acquires a corporate charter and legal personality because the relevant statute so permits. Citizens residing within a Board cannot be treated at par with shareholders of a company. This basic difference apart, what is being challenged in the present petit on is not any action of the Board but the action of the Collector and the inaction of Government. The Chairman of the Board is also a party to the proceeding in addition to the Collector and the State of Rajasthan. The preliminary objections, therefore, fail. 14. Shri V.P. Tyagi at the outset abandoned his prayer for a writ of quo warranto against the respondents Nos. 3 and 4. He has, however, pressed his prayer for quashing the order of the Collector dated 28th July, 1960, and for a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature thereof against the State for taking appropriate action against Sarva Shri Nihal Chand and Nathmal. 3 and 4. He has, however, pressed his prayer for quashing the order of the Collector dated 28th July, 1960, and for a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature thereof against the State for taking appropriate action against Sarva Shri Nihal Chand and Nathmal. Mainly two points, therefore, arise for determination: (1) whether the Collectors order dated 26th July, 1960 under sec. 285 of the Act is legal; and (2) whether in the circumstances of the case any direction should be issued to the State of Rajasthan. We may take-up the points in their order. 15. Shri V.P. Tyagi has argued that the extraordinary powers under sec. 285 of the Act were intended to be exercised only if the authority exercising them was first convinced of the existence of the basic facts, viz., that the execution of any order or resolution of the Board or the doing of anything which is about to be done is being done by or on behalf of the Board, is causing or is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or a breach of peace or is unlawful. In these circumstances alone the execution of such order or resolution could be suspended or prohibited. In the instant case Mr. Tyagi contends that on the Collectors own showing the reason excepting that the Collector was doubtful about the legality of the resolution of 19th July, the legality of the resolution being itself problematic the Collector abused his jurisdiction in exercising the powers under sec. 285 of the Act. In support of his proposition he has relied upon Kishore Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan and another (4) wherein it was held as follows:— "There are well defined limits within which the exercise of a discretionary power vested by the Statute in an administrative authority can be disturbed by the courts. 285 of the Act. In support of his proposition he has relied upon Kishore Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan and another (4) wherein it was held as follows:— "There are well defined limits within which the exercise of a discretionary power vested by the Statute in an administrative authority can be disturbed by the courts. These principles are— (i) The authority for the exercise of the power depends on its being strictly within the limits of the Statute, and the court would not allow the power to be exercised for any collateral purpose, (ii) There must be observance of the mandatory statutory procedure, and (iii) There is existence of the basic facts with reference to which the power is vested, provided that the Legislature does not vest the determination of the basic facts in the authority itself." Shri Tyagi finds fault with the exercise of the power by the Collector because he has suspended the resolutions for the collateral purpose of examining the legality of the resolutions. He also contends that the Collector ought to have forthwith submitted the reasons for his taking action to the Government as required under sec. 285(2). This has not been apparently done and, therefore, argues the learned counsel, that on all the three tests laid down by this Court in Kishore Singhs case the order of the Collector deserves to be interfered with. Shri Tyagi further argues that the proceedings of the meeting of the 19th July were perfectly legal. He submits that this Court in Deo Dutt Sharma Vs. Zahoor Ahmed Zaid has summarised the principles regarding adjournment (5) of a meeting by the Chairman, the material portion whereof reads: — "2. In the absence of any rule to the contrary the common law doctrine should be held to prevail that the adjournment of the meeting rests with the majority of the members present and is not a matter merely of the pleasure of the Chairman. 3. In the absence of any rule to the contrary the common law doctrine should be held to prevail that the adjournment of the meeting rests with the majority of the members present and is not a matter merely of the pleasure of the Chairman. 3. An exception to the aforesaid rule which has been almost universally accepted is that where disorder breaks out at a meeting, the Chairman has an inherent right, even if it has not been granted by statute or the rules, to adjourn the meeting, without consulting the majority." On the basis of these principles Shri Tyagi contends that on the 18th July when the meeting of the Board reached the stage of pandemonium and further business became impossible the Chairman could in exercise of his exceptional power validly adjourn the meeting. Therefore, the meeting of the 18th July stood concluded. The Chairman had every right to call a meeting which he did for the 16th July. If the 5 members refused to take notice the Chairman had every right to hold the meeting provided it was in quorum. The meeting of 19th July was in quorum and the resolutions passed were concerning the welfare of the town and were passed at a valid meeting. Therefore, the Collector had no semblance of jurisdiction to interfere on the plea of suspected illegality of these proceedings. 