JUDGMENT V.D. Bhargava, J. - This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution by Sri B.S. Nigam, who is a Sales Tax Officer at Agra, against the Second Additional Civil Judge Agra, and Sri Rameshwar Nath Agarwal, a Receiver appointed by the Additional Civil Judge. 2. There is a Kothi No. 62A, which was formerly numbered as 36/52, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Agra. It is owned by one Chaudhari Bhhoori Singh and others. This accommodation had been in the occupation of the Sales Tax Officer since 1948 & partly had been used for the residential purpose of the Sales Tax Officers and partly for office. Before 18-4-52, the building used to be allotted by the RCEO in the personal name of the Sales Tax Officer, who used to occupy the premises. Later on the representation by the Sales Tax Commissioner requested that instead of the allotment being made in the name of the individual Sales Tax Officer, it should be allotted by the official designation of the 'Sales Tax Officer' so that there may not be any need of allotment every time a person is transferred. It was allotted by the official designation of the Sales Tax Officer in 1952. The Petitioner, according to the affidavit, was posted in January, 1959 as the Sales Tax Officer of Agra and he occupied the building on 1-7-1959 when its occupant Sri R.G. Jauhari vacated the same on transfer from Agra. 3. There is a suit No. 66 of 1956 pending in the court of the IInd Additional Civil Judge Agra, between Chaudhary Ratan Lal and Chaudhari Sri Ram and 12 others in which this property is also in dispute. Consequently Sri Rameshwar Nath Agarwal had been appointed Receiver of the properties of the parties in dispute. 4. A notice was received from the court of the IInd Additional Civil Judge, Agra, to show cause why the Receiver should not be permitted to eject the applicant and take possession of the premises in question by use of force. That notice was received by the applicant on or about 12-7-59, and 18-7-59, was fixed as the date for hearing. A notice was received from the court of the IInd Additional Civil Judge, Agra, to show cause why the Receiver should not be permitted to eject the applicant and take possession of the premises in question by use of force. That notice was received by the applicant on or about 12-7-59, and 18-7-59, was fixed as the date for hearing. The case was not taken up on the 18th July, 1959, but was ultimately taken up on the 25th July, 1959, when the applicant was heard and the Second additional Civil Judge Agra passed an order directing the applicant to hand over the vacant possession of the premises to the Receiver before the 1st of August, 1959, failing which the Receiver was to take assistance from the local police and eject the applicant by force. The time for vacating the premises was too short and it was impossible for him to get another accommodation. The Petitioner has filed this petition challenging the order of the Second Additional Civil Judge, Agra, directing him to vacate the premises. 5. The Second Additional Civil Judge while directing the applicant to vacate the premises had held that the order of allotment could not be made in favour of the Sales Tax Officer, who is not a juristic person. He further held, that the RC and EO has no jurisdiction to allot any house, which is in the custody of a Receiver of a court and, therefore he had directed the ejectment of the applicant and has further directed that it would be the Second Additional Civil Judge, who will decide as to who should occupy the premises Aggrieved by this order the applicant has filed this petition & has also prayed for the stay of the operation of the order of the Second additional Civil Judge, which was stayed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. Since the matter was of importance it was directed to be laid at an early date. 6. Since the matter was of importance it was directed to be laid at an early date. 6. The grounds upon which, the order of the Second Additional Civil Judge is being challenged, inter alia, are that the Rent Control and Eviction Act applied to all the buildings and there is no exception made in the case of buildings, which are under the receivership; that the applicant had been in lawful occupation of the premises by means of a valid allotment order and a valid allotment order could be made legally in favour of the Sales Tax Officer. There is a preliminary objection which has been taken by the Learned Counsel for the opposite parties, and, that is, that since the order which had been passed by the Second Additional Civil Judge appears to have been passed under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC there would be a right of appeal against that order under Order 43 Rule 1(s) CPC and since, the applicant has not availed of that remedy this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution Reliance was also placed on the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in N.T. Veluswami Thevar Vs. G. Raja Nainar and Others, AIR 1959 SC 422 where their Lordships had held: The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs against orders of the Tribunal is undoubted; but then, it is well settled that where there is another remedy provided, the Court may properly exercise its discretion in declining to interfere under Article 226. 