JUDGMENT V.D. Bhargava, J. - A preliminary objection has been raised to the hearing of this appeal on behalf of the respondent. It was urged that this appeal was filed without obtaining a previous certificate in the proper manner from the learned single Judge, who had decided the case. There appeared to be a difference of opinion between the opinion expressed by Malik, C. J. in similar circumstances on 22-1-1953 in Second Appeal No. 187 of 1947 and that of Randhir Singh J. in Special Appeal No. 4 of 1953 wherein he had taken a different view. 2. On the last occasion, when the case was listed on 15-12-58, we had adjourned the case for a detailed report from the Deputy Registrar after obtaining information from Allahabad as to whether there were other cases on this issue or not. After enquiry from Allahabad a report has been put up before us. There were three cases at Allahabad, where leave was refused on the ground, that it was made after the delivery of the judgment, but all these three orders related to a period when Rule 6 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court had been amended and, therefore, those decisions are not of much assistance to us. 3. There is a history about the rule of obtaining permission from the judge. Before the amalgamation of the Allahabad High Court and the Oudh Chief Court the right of appeal so far as Allahabad High Court was concerned was governed by Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court and by Section 12 of the Oudh Courts Act which provided a right of appeal against an order of the Single Judge where the Judge who passed the judgment declared that the case was a fit one for appeal. The Allahabad High Court had made rules under the powers conferred upon it by the Parliament, the Letters Patent and the Acts of the Indian Legislature and it included R. 7 of Chap. 111 of the Rules of the High Court of Allahabad as it stood before the amalgamation. That rule read as follows:- "An application for leave to appeal under Section 10 of the Letters Patent against an appellate judgment of a Single Judge of this Court shall be made in writing or orally to the Judge deciding the appeal immediately after the judgment is delivered. That rule read as follows:- "An application for leave to appeal under Section 10 of the Letters Patent against an appellate judgment of a Single Judge of this Court shall be made in writing or orally to the Judge deciding the appeal immediately after the judgment is delivered. No other application for such leave to appeal shall be entertained." 4. The Oudh Chief Court had also made R. 7 of Chap. XII which read as follows:- "An application for a declaration under sub-Sec. (2) of Section 12 of the Oudh Courts Act, 1925, that a case decided in an appellate judgment of a single Judge of the Chief Court is a fit one for appeal, shall, unless made orally to the Judge at the time when the judgment is delivered, be made by a petition presented to the Registrar within 30 days from the date of the judgment, unless the Judge in his discretion on good cause shown grants further time for its presentation." 5. Thus the position before the amalgamation was that so far as Allahabad High Court is concerned, there could not be any application for a certificate from a single Judge after the pronouncement of the judgment. It could be either before or at the time of the delivery of the judgment. So far as the Oudh Chief Court is concerned, if it was an oral request it could be made at the time of the delivery of judgment but if it was a written application it could be made within thirty days from the date of the judgment. 6. Both the Courts were amalgamated in 1948 and for some time it appears that the respective rules of the two Courts remained in force till the High Court Rules of 1952 were framed. The original rule relating to this matter was R. 6 of Chapter VIII which was in the following words:- "Where a Special Appeal from the judgment of one Judge does not lie unless such Judge has declared that the case is a fit one for appeal, an application for such declaration may be made orally before or at the time when the judgment is delivered. The Court shall thereupon record an order granting or refusing to grant such declaration." 7. This rule was again amended by notification no. The Court shall thereupon record an order granting or refusing to grant such declaration." 7. This rule was again amended by notification no. 90/VIII-C-90 dated 30-3-1956 by means of which for the words may be made orally the words shall be made either orally or in writing had been substituted. There cannot be any doubt that after the amendment of this rule, there cannot be any application either oral or written for a certificate after the delivery of the judgment. It should be made either before or at the time of the judgment. 8. In the present case the learned single Judge decided the appeal on 28th September, 1954, on or before that date no application either oral or in writing was made for a certificate of fitness for filing the special appeal. On 11th November, 1954, however, an application was moved with a prayer that the appeal be certified to be a fit one for filing a special appeal, and the learned single Judge granted the aforesaid certificate on 9th December, 1954. We have thus to interpret the Rule 6 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court, 1952 as it stood before the amendment of 1956. Learned counsel for the respondent had argued that there is no provision in this rule for making any written application and the application could only be made orally at the time of the judgment or before it and it could not be made in any other manner and, therefore, the leave which has been granted in the present case is not a proper one. It was contended that the intention should also be gathered from the rule as it previously stood and also from the rule as it later on stands, from which it is quite clear that the Court never contemplated a written application being given after the delivery of the judgment. 9. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant on the other hand, is that in rule 6 the word used is may and it does not exclude the filing of a written application. It gives a right to the appellant to apply orally before or at the time of the judgment if he so wishes. 9. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant on the other hand, is that in rule 6 the word used is may and it does not exclude the filing of a written application. It gives a right to the appellant to apply orally before or at the time of the judgment if he so wishes. The choice is his, But, in case, he does not prefer to orally apply for the same, he can apply at a later stage by a written application which has not been prohibited by R. 6 of Chap. VIII as it then stood. He has further contended that, in any event, this Bench cannot question the propriety of the leave which has already been granted. 10. So far as the second argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned we do not agree. If the leave has not been properly granted in accordance with the Rules of Court, then certainly this Bench can go into the matter. There is provision for grant of special leave by this Court to appeal to the Supreme Court and 'their Lordships of the Supreme Court have in several cases considered whether the leave granted was a proper one or not and if it had not been properly granted they had refused to consider the appeal. In our opinion, therefore, the second contention of the learned counsel has no force and we are competent to look into the matter. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant in order to show that a right of written application has not been taken away had also placed reliance on Badruddin Abdul Rahim v. Sitaram Vinayak Apte, AIR 1928 Bombay 371. There the Bench had observed that if an oral request is made straightaway no written application was necessary. The counsel should be encouraged to make an oral application at the time the judgment is pronounced instead of making it later, when a written application would be necessary and arrangement would have to be made for a special sitting to hear the application by the Judge, who probably by that time must have forgotten the facts of the case. From this observation it was contended that the right of written application was not taken away, when provision was made for oral application to be made before or at the time of the delivery of the judgment. From this observation it was contended that the right of written application was not taken away, when provision was made for oral application to be made before or at the time of the delivery of the judgment. In interpreting the rule we cannot go into the intention of the rule makers. There was an old R. 7 of Chap. 111 which clearly provided for both oral and written applications. If the intention of the rule was to prohibit written applications altogether then certainly the rule should have said so. In the old rule the word used was shall and not may. Under the circumstances it cannot be presumed that when the new rule was framed the intention of the rule was to read the word may as shall. To our mind the clear meaning of the rule is that if an oral application is to be made it should be made before or at the time of the delivery of the judgment but there was no prohibition to make a written application later on. Honble Malik, C. J., had not considered this question in detail and this aspect does not appear to have been brought to his notice. To a certain extent Honble Randhir Singh J., in Special Appeal No. 4 of 1953 had considered it. He has held that Rule 6 of Chapter VIII was only an enabling provision. 12. We are, therefore, of opinion that the word may is indicative of the fact that in case the applicant wishes to make an oral application he could make it only before or at the time of the judgment but there is no prohibition in this rule from making any written application and the leave that has been granted in the present case is a proper leave under the rule as it then existed. We, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. The appeal will now be heard on merits.