JUDGMENT P. Govinda Menon, J. 1. This is an appeal by the V.T.K. Estate and Palace Fund Employees Union against the order in a writ petition filed by the Palace Administration Board (herein after referred to as the Board) for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing an order, dated 9th June 1958 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam and also for a writ of prohibition directing the Tribunal not to proceed with the adjudication of the Industrial Dispute No. 25/1958 on its file. The learned judge who heard the writ petition held that the work carried on by the Board would not come within the definition of 'Industry as defined in Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 (herein after referred to as the Act) and the dispute that is referred for adjudication will not be an industrial dispute and that the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry. 2. Before dealing with the question whether the work carried on by the Board is in the nature of an Industry' as defined in the Act it would be relevant to state how the Board came into existence. The Board is administering the properties belonging to the Cochin Royal Family, the income of which is utilized for the maintenance of the ladies and minor members of the Royal Family. The Palace Fund was also constituted by the Government of Cochin for the maintenance of the junior ladies of the Royal Family. Previously the Estate was under the direct supervision and control of the Valiamma Thampuran or the senior-most lady member of the Royal Family. The properties are all outstanding in the possession of tenants and she was collecting the rent of the properties from the tenants. This work of management was first entrusted to the Government of Cochin under a Proclamation of 1929 and the Government was employing a separate Government servant to manage the estate. The assumption of management by the Government however did not change its character or convert it into Government property. It is stated that the benefit or such Governmental management was conferred on various other ancient families like The Paliyam Family, The Cheranallur Stanam, etc. 3. At the time of the integration of the two States of Travancore and Cochin the Maharaja of Cochin promulgated a new Proclamation 9/1124 (1949). It is stated that the benefit or such Governmental management was conferred on various other ancient families like The Paliyam Family, The Cheranallur Stanam, etc. 3. At the time of the integration of the two States of Travancore and Cochin the Maharaja of Cochin promulgated a new Proclamation 9/1124 (1949). By section 3 of this Proclamation the Cochin Government as an administrative machinery was replaced by a body corporate and it is this Board that is now administering the estate and the palace fund. The preamble of the proclamation would show that the intention was to make provision for the administration, management and conservation of the estate and the palace fund. Sections 13 and 14 conferred powers on the Board to administer the properties as carefully as an ordinary prudent man will deal with his funds and properties and the Board was exercising all powers incidental to the beneficial management of the estate. 4. The question for consideration in this appeal is whether in managing the properties the Board is running an 'Industry' as defined in section 2 (j) of the Act and whether there is a valid reference by the Government under the Act. What is contended by the Board is that, what they are now doing is what was originally being done by the Valiamma Thampuran and that in discharging its duties and in managing the properties they are not engaged in any 'Industry' as defined in the Act. The Union on the other hand would contend that the Act has defined 'Industry' in very wide terms and having regard to the inclusion of the word undertaking� in the definition of 'Industry' the work done by the Board could be deemed to be an 'Industry for the purpose of the Act. 5. Before deciding the question whether the work carried on by the Board can be treated as an "undertaking" we would see the definition of these words in the Act. "Section 2 (J) "Industry" means any business, trade, undertaking manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen; (k) "Industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person". 6. 6. The question what the word Industry' and what the term undertaking' connotes have been the subject of various decisions. In Budge Budge Municipality v. Sri P.R. Mukherjee 1953 (1) L.L.J. 195 . His Lordship Chandrasekhara Aiyar, j., while discussing the import of the word 'Industry' stated as follows: "There is nothing, however, to prevent a statute from giving the word industry and the words "industrial dispute" a wider and more comprehensive import in order to meet the requirements of rapid industrial progress and to bring about in the interests of industrial peace and economy, a fair and satisfactory adjustment of relations between employers and workmen in a variety of fields of activity, it is obvious that the limited concept of what an industry meant in early times must now yield place to an enormously wider concept so as to take in various and varied forms of industry, so that disputes arising in connection with them might be settled quickly without much dislocation and dis-organisation of the needs of society and in a manner more adapted to conciliation and settlement than a determination of the respective rights and liabilities according to strict legal procedure and principles. Conflicts between capital and labour have now to be determined more from the standpoint of status than of contract. Without such an approach, the numerous problems that now arise for solution in the shape industrial disputes cannot be tackled satisfactorily, and this is why every civilised Government has thought of the machinery of conciliation officers, boards and tribunals for the effective settlement of disputes."