ORDER Anna Chandy, J. 1 This revision is from the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Chengannur dismissing the petition filed by the accused in C.C. No.112 of 1959 of that court praying that the complaint against them be dismissed for want of sanction as required by section 197 (1) of Criminal Procedure Code. 2. The complainant case was that at about noon on 23rd July 1959 while he was standing in his property called Illathu Purayidom on the southern side of Mulakkazha English High School a police party including the two accused the 1st accused was the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Chengannur and the 2nd accused, a Head Constable of the Armed Reserve came there and after beating up the people standing in front of the school the two accused trespassed into his property and assaulted him with the result that he suffered grievous hurt. The complaint was taken on the file and summons issued to the accused. The accused appeared and put in a petition stating that since the case was one concerning their actions while on official duty and as no sanction to prosecute them has been obtained as required by section 197 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the case should be dismissed. They alleged that at the time in question some 2,000 Persons under the leadership of the complainant and others had gathered at the High School in a demonstration against the Government. The local Executive First Class Magistrate declared the crowd an unlawful assembly and when the crowd failed to disperse the Magistrate ordered the police to disperse it by a lathi-charge. It is further alleged that the complainant was one of those arrested and charged in this connection. The learned Magistrate dismissed the above petition holding that the necessity for such a sanction must be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made in the complaint and not with reference to any plea that the accused proposed to raise and that in this case the allegations in the complaint indicate that the actions of the accused could not have been done or purported to have been done in the discharge of their official duties. 3. I shall first consider the point as to when the question of sanction under section 197 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code can be raised in a case. 3. I shall first consider the point as to when the question of sanction under section 197 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code can be raised in a case. Though there had been some differences of opinion on this point the matter has now been finally settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Metajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari A.I.R 1956 S.C. 44. In answering the question Is the need for sanction to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained?" the court held: " The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty ; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case." 4. In the light of the above observations there can be no doubt that the question of sanction under section 197 can be considered at any stage of the case, when from the facts before it, the court can come to a decision whether such sanction is necessary or not, However it must be observed that since the question is one of jurisdiction it is best determined at the earliest opportunity. 5. I shall now consider whether in this case there is at present enough material before court to decide the question of sanction. The complainant himself does not allege that the accused had any previous enmity with him or that they came to the place for the purpose of belabouring him. His case is that the accused at the head of a police party came there with rifles and lathies and after belabouring the crowd in front of the school, trespassed into his property and assaulted him, while the accused contend that they were only carrying out the orders of the Magistrate to disperse by a lathi-charge the crowd of persons which included the complainant. Thus it can be inferred from the complaint itself that at least when they were using their lathies on the crowd the accused were acting in the discharge of their official duty. The question whether the assault on the complainant also fell strictly within the scope of their duty or whether it was in excess of it are only to be decided later when the trial proceeds. What need be shown for the purpose of ascertaining whether sanction is necessary or not is that there was some relation between the offence alleged and the discharge of official duty, a relation such that the accused can reasonably claim that the act was done in the performance of his duty. In the case already cited the Supreme Court considered this question as well and the court held : " What we must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so inter-related that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. " The same view has been taken in an earlier case reported in Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 30. That was a case where a public servant was charged with the offence of criminal misappropriation. In the course of that judgment. His Lordship Mr. Justice Venkatarama Ayyar, J. observed: "It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under section 197(1), Criminal P.C.; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties ; but it the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office then sanction would be necessary ; and that would be so irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution. " After an elaborate discussion of the questions in the light of the decisions of the Privy Council, the Federal Court and the Supreme Court. " After an elaborate discussion of the questions in the light of the decisions of the Privy Council, the Federal Court and the Supreme Court. His Lordship ended up by saying that "Whether sanction is necessary to prosecute a public servant on a charge of criminal misappropriation, will depend on whether the acts complained of hinge on his duties as a public servant. If they do; then sanction is requisite. But if they are unconnected with such duties, then no sanction is necessary. " 6. Judged by this standard the instant case is one where on the available records the court could have held that the accused can reasonably claim that the acts complained of were done in the discharge of their duties as public servants and as such sanction was requisite for prosecuting them. 7. This Revision is hence allowed and the order of the learned Magistrate is set aside.