JUDGMENT M.S. Menon, J. 1. The two defendants in O. S. No. 173 of 1952 of the District Court, Ernakulam, are the appellants before us. The suit was for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under a promissory note for Rs 25,000/- Ext A dated 8-8-1951. 2. The contentions of the defendants which have been rejected by the court below are based on Ext. I, a letter alleged to have been given by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant on 8-8-1951. According to them the non fulfilment of the karar precludes the enforcement of Ext. A or at least reduced the amount payable by the price of the 120 bundles of tobacco agreed to be supplied by the plaintiff, free of cost, under Ext. I. The plaintiff denies Ext. I and the main question for consideration relates to the genuineness of that document. 3. The operative portion of Ext. I reads as follows: xxx The consideration for Ext.A is recited as follows in that promissory note: xxx This detailed recital will apparently improbabilise the existence of a simultaneous karar like Ext. I. 4. Ext. A has no attesting witnesses. Ext. I, however, has been honoured with two. One of them has been examined as DW 1. The lower court after considering his evidence in detail has chosen to disbelieve him. It says: "A reading of his testimony will show that he has not seen the plaintiff. It is such a person who has sworn that he saw the plaintiff executing Ext. I. The description of the plaintiff given by him, especially regarding the mustache will show that he is perjuring. He admits that he has seen plaintiff several times. Yet he commits such mistakes. Evidently he is now trying to support the defendants and he cannot be believed when he swears that Ext. I was executed by plaintiff in his presence." We see no reason to differ from this conclusion. 5. DW 1 said that he was acquainted with the plaintiff. He was asked whether the plaintiff had a mustache. The answer was; xxx 6. The only other witness, apart from the defendants, who attempted to prove the execution of Ext. I was DW 4. He is a casual witness whose evidence deserves no credence. 5. DW 1 said that he was acquainted with the plaintiff. He was asked whether the plaintiff had a mustache. The answer was; xxx 6. The only other witness, apart from the defendants, who attempted to prove the execution of Ext. I was DW 4. He is a casual witness whose evidence deserves no credence. The lower court has dealt with his testimony quite correctly as follows: "As regards DW 4, he is not an attestor to Ext. I nor does DW 1 swear that this witness was present at the time of execution of Ext. I. What DW 4 swears is that he had to get back a kuri kaipada from first defendant, that he went there and then he found the execution of Exts. A and I. I have no hesitation in disbelieving him. He states that the kuri kaipada was with first defendant five or six years before that and he did not claim it back till then. That itself will show that he would not have gone there." 7. One significant circumstance is the omission of the defendants to examine the second attesting witness to Ext. I who was also its scribe. His name -"Rama Kurup" was not even included in the witness list of the 2nd defendant dated 13-6-1953. It first appeared in the witness list of the 1st defendant dated 4-11-1955. No real attempt seems to have been made to get him to court and examine him. On 5-3-1956 the summons for his appearance on 7-3-1956 was returned unserved for want of time by the District Munsiff, Parur. M. P. No. 716 of 1956 dated 7-3-1956 was then filed praying that the summons be handed over to the 1st defendant for service, and that prayer was allowed. The summons, however, was not served and Rama Kurup was not examined. 8. We are told that Rama Kurup was a Muthalpidy of the Paliam. It is difficult to visualise any real difficulty in securing his examination. 9. In these circumstances we are not prepared to accept the genuineness of Ext. I. We hold that the lower court was right in giving a decree as prayed for on the basis of Ext. A. 10. The following words are found engrossed on Ext. It is difficult to visualise any real difficulty in securing his examination. 9. In these circumstances we are not prepared to accept the genuineness of Ext. I. We hold that the lower court was right in giving a decree as prayed for on the basis of Ext. A. 10. The following words are found engrossed on Ext. A : xxx It is contended that the incorporation of this statement amounts to a material alteration within the meaning of S.87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which provides that (subject to S.20, 49, 86 and 125) "any material alteration of a negotiable instrument renders the same void as against any one who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not consent thereto, unless it was made in order to carry out the common intention of the original parties". This contention was raised only at the time of the final submissions in the court below and is not covered by any of the issues raised in the case. Even if the statement was a subsequent interpolation it is impossible to hold that it amounts to a "material alteration" of the promissory note. An "accurate exposition" of the law on the subject to use the words of Whit C. J. in ILR 38 Madras 746-appears in ILR 33 Calcutta 812: "Any change in an instrument, which causes it to speak a different language in legal effect from that which it originally spoke, which changes the legal identity or character of the instrument either in its terms or (he relation of the parties to it, is a material change, or technically, an alteration and such a change will invalidate the instrument against all parties not consenting to the change. This is a wholesome rule founded on sound policy and may be defended on two grounds, namely, first, that no man shall be permitted, on grounds of public policy, to take the chance of committing a fraud without running any risk of loss by the event when it is detected, and, secondly, that by the alteration, the identity of the instrument is destroyed, and to hold one of the parties liable under such circumstances would be to make for him a contract, to which he never agreed. The question, to what extent the identity of an instrument must be changed in order that its legal effect will be altered so as to" bring the case within the terms of material alteration vitiating the instrument, must depend upon the nature of the alteration in each particular case. The lest is not necessarily, however, whether the pecuniary liability of one of the parties has been increased by the change; it is of no consequence, whether the alteration would be beneficial or detrimental to the party sought to be charged on the contract. The important question is whether the integrity and identity of the contract have been changed. It is to prevent and punish such tampering as changes the identity of the contract, that the law does not permit the plaintiff to fall back upon the contract as it was originally, or in the language of Swayne J. 'in pursuance of a stern but wise policy, the law annuls the instrument as to the party sought to be wronged' " 11. In the light of what is stated above the appeal must fail and has to be dismissed. We dismiss the appeal with costs.