7. On the other hand Learned Counsel for the applicant relied on the decision of their Lordships of the. Supreme Court in Rashid Ahmed Vs. The Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163 , where arguments of the learned Advocate General of UP had been repelled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, and, it was held: There can be no question that the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs, but the powers given to this Court under Article 32 are much wider and are not confined to issuing prerogative writs only. The Respondent Board having admittedly put it out of its power to grant a licence and having regard to the fact that there is no specific bye law authorising the issue of a licence, we do not consider that the appeal u/s 318 to the local Government which sanctioned the bye-laws is in the circumstances of this case an adequate legal remedy. 8. It has been further contended by the Learned Counsel for the applicant that actually in this case, there was no right of appeal. The order, which had been passed by the Second Additional Civil Judge, cannot come under Order 41 Rule 1. The order has been passed for ejectment of the applicant who was no party to the proceedings. Sub Rule 2 of Order 40(1) as amended by this Court reads as follows: Nothing in this rule shall authorize the Court to remove from the possession or custody of property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove. It was contended by the Learned Counsel for the applicant that none of the parties had any right to remove the applicant and being not party to the suit under Order 40(1) Rule 1 the Second Additional Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to pass this order and this order cannot be deemed to have been passed under Order 40 Rule 1 and, therefore, there was no right of appeal. 9. In any event, this is a matter, which was of a doubtful character, and if it was doubtful whether an appeal lay or not and if the applicant has come to this Court. I do not think that his application should be thrown away only on that preliminary ground. It may have been open to the applicant to file an appeal and urge that this order was beyond jurisdiction though it purported to have been passed under Order 40 Rule 1, but at the same time the appellate court might have taken the view that the order not having been passed under Order 40 Rule 1, no appeal lay. Besides, as their Lordships of the Supreme Court have said that it was not an absolute bar, that is one of the things that should be taken into consideration while considering the petition. Besides, as their Lordships of the Supreme Court have said that it was not an absolute bar, that is one of the things that should be taken into consideration while considering the petition. Considering all the circumstances of the case, and, since the period of limitation would have expired, I think I will not be justified in refusing to interfere in this writ petition only on this ground. It is only on account of these special circumstances that in spite of the fact that there may have been a right of appeal I consider this application on merits. 10. The first question that has been argued by the Learned Counsel for the applicant is that the view of the Second Additional Civil Judge that there cannot be an allotment in favour of the "Sales Tax Officer" and that he was not a juristic person is not correct. He has contended that in numerous writ petitions which are filed in this Court the opposite parties are always arrayed as the "Sales Tax Officer', the "District Judge' or other persons by their official designations. Therefore, they would be deemed to be juristic persons though they may not be a living person and would be representing a living person by their official designation. It was further contended that this order has been passed at the instance of the higher authorities of the State, that is, the Sales Tax Commissioner and in the rejoinder affidavit a letter has been filed which had been sent by the Sales Tax Commissioner to the then District Magistrate requesting that instead of allotting the house to the Sales Tax Officer by name, it may be allotted to the Sales Tax Officer by designation. There were two reasons for which this kind of allotment order was sought to be made. One was that the Sales Tax Officer used to live in a portion of the premises and in the rest there was Sales Tax Department. If there was a Sales Tax Office in the premises then the allotment could not have been made in the personal name of the Officer. It could be made only in the name of the Office. The second ground raised by the Commissioner was that the Sales Tax Officers are changed and every time to ask for an allotment would not be very convenient. It could be made only in the name of the Office. The second ground raised by the Commissioner was that the Sales Tax Officers are changed and every time to ask for an allotment would not be very convenient. I fail to see why the allotment could not have been made by the Official designation of the Sales Tax Officer. He is certainly a juristic person represented always by some living person. In any event, as