ORDER V.R. NEVASKAR, J. 1. This petition is directed against an order of the court below refusing to exercise its inherent power under Section 151, C.P.C. and secure to the petitioner the refund of money said to have been recovered from him at the instance of the opponent by means of proceeding involving abuse of the process of the Court. The circumstances giving rise to the present petition are as follows:- 2. Petitioner Mohanlal's father Chironjilal filed a suit for money against one Bansidhar and secured against him an order for attachment before judgment. In pursuance of the said order certain ornaments were attached and were entrusted to Ghanshyamdas, the son and Mukhtyar-Aam of Chironjilal for safe Custody with direction to produce them in court when he is required to do so. Later Chironjilal died and the ornaments attached before judgment continued to be in the possession of the petitioner as the heir of Chironjilal. While the attached property of Bansidhar was thus with the petitioner me opponent who had obtained a money decree against Bansidhar, applied for its execution and prayed for the issue of a warrant of attachment for the recovery of the amount in execution Rs. 188-2-3. The executing court issued a warrant. By that time no decree had been passed in favour of the petitioner. When the Nazir went to the house of the petitioner with the warrant aforesaid the petitioner represented the Ghanshyamdas who was looking after his father's litigation had gone out and that consequently he was unable to hand over the ornaments to him and agreed to deposit them in the court later. Petitioner's case is that in spite of his request Nazir would not agree and threatened him with attachment and that therefore he handed over to the Nazir Rs. 188-2-3 in cash on 12-1-1957. After this other decree-holders of Bansidhar also sought attachment. Thereupon Ghanshyamdas deposited the ornaments of Bansidhar held by him in Court on 5-2-1957 after securing decree against Bansidhar in the suit filed by his father on 2-2-1957. The amount of Rs. 188-2-3 deposited by petitioner on 12-1-1957 were paid off to the opponent, Somani. 3. About 8 months later on 7-10-57 the petitioner submitted an application in the Execution Case No. 460 of 1956, in which the opponent was the decree-holder, praying for a direction to the opponent to redeposit the amount of Rs. The amount of Rs. 188-2-3 deposited by petitioner on 12-1-1957 were paid off to the opponent, Somani. 3. About 8 months later on 7-10-57 the petitioner submitted an application in the Execution Case No. 460 of 1956, in which the opponent was the decree-holder, praying for a direction to the opponent to redeposit the amount of Rs. 188-2-3 which according to the petitioner had been recovered from him under the threat of an illegal warrant. The jurisdiction of the court under Section 151 CPC was sought to be invoked. The grounds put forth by the petitioner regarding illegality of warrant and recovery of Rs. 188-2-3 were - (1) Ghanashymdas was a public officer and the attachment of the property in his charge could only have been effected in accordance with the procedure laid down in Order 21 Rule 52, CPC. (2) Since the property was not in the possession of Judgment-debtor but it was with a third party the attachment should have been effected under Order 21, Rule 46 by issuing notice to the said party and not by a warrant for the seizure of the property or in the alternative money. (3) The property was under the Supradnama of Ghanshyamdas and not Chironjilal and heirs of the latter except Ghanshyamdas could not have called upon to produce the ornaments. 4. The defence put upon behalf of the opponent to this petition was that the property had neither been entrusted to Ghanshyamdas as a Supraddar nor was he a public officer with reference to the said ornaments of Bansdhar. The property was under the Supradaoma of Chironjilal and on his death his sons and legal representatives became liable to produce the property in court when called upon to do so. The court had asked for the production of the property with a view to its sale in execution of the decree but the petitioners and his brother realising that they had not by then secured a decree thought fit to take the risk and chose voluntarily to deposit the amount is execution with reference to opponent's decree. The petitioner could not seek court's aid by invoking its in herent powers after the decree obtained by the opponent had been entered as satisfied and proceeding closed. 5. It appears clear from the report of the Nazir Ex D/1 dated 12-1-57 and the terms of the warrant Ex. The petitioner could not seek court's aid by invoking its in herent powers after the decree obtained by the opponent had been entered as satisfied and proceeding closed. 5. It appears clear from the report of the Nazir Ex D/1 dated 12-1-57 and the terms of the warrant Ex. P/1 that the warrant was for production of the property given in charge of Chironjilal during the 'attachment before judgment proceeding' and, the warrant was directed against the heirs of deceased Chironjilal on the ground that Chironjilal was the Supraddar for the same. The petitioner as one of the heirs voluntarily paid, Rs. 188-2-3 with a view to save the property so that it might become available to himself and his brothers for realisation of the dues in respect of a prospective decree in a pending suit. Subsequent production of the property itself on 5-2-1957 was after they had secured their decree before 2-2-1957 (Vide Ex P/8) 6. Mr. Chaphekar's contention is that even on the assumption that the property was under the Supradnama of Chironjilal only warrant that could have been issued was in terms of Order 21, Rule 46, C.P.C. by notice as indicated there and not by seizure. The warrant for seizure was illegal and money paid under the threat of an illegal warrant was money illegally recovered and since this was done at the instance of the opponent it should be held to be refundable. 