Judgment. The respondent, who is the manager of a joint Hindu family owns a building at Theni which bears Union Nos. 320, 321 and 322. Nos. 320 and 322 are shops situate on either side of No. 321 which is a residential portion occupied by the family ; all the three portions are integrally connected. The shop bearing Union No. 320 was leased out to the petitioner in 1941 and since then he has been in occupation of it carrying on business in electrical goods. The family of the respondent is running a business called Gopal Radio Service in shop bearing No. 322 that is a business dealing in electrical goods and in renting out loud-speaker arrangement. The brother of the respondent, a qualified radio mechanic, started a business, which is now found to be a joint family business in repairing radios, etc., under the name of “Wirless India”. As the accommodation available in shop No. 322 was found insufficient, he took up on lease a building in another part of Theni. Stating that shop No. 322 was necessary for the business carried on by the younger member of the family, the respondent filed a petition for the eviction of the petitioner under section 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The petitioner resisted the application on various grounds, which it is now unnecessary to set out in detail. Nor is it necessary to refer to the chequered career of the petition. The Rent Controller directed eviction, while the appellate authority set aside that order. On revision, the learned Additional District Judge of Madurai held that the premises were required bona fide as additional accommodation for the purpose of the business of the family of the respondent and he directed the eviction of the tenant. This Revision Petition challenges the propriety of that order. For the petitioner it was first contended that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to convert a case which fell under section 7 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act that is a claim for bona fide occupation by a owner of another building, into one under section 7 (3) (c) of the Act, which related to a claim for additional accommodation in the same building. It was urged that the case should be decided only under the former provision and that as the younger brother of the respondent was already in occupation of a non-residential building as a tenant, no order for eviction should be passed against the petitioner. I cannot agree that the petition was filed only under section 7 (3) (a) (iii). The respondent was in occupation of a substantial portion of the building ; when he required for personal occupation the other portion as well, the case should be dealt with as one for additional accommodation under section 7 (3) (c), which specifically provides for such a case. It was however argued that as shop No. 320 occupied by the tenant would be a ‘building ‘within the meaning of the term as defined in section 2 (1) of the Act section 7 (3) (c) will not apply, as it contemplated a case of obtaining of additional accommodation of a part of a building, the owner already occupying another portion of the same building. In support of the contention reliance was placed on the decision of Mack, J., in Arunachala Naicker v. Gopal Stores1, where the learned Judge held that a landlord doing business in one building could not evict a tenant carrying on business in another portion of the building, as the portions in which they were respectively carrying on business should be held to constitute separate buildings under the Act, though they structurally formed part of the same building. That decision proceeded on the basis that if the landlord and tenant were in occupation of different buildings as defined in the Act, the operation of section 7 (3) (c) of the Act would be excluded and that the portion let out and that occupied by the landlord would form distinct buildings. A contrary view was however expressed by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in Ganapathi Panidan v. Sheik Mohammad2. It was held in that case that the word “building” defined in section 2 (1) as meaning “any building or portion of a building let or to be let separately” could not have the same meaning as the word “building” in section 7 (3) (c) where the phrase “who is occupying only a part of a building” would have a wider connotation. The view of Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., rests on the familiar rule of interpretation that all statutory definitions and abbreviations should be read subject to the qualifications, expressed in the definition clauses which create them, such as “unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”. In my view it is unnecessary to travel beyond the terms of the definition of the word ‘building' for the purpose of interpreting section 7 (3) (c). But before considering that question it is necessary first to refer to the view taken in Arunachala Naicker v. Gopal Stores1. The ratio of that decision is two-fold: (1) A case of additional accommodation can arise only where the landlord is already occupying a portion of the same building and wants the rest which is in occupation of the tenant ; where the buildings are separate and the landlord is occupying one of them but requires another, it will not be a case of additional accommodation under section 7 (3) (c), but one where the landlord wants accommodation of a building for his own use under section 7 (3) (a) (iii). (2) In deciding whether the landlord is in occupation of a part or whole of a building, the definition given in section 2 will have to be adopted. Therefore, a building structurally one, will constitute two or more if a portion or portions of it had been let out, the tenant occupying some portion or portions and the landlord another. To such a case section 7 (3) (c) will not apply, as they will constitute different buildings under the definition given in the Act. With