JUDGMENT T.C. Shrivastava, J. This first appeal by the defendants arises out of a suit which was filed by the respondents (plaintiffs) in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Hoshangabad, for a declaration that the properties detailed in the schedules annexed to the plaint belonged to them, as they were the rightful heirs of Mst. Jhukkobai, widow of Tikaram. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. The relationship between the parties is shown by the genealogical tree as on reverse. Two villages viz., Golgaon and Bhilpura were held by Himmatsingh in muaji rights as remuneration for the office of Kanungo. He died in 1854 and was succeeded by his five sons Sardarsingh, Govindsingh, Jorawarsingh, Girdharilal and Tikaram. The Kanungoship stood devolved after Himmatsingh's death on Sardarsingh who was recorded as the Ubaridar (muaji holder) of the two villages. After Sardaraingh's death, the office devolved on his son Heeralal who was thereafter recorded as the Ubaridar. The plaintiffs' case was that the five brothers separated sometime before 1864 and divided the lands which were left by Himmatsingh. They further alleged that in the year 1880 Tikaram and Bhalsingh started moneylending business in partnership which continued till the death of Tikaram in 1912. During this period they acquired considerable movable and immovable property from the profits of the shop. In 1912, Tikaram and Bhalsingh desired to separate their business of moneylending and to divide the properties which were acquired by them. Accordingly, they appointed one Jadaomal as an arbitrator to divide the properties. After Jadaomal had divided the house properties, Tikaram died and thereafter Jadaomal also died. Tikaram's widow Mst. Jhukkobai and Bhalsingh appointed fresh arbitrators who continued the partition proceedings which ended in the award Exh. P-79, dated 10-8-1914. Thereafter, both of them continued in possession of their separate shares in accordance with the award. Bhalsingh died in 1930 and was succeeded by his daughters' Bona, who are the appellants (defendants). After the death of Mst. Jhukkobai on 21-3-1954, disputes arose between the parties as regards the property left by her. A Curator was appointed by the District Judge, who took possession of all the properties. The plaintiffs then brought this suit for a declaration that they were the reversioners of Tikaram and as such entitled to succeed to the property in preference to the appellants. Jhukkobai on 21-3-1954, disputes arose between the parties as regards the property left by her. A Curator was appointed by the District Judge, who took possession of all the properties. The plaintiffs then brought this suit for a declaration that they were the reversioners of Tikaram and as such entitled to succeed to the property in preference to the appellants. The defendants (appellants) stated that they had no knowledge about any partition which took place before 1864, but admitted that Sardarsingh, Jorawarsingh and Girdharilal had separated from the other two brothers Tikaram and Govindsingh. They asserted that Tikaram and Govindsingh continued joint or, at any rate, re-united after the partition and continued joint. After Govindsingh's death, Tikaram and Bhalsingh continued joint till 1912. They denied that the moneylending business which was carried on by them was in the nature of a partnership and stated that it was joint family business of the two coparceners. It was admitted that Tikaram and Bhalsingh had appointed Jadaomal as an arbitrator to divide the properties held by them by metes and bounds and that Jadaomal died after he had partly done the work by dividing the house property. Thereafter, Tikaram's widow Mst. Jhukkobai and Bhalsingh continued the proceedings after appointing fresh arbitrators and the award Exh. P-79 was given by the panchas. This award was subsequently registered and was also made a rule of the Court by the judgment and decree Exhs. D1 and D-2. They pleaded that the award was nothing more than a family settlement or a compromise of a dispute between Mst. Jhukkobai and Bhalsingh. In the award it was stated that Mst. Jhukkobai would not alienate the property in her lifetime and after her death, the whole estate would pass to Bhalsingh to the exclusion of other reversioners. It was pleaded that this agreement was binding on the plaintiffs. It was also suggested that the property was given to Mst. Jhukkobai in lieu of her right of maintenance and not as a co-sharer of the joint family. It was further pleaded that the award amounted to a will or a gift by Mst. Jhukkobai in favour of Bhalsingh and therefore the interest of Mst. Jhukkobai passed to the defendants after her death. Jhukkobai in lieu of her right of maintenance and not as a co-sharer of the joint family. It was further pleaded that the award amounted to a will or a gift by Mst. Jhukkobai in