7. It was further contended in the alternative that even assuming that the heirs of Chironjilal were liable to produce the property the same having delivered in court on 5-2-1957 the amount recovered in lieu of that property was clearly refundable and should have been called back from the decree-holder under its inherent powers. The same not having been done it could have been secured when the court was moved later on invoking its inherent powers for which there was no limitation. 8. As regards the contention that the court could not have issued a warrant for delivery of ornaments against the heirs of Chironjilal the contention has no force. The warrant clearly was against the heirs and required them to hand-over the attached ornaments to its officer. The property being already actually seized there was no question of seizure. 8. As regards the contention that the court could not have issued a warrant for delivery of ornaments against the heirs of Chironjilal the contention has no force. The warrant clearly was against the heirs and required them to hand-over the attached ornaments to its officer. The property being already actually seized there was no question of seizure. It was really a warrant for delivery to persons who as Trustees or Supraddars from the very court were bound to hand over the ornaments to court's Nazir. The contention that they could not have been asked to give the ornaments at their own place but could have been asked to do so before the presiding officer in court has no substance. Provisions of Order 21, Rule 46 CPC have really no application in this case. The moveable property of the judgment-debtor was not really with a third party before its attachment. It had been already attached and seized and handed over to a person who can be said to be the subordinate officer of the court as the term is used in Order 21, Rule 43, CPC. The procedure provided in Order 21 Rule 46, CPC is to be followed prior to its attachment as the property of the defendant or judgment debtor. Where however the property is already attached in accordance with the procedure under Order 21, Rule 43 it need not be reattached. The property has merely to be called for its sale from the Supraddar. It is also not open for the petitioner to contend that the procedure to be followed was under Order 21, Rule 52. In fact Mr. Chaphekar did not press that part of the contention. There was therefore no real error in the warrant issued. The petitioner and his brothers could have followed the straight course and handed over the attached property to the Nazir and obtained the receipt. They would then have been relieved of all liability. But it seems they had the temptation not to allow the property (assets) to be received by the court on that day as they had not till then obtained any decree and hence could not have applied for its execution before the receipt of assets so as to claim ratiable distribution. They would then have been relieved of all liability. But it seems they had the temptation not to allow the property (assets) to be received by the court on that day as they had not till then obtained any decree and hence could not have applied for its execution before the receipt of assets so as to claim ratiable distribution. An excuse was therefore found that Ghanshyamdas had gone out and that they had no knowledge and that therefore they were prepared to pay the amount of the warrant. That this was merely an excuse appears to be clear because we do not find the petitioner or his brothers including Ghanshyamdas rushing to court the next day with the ornaments and praying for the refund of the amount paid by them. Nothing was done till they had obtained a decree in their suit. It was after the decree in their case and when finding further risk to keep the property by reason of similar attempt at execution against those ornaments by another decree-holder of Bansidhar on 4-2-1957, that the property was produced on 5-2-1957. On this occasion when a similar warrant was issued Ghanashyamdas rushed to the presiding officer to seek protection and did not wait as on the earlier occasion. Even after thus producing the property nothing was done for over seven months and after the execution proceedings of the opponents had long before terminated. 9. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the opponent had secured satisfaction of his decree by restoring to any proceeding involving abuse of the process of the court. The fault if any lay with the petitioner. The power under Section 151, CPC is discretionary and where the proceeding in which such power is sought to be invoked had already terminated. It could be exercised in clearest cases involving abuse of the process of the court. The opponent decree-holder in this case was not at fault. All that he was concerned with was realisation of his dues and when this was done he was not further concerned. He could not at this distance of time be required to pay back money and be left in lurch particularly when the petitioner could have avoided the situation by handing over the ornaments on 12-1-1957. 10. The refusal of the court below, therefore, to exercise powers under Section 151 CPC is correct. He could not at this distance of time be required to pay back money and be left in lurch particularly when the petitioner could have avoided the situation by handing over the ornaments on 12-1-1957. 10. The refusal of the court below, therefore, to exercise powers under Section 151 CPC is correct. At any rate there is no illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. 11. The petition therefore is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed