Ramachandra Iyer, J.- This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the appellant for a declaration of his title to and recovery of possession of house No. 37, Saravana Perumal Mudali Street, Purasawalkam, Madras. The house was originally owned by two brothers, Sarangapani Pillai and Janakiram Pillai who constituted members of a joint Hindu family. The appellant is the son of Sarangapani Pillai. On 18th May, 1934, the latter on his behalf as well as that of his minor son, the appellant and along with Janakirama Pillai executed a simple mortgage of the house in favour of one C.V. Subramania Iyer (D.W. 1) for a sum of Rs. 1,000 stated to be borrowed for the marriage expenses of Janakirama Pillai and for effecting repairs to the house. Subsequent thereto, the same creditor appears to have advanced further sums on promissory notes, which need not, however, be referred to in detail as they were subsequently consolidated and two mortgages bearing dates 2nd September, 1937 and 21st January, 1938 (Exhibits B-5 and B-8), were executed over the same property for Rs. 500 and Rs. 200 in lieu thereof. By the year 1940 both Janakirama Pillai and Sarangapani Pillai had died. The latter was survived by his widow, the second respondent and the appellant his son who was then a minor. On 27th June, 1944, the second respondent acting as the guardian of the appellant, executed a deed of sale (Exhibit B-10) of the mortgaged property in favour of the first respondent for a sum of Rs. 5,500, Rs. 2,000 being reserved with the purchaser for discharging the three mortgages mentioned above. It was agreed that the balance of purchase money, viz., Rs. 3,500 was to be retained by the purchaser for the benefit of the appellant to be invested either by the purchaser or the guardian in proper securities, and that till then, the purchaser was to pay interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum up to 31st December, 1944, and at 3 per cent, per annum thereafter. A charge over the property sold was also provided for the unpaid purchase money. The contemplated investment never fructified presumably because neither the second respondent nor the purchaser was able to find a suitable one. The interest on the amount is stated to have been regularly drawn by the second respondent. The sum of Rs. A charge over the property sold was also provided for the unpaid purchase money. The contemplated investment never fructified presumably because neither the second respondent nor the purchaser was able to find a suitable one. The interest on the amount is stated to have been regularly drawn by the second respondent. The sum of Rs. 3,500 was in the hands of the purchaser. The appellant attained the age of majority in 1952 ; shortly thereafter, he repudiated the alienation made by his mother, and instituted the suit, out of which this appeal arises, for the reliefs referred to earlier. The suit was contested by the first respondent, the purchaser ; the second respondent who sold the property was ex parte. The learned City Civil Judge held that the alienation was made for proved necessity and also for the benefit of the appellant, and, as such, binding on him. The suit was dismissed. The substantial question that arises in the appeal is whether the act of the guardian in selling the property could be justified. The extent of the power of the guardian of a minor to alienate the property of the latter was laid down in the leading case of Hanooman Prasad v. Mussamat Baboyee1thus: “The power of the manager of an infant heir to charge an estate not his own is under the Hindu Law a limited and qualified power. It can only be exercised rightly in case of need or for the benefit of the estate. The actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted or the benefit to be conferred upon it in the particular instance, is the thing to be regarded.” Doubts arose as to whether the necessity and benefit referred to by their Lordships of the Privy Council as justifying a guardian’s alienation formed really one head or whether they were distinct heads. In Vembu Iyer v. Srinivasa Iyengar2, Sundara Aiyar, J., dealing with the case of an alienation by a natural guardian held that the words need and benefit imported two distinct ideas. Necessity according to the learned Judge implied the warding off an evil or the doing of something that could not be avoided or of something which was one’s legal duty to do e.g., to avoid the sale of the minor’s property for a debt binding on him would be warding off an evil. Necessity according to the learned Judge implied the warding off an evil or the doing of something that could not be avoided or of something which was one’s legal duty to do e.g., to avoid the sale of the minor’s property for a debt binding on him would be warding off an evil. The other head of justification of the alienation is expressed by the learned Judge thus: "But over and above all these acts that are necessary there may be acts which are positively beneficial to the minor and an alienation which would conduce positively to the benefit of the minor would be upheld apart from any necessity unless of course it is accompanied by other evils." That such an alienation could be justified under any one of the two distinct heads of need and benefit was the consistent view taken by this Court in several cases dealing with analogous cases of alienations by qualified owners. In Sellappa v. Suppan1, Venkatasubba Rao, J., while