favour of Bhalsingh and therefore the interest of Mst. Jhukkobai passed to the defendants after her death. The trial Court found that there was a partition in the family before 1864 in which all the five brothers separated, that the alleged re-union between Tikaram and Govindsingh was not proved and that the business which was jointly carried on by Tikaram and Bhalsingh from 1880 to 1912 was in the nature of a partnership business. At any rate, it was held that the appointment of arbitrators by Tikaram to divide the property amounted to severance of the status of jointness. The plea that Mst. Jhukkobai continued in possession of the property in lieu of her right of maintenance was negatived and it was held that after her death, the properties passed to the plaintiffs in spite of the recital in the award that the property would pass to Bhalsingh. Before we discuss the merits of the ease, we may state that the succession case in which the District Judge had appointed the Curator has terminated in favour of the respondents after the filing of this appeal. Shri A.R. Choubey for the respondents pointed out that the declaration granted in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs is now of academic interest and he was prepared to withdraw the suit. However, Shri A.V. Khare for the appellants insisted that the appeal should proceed and be decided on merits. We find that the suit for declaration when filed was tenable. As the question of title has been fully litigated, we agree that it is desirable to decide the dispute on merits. The history of the grant of this muaji is given in Exh. P-1 which is a copy of the Register of Muafi Grants for the year 1917. From this document and also from the entries in the Roopkar Exh. P-2 it appears that the muafi was granted to the family in the time of Moghal Rulers and was continued by the Maratha Rulers. In 1825 the muaji was granted by the British Government to the forefathers of the parties and was continued in the family till 1854 when Himmatsingh died. Thereafter, the office was held by Sardarsingh. P-2 it appears that the muafi was granted to the family in the time of Moghal Rulers and was continued by the Maratha Rulers. In 1825 the muaji was granted by the British Government to the forefathers of the parties and was continued in the family till 1854 when Himmatsingh died. Thereafter, the office was held by Sardarsingh. As the grant was for holding the office of Kanungo, the Jagir was recorded in the name of the person who actually held the office. The first question for decision in this appeal is whether there was a partition between the five brothers before 1864, as alleged by the plaintiffs. The defendants have admitted that three of the brothers separated from the other two. The question whether the separation of some of the co-parceners from the others raises a presumption of the severance of the joint family was a matter of some conflict in judicial decisions. The law of the point was reviewed in Bhagwati Prasad Sah and others v. Dulhin Rimeshwari Juer and another AIR 1952 SC 72 = 1951 SCR 603 and the conclusion reached is that there is no presumption either way. It would be a question of face to be determined in each case upon the evidence relating to the intention of the parties whether there was a separation among the other co-parceners or that they remained united and the burden would lie on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which he claims relief. The question whether Tikaram and Govindsingh continued joint or had separated is therefore to be decided on the evidence on record. In Exh. P-2 we find that the lands held by the five brothers were recorded separately. The same position appears in Exh. P-4 and Exh. P-5. Exh. P-10 and Exh. P-37 relate to the proceedings before the Settlement Officer recorded in 1865. They also show that the lands were separately held by the five brothers and were recorded according to their possession in the Settlement Khevat and Jamabandis. It appears that some of the brothers had filed objections before the Settlement Officer that the division of the lands between them was unequal, and after the Settlement Officer rejected the objections they filed an appeal before the Settlement Commissioner. Exh. P-24 is the order of the Settlement Commissioner. It appears that some of the brothers had filed objections before the Settlement Officer that the division of the lands between them was unequal, and after the Settlement Officer rejected the objections they filed an appeal before the Settlement Commissioner. Exh. P-24 is the order of the Settlement Commissioner. There are observations in the order that the lands are held by the different brothers in lieu of their shares. It was held that there was no reasonable ground to hold that anyone of them held more lands than his legitimate share. In the Settlement of 1891-92 the same