JUDGMENT A. P. Srivastava, J. - This is an appeal against a decision of Mr. Justice Mehrotra dated the 20th September 1957 allowing a petition filed by the respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The respondent was elected a member of the Municipal Board Bhadohi in the district of Varanasi in the year 1953. In 1955 he was elected as the Senior Vice-President of the Board. In that capacity he performed the duties of the President whenever it became necessary. On the 12th January 1957 at the instance of the State Government the Commissioner of the Banaras Division served a notice upon him under sub-Sec. (3) of Section 40 of the U. P. Municipalities Act calling upon him to show cause why he should not be removed from the membership of the Board on the ground that he had flagrantly abused his powers as a member while acting as President of the Board. A charge-sheet containing the following charges accompanied the notice:- "He has so flagrantly abused his position while acting as President of the Municipal Board, Bhadohi, as to render his continuance as a member detrimental to the public interest, instances whereof are as follows:- (1) That he, while acting as President, granted permission to Sri Shitla Prasad to construct an enclosure completely blocking the public thoroughfare. This was an encroachment and the previous approval of the Executive Engineer, was not obtained as the site is located within a radius of 220 yards of the Provincial Road. (2) That he, while acting as President, ordered demolition of the house of Sri Dhantal Gareria residing within limits of the Bhadohi Municipality though he had obtained the permission of the Board for the construction of the said house." 3. The respondent submitted his explanation on the 4th May 1957 and disputed the allegations made against him. In his explanation he also made a grievance of the fact that as the necessary file had not been supplied to him he was not in a position to give a detailed reply to the charges. The Government considered his reply and by an order dated the 5th August 1957 directed the respondents removal from the membership of the Board. In his explanation he also made a grievance of the fact that as the necessary file had not been supplied to him he was not in a position to give a detailed reply to the charges. The Government considered his reply and by an order dated the 5th August 1957 directed the respondents removal from the membership of the Board. Aggrieved with that order the respondent filed the writ petition out of which this appeal has arisen and prayed for the quashing of the order of removal and the proceedings in which it had resulted. 4. Three grounds were submitted in support of the application. They were :- (1) That the two acts to which exception was taken by the State had been performed by him while he was acting as a President. In respect of those acts action could not have been taken under sub-Sec. (3) of Section 40 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. If at all, action could have been taken under Section 48 of the Act. (2) That the charges were vague and had no relation to the grounds on which the respondent could be removed under sub-Sec. (3) of Section 40 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. (3) That no reasonable opportunity had been given to him to show cause against the charges. 5. The first submission was rejected by the learned Judge. He accepted the second submission because in his view the acts mentioned in the charge-sheet standing by themselves could not amount to a flagrant abuse of the respondents position as a member unless there was a sinister motive behind them and no such motive had been alleged. Reference was made in support of this view to the case of Shri Bhagwan Das Barnwal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1956 ALJR 409. The third submission was also accepted. 6. The petition was as a result allowed and the order of the respondent's removal quashed. 7. The three opposite parties to the petition, including the State of Uttar Pradesh, have now preferred this appeal and question the correctness of the view taken by the learned Judge in respect of two submissions which found favour with him. The respondent in' his turn seeks to support the order under appeal on the ground that the first submission made by him was well founded and should also have been allowed to prevail. 8. The respondent in' his turn seeks to support the order under appeal on the ground that the first submission made by him was well founded and should also have been allowed to prevail. 8. We have no doubt that the first contention of the respondent was rightly rejected. Section 48 of the U. P. Municipalities Act could not apply to his case because he was not being removed from the office of President. At the time when the action was taken against him he was not the President of the Board. Nor could he claim to have been the President of the Board at the time when he passed the orders which were being objected to on behalf of the State. In his capacity as a member he had been elected as Vice-President. Under Section 55 of the Act as a Vice-President he could perform some of the duties and functions of a President during his absence, but did not on that account become the President. The only capacity which he retained along was that of a member of theft Board. It was only as a member that he got elected as a Vice-President and on occasion performed the duties office President. 9. As to the second submission under sub-Sec. (3) of Section 40 of the Act. "The State Government may remove from the board a member who in its opinion had so flagrantly abused in any manner his position as a member of the board as to render his continuance as a member deterimental to the public interest." 