These two appeals arise out of proceedings by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act acquiring several items of properties situated in the village of Mukhasa Nanjikottai, Tanjore District, for the public purpose of construction of quarters for the Armed Reserve. The claimant before the Land Acquisition Officer was one A.Y.S. Parisutha Nadar. At the inception the claim was made for himself and as guardian of his minor children. Being an Indian Christian governed by the Indian Succession Act and the properties acquired being the sole and exclusive properties of Parisutha Nadar at the subsequent stages of the proceedings following the award by the Land Acquisition Officer, he alone figured as the claimant. O.P. No. 40 of 1955 on the file of the Subordinate Judge’s Court of Tanjore arose out of a reference by the Land Acquisition Officer under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and that related only to the quantum of compensation payable to the claimant. O.P. No. 20 of 1955 on the file of the same Court arose out of a reference under sections 30 and 31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act and that related to the title of the claimant to receive the compensation amount payable as a result of the acquisition. The total extent of the plots acquired was 8 acres, 63 cents and 278.8 sq. feet comprised in four items: (1) R.S. 1/2-A: (ii) T.S. 2851-A-1 ; (iii) T.S. 2851-B-1 and (iv) T.S. 2851-C-1-A. Before the Land Acquisition Officer the claimant claimed compensation at the rate of Rs. 5,500 per acre. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation only at the rate of Rs. 2,000 per acre. At that rate the amount of compensation worked out to Rs. 17,272-12-0. To this a sum of Rs. 1,437-8-0 was added representing the value of building, wells, crops, trees, etc. The 15 per cent. solatium came to Rs. 2,806-8-0. The total award of compensation was therefore Rs. 21,516-13-6. At the stage of the reference under section 18 of the Act before the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore the claimant put forward a claim at the rate of Rs. 6,063 per acre. The learned Subordinate Judge in modification of the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer fixed the amount of compensation at the rate of Rs. 5,445 per acre. On this basis the amount payable by way of compensation came to Rs. 54,078-11-0. 6,063 per acre. The learned Subordinate Judge in modification of the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer fixed the amount of compensation at the rate of Rs. 5,445 per acre. On this basis the amount payable by way of compensation came to Rs. 54,078-11-0. A.S. No. 169 of 1957 has been preferred by the State of Madras against this award of the Sub-Court of Tanjore. The contention on behalf of the State Government is that the award made by the Court below is excessive. The Mukhasa village of Nanjikottai wherein the acquired properties are situated was notified under Madras Act XXVI of 1948 and was taken over by the State Government under Notification, dated 22nd December, 1952. In O. P. No. 20 of 1955 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tanjore, the State Government raised the contention that the claimant is not entitled to draw the compensation amount as there was no patta in his favour issued under the provisions of the Madras Estates Abolition Act of 1948 and the learned Subordinate Judge overruled this contention holding that the claimant was not in any way disentitled to get the benefit of the award. A.S. No. 230 of 1957 has therefore been preferred by the State Government challenging the correctness of this decision of the learned Subordinate Judge as well. We shall first deal with A.S. No. 169 of 1957 raising the question of the proper compensation amount payable by the State Government for the acquisition made. The acquired properties are admittedly situated in a prominent, aristocratic locality in the Tanjore town. On the west of the acquired sites the residential quarters of the District Superintendent of Police, the District Collector, the District Judge, the District Engineer and the other officers are situated. Quite a large number of big bungalows have been built by wealthy residents of the locality in the row opposite to the quarters of the aforesaid officers. The railway station of Tanjore lies in close proximity to the sites. They abut the Tanjore-Pudukottai Road. The area in which the sites are located is such as to covet persons to purchase plots therein for construction of residential quarters. The notification under section 4 (1) of the Act was on 28th October, 1953. The railway station of Tanjore lies in close proximity to the sites. They abut the Tanjore-Pudukottai Road. The area in which the sites are located is such as to covet persons to purchase plots therein for construction of residential quarters. The notification under section 4 (1) of the Act was on 28th October, 1953. Under section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under the Act the Court should take into