great respect to the learned Judge, I am unable to agree with the latter proposition. A part of a building in occupation of the landlord will not be a building as defined by the Act, though the part in the occupation of the tenant will be one. Section 2 (1) which defines building creates a fiction in regard to certain cases, whereby a part of a building is deemed to be a building. A part of a building to which that fiction would not apply wi1l not obviously constitute a building under the Act, but would still be called a part of the building. Section 2 (1) which defines building creates a fiction in regard to certain cases, whereby a part of a building is deemed to be a building. A part of a building to which that fiction would not apply wi1l not obviously constitute a building under the Act, but would still be called a part of the building. Section 2(1) states that “building” means any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes, etc. Therefore a part of a building will be deemed to be building for the purpose of the Act only if it is 1et or intended to be let. A portion in the occupation of the landlord cannot be said either to be let or intended to be let. Therefore, that portion will not constitute a building under the Act, and could only be termed a part of the building. Section 7 (3) (c) contemplates a portion of the building in the occupation of the landlord and another portion in the occupation of the tenant, the former seeking eviction of the latter. Further to interpret the portion of the building in the occupation of the landlord as a building would only render nugatory the provisions of section 7 (3) (c) and defeats the purpose of the enactment. On the terms of the definition of the word ‘building’ a landlord occupying a portion of a building could not be said to occupy a distinct building so as to disentitle him to resort to the provisions of section 7 (3) (c). In my opinion, where a portion of a building has been let out to a tenant and the other portion remains with the landlord, the case, would come under section 7 (3) (c) as the portion of the building, in the possession of a landlord could not be held to be a separate building. It was argued that even if section 7 (3) (c) were held to apply, the landlord should positively prove that balance of convenience is in his favour and, as in this case the landlord is occupying a building taken on lease, it should be held that the condition in clause (c) had not been satisfied and that therefore the application for eviction should be rejected. The question whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the landlord or tenant is one of fact. The learned District Judge has held that in the circumstances the landlord would suffer more if relief was refused to him than the tenant by eviction. I do not agree with the contention that whenever a landlord is in occupation of another portion, he cannot apply under section 7 (3) (c) for additional accommodation of a building part of which is already in his occupation ; to hold otherwise would be to import the restrictions, contained in section 7 (3) (a) (iii) into section, section 7 (3) (c). There may be cases where a landlord in occupation of part of a building may bona fide need the rest of it though he may be in occupation of a different building as a tenant. To such case section 7 (3) (c) would apply. Mr. Ramanujam, learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that the business that had been carried on in No. 322 by the respondent was different from the one carried on by his younger brother and that therefore it could not be said that the additional accommodation was required for the purpose of the business that was being carried on in No. 322. According to the learned counsel the words “additional accommodation” in section 7 (3) (c) would imply that additional accommodation was necessary in respect of the very business that was being carried on in the other part of the building. In the present case, it has been found that the nature of the business that has been carried on in No. 322 is the same as that which is carried on by the respondent’s younger brother outside. Both the businesses are the businesses of the family. Even apart from that, I cannot put such a narrow construction on the provisions of section 7 (3) (c). What the provision enacts is that the landlord should require for additional accommodation in respect of his business ; the need should be the landlord’s and not that for the business that is being carried on in the other part of the building. A landlord may have more than one business, or it may be that the landlord might be doing no business in the part of the building which he is occupying, e.g., it might be used only for residential purposes. A landlord may have more than one business, or it may be that the landlord might be doing no business in the part of the building which he is occupying, e.g., it might be used only for residential purposes. In either case, if he needs the portion in the possession of a tenant for the purpose of his business, it will be “additional accommodation” coming within section 7 (3) (c). It follows that the view of the learned District Judge that the respondent is in need of additional accommodation is correct. The Civil Revision Petition fails and is dismissed with costs. On behalf of the petitioner Mr. Ramanujam requests six months’ time being given for delivery of possession of the property. The petitioner has been in occupation of the premises since 1941 and it is stated that it will be extremely difficult for him to obtain accommodation for non-residential purposes in Theni in a short time. I consider that, in the circumstances of the case, the request is a reasonable one. The petitioner will have six months’ time to give vacant possession of the property from the date of receipt of this order by the Rent Controller. R.M. -------- Petition dismissed.