entries continued (vide Exhs. P-6, P-41, P-42 and P-43). The documentary evidence clearly shows that there was partition in the family prior to 1864. Naturally it is not possible for the parties to adduce any evidence regarding such an old partition or to give any details thereof. The settlement records furnish the best evidence on the point. The only criticism which Shri A.V. Share has levelled against the settlement entries is that the lands recorded in the names of the five brothers do not appear to be equal in area or land revenue. The difference does not appear to us to be substantial. As we have already said, the point was specifically taken before the Settlement Commissioner in 1865 and the contention was rejected. There can be no doubt that the entries were the result of a partition in the family. Accordingly, we agree with the trial Court that there was such a partition prior to 1864. The parties have adduced oral evidence on the question of separate residence and messing of Tikaram and Bhalsingh. The plaintiffs examined Ranjitsingh (P.W. 3), Budhulal (P.W. 7), Raghunath (P.W. 11) and Gendalal (P.W. 12) who have all stated that Tikaram and Bhalsingh were living in separate portions of the house and had separate mess. The defendants have examined some witnesses to prove the contrary, that is, they were living jointly. Motisingh (D.W. 7) was, however, constrained to admit that Mst. Jhukkobai was living for 38 to 40 years in the house in which she died and this house is separate from the house in which Bhalsingh lived. The trial Court relied upon the witnesses of the plaintiffs in preference to the witnesses examined by the defendants. Motisingh (D.W. 7) was, however, constrained to admit that Mst. Jhukkobai was living for 38 to 40 years in the house in which she died and this house is separate from the house in which Bhalsingh lived. The trial Court relied upon the witnesses of the plaintiffs in preference to the witnesses examined by the defendants. We need not discuss the merits of the oral evidence on record, as the documentary evidence, in our opinion, is sufficient to justify the inference that there was a partition in the family before 1861 in which all the five brothers had separated. Besides the settlement records, we have the will Exh. D-11 which was executed by Bhalsingh himself. He has described the property held by Mst. Jhukkobai as "the property of Tikaram" and has stated that Mst. Jhukkobai got that property by "the right of inheritance". This shows that Tikaram had separated from Bhalsingh before his death. Another important document is Exh. P-5'2, which is the will of Heeralal, who was the son of one of the five brothers. Heeralal died on 20-8-1928 after executing the will. The will is admissible under section 32(3) of the Indian Evidence Act to prove that there was a partition in the family. [See Bhagwati Prasad Sah v. Dulhin Rameshwari Juer AIR 1952 SC 72 = 1951 SCR 603 ]. In this will, Heeralal states in the second paragraph as follows: My father Thakur Sardarsinghji and my uncles Thakur Govindsinghji, Thakur Jorawarsinghji, Thakur Girdhari Singhji and Thakur Tikaramji sons of Thakur Himmat Singhji were five brothers, who got their respective shares of immovable property partitioned mutually just before the death of Thakur Himmat Singhji. Each of them took possession of their respective properties separately and got their respective names and rights recorded in the village papers. They divided the movable property also and began to reside in separate houses. They managed their respective properties in particular and they have not even maintained their good relations, since then till this day (and) they have become separate absolutely. It is clear from these recitals that all the five brothers had separated. The next question is whether there was a re-union between Tikaram and Govindsingh as alleged by the defendants. It will be noticed that the defendants have not definitely alleged whether the re-union was between Tikaram and Govindsingh or between Tikaram and Bhalsingh. It is clear from these recitals that all the five brothers had separated. The next question is whether there was a re-union between Tikaram and Govindsingh as alleged by the defendants. It will be noticed that the defendants have not definitely alleged whether the re-union was between Tikaram and Govindsingh or between Tikaram and Bhalsingh. It is settled law that a re-union can take place only between the coparceners who separate. Shri Khare has contended before us that the re-union was between Tikaram and Govindsingh and although there is no evidence on this point directly, he asked us to infer from the conduct of the parties that such a re-union had taken place. Reliance is placed on Ramadin v. Gokul Prasad 1959 MPLJ 329 = AIR 1959 MP 251 . No doubt, in the absence of direct evidence about an agreement to re-unite, an inference