16. Shri Bhargava on behalf of the respondent No. 6 has urged that it is not only an abuse of authority as suggested by Mr. Tyagi but the Collectors action is completely without jurisdiction. He pointed out that the rough notes of the meeting produced by the responde-nts Nos. 3 and 4 also show that a stage was reached when abuses were being hurled. That there was disturbance in the meeting of the 11th July is no longer a matter of controversy. What may be controversial, however is as to who was to blame for this disturbance. When the Chairman adjourned the meeting and used the word "barkhast" he should be deemed to have adjourned the meeting sine die. He further argued that the Collectors partiality for the opposition group of 5 members is evident when he saved resolution No. 5 from suspension because the opposition agreed about it. When the Chairman adjourned the meeting and used the word "barkhast" he should be deemed to have adjourned the meeting sine die. He further argued that the Collectors partiality for the opposition group of 5 members is evident when he saved resolution No. 5 from suspension because the opposition agreed about it. If the meeting of the 19th July was illegal it was illegal and no amount of consent on the part of these 5 members could have cured the illegality. Therefore, the Collector apparently abdicated his position of neutrality and became a partisan and abused the authority which the statute has conferred on him. The delay on the part of the Collector from 18th July to 28th July was also assailed by the learned counsel on the ground that for all these 16 days only suspicion continued to lurk in the mind of the Collector though within the period he could have easily reached a conclusion as required under sec. 285 of the Act, that the resolutions were really lawful. 17. The learned Government Advocate, however, urged that the resolutions of the 19th July on their face suffer from illegalities, for instance, he pointed out that the Board had primary and secondary functions as envisaged by Chapter VI. A reference to sec. 101 (w) and (x) shows that establishment and maintenance of primary schools or promotion were secondary functions. He argued that the Girls High School being not a primary function under sec. 101(x) any expenditure on that account could only be resolved by votes of not less than two-thirds of the whole numbers and with the approval of the State Government. Sanctioning of Rs. 40,000/- on girls High School at the expense of primary functions, argued the learned Government Advocate, was on its very face illegal. The learned Government Advocate also argued that when 5 members out of 9 represented to the Collector that they did not receive notice for the meeting on 19th July, he was justified in placing reliance on such representation and in assuming that no notice in point of fact was served on them for the proposed meeting, The absence of notice vitiated the proceedings as has been held in Subh Karan Vs. The State of Rajasthan (6). The State of Rajasthan (6). The learned Government Advocate, distinguished Deodutts case (5) on the ground that it was a case where a member was merely prevented from exercising a right of franchise which, as disqualified member he could not exercise: whereas in the present case it was not open to the Chairman, respondent No. 5, to exclude respondents Nos.3 and 4 from the exercise of their right as members altogether because that would amount to suspending them from membership, a power which is vested under sec. 63 of the new Act in the State Government alone. The learned Government Advocate stoutly suppored the action of the Collector and stated that the proceedings of the 19th were illegal because there was no notice to the five members and there was a resolution, which was prima facie beyond the powers of the meeting of 19th July. 18. Shri Hasti Mal for the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 contended that the Chairman acted illegally on 18th July when he defied the decree of injuction passed by the Munsif and in persisting to disqualify respondents Nos. 3 and 4. He contended that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court could not be exercised to quash an order under sec. 285 (1) and relied upon Province of Bombay Vs. Khushaldas (7). He further submitted that the petitioners petition was premature as the resolutions were merely suspended. 19. Let us, therefore, now examine to what extent the respective contentions are well-founded. The justification for the action taken by the Collector depends upon the language of sec. 285 of the Act. Sec. 285 runs as follows:— "Power of suspending execution of order etc. of board.—If in the opinion of any such officer as may be appointed or authorised by the State Government in this behalf the execution of any order or resolution of a board, or the doing of anything which is about to be done or is being done by or on behalf of a board, is causing or is likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or a breach of the peace or is unlawful, he may, by order in writing under his signature, suspend the execution or prohibit doing thereof. (2) When any such officer makes any order under this section, he shall forthwith forward to the State Government and to the board affected thereby a copy of the order, with a statement of the reasons for making it, and it shall be in the discretion of the State Government to rescind the order or to direct that it shall continue in force with or without modification, permanently or for such period as it thinks fit: Provided that no order of such officer passed under this section shall be confirmed, revised or modified by the State Government without giving the board reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the said order." Sub-section (1) of the section, amongst others, requires that the officer authorised should be of opinion that the execution of any resolution of the Board is causing or is likely to cause (i) injury or annoyance to the public (ii) or a breach of the peace, or (iii) is unlawful. Then the Collector, who was admittedly authorised to act under the section, could