� Speaking about the word "undertaking in the definition of industry, it is stated: "Though the word undertaking� in the definition of industry� is wedge in between business and trade on the one hand and manufacture on the other and though therefore it might mean only a business or trade undertaking, still it must be remembered that if that were so, there was no need to use the word separately from business or trade. The wider import is attracted even more clearly when we look at the latter part of the definition which refers to "calling, service, employment or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen Undertaking" in the first part of definition and "industrial occupation or avocation" in the second part obviously mean much more than what is ordinarily understood by trade or business. The wider import is attracted even more clearly when we look at the latter part of the definition which refers to "calling, service, employment or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen Undertaking" in the first part of definition and "industrial occupation or avocation" in the second part obviously mean much more than what is ordinarily understood by trade or business. The definition was apparently intended to include within its scope what might not strictly be called a trade or business venture." The learned Judge then quoted the observations of Isaacs and Rich, JJ., in Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employee Union of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation 28 C.L.R. 508) "Industrial disputes occur when, in relation to operations in which capital and labour are contributed in co-operation for the satisfaction of human wants and desires, those engaged in co-operation dispute as to the basis to be observed, by the parties engaged, respecting either a share of the product or any other terms and conditions of their co-operation." It will therefore be seen that while liberally construing Industry' and Industrial dispute' Their Lordships have emphasised that the essence of the definition of 'Industry' is one of co-operation between capital and labour. 7. This decision has been followed in a later decision of the Supreme Court in Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen 1957 (1) L.L.J. 8 . The question for decision there was whether the workers in a Municipal Department engaged in the generation, supply and sale of electric energy were entitled to bonus, Referring to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court it was observed: "It is now finally settled by the decision of this court in D.N. Banerjee v. P. R. Makerjee (1953 S.C.R. 302) that a municipal undertaking of the nature we have under consideration here is an "industry" whithin the meaning of the definition of that word in S.2 (j)of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, and that the expression industrial disputes� in that Act includes disputes between municipalities and their employees in branches of work that can be regarded as analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business." 8. In Hospital Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Bombay 1957 (1) L.L.J. 55 the question was whether the dispute regarding retrenchment of some workmen in the J.J. group of hospitals was an industrial dispute. In Hospital Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Bombay 1957 (1) L.L.J. 55 the question was whether the dispute regarding retrenchment of some workmen in the J.J. group of hospitals was an industrial dispute. Chagla, C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench stated: "The definition of "industry is not confined to an activity of commercial character, nor does it import necessarily a profit motive of the employment of capital. Industry is not only any business or trade or manufacture, but it is also an undertaking or calling of employers and the expression "undertaking" is an expression of very wide import and connotation. Undertaking is nothing more than any work or project which a person might engage in. Work or project might not be for commercial implications. It might not be engaged in with the object of making profit. It might be from motives of philanthropy." The learned Judge further stated that- "The correct test to determine whether a particular activity undertaken by the Government is "industry within the meaning of S. 2 (k) of the Act would be to determine whether if that activity had been undertaken by a private agency it would have been an industry to which the act would apply. The correct approach would be to decide what activities are essential to the authority of Government as such, what are the functions which only the Government could discharge and which it would not be competent for any private individual to discharge. If there is an activity which can be undertaken by a private agency and the same activity is carried on by Government, then such activity must be held to be "industry" within the meaning of the industrial Disputes Act." 9. Reference was then made to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Dunderdale v. Mukherjee 1958 (II) L.L.J. 183 Mukherji, J., observed: "Industry is a partnership between labour and capital and the industrial product is the result of that co-operation and partnership. They each have a share in building the product of industry. Both capital and labour are impressed on the product of industry. That is the basic and distinctive test of industry for the settlement of whose industrial disputes the Constitution of India as well as special statutes like the Industrial Disputes Act and many other statutes have made zealous provisions for the industrial welfare of the country." 10. Both capital and labour are impressed on the product of industry. That is the basic and distinctive test of industry for the settlement of whose industrial disputes the Constitution of India as well as special statutes like the Industrial Disputes Act and many other statutes have made zealous provisions for the industrial welfare of the country." 