about re-union can be drawn from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties. Thus, a joint record of the land in the village papers, unity of cultivation and enjoyment of the produce, joint acquisition of lands and similar other circumstances may lead to the inference of re-union. In the instant case, it is true that the business was jointly carried on by Tikaram and Bhalsingh from 1880 to 1912 and several documents relating to the moneylending and acquisition of property from the profits of the business are in their joint names. On this evidence, an inference of re-union could be drawn if contrary circumstances did not exist on record. We find that the lands which were separately recorded in 1865 in the names of Tikaram and Govindsingh continued to be so recorded. There is enough evidence on record to show that the cultivation was carried on by them separately. Had there been a re-union, one would expect them to have the lands jointly recorded in their names. In the copy of Form section 11 from the settlement misal (Exh. P-6) we find separate khatas of Tikaram and Bhalsingh and also a joint khata. The separate khatas are about the lands which were recorded separate in the earlier Settlement, and the joint khata is for lands which were subsequently acquired from the joint business. The existence of separate khatas of this nature supports the case of the plaintiffs that they held separate lands as well as joint lands. The separate khatas are about the lands which were recorded separate in the earlier Settlement, and the joint khata is for lands which were subsequently acquired from the joint business. The existence of separate khatas of this nature supports the case of the plaintiffs that they held separate lands as well as joint lands. Further, the conduct of Bhalsingh in continuing the partition proceedings after Tikaram's death and his statements in subsequent litigation to which we shall presently refer show that Tikaram and Bhalsingh were not joint and Bhalsingh never lay claim to the properties by survivorship. On this evidence, therefore, we must agree with the trial Court that the re-union has not been proved. Coming now to the events which happened in 1912, it is common case between the parties that Tikaram and Bhalsingh had by agreement appointed Jadaomal as arbitrator to divide the joint properties. After the death of Tikaram and Jadaomal, Mst. Jhukkobai and Bhalsingh referred the matter to fresh arbitrators and Exh. P-79 is their award. From this award it appears that there was an agreement between the parties to refer the matter to arbitrators. It is unfortunate that this agreement is not available and we are therefore left to the recitals in Exh. P-79 to infer what was contained in the agreement. It appears from paragraph 2 of the award that the immovable property which was separately held by Tikaram and Bhalsingh was not divided by the plaintiff. This is the property which they held in separate names after the Settlement of 1865. The fact that the Panchas were not asked to divide this property shows that this was treated as separate property all along which incidentally is contrary to the plea of re-union advanced by the defendants. In paragraph 3, the award states that the partition made by Jadaomal would be accepted as valid by the parties. The award extends over several pages and every item of property has been very carefully considered by the arbitrators. The scheme followed in the award is that each item of property is tentatively valued and if it is given to one of the parties, the other party is credited with half its value. The debits and credits against the parties thus arising are ultimately balanced. The scheme followed in the award is that each item of property is tentatively valued and if it is given to one of the parties, the other party is credited with half its value. The debits and credits against the parties thus arising are ultimately balanced. One thing which strikes us on reading the award is that the property is being divided strictly into two shares for the two parties. Not only that, the award imposes a liability on Bhalsingh to render accounts of the village profits for the share of Mst. Jhukkobai. The plea of the defendants that the property was given in lieu of maintenance to Mst. Jhukkobai is negatived completely by the mode in which the award has been made. In a case where property is given in lieu of maintenance, such meticulous accounting and determination of liability between the parties is quite unnecessary. Usually a few items of property are given to the woman concerned to be enjoyed by her for life and then property reverts to the male owner. In the instant case, the award is obviously a continuation of the division of the property into two shares which was started by Tikaram in his life-time. The background of the award remained the same all through and there was