Judgment :- The Petitioner was a Winch driver in the Work Establishment of the Electricity Department till he was discharged from service by Ext. P1 memo dated April 13,1957. On representations made by him subsequently, he was informed by Ext. P-2 dated July 8,1958 by the second respondent who is the Chief Operation Engineer of the first respondent, the Kerala Electricity Board, Trivandrum, that his prayer for re-entertainment in service cannot be allowed. This petition is to quash both Exts. P-1 and P-2, on the grounds, firstly, that though service in the Work Establishment personnel is temporary, by proceedings of Government, Ext. P4, dated May 20,1954 such personnel were allowed the option to continue in service till their sixtieth year, that upon the transfer of such personnel, including the petitioner, from the Electricity Department to the first respondent, upon the formation of the Kerala Electricity Board subsequent to Ext.P4, their previous conditions of service were guaranteed by proceedings of Government, Ext. P5, dated April 3,1957, and that therefore the petitioner is entitled to continue in service till his sixtieth year, secondly, that his removal from service was in violation of the guarantee under Art.311 (2), and of the provisions of Art.320 (3), of the Constitution, and thirdly, that the termination of his service was discriminatory, other employees in the Work Establishment being still permitted to continue in service even after they have attained fifty-five years of age. 2. It was common ground, that service in the Work Establishment has always been and is temporary. This was admitted by the petitioner in Para.2, 4 and 6 of the affidavit in support of his petition. The petitioner's service was in the Work Establishment, even after his transfer from the civil branch to the electrical branch of the department a few years ago. The post of Winch driver was also borne on the Work Establishment and continued to be temporary till April 1, 1957, when it was made permanent and was placed "on a superior cadre in regular service". The post of Winch driver was also borne on the Work Establishment and continued to be temporary till April 1, 1957, when it was made permanent and was placed "on a superior cadre in regular service". According to respondents 1 and 2, the petitioner having completed fifty-five years of age on April 6, 1956, could not be borne on the regular cadre, and was not entitled to continue in service, and had therefore to be discharged, the irregularity in his continuance in service from April 1, when the post was made permanent, to April 13, when he was discharged, being condoned by special proceedings of the first respondent, Ext. B-1, dated January 9, 1959. 3. The contentions of respondents 1 and 2 in answer to the petition are, that Ext. P-4 was applicable only to the Work Establishment personnel in the Public Works Department of the State and not in the former Electricity Department, and therefore the guarantee by the first respondent under Ext. P-5, did not extend to the rights conferred by Ext. P-4, that in any event, the post held by the petitioner having been temporary and having been abolished, his removal from service was not in fact by way of punishment, and could not be deemed to be so, Art.311 being therefore inapplicable, that there having been no disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, Art.320 [3] is also not attracted, and that Ext. P-1 was not discriminatory. Both on the terms of Ext. P-4 & on the title & the heading in it, there is considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, that Ext. P-4 was intended to apply only to the Work Establishment personnel in the Public Works Department. The petitioner had no case, that he was at any time borne on the Work Establishment in that department and was transferred later to the Electricity Department. I am also unable to accept the argument of the petitioner's learned counsel, based on Para.2, 5 and 6 of Ext. P5, that Ext. P-4 was made applicable to the Work Establishment personnel in the Electricity Department. The guarantee under Ext. P-5 by the first respondent, was only to the extent to which the Electricity Department stood committed in respect of the terms and conditions of service of its employees and not more. In others words, if Ext. P5, that Ext. P-4 was made applicable to the Work Establishment personnel in the Electricity Department. The guarantee under Ext. P-5 by the first respondent, was only to the extent to which the Electricity Department stood committed in respect of the terms and conditions of service of its employees and not more. In others words, if Ext. P4 had no application to the Work Establishment personnel in the Electricity Department, Ext, P-5 did not make it applicable. It does not matter in the least, that Ext. P-5 had acquired statutory force by virtue of R.66 of the Kerala Electricity Rules, framed under the concerned Statute. But with all this, I still find difficulty in accepting the contention of the respondents fully, not so much for the reason, that it has not been alleged by them in the counter-affidavit in categorical terms, that Ext. P-4 is not applicable to the petitioner and others in the work establishment to which he appertained but more so because, some of those admittedly, employed in the Work Establishment in the Electricity Department are continuing in service even after their fifty-fifth year. If it were necessary to take a decision on this ground, I would have called upon the respondents to explain this, or to furnish further particulars. But I think, that the petitioner has to fail for a different reason, to be stated presently. 