10. In National Union Commercial Employees and another v. Meher and others 1959 (II) L.L.J 38, the same question whether a firm of solicitors is an industry within the meaning of the Act came up for consideration. Chainani then acting, C.J., observed: "In any case, the basic concept of industry has always been held to be that there must be co-operation between the employer and the employee, either in producing wealth or in rendering services. In other words, what comes out of the industry must be the result of the combined effort of both. That the legislature had this concept in mind is indicated by the use of the words of employer in the first part of the definition and the words employment, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen in the second part." His Lordship further stated: "The pursuit or a learned profession like that of a solicitor does not require any co-operation of labour. A solicitor offers his own personal services, or, to put in different words is paid for the legal advice and legal assistance given by him personally. His staff cannot do this work or give legal aid to his clients. The money which he earns is for work done by him personally. Its quality depends on his personal qualifications, his brains, his knowledge of law, and the labour put in by him personally. The remuneration earned by him depends upon his personal reputation and the kind and quality of work done by him personally. His staff performs what may be called ministerial functions by typing his opinions, or the documents prepared by him, or by maintaining accounts of his income and expenditure. There is no co-operation between or joint effort of the employer and the employee in this profession, nor is such co-operation or combined effort indispensable for carrying on the profession. An essential requisite of the concept of industry is, therefore, wanting. Consequently, such a profession cannot be said to be an industry within the meaning of the Act." 11. There is no co-operation between or joint effort of the employer and the employee in this profession, nor is such co-operation or combined effort indispensable for carrying on the profession. An essential requisite of the concept of industry is, therefore, wanting. Consequently, such a profession cannot be said to be an industry within the meaning of the Act." 11. The next case to which reference was made was the decision in Osmania University v. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad 1960 (1) L.L.J. 593 to which one of us (Ansari, C.J.), was a party. It was held in that case that the definition in the enactment would not be intended to cover what would not be the disputes between capital and labour nor disputes where activities are neither directly connected with or attendant upon the production or distribution of wealth, and that the essence of the definition of "industry is one of co-operation between capital and labour, however, varied the co-operation may be and that the co-operation between labour and capital being the significant and distinctive test any educational institution where that co-operation does not exist, would not be covered by the definition of industry. 12. This question has been considered in a recent Supreme Court Case in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha 1960(1) L.L.J.251. That was a case where two employees in the J. J. group of hospitals were retrenched and the question that arose for consideration was whether the Act would apply to those hospitals and whether the hospitals could be said to be an industry. Their Lordships stated that though section 2 (j) uses words of very wide denotation, a line would have to be drawn in a fair and just manner so as to exclude some callings, services or undertakings, and that it would be possible to exclude some activities from section 2 (j) without any difficulty. The activities of the Government which can be properly described as regal or sovereign activities are outside the scope of section 2 (j) as they are functions which a constitutional Government can and must undertake for governance and which no private citizen can undertake. The activities of the Government which can be properly described as regal or sovereign activities are outside the scope of section 2 (j) as they are functions which a constitutional Government can and must undertake for governance and which no private citizen can undertake. Their Lordships then observe: "In considering the question as to whether the group of hospitals run by the appellant undoubtedly for the purpose of giving medical relief to the citizens and for helping to impart medical education are an undertaking or not, it would be pertinent to enquire whether an activity of a like nature would be an undertaking if it is carried on by a private citizen or a group of private citizens. There is no doubt that if a hospital is run by private citizens for profit, it would be an undertaking very much like the trade or business in their conventional sense. We have already stated that the presence of profit motive is not essential for bringing an undertaking within section 2 (j). If that be so, if a private citizen runs a hospital without charging any fees from the patients treated in it, it would nevertheless be an undertaking under section 2 (j). Thus the character of the activity involved in running a hospital brings the institution of the hospital within section 2(j). Does it make any difference that the hospital is run by the Government in the interpretation of the word "undertaking" in section 2(j)? In our opinion, the answer to this question must be in the negative. It is the character of the activity which decides the question as to whether the activity in question attracts the provision of section 2(j); who conducts the activity and whether it is conducted for profit or not do not make a material difference. Their Lordships stated that it is difficult to state what are the attributes the presence of which makes an activity an undertaking within section 2 (j): But "An activity systematically or habitually undertaken for the production or distribution of goods or for the rendering of material services to the community at large or a part of such community with the help of employees is an undertaking. Such an activity generally involves the co-operation of the employer and the employees and its object is the satisfaction of material human deeds. Such an activity generally involves the co-operation of the employer and the employees and its object is the satisfaction of material human deeds. It must be organized or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organized or arranged. It must not be casual, nor must it be for oneself nor for pleasure. Thus the manner in which the activity in question is organized or arranged, the condition of the co-operation between employer and the employee necessary for its success and its object to render material service to the community can be regarded as some of the features which are distinctive of activities to which S. 2 (j) applies. 