no change on account of the death of Tikaram. It is significant that the word "maintenance" is nowhere used in the award; on the contrary, the word "partition" finds place in several places. It appears that Mst. Jhukkobai had applied for imperfect partition of the village Chhaterkheda which was given to the parties jointly in the award. This prayer was opposed by Bhalaingh, but the revenue officer proceeded to partition the village. Thereupon Bhalsingh instituted a suit in 1925 alleging that the village was given to Mst. Jhukkobai in lieu of maintenance. Exh. P-15, Exh. P-16 and Exh. P-17 are the judgments of the trial Court, the first appellate Court and the Additional Judicial Commissioner in that litigation. The trial Court has rejected the plea of the appellant in that suit that the property was given in lieu of maintenance and ultimately the right of Mst. Jhukkobai to have the village divided was upheld. Exh. P-28 is the statement made by Bhalsingh on 7-11-1912 in the mutation proceedings in which he stated that: Now Mst. The trial Court has rejected the plea of the appellant in that suit that the property was given in lieu of maintenance and ultimately the right of Mst. Jhukkobai to have the village divided was upheld. Exh. P-28 is the statement made by Bhalsingh on 7-11-1912 in the mutation proceedings in which he stated that: Now Mst. Zakoo widow of the deceased be recorded as proprietor of the share. She holds her possession over the share. Such a statement would not be made by Bhalsingh if he were joint with Tikaram and had succeeded to the whole village by survivorship. Exh. P-75 is another statement of Bhalsingh made on 19-1-1922 in which he stated: Partition took place after the death of Tikaram. In the lifetime of Tikaram the partition proceedings were commenced and the Panchas were appointed for this purpose. And further: I told him that the partition proceedings were going on and that it would not be known who would get the deed in partition and that it would not be possible to take possession before it was complete. It is clear from these statements of Bhalsingh himself that he treated the proceedings between 1912 and 1914 before the arbitrators to be proceedings for partition of property and not for giving any property to Mst. Jhukkobai in lieu of maintenance. Shri A.V. Khare has strenuously argued that the condition in the award that the reversioners would not succeed to the property after Mst. Jhukkobai's death and the property would go to Bhalsingh is binding on the reversioners. It is pertinent to observe that in this case the partition proceedings had commenced in the life-time of Tikaram and they were only continued by his widow. Even assuming that Tikaram and Bhalsingh were joint, there was a severance of their joint status by the appointment of an arbitrator to divide the property by metes and bounds. [See Ramadin v. Gokul Prasad 1959 MPLJ 329 = AIR 1959 MP 251 ]. Thus after the reference, no dispute existed between the parties on the question of the devolution of the estate by inheritance or survivorship. There could be no doubt that each of them owned half a share and the lands passed to Mst. Jhukkobai by inheritance. This is precisely what Bhalsingh himself thought when he executed the will Exh. D-11. Thus after the reference, no dispute existed between the parties on the question of the devolution of the estate by inheritance or survivorship. There could be no doubt that each of them owned half a share and the lands passed to Mst. Jhukkobai by inheritance. This is precisely what Bhalsingh himself thought when he executed the will Exh. D-11. The division of the property by metes and bounds being the only dispute between the parties at that time, it was wholly unnecessary for the widow or the arbitrators to say anything as to how the property would devolve after the death of the widow. Under the circumstances, the recital on that point in the award cannot be considered to be a bona fide compromise or family settlement. It was not at all in the interest of the reversioners. We shall now refer to the decisions relied upon by Shri A.V. Khare to support his contention that the reversioners are bound by Mst. Jhukkobai's agreement that the property shall pass to Bhalsingh after her death. In Rani Bhuneshwari v. Secretary of State AIR 1937 Pat 374 it was held that an admission of fact by a widow made under certain circumstances amounts to an estoppel against the reversioners. In that case, a lease of some properties was executed by the deceased husband of the widow and she had admitted the lease in a litigation between the lessee and herself. It was decided that as the widow represented the estate in the litigation, unless the admission could be shown to be collusive or fraudulent, the reversioners were bound. In Babulal Nandram v. Maniklal Beharilal 1941 NLJ 142=AIR 1941 Nag 79 it was held that an alienation