4. Assuming that Ext. P-4 governs the petitioner's case and that Ext. P-5 binds the first respondent to it, the petitioner could continue in service only so long as the post which he filled, was itself continuing. The department or the Government had the right to abolish a temporary post notwithstanding Ext P-4; if so, the first respondent too had that right, notwithstanding Ext. P-5. Brajnandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR. 1955 Patna 353, seems to be a case which is on all fours, on more than one point arising here for decision. In that case, S.K. Das, C.J., as he then was, observed that: "if a person is appointed to a temporary post, it is obvious that his period of appointment expires when the post itself is abolished, even though no period was specifically mentioned in the order of appointment... In that case, S.K. Das, C.J., as he then was, observed that: "if a person is appointed to a temporary post, it is obvious that his period of appointment expires when the post itself is abolished, even though no period was specifically mentioned in the order of appointment... The services of the petitioners were terminated not because any penalty was being imposed on them for good and sufficient reasons, but because the very posts to which they were appointed were abolished." The post being temporary, the petitioner could not be heard to contend, that it must be kept up till his sixtieth year; the termination of his employment on the abolition of the post, was not and could not be, by way of punishment. If so, no question of violation of the statutory guarantee under Art.311 (2) can arise. As also held in the case cited, their having been no disciplinary proceedings, Art.320 (3) cannot be invoked by the petitioner. 5. Reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner on P.L. Dhingara v. Union of India, AIR. 1958 S.C. 36, for the proposition: that if Ext. P-4 was applicable to the petitioner, as it must be assumed to be for the purpose of this argument, the petitioner had a right to hold the post, as his appointment, though to a temporary post, was for a specified period, that is, till he attained sixty years of age. There is no allegation in the affidavit that the petitioner's appointment was for a specified period Granting that Ext. P-4 applied to the petitioner, the result was, that he might, at his option, continue in service till his sixtieth year, only if, in the meanwhile, the post itself, which was temporary, was not abolished. This does not mean that the petitioner was appointed for a specified period, so as to confer on him a right to hold the post for that period, within the meaning of the rule in Dhingra's case. If so, the termination of the petitioner's service on the abolition of the post, cannot, on the authority of Dhingra's case, he held to be by way of punishment. 6. The argument as to discrimination remains, and was founded on the allegation in the affidavit, that a few of those employed in the Work Establishment of the Electricity Department, still continue to hold office after the fifty-fifth year. 6. The argument as to discrimination remains, and was founded on the allegation in the affidavit, that a few of those employed in the Work Establishment of the Electricity Department, still continue to hold office after the fifty-fifth year. The counter-affidavit has explained, that the post held by these incumbents had not been made permanent, as in the case of the post held by the petitioner. Therefore, it can hardly be contended that the petitioner pertains to the same category as the others, but was singled out for discriminatory treatment. A somewhat similar argument was advanced in the Patna case too and was repelled. There, two temporary posts were abolished, and there remained a third which was held by one, who was junior to those who were removed from service, and the charge of discrimination was rejected in these terms: "The petitioners were appointed to two temporary posts and it is not disputed before us that those two posts were abolished. As soon as those two posts were abolished, the period of appointment of the two petitioners came to an end. I do not think that the petitioners could claim any legal right to a third post; and if they, or any of them were not appointed to the third post, it cannot be said that there was any discrimination against them within the meaning of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution." 7. In the present case, there is the additional feature, that the petitioner alone was a Winch driver and the others were holding different posts, though, in the Work Establishment, and that the petitioner has no contention, that as one senior to the others, he is entitled to continue in one of the posts now held by them I therefore overrule this contention of the petitioner. A further argument was advanced in the Patna case, that the abolition of the post was a cloak or device to terminate the services of the employees, but there is no such case here. The petition is dismissed, but I do not order costs. Dismissed.