has been held by my learned brother Dwivedi, J. in Writ Petition No. 3223, this order would be in favour of the State through its agent, the Sales Tax Officer. There cannot be any doubt that there could be an allotment in favour of the State. In that case, the allotment had been made in the name of the Superintendent of Police, Sri V.P. Hingurani, who was at that time the Superintendent of Police of Bijnor. He was deemed to be an agent of the State and, therefore, it was held that the allotment was a proper allotment. It was also held that when it was allotted to the Superintendent of Police and Sri V.P. Hingurani was the Superintendent of Police at that time, the allotment would be deemed to have been made in favour of Sri V.P. Hingurani I respectfully agree with the observations made by my learned brother in that case. In case there is an application for execution of a lease on behalf of the State, the lease, of course, will be executed by the Collector on behalf of the State as required under the Constitution. But all the same since the rent in this case of the part of the building will be paid by the Sales Tax Department and part by the Sales Tax Officer, the allotment in favour of the Sales Tax Officer appears to be a valid allotment. An allotment of this kind can well also be supported on the basis of convenience of the Government offices. It is usual that one Government officer is transferred from one place to another and the usual practice his been that whenever an officer is transferred his successor usually occupies the same building, which was occupied by his predecessor. The present allotment, therefore would be for the convenience of the State offices. It is usual that one Government officer is transferred from one place to another and the usual practice his been that whenever an officer is transferred his successor usually occupies the same building, which was occupied by his predecessor. The present allotment, therefore would be for the convenience of the State offices. If the building which was occupied by an outgoing officer is not allotted to the incoming officer in his place there is liable to be great difficulty in the administration. 11. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties had argued that a lease cannot be granted in favour of a non living person and since the Sales Tax Officer is a non-living person, the allotment could also be not made in his favour. I am unable to agree with this contention. A Sales Tax Officer is always represented by a living person and the allotment is really not to a dead or an inanimate person, but it is made to a living person by his official designation. For this proposition he relied on certain decisions of the Privy Council as well as of this Court. There are entirely different considerations where the Court had to transfer a certain property and in those cases it considered whether those transfers were valid or not. Rent Control and Eviction Act has been enacted for an entirely different purpose. Considering all the circumstances, I think, therefore, the allotment which was made in 1952 in favour of the Sales Tax Officer was a valid allotment order and any Sales Tax Officer occupying the building would be occupying it in a proper and legal way and he could not be ejected. 12. The real cause of this disturbance in possession appears that the Receiver thinks that this building can fetch a rent of Rs. 125 per month as has been deposed by him in his counter affidavit. The building was assessed in 1942 at only Rs. 45 of rent which was being paid by the Sales Tax Officer. The Receiver wanted to make gain and, therefore, most probably the whole trouble arose. This would be directly in the teeth of the objects of the Rent Control and Eviction Act. The Act had been made for the purpose of protection of the tenants because there was dearth of accommodation. The Receiver wanted to make gain and, therefore, most probably the whole trouble arose. This would be directly in the teeth of the objects of the Rent Control and Eviction Act. The Act had been made for the purpose of protection of the tenants because there was dearth of accommodation. The preamble of the Act says that it was passed "to provide for the continuance during a limited period, of powers to control the letting and the rent of residential and non-residential accommodations and to prevent the eviction of tenants there-form." 13. The second contention of the Learned Counsel for the applicant was that the view of the Second Additional Civil Judge that when an accommodation is put under a Receiver by his order, it was he alone who could allot the same is not sustainable in law. According to him the Act applied to every accommodation except those which have been mentioned in Section 1 Sub-section (2)(a) which runs in the following terms: It shall apply to every municipality and notified area established under the UP Municipalities Act, 1916, and to areas situated within two miles of such municipality or notified area. It is open to the State Government to exempt certain areas or to include certain notified areas. The only exception where this Act will not apply is contained in the proviso which is in the following words: Provided also that nothing in this Act shall apply (i) to any premises belonging to the State Government or Central Government, (ii) to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the State Government or Central Government in respect of premises taken on lease or requisitioned by such Government. (iii) to any tenancy or other relationship in respect of any plot of land not covered by roofed structure. 