10. According to the charges framed against the respondent he was alleged to have flagrantly abused his position as a member because he had passed two orders mentioned in the charge-sheet. It is urged on behalf of the appellants that under the statute the State Government was the final authority to decide whether the acts complained of amounted to a flagrant abuse of the respondents position as a member. The argument is that if the orders passed were in contravention of the provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act or the bye-laws framed thereunder, the Government could form the opinion that the acts amounted to a flagrant abuse of the respondents position as a member. It was not necessary, it is contended, for the Government to allege further that the acts had been committed with a sinister motive. It was not necessary, it is contended, for the Government to allege further that the acts had been committed with a sinister motive. There may be acts, it is stated, which can be considered to be a flagrant abuse only because of some oblique motive behind them; Shri Bhagwan Das Barnwal's case (supra) may be an instance of such acts. Such a motive is not, it is contended, necessary in every case; some acts can amount to a flagrant abuse even without such a motive. 11. The point is in our opinion concluded against the appellants by the decision of this Court in Shri Purshottam Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1957 ALJ 885. It was pointed out in that case that the two conditions precedent for taking action under Section 40(3) of the Municipalities Act were that the conduct of the member to which exception was taken must be conduct in his capacity as a member and that the conduct should be such as can amount to a flagrant abuse of his position as a member. Rejecting the precise argument now being advanced it was observed:- "Learned counsel's argument is that a member abuses his position as a member of the board if, while he is a member, he contravenes any of the provisions of the Municipalities Act or the bye-laws made thereunder. We are unable to accept this view, but, even if it be correct, the conduct of the appellant is not such as would bring him within this definition. The learned Judge has held, and we think rightly, that while he was a member the appellant contravened no bye-law; if contravention there was, it occurred when the construction of the building commenced, and this was before the appellant became a member. Without attempting an exhaustive definition, we are of opinion that a member abuses his position as a member when he misuses his position for the benefit of himself or some other person." 12. According to the dictionary `flagrantly' as an adverb means glaringly, notoriously or `scandalously' and `abuse as a transitive verb means `misuse', make bad use `or' `use for a wrong purpose or need', and take a bad advantage. According to the dictionary `flagrantly' as an adverb means glaringly, notoriously or `scandalously' and `abuse as a transitive verb means `misuse', make bad use `or' `use for a wrong purpose or need', and take a bad advantage. The use of the expression flagrantly abused in sub-Sec. (3) of Section 40 therefore requires that even if there is no sinister or oblique motive there must be something to show that in committing the acts complained of the member concerned was using his position as a member for a wrong purpose or that he was taking some advantage of his position which he ought not to have taken and that he was doing so in a glaring and scandalous manner. Without unduly stretching the meaning of the expression, therefore, an act cannot be brought within its purview simply because it in some way contravenes any of the provisions of the Municipalities Act or the bye-laws made thereunder. It was not said in the charge-sheet in connection with either of the two orders passed by the respondent that in passing them he had in any scandalous way attempted to misuse his position as a member. The charges were, therefore, not such as could attract action against the respondent under sub-Sec. (3) of Section 40 of the Act. 13. The respondent also appears to have been justified in his complaint that he was not given a reasonable opportunity of explaining the charges. The orders, the subject matter of the charges had been passed long before the charges were framed. The relevant papers were not with the respondent in order to enable him to fully explain the circumstances in which the orders were passed. He pointed out that handicap in the explanation which he submitted but without making the papers available to him and thus enabling him to completely explain his position the State Government decided to remove him from membership. Under sub-Sec. (4) of Section 40 of the Act before action could be taken under sub-Sec. (3) an opportunity of explanation which in the context means a reasonable opportunity was bound to be given to the member concerned. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that the respondent never asked for the papers. In the circumstances of the case a specific request in that respect could not have been insisted upon. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that the respondent never asked for the papers. In the circumstances of the case a specific request in that respect could not have been insisted upon. The respondent having mentioned in his reply that he was not in a position to give a detailed explanation in the absence of the necessary file, before taking the drastic action contemplated by sub-Sec. (3) the authorities should have made the papers available to the respondent. 14. The order of the respondents removal thus appears to have been rightly set aside. The appeal has no force and is dismissed with costs.