consideration the market value of the land on the date of the publication of the notice under section 4 (1) of the Act. The expression ‘market value’ is not defined under the Act, but it is now settled law that the market value is the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser. See Vyricherla Narayana Gajapathiraju v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatnam1 . One of the several guides adopted by the Court fixing the amount of compensation is to have regard to the price for which lands adjacent to the acquired lands or lying in close vicinity thereof were sold and purchased, before the notification under section 4 (1) of the Act. On behalf of the State Government reliance is placed on Exhibit A-6, dated 28th October, 1953, the very date of section 4 (1) notification which was a sale deed executed by one Arulanandaswami Nadar, brother of the claimant in favour of Sri R.A. Sundaram Bishop of Tanjore. The consideration for this sale-deed was a sum of Rs. 2,000. It was only on the basis of this sale-deed that the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 2,000 per acre. We are of opinion that Exhibit A-6 cannot afford a criterion to fix the proper compensation having regard to the evidence on record which shows that Exhibit A-6 was not a normal transaction by which the property therein was conveyed for the prevailing market value. The vendee under Exhibit A-6 was examined on commission and the deposition taken has been filed as Exhibit B-105 in the case. That shows that the vendor Arulanandaswami was of a charitable disposition and that he gave away a few sites adjacent to the property comprised in Exhibit A-6 to an association called Little Flower Colony at a concessional rate. The vendee under Exhibit A-6 was examined on commission and the deposition taken has been filed as Exhibit B-105 in the case. That shows that the vendor Arulanandaswami was of a charitable disposition and that he gave away a few sites adjacent to the property comprised in Exhibit A-6 to an association called Little Flower Colony at a concessional rate. Further under Exhibit B-106, dated 22nd October, 1953, Arulanandaswami who conveyed the property under Exhibit A-6 to the Bishop made a gift to that very Bishop of an extent of about 6 acres of land. The report of the Tahsildar, Exhibit B-104 shows that the sale in favour of Rev. Sundaram under Exhibit A-6 should not be taken as the basis for fixing the compensation amount. As per that report of the Tahsildar Rev. Sundaram told him that Rs. 2,000 which was paid by him per acre was far below the market price of the sites in the vicinity and that the vendor showed him some concession in the price as the land was purchased for his. Diocese. We are of opinion that the sale deeds, Exhibits B-22 and B-24 comprising lands adjacent to the lands acquired can be taken into consideration for fixing the market value of the acquired properties. Exhibits B-22 and B-24 bear the same date 4th June, 1952. The price disclosed in those two sale-deeds shows that one acre of land was valued at bout Rs. 6,000. It is true that both Exhibits B-22 and B-24 related to bits of property, 15,810 sq. feet and 18, 578sq. feet respectively. The acquired plot being 8 acres, 63 cents and 278. 8 sq. feet is no doubt larger in extent than those covered by Exhibits B-22 and B-24. It may be that some reduction from the market value indicated in Exhibit B-22 and Exhibit B-24 is called for because of the size of the property acquired. The learned Subordinate Judge has only granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 5,445 per acre and not at Rs. 6,000-the rate at which the properties were sold under Exhibits B-22 and B-24. There is another sale-deed Exhibits B-25, dated 18th October, 1953, in regard to an adjacent land which shows that the value was fixed at Rs. 11,880 per acre. 5,445 per acre and not at Rs. 6,000-the rate at which the properties were sold under Exhibits B-22 and B-24. There is another sale-deed Exhibits B-25, dated 18th October, 1953, in regard to an adjacent land which shows that the value was fixed at Rs. 11,880 per acre. The learned counsel for the State Government contended that Exhibit B-25 ought not to be taken into consideration as the property therein was purchased for the purpose of erecting a petrol bunk. Assuming that Exhibit B-25 fixed the value at a level abnormally higher than the prevailing market value, it cannot be said that the rate Rs. 5,445 per acre fixed by the learned Subordinate Judge is in any way extravagant or excessive. P.W. 1 the Land Acquisition Officer who passed the award admitted in cross-examination that the land value in the locality has been steadily increasing between 1952 to 1954. On the date of the section 4 (1) notification the market value of the sites in that locality was certainly in an upward trend. As the Judicial Committee pointed out in Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v. Charlesworth Pilling & Co.1, in all valuations judicial or otherwise there must be room for inferences and inclinations of