ORDER : M.S. MENON, J. 1. The petitioners prayed that the court sale of four items of property in pursuance of the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1109 of the District Court of Kottayam should be set aside. The prayer was rejected. 2. The prayer was based on sub-section (1) of S. 22 of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958. The petitioners prayed that the court sale of four items of property in pursuance of the decree in O. S. No. 81 of 1109 of the District Court of Kottayam should be set aside. The prayer was rejected. 2. The prayer was based on sub-section (1) of S. 22 of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958. That sub-section (omitting the provisos) reads as follows: “(1) Where any immovable property in which an agriculturist had an interest has been foreclosed, or sold, either in execution of any decree or under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force, for the recovery of a debt due to a creditor or to a banking company, as defined in the Banking Companies Act, 1949, in liquidation- (i) On or after 1st November, 1956, or (ii) Before 1st November, 1956, but the possession of the said property has not actually passed before 20th November 1957, from the judgment debtor to the purchaser, then, notwithstanding anything in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or in the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force, and notwithstanding that the sale has been confirmed such judgment debtor, may- (a) In the case of a sale where the purchaser is the decree-holder, deposit one-half of the purchase money together with the costs of execution, where such costs were not included in the purchase money, and apply to the Court within six months of the commencement of this Act to set aside the sale of the property and the Court shall, if satisfied that the applicant is an agriculturist entitled to the benefits of this Act, order the sale to be set aside and the Court shall further order that the balance of the purchase money shall be paid in ten equal half-yearly instalments together with the interest accrued due on such balance outstanding till the date of payment of each instalment at five per cent per annum, the first instalment being payable within a period of six months from the date of the order of the Court; and (b) In other cases, deposit the purchase money as respects sales, or the mortgage amount including interest and costs as respects foreclosures, and apply to the Court within six months of the commencement of this Act to set aside the sale or foreclosure of the property, and the Court shall, if satisfied that the applicant is an agriculturist entitled to the benefits of this Act, order the sale or foreclosure to be set aside.” 3. The sale of the four items of property was in one lot, and prior to the 1st November 1956. It is also clear that the possession of only three of the items actually passed before the 20th November 1957 to the purchaser, and that the possession of the remaining item is still with the petitioners. The question for consideration is whether the sale in such a case can be set aside under subsection (1) of S. 22. 4. The order of reference states the question as follows: “The question is whether when possession of a portion of the property sold in execution has passed from the judgment-debtor to the purchaser before the 20th November 1957 but possession of the rest has not, the judgment-debtor can claim that possession of the property sold has not actually passed so as to bring his case within S. 22 (1) (ii) of Kerala Act 31 of 1958.” 5. It is common ground that if the sale has to be set aside, it has to be set aside in its entirety, and that it is not possible to set it aside only in so far as it affects the item of property still in the possession of the petitioners. The question, therefore, is whether, when four items of property were sold in one lot, we can say that the possession of “the said property” has not actually passed if one of the items included in the sale has not been delivered to the purchaser. We think we can. “The said property” must mean the entire property sold, and when the possession of the whole of that property has not passed, but only of a portion thereof, the possession of “the said property” should be considered as not having passed from the judgment-debtor to the purchaser. 6. It follows that this petition has to be allowed, and we do so with costs here and in the court below. 7. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the possession of all the four items have, as a matter of fact, passed to the purchaser. The papers on record make it quite clear that this submission is incorrect, that the delivery of the second item was stayed by the court, and that the said item is still in the possession of the petitioners. 8. The papers on record make it quite clear that this submission is incorrect, that the delivery of the second item was stayed by the court, and that the said item is still in the possession of the petitioners. 8. In A.I.R. 1941 Madras 158, when dealing with a similar enactment-the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 - Patanjali Sastri, J., said that the provisions of the Act being of an expropriatory character it should be strictly construed and its scope should not be extended beyond what is clearly and expressly indicated by its terms. We have proceeded on this basis. 9. It has, however, to be noted that another view is possible, and that debtor and creditor legislation has often been the subject of a liberal interpretation. As stated by Sutherland: “Both legislation and decisions show a tendency to favour the rights of the debtor over the claims of the creditor, probably, because the position of the creditor under the common law was such that his bargaining power permitted him, sometimes, to gain an unfair advantage. Therefore, in the interpretation of debtor and creditor legislation the tendency has generally been to favour the debtor.” (Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, page 358) The legislature of a welfare State cannot but encroach on many of the Victorian sanctities of contract and decree. The preamble to the Act itself shows that its avowed object is “to provide for the relief of indebted agriculturists in the State of Kerala”. 10. There is a very clear statement of the distinction between the strict and liberal constructions in Mecaffrey’s Statutory Construction: “Strict construction of a statute is that which refuses to expand the law by implications or equitable consideration, but confines its operation to cases which are dearly within the letter of the statute as well as within its spirit or reason; it resolves all reasonable doubts against the applicability of the statute to the particular case. Liberal construction expands the meaning of the statute to embrace cases which are clearly within the spirit or reason of the law, or within the evil which it was designed to remedy, provided such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the language used; it resolves all reasonable doubts in favour of the applicability of the statute to the particular case.” (Page 145) “Few words” as stated by the author “are so plain that the context or the occasion is without capacity to enlarge or narrow their extension”. The justification for the application of one or the other of the rules to a given case must depend on the fact that the rule of construction utilised gives effect to the legislative intent. 11. A large and increasing amount of the time of the courts has during the past three hundred years been spent in the interpretation and exposition of statutes, and as pointed out by Lord Simonds in (1957) I All. England law Reports 49: “It is natural enough that the guiding principles should be stated in different language and with such varying emphasis on different aspects of the problem that support of high authority may be found for general and apparently irreconcilable propositions.” 12. We consider it unnecessary to deal with the matter any further. As already stated the petition has to be allowed even on the adoption of the strict rule of construction. 13. The question raised but not considered by the court below cannot be dealt with in this order and are left open for future determination.