recognising the fact that in some cases need and benefit would be so interwoven as to make demarcation difficult held that ‘benefit’ would be as much a distinct ground of justification of the alienation as necessity. Yahya Ali, J., while upholding an alienation on the mere ground of benefit in Tiruvengada Mudaliar, In re2, referred to a number of unreported decisions of this Court. Then there was a further question as to the nature of the benefit, viz., whether the benfit contemplated should be of a defensive character. In Krishnamurthy Iyer v. Nataraja Iyer3, Wads-worth, J., repelled an argument confining the meaning of the word benefit by laying down a hard and fast rule. The import of the expression was held to be elastic dependent on the circumstances of each case. In A.S. No. 671 of 1948 a Bench of this Court in which one of us (Rajagopalan, J.), was a member, after considering the several decisions observed: "At no stage did any of the learned Judges attempt the task of preparing an exhaustive list of cases where the sale or alienation could be justified on the ground of benefit. Such a task is obviously impossible. Such a task is obviously impossible. The question whether in any given case there has been a benefit or not is really a question of fact as was pointed out by Wadsworth, J., in Krishnamurthy Iyer v. Nararaja Iyer.3 Thus guardian’s alienation of the property of the ward (as also the manager’s alienation of family property and a Hindu widow’s alienation of property in which she has a limited interest) could be justified as one for (1) necessity, (2) partly for necessity and partly for benefit and (3) benefit simpliciter. The burden of proving that any one or more of the aforesaid justifying elements existed is on the alienee. Now what are the circumstances under which the second respondent sold the property under Exhibit B-10 ? The family of the minor appears to have owned a printing press in addition to the suit property. It is said that the printing press had been sold some time in the year 1930, long before the appellant was born. When Sarangapani Pillai died, only the house remained as family property ; in that property his widow would have a limited right in half a share thereof under the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937. The property itself was subject to three mortgages Exhibits B-1, B-5 and B-8 created by Sarangapani Pillai for a sum of Rs. 2,000 bearing interest at 9 per cent, per annum and more. It is argued that Exhibit B-1 not being for an antecedent debt incurred by the appellant’s father would not constitute a valid charge. But the recital in the mortgage shows that it was for a necessary purpose. Assuming, however, that there was no necessity, the amount due under it could be enforced as a money claim against the appellant. Exhibits B-5 and B-8 would be binding even as mortgages. The mortgages conferred a power of private sale under section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act on the mortgagee. The only source of income for the appellant and his mother was the rental income from the mortgaged property. The evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2 shows that the property yielded an income of Rs. 23 to 27 per month. There is no acceptable evidence contra. The appellant who was a minor on the date of sale could not have known anything personally. The evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2 shows that the property yielded an income of Rs. 23 to 27 per month. There is no acceptable evidence contra. The appellant who was a minor on the date of sale could not have known anything personally. His mother the second respondent who is living with him and who without doubt is largely interested in the appellants’ success, has not chosen to give evidence contradicting the evidence on the side of the purchaser. Further, there is evidence on the side of the purchaser to show that the house was in a dilapidated condition. That the evidence as to income from the property on the date of Exhibit B-10 must obviously be nearer the truth is shown by Exhibit B-12, the extract from the Assessment Register of the Corporation of Madras, which gives the annual valuation as Rs. 273. The learned Advocate for the appellant tried to demonstrate that even with that income there must have been a surplus available with the second respondent. Let us see how far learned counsel is correct. Taking the rent at the higher of the two figures, viz., Rs. 27 per month, the annual gross income would be Rs. 324. Out of this, municipal taxes payable was Rs. 48. Interest payable on the three mortgages would be Rs. 163. There would only be a balance of Rs. 113 per year out of which necessary repairs had to be effected for the house. There is no evidence that the second respondent was earning. With this meagre income it would have been hardly possible for the second respondent to maintain herself and her son and to make any payment to reduce the mortgage liability. It is the case for the alienee as spoken to by D.W. 1, whose evidence was accepted by the learned trial Judge, that the mortgagee Narayanaswami Iyer, the real owner of the mortgages was pressing the second respondent for money. This evidence is strongly criticised by the learned advocate for the appellant on the ground that Narayanaswami Iyer himself has not been examined. The learned counsel went even so far as to suggest that the alienee should have examined on