13. In Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Its employees 1960(1)L.L.J. 523 the question was whether and to what extent the activities of the Corporation of the City of Nagpur would come under the definition of Industry� in section 2(14) of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947. His Lordship Subba Rao, J., stated that the definition of industry in the Act is very comprehensive and having regard to the clear phraseology used therein, the section cannot be confined to trade or business or activities analogous to trade or business and that if a service rendered by an individual or a private person would be an industry it would equally be an industry in the hands of the corporation. The principles laid down in the earlier case were affirmed. 14. Judged in the light of the principles in these cases it would be seen that the work carried on by the Board in this case would not be an Industry. It is not an activity which is concerned with the production or distribution of goods nor is its activity concerned with the rendering of material service to the community. The only work that is being done by the Board is to manage certain private properties of some of the members of the Cochin Royal Family by collecting rent from the tenants. It is true that staff is employed by the Board for clerical work or for keeping proper accounts or for collection work. In that way the staff may be said to make some contribution. But the employment of such persons cannot convert a purely personal or individual effort into an Industry. It is true that staff is employed by the Board for clerical work or for keeping proper accounts or for collection work. In that way the staff may be said to make some contribution. But the employment of such persons cannot convert a purely personal or individual effort into an Industry. Every aspect of activity in which the relationship of employer and employee exists or arises does not thereby become an industry. We can hardly think in terms of an industry when we have regard, for instance, to the rights and duties of master and servant or of a Government or its secretariat or the member of the medical profession working in a hospital. As Justice Mukherji observed in the case in Dunderdale v. Mukherjee 1958 (II) L.L.J. 183 : "Industrial Disputes Act has for its aim in the preamble "settlement of industrial disputes. The purpose of the Act is to bring in harmony between the relationship of labour and capital. The normal inequality of bargaining power between labour and capital is one of the reasons why the statute in a welfare democracy to-day intervenes to help and safeguard labour to solve the disputes. The principles on which this intervention is based is not far to seek. It is that the product of industry is regarded as a joint venture of labour and capital. The shareholders and directors of a company arrange the capital, raise the share money and provide the management. The workers provide the labour and thus join in manufacturing and producing the product. The capital of the employer is wedded to the labour of the employees. The final product, therefore, is the result of the co-operation between labour and capital." 15. But where the pruduct is not the joint result of labour and capital, then the very basic test of industry is absent. It must also be noticed that there is no activity undertaken by this Board concerning the production and distribution of goods to the community. Its activities cannot in any sense be said to be for service to others except probably the owners of the property. It must also be noticed that there is no activity undertaken by this Board concerning the production and distribution of goods to the community. Its activities cannot in any sense be said to be for service to others except probably the owners of the property. It is difficult to hold that if the Valiamma Thampuran, the senior-most lady was doing this work it could be treated as an industry or an undertaking and if what she was doing cannot be said to be an industry then the mere fact that the Board has stepped into her shoes would not make the work an industry or undertaking. If the work of management by an individual having one item or a few items of property and receiving its income would not be treated as an industry, we fail to see, how if there are a large number of items of properties and it is being managed by an agent of the owner it would make any difference. 16. It might be that if the Board undertakes any other business venture like starting an industry with the surplus income of the estate and disputes arise between the Board and its employees it may be an industrial dispute. But where nothing like that exists, we are not able to see how the management of the properties in this case could be deemed to be an industrial undertaking. It was pointed out that the Board has invested some of the surplus income in constructing a house at Ernakulam and has let it out on rent. That by itself would not be an undertaking, however wide a connotation is given to the expression 'undertaking. Therefore the argument that every institution which employs persons is an industry within the meaning of the Act and the disputes between the institution and its employees would be an industrial dispute cannot be accepted. It ignores the basic concept of industry, which is, that there must be a joint endeavour of both the employer and the employed and that what comes out of the industry must be the result of the combined efforts of both. It, therefore, follows that the order of the learned Judge allowing the writ petition is correct It is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed, but under the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.