by an order in writing suspend the execution thereof. Those basic facts required by the section must exist in the opinion of the Collector before he acquires the necessary authority to operate under the section. The opinion of the Collector must be objectively formed as to the existence or otherwise of the facts aforesaid-that is the very essence of his authority. If the Collector is unable to form any definite opinion as to the existence of any of these facts, then he cannot exercise the power of Suspending the resolutions on some hypothetical basis. The authority of the Collector under the section is not final. Sub-sec. (2) requires that he should forthwith forward to the State Government and to the Board affected thereby a copy of the order, with a statement of the reasons for making it. It shall then lie in the discretion of the State Government to rescind the order or to direct that it shall continue in force with or without modification, permanently or for such period as it thinks fit. Thus the final order can be passed by the State Government either maintaining or rescinding the order of the Collector or modifying the same after giving a reasonable opportunity to the Board for showing cause against the order. Thus the final order can be passed by the State Government either maintaining or rescinding the order of the Collector or modifying the same after giving a reasonable opportunity to the Board for showing cause against the order. This is, therefore, an extraordinary power vested by the statute in the Collector to interfere with the functioning of a local body; and it must be limited strictly to the terms of the section. The authority should not be allowed to be exceeded. Keeping these principles in view let us see if the order of the Collector can be justified in law. The order runs as follows:— "In exercise of power conferred under section 285 of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act 1959, the execution of all the resolutions passed by the Municipal Board Jalore in the meeting dated 18.7.60 and 19.7.60 except the resolution No.5 dated 19.7.60 regarding lighting arrangement during the month of Savan and Bhadva to which all the opposite members also agreed are hereby suspended pending enquiry into the legality or otherwise of the aforesaid resolution." It is clear from the order that the Collector has suspended all the resolutions passed by the Municipal Board of Jalore in the meetings held on the 18th and 19th of July, 1960, except Resolution No. 5 of the 19th regarding lighting arrangement during the months of Shravan and Bhadon, to which the dissident members also agreed. The reason given for the suspension, as the order indicates, is "pending enquiry into the legality or otherwise of the aforesaid resolution." It is, therefore, obvious that the Collector had not formed any opinion till the date of the order as to whether the resolutions in question which he had suspended were actually unlawful. It is not suggested that the implementation of those resolutions was likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or any breach of the peace. Therefore, the question arises whether he should have hastened to suspend the resolutions without having made up his mind as to their unlawful character, because in view of the requirements or the section it was incumbent on the Collector to do so. Absence of this base fact would be fatal to the assumption of authority on his part to act under the aforesaid section and to direct suspension of the resolutions. Absence of this base fact would be fatal to the assumption of authority on his part to act under the aforesaid section and to direct suspension of the resolutions. The resolutions were actually passed on the 18th and 19th July, 1950, and the order in question was made by the Collector some 9 or 10 days afterwards. During all this period he had plenty of time to decide whether or not the resolutions of the Board passed on the dates in question were illegal. In fact till the date when this petition was filed on 16th August, 1960, it does not appear that the Collector had come to any decision in the matter or submitted any final report to the Government. It is contended that if the Collector had the power to suspend on forming a definite opinion that the resolutions were illegal, he could under the law, also exercise this power during the process of or as a preliminary to any such inquiry to avoid a possible mischief. No one doubts the position that if in his opinion the implementation of the resolutions was likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or any breach of the peace, the circumstances would have fully justified the Officer in taking immediate action in suspending the resolutions. There is ample provision in the section to meet emergent cases. We are, therefore, unable to see why, when none of those conditions, existed, the Officer should adopt the questionable procedure of suspending the resolutions. It is true that the existence of those basic factors is a matter of opinion of the Officer concerned; but as we have pointed out this opinion must be objectively formed and in case there is no valid foundation for the opinion and the basic requirements of the section are absent any action taken by the Collector would be open to question as being unauthorised by law. 20. On behalf of the respondents, however, our attention has been drawn to the latter part of the order wherein presumably in compliance with sub-sec. (2) of sec 285, the Collector purported to forward a copy of the order to the Board and the State Government with a statement of the reasons for making it. In our opinion, even those reasons do not improve the position. (2) of sec 285, the Collector purported to forward a copy of the order to the Board and the State Government with a statement of the reasons for making it. In our opinion, even those reasons do not improve the position. The statement shows that five members of the Municipal Board, Jalore, had represented that the special