14. The effect of S. (2)(a) thus is that unless any premises comes within any of the provisos mentioned above it will be governed by the Rent Control and Eviction Act. This property is under the Receivership and it cannot be said that it belongs to the State Government or to the Central Government nor the tenancy of this property was created by the State Government or the Central Government. There is pucca construction over this plot and, therefore, none of the provisos applies to it. 15. This property is under the Receivership and it cannot be said that it belongs to the State Government or to the Central Government nor the tenancy of this property was created by the State Government or the Central Government. There is pucca construction over this plot and, therefore, none of the provisos applies to it. 15. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties had argued that once a property is taken in the custody of the court it is the court and the court alone which can pass orders about it. If that was so, the Act would have made a provision for it. If there was a suit pending with respect to this property before the Second Additional Civil Judge and there was a necessity of a judicial order of injunction being passed then it was open to the Civil Judge to issue an injunction order to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer not to let out to any one except with his orders and in that case finally also he would pass an order as to whom it should be allotted after considering the law. But in a quasi administrative order it could not declare the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as invalid and take upon himself the jurisdiction of allotting houses instead of that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The property actually will be deemed to be the property of the landlord though for the purpose of administration it will be the Receiver, who will be managing. By giving the property to the Receiver, it will not become a suit property. 16. A direction u/s 7 will issue to a landlord to let or not to let a premises. A landlord has been defined u/s 2(c) as follows: 'Landlord' means a person to whom rent is payable by a tenant in respect of any accommodation and includes the agent, attorney, heir or assignee of such person. The Receiver will be deemed to be an agent of the landlord. A landlord has been defined u/s 2(c) as follows: 'Landlord' means a person to whom rent is payable by a tenant in respect of any accommodation and includes the agent, attorney, heir or assignee of such person. The Receiver will be deemed to be an agent of the landlord. After the appointment of the Receiver the rent would be payable to the Receiver by the tenant, whosoever, he may be and, therefore, for the purposes of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, he would be deemed to be the landlord of the premises and as such any direction, which has to be issued by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer will be issued to him. 17. The Second Additional Civil Judge had taken it upon himself because he and his predecessor had made some allotments. Merely because he had made some allotment orders without jurisdiction will not create a jurisdiction in the Civil Judge. The Rent Control and Eviction Act does not provide that any tenancy could be allotted by any Civil Judge. It is only open to the RC and EO to issue a direction under the Act that certain premises may be allotted by some one else and if the Civil Judge wants that it should be allotted to some one it is open to him to move to the RC and EO and get the release of the building. But so long as he does not do so, in my opinion, it is not open to him to make the allotment. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties had argued that the Civil Judge is a higher officer and therefore he should not be governed by the orders of the RC and EO, when allotments are being made. A Civil Judge is no officer at all much less a higher officer. Even if a premises is required by any other higher officer including a High Court Judge, he has got to go to the RC and EO for an allotment and he cannot himself assume the right of allotment because he is simply a higher officer. If there was a judicial proceeding in which there was a necessity of an order being passed the matter would have stood on an entirely different footing. If there was a judicial proceeding in which there was a necessity of an order being passed the matter would have stood on an entirely different footing. Under the circumstances, I think the view of the learned Civil Judge that he would make the allotment and his direction to allot it to some one else are against law. 18. I, therefore, allow the writ petition, quash the order of the Second Additional Civil Judge dated the 25th of July, 1959. The applicant is entitled to his costs from opposite party No. 2.