opinion which being more or less conjectural are difficult to reduce to exact reasoning or to explain to others. In Nowroji Rustomji Wadia v. The Government of Bombay2, Lord Sumner observed that fixing of fair compensation for land is not an algebraic problem which can be solved by an abstract formula. The learned Subordinate Judge has done his best in fixing the amount of compensation as fairly and accurately as possible having regard to the evidence on record and if we were to modify it in any manner reducing the amount of compensation we will only be introducing our guess in the matter. We do not therefore feel called upon to interfere with the amount of compensation as fixed by the Court below. This appeal: therefore fails and is dismissed without costs. The respondent in A.S. No. 169 of 1957, the claimant, has preferred a memorandum of cross-objections claiming compensation at the rate of Rs. 6,063, per acre. He is not entitled to claim anything more than what he claimed before the Land Acquisition Officer. This appeal: therefore fails and is dismissed without costs. The respondent in A.S. No. 169 of 1957, the claimant, has preferred a memorandum of cross-objections claiming compensation at the rate of Rs. 6,063, per acre. He is not entitled to claim anything more than what he claimed before the Land Acquisition Officer. It is sufficient to say that his claim for enhanced compensation claiming more than what was awarded to him by the Court below is absolutely devoid of merits. The memorandum of cross-objections therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. A. S. No. 230 of 1957.-This appeal raises the question whether the claimant is disentitled to receive the compensation amount either on the ground that he has no title to the properties acquired or on the ground that there is a statutory bar under the provisions of Madras Act (XXVI of 1948) disabling him to assert any title to those properties. The claimant purchased the properties from his elder brother, Arulanandaswami Nadar under Exhibit B-2, dated 20th September, 1947, for a sum of Rs. 10,000. In respect of item No. 1 (R.S. 1/2-A-6 cents) there is no document of title in favour of Arulanandaswami or in favour of the claimant. Item No. 4 T. S. 2851-B-1 of an extent of 29,419, sq. feet belonged to the Municipal Council of Tanjore as a result of acquisition by the State Government on its behalf as evidenced by Exhibits B-14 and B-15. The Municipal Council conveyed the property in favour of Arulanandaswami under Exhibit B-7, dated 15th February, 1932. The title of the claimant in respect of this item is therefore indisputable. Items 2 and 3 T.S. 2851-A-1 of an extent of 26,460 sq. feet, T. S. 2851-C-1-A of an extent of 7 acres and 12,786 sq. feet were acquired by Arulandaswami under various sale-deeds, Exhibits B-1, B-2, B-3, B-5 and B-8. It is not necessary to refer to those documents in detail. The properties originally belonged to the members of the Tanjore Royal family who were parties to a partition suit, O.S. No. 3 of 1919 on the file of the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Tanjore. Arulanandaswami acquired the properties from the several sharers of the Royal Family and ultimately sold them to his brother, the claimant, under Exhibit B-12, dated 20th September, 1947, as stated already. Arulanandaswami acquired the properties from the several sharers of the Royal Family and ultimately sold them to his brother, the claimant, under Exhibit B-12, dated 20th September, 1947, as stated already. The recitals in the sale-deeds in favour of Arulandaswami show that he became the owner of both the warams in the lands. The title of the claimant in respect of items 2 and 3 also cannot be disputed. The learned counsel for the State Government contended that the absence of any sale-deed in respect of item 1, R. S. 1/2-A, in favour of the claimant or his brother, Arulanandaswami, would disentitle the claimant to draw the compensation amount payable for that item. It does not appear that this contention was raised on behalf of the State Government in the Court below. The properties acquired and forming the subject-matter of these proceedings were only part of the properties which the claimant had purchased from his brother, Arulanandaswami. The recitals in Exhibit B-12, the sale-deed in favour of the claimant show that this item of property might well have been included under that document. Admittedly the claimant was in possession of this property on the date of the section 4 (1) notification claiming title to the property, and it must be remembered that there is no rival claimant on the scene. We are therefore of opinion that the claimant had made good his claim in respect of the compensation payable to him in regard to all the items of lands comprised in O.P. Nos. 20 and 40 of 1955, Sub-Court, Tanjore. The main contention urged by the learned counsel appearing for the State Government was that it was not open to the claimant to assert any title to the acquired lands as against the State Government, which became vested