his side the second respondent. We cannot however agree. This evidence is strongly criticised by the learned advocate for the appellant on the ground that Narayanaswami Iyer himself has not been examined. The learned counsel went even so far as to suggest that the alienee should have examined on his side the second respondent. We cannot however agree. D.W. 1 speaks to the demand by Narayanaswami once when the mortgage was in his name as benamidar and again after he had assigned the same in favour of the latter. The evidence besides being uncontradicted is probable having regard to the fact that the first of the mortgages was nearly seven years old at the time. It is true that the onus of proof is one on the purchaser but one cannot with reason expect him to examine on his side the appellant’s mother who is a party to the suit and who would in all probability support only her son. Assuming, even that the story of the demand is not true, the position of the appellant is not improved thereby. That the debts under Exhibits B-1, B-5 and B-8 existed can admit of no doubt. They would afford sufficient basis for necessity particularly in the known circumstances of the case, without even a formal demand by the creditor. The learned trial Judge held that the price paid under Exhibit B-10 was proper. The rental income and the municipal valuation do support that conclusion. It is not suggested that the second respondent was actuated by any improper motives either to sell the property when there was no need or to sell it at a low value. Her father was alive and was living with her in or near the house. Possibly with a view to provide an explanation for the alienation the appellant charged in the plaint that his mother was misguided and tricked into executing the sale deed and that his grandfather was inimically disposed towards him. There is no evidence in regard to the former: that in regard to the latter cannot be accepted. But the contention of the learned advocate for the appellant is not that there is any explanation on the appellant’s part as to why his own mother should sell the property but that it must be held that the evidence let in by the alienee is untrustworthy and even otherwise would be insufficient to discharge the burden of proof that lay on him. We have already indicated that the witnesses on the side of the alienee speak to all material facts and that evidence is uncontradicted and probable. That evidence if accepted would justify the sale. Where evidence has been let on the material point, the question then is purely one of assessment of the evidence. Onus becomes important only when there is no evidence on a particular point, or where evidence let in on both sides is evenly balanced or equally untrustworthy or is of such a nature that the Court feels that it could not come to a definite conclusion thereon. In such a case the matter can be decided on the basis of burden of proof. Where as in this case there is evidence, the case has to be decided on the footing whether it is such as could be accepted or acted upon and if acted upon would be sufficient to prove the existence of the relevant factors to justify the guardian’s alienation. It was then contended that even if one were to accept the evidence on the side of the alienee, there was necessity only for a portion, and a minor portion of the price for which the property was sold, and that the guardian could not be said to have acted on account of necessity when she invested the unpaid purchase money with the purchaser. If a guardian merely sells a property for investing the amount on a mortgage or with the vendee it cannot be said on that basis alone that the sale is one which is justifiable. The propriety of the investment of the balance of purchase money should be judged in the light of the necessity for the sale and not by viewing it as an independent transaction. In the pressed case the guardian had to sell the property to liquidate the claims thereon. The necessity for such a transaction cannot be decided by merely taking into account the arithmetical proportion between that portion of the amount which was for a necessary purpose and that which was not. The proper approach will be to see whether the sale itself is one which was justified by necessity or benefit. It is obvious in the circumstances that the pressure of the creditor could not have been met otherwise than by alienating the property wholly. The proper approach will be to see whether the sale itself is one which was justified by necessity or benefit. It is obvious in the circumstances that the pressure of the creditor could not have been met otherwise than by alienating the property wholly. That was the only property which the appellant had and no question of alienation of part of the house can at all arise. The sale being proper, the investment of the surplus purchase money is only incidental. It is however contended that the guardian could have mortgaged the properties for paying off the creditor and that a sale was therefore not justified. For one thing the execution of a fresh mortgage would at best be from Scylla to Charybdis ; the position of the minor would improve in no way ; if the interest in the mortgage were to he paid to the new creditor, very little would be left for the minor’s maintenance; if not paid the mortgage would swallow the entire property in course of time. Secondly, once it is found that an alienation was necessary, what form that