JUDGMENT Mootham, C.J. - This is an appeal from an order of a learned Judge dated 17-12-59. 2. The first Respondent is the owner of a residential house of Nawab Yusuf Road, Allahabad, which is and has been in the occupation of the Appellant as the tenant of this Respondent since 1940. In 1958 the Respondent applied to the District Magistrate u/s 3(1) of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for per-mission to file a suit for the ejectment of the Appellant, but that application was rejected by an order dated 21-7-58, and an application for the revision of that order was dismissed by the Commissioner on 3-11-58. The first Respondent then filed a petition in this Court u/Art. 256 of the Constitution in which he challenged the validity of the orders of the Additional District Magistrate and the Commissioner and prayed that they be quashed. That petition was allowed and the relief sought was granted by the order which is the subject of this appeal. 3. The Respondent sought permission to file a suit for the ejectment of the Appellant on the ground that he required the house for his own residence. He said that he was living as a guest in that house of his father-in-law in the city, that as he had a large family that accommodation was insufficient and his relations with his father-in-law had become strained. It also appears that he wanted to provide accommodation for his son who would shortly be setting himself up as a legal practitioner. The application was opposed by the Appellant who is an Advocate. His case was that the Respondent's application was not genuine, his purpose in making the application being to compel the Appellant to agree to an increase of rent. 4. Section 3(1) provides that a landlord cannot file a suit for the eviction of his tenant, except on certain specified grounds, unless he first obtains the permission of the District Magistrate. It is well settled that the order of the District Magistrate granting or refusing permission is an administrative order made by him in the exercise of his discretion. The section however lays down no guide as to how or on what principles the District Magistrate should exercise this discretion; but that does not mean that his power is unfettered or uncontrolled. The section however lays down no guide as to how or on what principles the District Magistrate should exercise this discretion; but that does not mean that his power is unfettered or uncontrolled. The power given to the District Magistrate is conferred on him for the purpose of effect being given to the policy of the Act itself. It can be for no other purpose. In Harishankar Bagla and Another Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 465 the validity of a power given to the Textile Commissioner by Cl. 3 of the Cotton Textiles Control of Movement Order, 1948, to grant permits for the movement of textiles was challenged on the ground that it was Arbitrary and unregulated, as Cl. 3 did not lay down any guide as to the manner in which the Textile Commissioner was to exercise his discretion. The Supreme Court rejected this contention. It said: The policy underlying the order is to regulate the transport of cotton textile in a manner that will ensure an even distribution of the commodity in the country and make it available at a fair price to all. The grant or refusal of a permit is thus to be governed by this policy and the discretion given to the Textile Commissioner is to be exercised in such a way as to effectuate this policy. So also in our opinion the discretion of the District Magistrate u/s 3(1) is to be so exercised as to carry out the policy of the Act. A similar view has been expressed by Mehrotra, J. in Dr. J.R. Bhatia v. Shrimati Victoria Rani Sahiba 1957 AWR 396 , by M.L. Chaturvedi, J. in Sri Jai Shankar Prasad Shttkla v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur Writ petition No. 583 of 1957, decided on 14.10.57 and more recently by Dhavan, J. in Ram Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others Writ Petition No. 3233 of 1958, decided on 22-9-59. 5. The policy of the Act is to be found in its preamble and provisions. It is to ensure that vacant accommodation is fairly allocated, that the rent therefor is not excessive and is regularly paid and that tenants are not to be evicted except on good grounds. 5. The policy of the Act is to be found in its preamble and provisions. It is to ensure that vacant accommodation is fairly allocated, that the rent therefor is not excessive and is regularly paid and that tenants are not to be evicted except on good grounds. The Act was passed at a time when there was an acute shortage of accommodation and the attendant risk of rack-renting and other exploitation of tenants and it was, we think, to guard against these risks that this legislation was enacted. Section 3(1), as is pointed out in the last mentioned case, is intended to protect a tenant against arbitrary eviction by placing a restriction on the landlord's right to file a suit for his ejectment. If the landlord desires to file a suit for the eviction of his tenant on any of the grounds specified in Clauses (a) to (g) of this Sub-section, he is free to do so; if however he wants to file a suit for the eviction of his tenant for any other reason, he must satisfy the District Magistrate that he has a good ground for doing so. We are of opinion therefore that it is the duty of the District Magistrate, when dealing with an application u/s 3(1), to weigh the respective claims of the landlord and the tenant and then to grant or refuse permission. Provided he acts in good faith-for the exercise of any discretionary power to be valid must be in good faith- and is not shown to have misdirected himself as to the purpose of the Act, his decision cannot successfully be questioned in this Court. 6. Provided he acts in good faith-for the exercise of any discretionary power to be valid must be in good faith- and is not shown to have misdirected himself as to the purpose of the Act, his decision cannot successfully be questioned in this Court. 6. It was pressed on us in argument on behalf of the Respondent that, as a landlord has a fundamental right to enjoy his property in any manner that he chooses, permission ought to be given to him to file a suit for the eviction of his tenant provided he can satisfy the District Magistrate that his need for the accommodation is genuine; and reliance was placed on L. Chiman Lal v. Messrs Banwari Lal Kailash Chand 1959 AWR 70 in which the learned Judge said at p. 73: Where the owner requires the accommodation for himself and his need is genuine the Rent Controller has in view of the very nature of the right of the owner of the property, a duty under the law to grant him the requisite permission u/s 3. With great respect we are of opinion that undue emphasis has been laid on the claim of the owners. Every citizen has a fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, but property includes leasehold rights and both are subject to reasonable restrictions. this Court has held the Rent Control and Eviction Act to be a valid enactment, and the correctness of that decision is not questioned. A landlord's right to recover possession of property in the occupation of a tenant is therefore subject to the provision of Section 3(1). 