with the lands by force of operation of the statute, Madras Act (XXVI of 1948). It was contended that once an estate was taken over by the State Government in exercise of its powers under the Estates Abolition Act the entire land in the taken over estate vested in (the State Government in absolute ownership, and that no other claim of ownership in respect of any parcel of the land in the estate can be put forward by any other person as against the State Government without obtaining a ryotwari patta under the machinery of the Act. According to the State Government portions of the lands comprised in the acquisition were described in the revenue records as ‘Government open waste’. Before examining the above contention urged on behalf of the State Government we desire to point out that the State Government is not competent to put forward its own alleged title to the acquired properties in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act emerging from . its relevant provisions rests on the basis that the lands acquired belong to others and not to the State Government itself. By acquisition of land under the Act the State Government comes under an obligation to pay the market value of the acquired lands as compensation to persons deprived of the properties. The notion of the State Government acquiring its own lands and paying compensation to itself is extremely ridiculous. Section 30 of the Act enables the Collector to refer to the Court any dispute which may arise as to the apportionment of the compensation amount or as to the person to whom the amount or part thereof is payable. Section 31, clause (2) provides that if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or to the apportionment of it the Collector shall deposit the amount of compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted. In the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act the dispute referred to under sections 30 and 31 of the Act cannot be a dispute between the State Government on the one hand and the claimant on the other in regard to the title of the property acquired but only a dispute between two or more rival claimants claiming the compensation amount. There is no machinery under the Land Acquisition Act for the settlement of any dispute between the State Government, the acquiring authority, and the claimant who puts forward title to the property acquired. The State Government having availed itself of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for compulsory acquisition of lands for a public purpose treating the subject-matter of acquisition as not belonging to itself but to others is estopped in the course of such proceedings from putting forward its own title to the properties so as to defeat the rights of persons dispossessed from the lands as a result of the application of the Act. We shall now examine the provisions of the Madras Estates Abolition Act to ascertain its scope and ambit and its true intent and purpose. The Preamble to the Act indicates that the Act was intended to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement and for the acquisition of the rights of the landholders in permanently settled estates and other estates in the State of Madras and for the introduction of Ryotwari Settlement in such estates. The whole object of the Act is to convert zamindari and pre-1936 inam areas into ordinary Government ryotwari villages. Section 3 of the Act is as follows: “With effect on and from the notified date and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act- (a)......... (b) the entire estate (including all communal lands; porambokes; other non-ryoti lands; waste lands; pasture lands ; lanka lands; forests; mines and minerals; quarries; rivers and streams; tanks and irrigation works; fisheries and ferries); shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them, free of all encumbrances and the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865, and all other enactments applicable to ryotwari areas shall apply to the estate; (c) all rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date by the principal or any other landholder, shall as against the Government cease and determine; (d) the Government may, after removing any obstruction that may be offered, forthwith take possession of the estate, and all accounts, registers, pattas, muchilikas, maps, plans and other documents relating to the estate which the Government may require for the administration thereof: Provided that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta- (i) if such person is a ryot, pending the decision of the Settlement Officer as to whether he is ‘actually entitled to such patta; (ii) if such person is a landholder, pending the decision of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal, if any, to it, as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta”. Section 11 of the Act enables every ryot in the abolished estate to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of his ryoti holding. Section 12 of the Act enables the landholder in a zamin estate to