made by a widow as a result of a compromise which is fair, reasonable and prudent in the circumstances in which the widow is placed is binding on the reversioner. In both these cases, it will be seen that the widow was acting for the estate and fighting a litigation in respect of a small part thereof with outsiders. The third case on which strong reliance was placed for the appellants is Sakerlal v. Chunilal AIR 1953 Sau 146. In that case, there was a dispute between the widow and her husband's brother, the widow claiming the whole property of the husband by inheritance and the husband's brother claiming the whole property by survivorship. The third case on which strong reliance was placed for the appellants is Sakerlal v. Chunilal AIR 1953 Sau 146. In that case, there was a dispute between the widow and her husband's brother, the widow claiming the whole property of the husband by inheritance and the husband's brother claiming the whole property by survivorship. The dispute was compromised under which the widow took 2/5th of the estate giving the remaining 3/5th to the husband's brother. The widow then bequeathed her share to her daughter by a will. The husband's brother challenged the disposition. It was held that under the compromise the widow was given the property in absolute right and she could dispose it of by will. The decision was based on the ground that the plaintiff who had himself taken advantage of the compromise and got some properties thereunder could not deny the right of the widow under the compromise. All that that case lays down is that a reversioner who is a party to a compromise with the widow cannot resile from it. That case does not at all help the appellants, as the plaintiffs in the present case were not parties to the compromise. In our opinion, the contention must be rejected in view of the decision in Phool Kuer v. Pern Kuer AIR 1952 SC 207 . In that case, there was a compromise between a widow Khem Kuer with two reversioners who claimed under a will from the remote reversioner. One of the terms of the compromise was that after the death of Khem Kuer, the property would descend on the other party to the compromise. The property was claimed by the next reversioner of the husband after the death of Khem Kuer and it was pleaded by the remote reversioners that the compromise by Khem Kuer was in the nature of a family arrangement and the next reversioner was bound by it. It will be noticed that the facts in that case were very much similar to the facts in the instant case. The case-law on the point was reviewed by their Lordships and the final conclusion arrived at was that: a compromise made bona fide for the benefit of the estate and not for the personal advantage of a limited owner will bind the reversioner. The case-law on the point was reviewed by their Lordships and the final conclusion arrived at was that: a compromise made bona fide for the benefit of the estate and not for the personal advantage of a limited owner will bind the reversioner. Regarding the merits of the compromise in that case, their Lordships said: In agreement with the High Court we are of the opinion that it cannot be so supported, Mohan Kuer in entering into the compromise on behalf of the minor widow never applied her mind to the interests of the ultimate reversioners. She entered into it for her own personal benefit and for the personal benefit of the minor widow in complete indifference as to what was to happen to the estate after their respective deaths. Under this compromise these two ladies got all the rights they had under Hindu law without sacrificing an iota of their property and then they agreed that after their death the plaintiffs in equal shares and after them their heirs shall be the owners of the estate of Chiranji Lal, It did not matter in the least to the two ladies what was to happen to the estate after their deaths and they were quite willing to let this estate go to the plaintiffs in the suit, though one of them was a remote reversioner. The compromise therefore was made in the interest of the actual parties to the suit in complete disregard of the interests of the ultimate reversioners. The widows undoubtedly acted with reasonableness and prudence so far as their personal interest was concerned but further than that they did not see. The claim of the two plaintiffs in suit No. 120 of 1916 was adverse to the interests of the reversioners as they were claiming as legatees under the will. The widows while entering into the compromise safeguarded their personal rights only and thus in entering into it they only represented themselves and not the estate or the reversioners and surrendered nothing out of their rights, and it cannot be said that in the true sense of the term it was a bona fide settlement of disputed rights where each party gave up something of its own rights to the other. The plaintiffs got an admission from the widows in regard to the future succession of the estate that after their deaths they would succeed though they were not heirs in accordance with Hindu law. By this admission the widows lost nothing whatsoever. Those who lost were the ultimate reversioners and their interest was not in the least either considered or safeguarded. In these circumstances it seems to us that the compromise cannot be held to be a bona fide settlement or family arrangement of disputed rights........ We have quoted these observations in length, as they apply fully to the case before us. In the instant case, Mst. Jhukkobai got everything that she could get and her agreement that the property shall not pass to the next reversioners but to Bhalsingh was wholly unnecessary. There cannot be any doubt that she was representing herself alone in entering into the compromise and did not at all consider the interests of the reversioners. Accordingly, we hold that the condition in the award regarding the devolution of property on Bhalsingh after the death of Mst. Jhukkobai does not bind the reversioners. As we have already said, there was no dispute regarding the title of Mst. Jhukkobai to have half a share in the property after the death of her husband. The only dispute at the time was regarding the division of the property by metes and bounds, and on this aspect the award is binding on the reversioners who cannot now say that the partition should have been in a different manner. It is pertinent to observe that Mst. Jhukkobai and Bhalsingh had come to an agreement on the question of devolution of the property even before the matter was entrusted to the Panchas. As stated in paragraph 4 of the award Exh. P-79, it was a term of the agreement between the parties that the entire immovable property given to her share shall pass to Bhalsingh after her death. The arbitrators repeated this condition in paragraph 9 of the award not as a matter decided by them but as something which was agreed to by the parties themselves. Obviously it was not a decision of the arbitrators on any dispute between the parties but the recital of an agreement by the widow which was actuated entirely by her self-interest without any regard to the interests of the reversioners. Obviously it was not a decision of the arbitrators on any dispute between the parties but the recital of an agreement by the widow which was actuated entirely by her self-interest without any regard to the interests of the reversioners. In view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Phool Kuer v. Pem Kuer AIR 1952 SC 207 , which is on all fours with the present case, it must be held that the agreement or the award as far as it relates to the devolution of the property to the prejudice of the next reversioners is not binding on the reversioners. We need not refer to the several cases cited by Shri A.V. Khare on the question that an alienation made by a widow as a result of a compromise of a bona fide claim set up against the estate is binding on the reversioners. The condition which was to operate after the death of the widow can hardly amount to an alienation. Shri A.V. Khare referred to the decision in Babulal Nandram v. Maniklal Beharilal 1941 NLJ 142=AIR 1941 Nag 79 and pointed out that a presumption regarding the existence of legal necessity arises if a reversioner does not challenge an alienation for a sufficiently long time. We do not see how that decision helps the appellants, as in the instant case there was no alienation and the stipulation made by the widow regarding the devolution of property is not a matter about which any presumption of correctness or legality can be raised by mere lapse of time. The reversioners could not bring any suit for challenging the stipulation till the death of the widow and waiting till then to file the present suit can hardly affect the merits of their contention. In the pleadings stage the appellants had also pleaded that the disposition by the widow in accordance with the award could be considered to be a gift or a will. Shri Khare stated before us that he did not rely on this aspect of the case. We may state that the suit was originally brought by Fatehsingh and Sahibsingh, Later, the other plaintiffs, who are all descendants of their brothers, were impleaded on the ground that some share in the property had been alienated to them. Shri Khare stated before us that he did not rely on this aspect of the case. We may state that the suit was originally brought by Fatehsingh and Sahibsingh, Later, the other plaintiffs, who are all descendants of their brothers, were impleaded on the ground that some share in the property had been alienated to them. It is not necessary for us to decide the rights of the plaintiffs inter se in this case, as that does not affect the interests of the appellants. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed