This appeal under sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been filed against an order of the Deputy Collector, Jagir, Jhunjhunu dated 11.6.1957 whereby the claim of the appellant was finalised under sec. 32(2) of the Act. This appeal was heard by a Division Bench on 30.4.58 and was referred to a larger Bench because of a decision of another Division Bench delivered on 18.4.1958 in Sarup Narains case. In that case the point involved for determination was as to whether an order passed under sec. 21 could be made the subject of an appeal to the Board or not and it was decided in the negative. The present case is clearly distinguishable from that case. Ordinarily this case could have been remitted to the Bench concerned for decision on merits but on the request of the learned counsel for the parties it was considered proper to dispose of this case in view of the fact that it had become fairly old. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has laid stress on the following points— (1) The lower court was not justified in allowing compensation and rehabilitation grant on the basis of assessed rent, i.e. Rs. 93.1.0 and disallowing the rent actually being realised i.e. Rs. 261.8.0. (2) That the Patwar Fund of Rs. 58.6.6 was wrongly rejected by the lower Court. (3) That the date of resumption should have been taken to be 29.10.54 and not 10.9.55. (4) That village Pipal-Ka-Bas should have been taken as unsettled in view of the judgment of the Special Board of Revenue of the former Jaipur State dated 29.4.47 which was upheld by the Prime Minister of the former Jaipur State on 6.5.47. To appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant it will be necessary to examine in detail the decision of the Special Revenue Board of the former Jaipur State dated 29.4.47. It would appear therefrom that village Bhimsar alias Pipal-ka-Bas which was included in the Matmi of Thakur Sobhagsingh of Jhakora was brought under settlement operations along with other villages of that Thikana. The chakbandi parchas were also distributed in Smt. 1999. The Government of former Jaipur State vide its order N0.853/SC.
It would appear therefrom that village Bhimsar alias Pipal-ka-Bas which was included in the Matmi of Thakur Sobhagsingh of Jhakora was brought under settlement operations along with other villages of that Thikana. The chakbandi parchas were also distributed in Smt. 1999. The Government of former Jaipur State vide its order N0.853/SC. dated 8th June, 1945 had decided "bonafide hawalas which existed at the time of the introduction of settlement will for the present be excluded from settlement but the hawalas which the Panchpana Sardars created after the introduction of settlement or which they may create hereafter will not be excluded from settlement." In pursuance of this Government order the Kamdar of the Thikana presented an application to the Settlement Department on 14.7.45 with the prayer that as this village was held in Khangi by the Thakurs wife Thukrani Bika-watji, under a patta executed in February, 30 the settlement introduced in that village may be cancelled. After necessary enquiries in the matter the Special Board of the former Jaipur State consisting of Sarva Slid Altaf Ahmad Kheri and Pashupati Nath Kaul came to the conclusion that the objection filed by the Thikana should be allowed, that the village Bhimsar alias Pipal-Ka-Bas, be recorded in the hawala of Thakurani Bikawatji of Thakur Sobhsinghji of Jhakora and the settlement parchas distributed to the tenants of the village be treated as cancelled subject to the understanding that arrears of rent would be realised at the rates mentioned in the cancelled parchas plus 25% over and above such rates. This recommendation was submitted by the Special Board to the Prime Minister who agreed with it on 6.5.47. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to this decision and has argued that as the settlement parchas distributed in this village were cancelled it should be held that the settlement itself was cancelled and that the village should be treated as unsettled for purposes of the present Act. The term "settled" has been defined in sec. 2 (n) of the Act. Prior to 4-12-57 (i.e. before the enforcement of Rajasthan Act No. 36 of 1955) the term used was "settled village" and was defined as meaning a village to which the rent rates determined during settlement operations have been made applicable.
The term "settled" has been defined in sec. 2 (n) of the Act. Prior to 4-12-57 (i.e. before the enforcement of Rajasthan Act No. 36 of 1955) the term used was "settled village" and was defined as meaning a village to which the rent rates determined during settlement operations have been made applicable. The term "settled" when used with reference to a village or any other area means the village or other area to which the rent rates determined during settlement operations have been made applicable whether prospectively or retros-pectively and the whole of such village or area shall be deemed for the purposes of the Act and the Rules and orders made thereunder to be so settled if such rates have been made so applicable to not than less three fourths of such village or other area. Generally speaking therefore it may be observed that both the definitions have one feature in common namely the application of rent rates determined during settlement operations. We have, therefore, to determine as to how far this ingredient will be found to exist in the present case. The decision of the Special Board no where lays down that settlement operations carried out in the village or that the rent rates determined during settlement operation shall be treated as cancelled. It simply lays down that the settlement parchas distributed to the tenants of this village be treated as cancelled and this was also subject to the understanding that arrears of rent would be realised at 25% over and above such rates. This order when considered in the context of the then events would reveal that the trouble against the settlement operations arose at the instance of the Jagirdar for the obvious reason that he was interested in collecting produce rents or cash rents much in excess of those which could be held to be economic or fair by the Settlement Officer. The State Government as a matter of policy though anxious to introduce settlement in the interest of fixity and fairness of tenures was desirous of adopting a cautious approach with a view to avoid organised residence from numerous Jagirdars. The Jagir-dars were authorised in the former Jaipur State to create sub-grants and the exclusion of these sub-grants from settlement operations was considered as a conciliatory step.
The Jagir-dars were authorised in the former Jaipur State to create sub-grants and the exclusion of these sub-grants from settlement operations was considered as a conciliatory step. The grant of Khate-dari parcha is generally associated in the common mind with the acquisition of tenancy rights and to remove any notions in this respect emphasis was laid on the cancellation of the Khate-dari parcha. The rent rates evolvd by the Settlement Department were nowhere held to be void or wrong. On the contrary they were held to be valid and justifiable and as a concession to the jagirdars demand the arrears were allowed to be collected at a higher rate which was to be regulated by a fixed percentage over the assessed rent rate. If the assessed rent rate be ignored there would be a vacuum and it was not possible for the Jagirdar to realise any rent or arrears of rent. If cannot, therefore, be held that the rent rates were not made applicable in the present case. We have made further enquiries in the matter and have been informed that this village of Bhimsar was settled in Smt. 1999 prior to the formation of Rajasthan and after that there has been no subsequent settlement. What is more important is the fact that at present rents are being realised at the rates settled by the Settlement Officer of the former Jaipur State in Smt. 1999. In other words, the rent rates evolved in Smt. 1999 are applicable even now and have been in the filed since then. The village must therefore deem to be settled one. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant therefore is untenable. In view of the above decision it would not be necessary to discuss the date of resumption. But as some arguments were addressed to us on this point it may be observed that the Revenue Department vide Notification No. F. 4(388) Rev. A/53, dated 17th December, 1954 published in Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 18th December, 1954 Extraordinary issue appointed 1st January, 1955 as the date for resumption of settled Jagir lands with an annual income of not less than Rs. 1001 and not more than Rs. 2000.
A/53, dated 17th December, 1954 published in Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 18th December, 1954 Extraordinary issue appointed 1st January, 1955 as the date for resumption of settled Jagir lands with an annual income of not less than Rs. 1001 and not more than Rs. 2000. It has been argued that as this Jagir was unsettled this Notification should be deemed to be inapplicable to it and that Notification No. D. 1773/F.1(D) dated 15.2.1960 published in Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary dated 15.2.1960 should be deemed to be applicable to it. This notification lays down that first day of March, 1960 shall be the date of resumption of all Jagir lands settled or unsettled that have not so far been resumed under or in pursuance of any previous Notification. A reference to the claim filed by the appellant itself shows that the date of resumption has been shown as 10.9.55. On what basis has this been arrived at is not clear. However, it is clear that this Jagir was resumed long before the Notification dated 15th February, 1960 and hence it cannot be said with regard to this Jagir that it had not been resumed till then. For this reason the Notification would be inapplicable to it. Besides, as pointed out above this Jagir cannot be deemed to be unsettled. Though it is discussed by implication above yet for the sake of clarity we may point out that the learned lower court was justified in allowing Rs. 93/1/- only on the basis of the assessed rent rates. The claim of the appellant for Rs. 261.8.0 is based on actual collections far in excess of the assessed rent rates. For purposes of calculation of gross income the principles laid down in sec. 6(3) (a) shall apply. We find, therefore, no substance in this appeal and direct that the same shall be rejected accordingly.