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1960 DIGILAW 305 (MAD)

S. U. S. Davey Sons v. Additional Commissioner For Workmens Compensation and Another

1960-10-27

RAJAGOPALA IYENGAR

body1960
Judgment :- RAJAGOPALAN, J This writ appeal against the order of Rajagopalan, Jarises out of the order of the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Madras, on an appeal under S.41 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947. The respondent 2 was an employee of a firm of opticians, who are the appellants before us. His services were terminated by an order dated 21 February 1959. The two reasons for the dismissal were : (1) that the employee had refused to do the job entrusted to him by one of the partners of the firm; (2) that he behaved in an indecent and unmannerly way towards one of the partners. The Commissioner held that the order of dismissal was wrong. He found that the first ground was unreasonable became the employee was asked to do something, which he had not been doing before, and on the second ground there was no evidence either before the Commissioner or even in the proceedings of the enquiry. In the result the Commissioner held that the employee was not guilty of misconduct and consequently set aside the order of dismissal. To quash this order of the Commissioner, the employer-firm filed an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. That application was dismissed by Rajagopalan, J., who found that there was no excess of jurisdiction or error in its exercise. Against the dismissal of their petition the employers have come in appeal before us. Mr. Narayanaswami, learned counsel for the employers, pressed before us two points, namely : (1) that the dismissal was for misconduct, but in the memorandum of appeal there is no specific ground that he was not guilty of misconduct; and (2) that, in any event, the appellate authority exceeded its jurisdiction in itself investigating charges of misconduct. There is no substance in the first point. In the application filed by the employee under S. 41 he has stated that his services were terminated without reasonable cause and that it was against law, unjust and unlawful. He requested the Commissioner to inquire into the matter and set aside the order of termination of services. The counter-statement filed by the employers shows that they understood the appeal to be based on the ground that the employee was not guilty of any misconduct. He requested the Commissioner to inquire into the matter and set aside the order of termination of services. The counter-statement filed by the employers shows that they understood the appeal to be based on the ground that the employee was not guilty of any misconduct. The Commissioner says in his order that it is common ground that the applicant was dismissed for misconduct by an order dated 21 February, 1959. Therefore, it is obvious that the question which fell for his decision was whether the dismissal for misconduct was justified.The second contention of Mr. Narayanaswami for the employers-appellants, is evidently based on certain observations to be found in two decisions of the Supreme Court, Indian Iron and Steel Company v. Their workmen and Balipara Tea Estate v. Its workmen We may mention that these two decisions relate to awards passed under the Industrial Disputes Act on references made by the Government of industrial disputes. It cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the appellate authority under S.41 of the Shops and Establishments Act is in pari material with the jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal on a reference under S.10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Apart from this and applying the principles laid down by their lordships of the Supreme Court in these two cases to the instant case, we are unable to find any error committed by the Commissioner in the exercise of his jurisdiction. He found that there was no evidence on record, which would justify the management in holding that the employee was guilty of misconduct. In the circumstances, we entirely agree with Rajagopalan, J., that this Court cannot interfere with the order of the Additional Commissioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The appeal is dismissed with costs of the respondent 2. Advocate's fee Rs. 100.