obtain ryotwari patta in respect of his private lands. Section 11 of the Act enables every ryot in the abolished estate to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of his ryoti holding. Section 12 of the Act enables the landholder in a zamin estate to obtain ryotwari patta in respect of his private lands. Section 13 of the Act relates to the land holder in an inam estate who can obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of his private lands. Section 15 of the Act enables the Settlement Officer to examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims ryotwari patta under sections 12, 13 or 14 as the case may be and to decide in respect of which lands the claim should be allowed. Then there are several provisions in the Act regarding the fixing of the compensation amount payable, and the mode of payment and distribution of the compensation amount to several claimants. In this process of statutory conversion of erstwhile zamin and inam estates into ryotwari villages it was the landholder who lost his existence as such. Even this landholder, despite the Act, is not deprived of the holding of his private lands as he had a right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of such lands. The vesting of the entire estate as provided for under section 3 of the Act free of all encumbrances and the transfer to the Government have got to be understood and interpreted in the light of the object of the enactment and should not be construed as having brought about a total abolition of all rights of ownership of properties lying within the limits of the taken over estate. The question for determination in this appeal is whether in consequence of the notification of the State Government of the Mukhasa village of Nanjikottai the rights of ownership in the several parcels of lands inhering in several individuals have become extinct. The contention urged on behalf of the State Government is that the statutory vesting of the estate under section 3 of the Act is so full and complete and unreserved that the State became the sole and exclusive owner of the entire estate, and that it followed that along side that ownership no ownership in favour of any other person can be recognised. In support of this contention the decision of Ramachandra Iyer, J., in State of Madras v. Karuppiah Ambalam1, was cited. In that case the village of Sudaikanendal came under Madras Act XXVI of 1948. Prior to the notification under the Act the village was unsurveyed and a survey was therefore undertaken by the State under section 21 of the Act to facilitate the introduction of Ryotwari Settlement. There was a dispute between the State Government and one of the ryots as to the demarcation of the limits of a tank poramboke. The ryot having failed to establish his rights before the Survey authorities filed the suit, out of which the appeal arose, under section 14 of the Surveys and Boundaries Act. The question for decision in the Second Appeal was whether an erstwhile ryot or landholder who had not yet obtained patta had a right of suit under section 14 of the Madras Surveys and Boundaries Act. The learned Judge held that such a suit was not maintainable. At page 186 Ramachandra Iyer, J., observed as follows: “Therefore after the estate vested in the Government, the only right of the landholder, undertenure holder or the ryot was to obtain patta.” Referring to section 3 (d) of the Act and the Proviso thereunder it was further observed as follows: “This provision does not in any way derogate the absolute vesting of the title in the Government or create any title in the person in possession of the property........It is therefore clear that in respect of lands in a village taken over by the Government under the Abolition Act there-is no ownership by any private individual till that person obtains ryotwari patta from the Government.” These observations of the learned Judge were made in considering the question whether on the facts and circumstances of that case the suit could be properly laid under section 14 of the Madras Surveys and Boundaries Act challenging the demarcation of boundaries by the Survey authorities. The dispute, between the State and the ryot in that case was whether a parcel of land formed part of a tank poramboke or whether it was comprised in the patta land of the ryot. The dispute, between the State and the ryot in that case was whether a parcel of land formed part of a tank poramboke or whether it was comprised in the patta land of the ryot. When the ryot insisted that disputed parcel of land was in his patta land and challenged the correctness of the decision of the survey authority in having included it in the tank poramboke, he was in effect and in substance claiming a ryotwari patta in respect of that land. It must be noted that the survey operation in that case was one undertaken under the very provisions of the Abolition Act in order to facilitate the introduction of Ryotwari Settlement. We understand the observation of the learned Judge referred to above as implying nothing more than that