7. We turn now to the impugned order of the District Magistrate. In this order the Additional District Magistrate, after stating briefly the claims of the landlord and the tenant,says: The house was inspected, by the Rent Control Inspector who has submitted his report, about the accommodation in both the houses, i.e., the house in dispute and the one in which the applicant was living at present. From the whole file which I have perused with care and after hearing the arguments of the applicant and the opposite party it appears that the house in dispute is in possession of the opposite party who is practising as a lawyer for the last 18 years on handsome rent. From the whole file which I have perused with care and after hearing the arguments of the applicant and the opposite party it appears that the house in dispute is in possession of the opposite party who is practising as a lawyer for the last 18 years on handsome rent. He has established his practice and has earned- goodwill while the applicant wanted the house in dispute for his son who was still studying & was likely to enter into the legal profession in future. The accommodation in possession of the applicant at present seems to be sufficient for his purposes and I do not see any reason for uprooting the opposite party from the house in dispute. I do not consider the applicant's need as genuine and reject the application". The learned Judge was of opinion that this order-as also that of the Commissioner to which we shall refer shortly was vitiated in two respects by "manifest error." In the first place, he was of opinion that the Addl. District Magistrate had Completely ignored the size of the accommodation, the number of persons living in it and the growing needs of a growing family". Secondly, he considered that both officers were "eminently persuaded in their conclusions in "refusing the permission by the fact that respondent No. 3 had been living in the accommodation for over 18 years and built up a goodwill also therein". In essence, it appears, the learned Judge was of the view that the Additional District Magistrate had attached undue importance to the claim of the tenant and had failed to examine sufficiently closely the need of the landlord. 8. With all due respect to the learned Judge we think that these were matters which lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Addl. District Magistrate. The officer considered the claims of both parties; he did consider the need of the landlord and he weighed against it the disadvantage which would accrue to the tenant if he were evicted. This he was entitled to do; and although the conclusion at which he arrived may not be one which this Court would have reached a matter about which we express no opinion at all it is not a conclusion with which this Court can interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. This he was entitled to do; and although the conclusion at which he arrived may not be one which this Court would have reached a matter about which we express no opinion at all it is not a conclusion with which this Court can interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. We are of opinion that there are no sufficient grounds, in the exercise of that jurisdiction, for setting aside the order of the Addl. District Magistrate. 9. The order of the Commissioner in revision stands on a different footing. This order is of a quasi-judicial nature and therefore liable to be quashed if it suffers from an apparent, error of law. The Commissioner rejected the applicant on in revision for two reasons. It appears that the Respondent had stated his willingness to share the accommodation with, the Appellant. The Commissioner regained this statement as evidence that the Respondents' application for permission to evict the Appellant from the entire building was extravagant. The Commissioner was further of opinion that as the Respondent's counsel had said that the Appellant had sublet a small part of the premises, this fact, if true, would entitle the Respondent to file an ejectment suit against the Appellant, u/s 3(1). Cl. (e) without first obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate. 10. In the first place we think that the Commissioner overlooked the fact that even if the Respondent would be satisfied if he obtained possession of part only of the house, he had (in the absence of agreement with the Appellant) to apply for permission to file a suit for the eviction of the Appellant from the entire house. The law did not permit him to apply for permission to file a suit for the ejectment of the Appellant from a part of the building. 11. Secondly, the Commissioner was in error in thinking that the mere fact that the Appellant had sublet part of the premises would entitle the Respondent to file an ejectment suit. Cl. (e) of Section 3(1) provides that a landlord may file a suit (without first obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate) for the eviction of a tenant who has, on or after the 1st October 1946, sublet the whole or part of the accommodation without the permission of the landlord. Cl. (e) of Section 3(1) provides that a landlord may file a suit (without first obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate) for the eviction of a tenant who has, on or after the 1st October 1946, sublet the whole or part of the accommodation without the permission of the landlord. It appears to have been the Respondent's case that such subletting as occurred was lot unauthorized, and if this be so, Cl. (e) would have no application. This matter was not enquired into by the Commissioner. 12. We are of the view, therefore, that although there is no ground for setting aside the order of the Additional District Magistrate, the order of the Commissioner cannot stand. The appeal is therefore allowed to this extent, that so much of the order of the learned Judge as directs that the order of the Additional District Magistrate dated the 22nd July, 1956 be quashed is set aside. The case will go back to the Commissioner for a reconsideration of the application in revision in the light of the observations made in this judgment. As the Appellant has partly succeeded and partly failed, there will be no order as to costs.