general meeting convened on 19th July, 1960 by the Chairman was illegal inasmuch as they were not sent the agenda or notice of the meeting. This point has been disputed by the petitioners as also by the Chairman of the Board who says that the necessary notices and the agenda were sent to the dissident members who refused to accept the same. This was a matter in which the Collector could have easily enquired and come to some conclusion whether the representation was correct or incorrect, before he embarked upon making the order of suspension. The next reason suggested by the Officer is that there was some agreement that in any case no date for the adjourned meeting was denoted. This was again a matter for enquiry and the Collector could have very well dealt with these objections before passing the order. The Collector admits that he was still enquiring into those allegations and yet he proceeded to suspend the resolutions. As we have said, this suspension was unauthorised until he had come to some definite finding on those points and was fortified in his opinion that the resolutions were unlawful. There was no emergent situation to meet so as to compel him to adopt the procedure of suspension. The learned Government Advocate points out that at least one of the resolutions passed on 19th July, 1960, about the grant of Rs, 40,000/- to the Government Girls School for its building was clearly illegal because it had not been passed by two-thirds of the members of the Board as required by sec. 101 (x) of the Act. Even so, if the Collector held that this resolution was illegal and unlawful, it was open to him to suspend this resolution alone. 101 (x) of the Act. Even so, if the Collector held that this resolution was illegal and unlawful, it was open to him to suspend this resolution alone. The fact is that as a result of the Collectors order, even the saving provided in favour of Resolution No. 5 dated 19th July, 1960, in respect of lighting arrangement during the months of Shravan and Bhadon was of no advantage to the citizens living in the area, for the obvious reason that even this resolution could not be given effect to for lack of funds. The rele-vent resolution in respect of funds also was suspended by the Collector, inadvertantly though it may be, and the residents thereby must have suffered a great deal of trouble and inconvenience on account of lack of this essential amenity. 21. Long arguments have been advanced before us about the legality or otherwise of the resolutions in question. It has been submitted that the five dissident members had withdrawn from the meeting which had been adjourned and that they had themselves passed a separate set of resolutions at a meeting held by them. In the order of the Collector there is no reference to the resolutions passed by these dissident members or to any such representation having been made by them to the Collector. It is not for us to anticipate what opinion the Collector would have actually formed about the legality or otherwise of the resolution in question. He had to form his opinion on those matters, and we would not, therefore, like to say anything which might prejudice him. Suffice it to say that even though it may not be open to the Chairman to suspend some members of the Board and exclude them from the meeting altogether, it was certainly open to him to regulate the proceedings of the meet-ing and to reserve order; and when he found himself unable to do so, the only alternative left to him was to adjourn the meeting when his ruling was not obeyed. Under R. 5 of the relevant Rules a member called to order by the presiding authority should resume his seat till the decision of the point of order raised; and if any member desired to dispute the decision of the presiding authority, he could bring forward a proposition to that effect at the following meeting. Under R. 5 of the relevant Rules a member called to order by the presiding authority should resume his seat till the decision of the point of order raised; and if any member desired to dispute the decision of the presiding authority, he could bring forward a proposition to that effect at the following meeting. We are, therefore, convinced that the action taken by the Collector was premature and without legal sanction. He had no jurisdiction to pass the order in question and we have no alternative but to quash the order. The result is that any reference made by him to the Government on the basis of any such order also falls through. 22. Turning to the second question we think that the application for grant of mandamus against the State to expedite the disposal of the matter must issue. It appears that as early as in February, 1960, the State Government was moved in the matter of declaring Shri Nathmal and Shri Nihal Chand as disqualified members; yet the Government have taken no action in the matter. The obligation of the Government is a statutory obligation which they must discharge without undue delay. Much of these complications could have been avoided if the State Government had acted with a little promptitude in disposing of the question of the alleged disqualification of the members aforesaid. We have again no desire, inspire of the lengthy arguments addressed on the question, to prejudice the decision of the Government on these points. A definite stand appears to have been taken by the Government in respect of the respondent Shri Nihal Chand. Whether the Government is right or wrong it is for the Government to decide. For the present we would hesitate to make any observation on the point. 23. In view of what has been said above, we hold that the application must be allowed and the order of the Collector dated 18th July, 1960, must be quashed. At the same time we direct that a mandamus should be issued to the State Government for speedy disposal of the questions referred to them regarding the disqualification alleged to have been incurred by two members of the Board. The petitioners are entitled to their costs, hearing fee Rs. 100/-.