it will not be open to a ryot of a parcel of land in an abolished estate to agitate a claim for patta in a civil Court. The terms of the Proviso to section 3 (d) of the Act are clear and mandatory. Any person in possession of any land in the estate claiming to be a ryot or a land-holder shall not be dispossessed if it were to be found that such a person is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta under the Act. Sections 11 to 14 are equally mandatory enabling the ryot or the landholder to claim ryotwari patta in accordance with the terms of the said sections. The immunity from dispossession as vouchsafed under the Proviso to section 3 (d) in favour of persons in possession of parcels of lands in the estate is part and parcel of the vesting of the entire estate in favour of the State Government, and it can be said that to the extent to which this right of immunity has to be recognised the operation of the vesting itself has to be limited.. The Act does not create new rights of ownership and the grant of ryotwari patta under the Act is not a conferment of rights by way of grant or conveyance. The obtaining of ryotwari patta by the persons entitled to such patta under the Act can. if at all be only in recognition of pre-existing rights of ownership. The Act does not create new rights of ownership and the grant of ryotwari patta under the Act is not a conferment of rights by way of grant or conveyance. The obtaining of ryotwari patta by the persons entitled to such patta under the Act can. if at all be only in recognition of pre-existing rights of ownership. A ryotwari patta granted by the Revenue Authorities in respect of lands in a Government village is not a title deed but is only a bill for rent. This position has been held by this Court in a series of decisions commencing from Secretary of State for India v. Kasturi Reddi1 . We shall now refer to an unreported decision of Ramachandra Iyer, J., in (C.M.A. No. 295 of 1959) Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar2 . The question that arose for consideration in that case was whether a grant of a ryotwari patta in favour of an erstwhile ryot in an abolished estate amounted to conclusive evidence of title of the property comprised in the patta in favour of the grantee. The learned Judge held that having regard to the scheme of the Abolition Act and the well-known incidents and features relating to ryotwari patta such patta was not conclusive evidence of title of the properties comprised in the patta. The learned Judge dealing with the scope of the Abolition Act observed thus: “The kudiwaram right and the right to private lands are all incidents of a tenure which had been expressly abolished by the Act. In the place of the old system the ryotwari system has come into being. It will therefore be incorrect to say that the kudiwaram still vested in the ryot and the effect of the grant of patta is only to add to or augment the rights already held. In the place of the old system the ryotwari system has come into being. It will therefore be incorrect to say that the kudiwaram still vested in the ryot and the effect of the grant of patta is only to add to or augment the rights already held. What the Act intended to do was to effect a conversion of the erstwhile Zamindari and Inam estates into ryotwari system of tenure........it would therefore follow that the statute having declared that the:erstwhile ryot (that is the ryot lawfully entitled to be in possession of the holding) would be entitled to patta and not having designated a Tribunal or machinery to decide as to who amongst the several claimants would be entitled to patta, the dispute if and when it arises will have necessarily to be decided by the civil Court.” The learned Judge also referred to his prior judgment in The State of Madras v. Karuppiah Ambalam3and observed thus: “It is unnecessary to refer to the decision State of Madras v. Karuppiah Ambalam3, which concerned’ the right of a ryot to contest a survey conducted under the Abolition Act. That decision was also rendered with reference to section 56.” There was a provision under the Estates Abolition Act, section 56 which was as follows: “(1) Where after an estate is notified, a dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (6) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the Settlement Officer. (2) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1) may, within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal; and its decision shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law.” This provision was repealed by Madras Act XXXIV of 1958. The observation of Ramachandra Iyer, J., in the unreported decision referred to above relating to his prior decision, State of Madras v. Karuppiah Ambalam3, indicates that the legal position relating to the maintainability of suits in civil Courts in respect of ryoti lands has undergone a material and radical change after the repeal of section 56 of the Act. The observation of Ramachandra Iyer, J., in the unreported decision referred to above relating to