should take, whether it should be a sale or mortgage was one entirely for the guardian to decide. In Nagammal v. Varada Kandan1, a Bench of this Court held that the validity of a sale of the ward’s properties by a guardian with a view to discharge debts binding on the former, should be judged by circumstances obtaining on the date of the transaction and not on events which subsequently happened, events which could not have been thought of at that time and that it was not necessary that creditors were making demands before it could be found there was pressure on the estate. The learned Chief Justice observed in the course of his judgment: “In dealing with the property of a ward considerable latitude should be allowed for the exercise of the guardian’s discretion though if the act was of a speculative character it cannot be supported by Court.” Learned counsel for the appellant however contended that there was no such discretion in the guardian and that it was the duty of the alienee to show that the guardian had no option but to sell. In support of this contention reliance was placed on two decisions of Mudholkar, J., (as he then was) viz., Tulsiram Sitaram v. Narayana Waman2, and Nathu Bhiwaji v. Ganpath Bablaji3, where it was held that an alienee from a natural guardian had to show positively that the course which the latter took was the only one open to her in the circumstances. We must however express our respectful disagreement with that view. A guardian, as we have shown earlier, can sell the ward’s property for necessity or benefit and such benefit need not necessarily be of a defensive nature. In the case of an alienation for the benefit of the minor, pure and simple, it cannot be said that the guardian had no alternative, for she could have retained the property. A power to sell for the benefit of the ward implies a discretion, discretion not merely to decide as to the form of alienation, e.g., mortgage, lease or sale, but whether the alienation is at all to be made. For example, if the minor has an unproductive property and the guardian sells it with a view to purchase a productive one it cannot be said that only course open to the guardian was to sell the property. But yet the alienation would be binding. The test in such cases is not that there should be no alternative, but whether the act was one for the benefit of the minor in the known circumstances. In Vembu Iyer v. Srinivasa Iyengar1, Sundara Iyer, J., observed at page 643: “The question in each case would be whether the discretion vested in the guardian has been exercised properly. He would be taken to have done so if he acted with due prudence and caution.. .. At the same time the Court has certainly to judge of the act of a guardian as it would appear to a prudent man at the time the act was done. He would be taken to have done so if he acted with due prudence and caution.. .. At the same time the Court has certainly to judge of the act of a guardian as it would appear to a prudent man at the time the act was done. It will not set aside his acts on the ground that years after the act has been done it appears to the Court that the guardian might have acted better.........the right view to lay down appears to me to be to consider, whether in the circumstance that existed at the time of the alienation, the act would be regarded as a prudent one by men of ordinary prudence in dealing with the property of the ward.” Sadasiva Iyer, J., observed: “The only safe and convenient rule is that if the guardian of a Hindu minor alienates the minor’s property because he considers it after weighing all the then existing circumstances to be in the best interests of the minor to make that alienation, the minor is clearly bound by that act of alienation.” It is however obvious that the standard of prudence is not a subjective one, i.e., what the guardian would do if the property were his. The guardian occupies a fiduciary position: his decision to alienate should be objective, viz., whether in the circumstances it is either necessary or for the benefit of the minor that the property should be sold or otherwise alienated. The standard of care required would be more akin to that of a trustee than that of a owner. The proved circumstances of this case show that the alienation under Exhibit B-10 would stand even a more rigid test. The alienation was inevitable: if matters were delayed the mortgagees might have brought to sale the property either privately or through the Court with the result that very little would have been left for the minor to live upon. If under those circumstances the guardian thought it was wiser to sell the property and save thereby a sum of Rs. 3,500 for the minor on the security of the same property in the absence of a better investment, it cannot be said that sale was speculative. It was one in the interests of the minor and would bind him. If under those circumstances the guardian thought it was wiser to sell the property and save thereby a sum of Rs. 3,500 for the minor on the security of the same property in the absence of a better investment, it cannot be said that sale was speculative. It was one in the interests of the minor and would bind him. It is now represented that the alienee had deposited the unpaid balance of purchase money in the lower Court and the same has been drawn by the appellant. We dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances without costs. V.S. ------ Appeal dismissed.