his prior decision, State of Madras v. Karuppiah Ambalam3, indicates that the legal position relating to the maintainability of suits in civil Courts in respect of ryoti lands has undergone a material and radical change after the repeal of section 56 of the Act. In Adaikalathammal v. Chinnayyan Panipundar4, a Division Bench of this Court considered the question of the jurisdiction of the civil Court in relation to the dispute between two rival ryots each claiming to be the owner of the land in dispute between them. The learned Chief Justice delivering the judgment of the Bench after referring to the several decisions on the subject observed thus at page 317: “We are in entire agreement with this decision of Ramachandra Iyer, J. (Soosai Udayar v. Andiappan Ambalam5, We agree that if the relief claimed in a civil Court is not what is created or granted by the Act, e.g., the right to obtain patta but a civil right the jurisdiction of the civil Court which always existed cannot be held to be ousted as the statute does not either expressly or impliedly extinguish such rights.” The learned Chief Justice then referred to the repeal of section 56 of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 by Madras Act XXXIV of 1958 and observed thus: "Henceforward the question has really become academic because with the disappearance of section 56 there can be no basis for the plea that the jurisdiction of the civil Court has been ousted." We are of opinion that the absence of any ryotwari patta in favour of the claimant in this land acquisition proceeding cannot preclude him from contending that be is entitled to be paid the compensation amount by reason of his ownership and possession of the lands acquired. The Abolition Act has not brought about a forfeiture of the rights of his property situated in the estate. This is clear because under the Proviso to section 3 (d) he is not liable to be dispossessed being, prima facie a person lawfully entitled to be in possession of the property. It is not as if that the right of ownership of the property cannot be proved except by the production of a ryotwari patta. This is clear because under the Proviso to section 3 (d) he is not liable to be dispossessed being, prima facie a person lawfully entitled to be in possession of the property. It is not as if that the right of ownership of the property cannot be proved except by the production of a ryotwari patta. As observed by Ramachandra Iyer, J., in the unreported decision referred to above even if such ryotwari patta were to be produced it cannot be conclusive evidence of title. The decisions of this Court have held that the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon a dispute between two rival ryots as to who is the owner of the holding. The repeal of section 56 of the Act has made the position very clear and no doubt can be entertained in respect of the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide disputed questions of title relating to ryoti lands in an estate taken over under Madras Act XXVI of 1948. The civil Court clothed with jurisdiction under the Land Acquisition Act to decide reference made to it under sections 18, 30 and 31 of the Act is certainly competent to decide the question of title in case of disputes that may be raised in the course of such proceedings. We therefore hold that the contention on behalf of the State Government that the -claimant is not entitled to have the compensation amount paid out to him is unsustainable. Under the Abolition Act, the claimant could claim the benefit of the Proviso to section 3 (d) if he were sought to be dispossessed from his holding. The claimant has now been actually dispossessed by reason of the machinery of the Land Acquisition Act having been set in motion. He could not obviously resist dispossession under the Land Acquisition Act. The compensation amount now deposited in Court really represents the property from which the claimant has been dispossessed. "Such right as the claimant has under the Abolition Act to resist dispossession is fastened on the substituted property. The disability on the part of the State Government to evict the claimant from his holding by virtue of the Proviso to section 3 (d) cannot be got rid of by merely taking shelter under the Land Acquisition Act, and denying the claimant’s right to get compensation. The disability on the part of the State Government to evict the claimant from his holding by virtue of the Proviso to section 3 (d) cannot be got rid of by merely taking shelter under the Land Acquisition Act, and denying the claimant’s right to get compensation. The claimant can well be heard to say that such rights as he had under the Abolition Act in respect of the property from which he has been dispossessed should attach to the fund in Court. If such a right were to be recognised in favour of the claimant it follows that the State Government cannot put forward any obstacle in his way to receive the compensation amount. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. R.M. ------------ Appeal dismissed.