Judgment :- 1. This is a petition to quash Ext. P3, an order, by which Government declined to interfere in revision, with Ext. P2, which was an order by which the Assistant Collector and Executive First Class Magistrate, refused relief to the petitioner under Clause.4A of the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1958, which may be referred to hereafter as the 'Order'. The petitioner's wife and respondents 2 and 3 herein are adjoining land owners. It was common ground, that in an area of 21 cents of land belonging to respondents 2 and 3, which may be referred to as the respondents' land, and which lies contiguous with the land of the petitioner's wife, which may be referred to as the petitioner's land, paddy crop was raised for both crops in each of the years 1132,1133 and 1134, M. E.; it was also not in dispute, that no paddy was raised in the respondents' land for the Kanni crop of 1135. The petitioner applied on September 7, 1959, corresponding to Chingam 22,1135, under Clause.4-A of the'Order', to the Collector complaining, that respondents 2 and 3 were converting their land into a garden so as to affect the petitioner's paddy land prejudicially. By Ext. P2, Clause.4A was held to be inapplicable, for the reason, that paddy cultivation was not raised in the respondents' land "during the last three years". This view was taken, because the crop for 1135 was not raised. It may be mentioned, that Clause.4A which was introduced in the 'Order' by way of amendment, came into force on August 18, 1959, that is, in Chingom 1135, and apparently, the reasoning in Ext. P2 is, that there had been no cultivation from the month of Medom or so, till the end of Karkadakom, in the year 1134. 2. The learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 raised a preliminary objection, that the petitioner has no locus standi for two reasons, first, that the petitioner's wife and not the petitioner, is the owner of the land, and second, that the petitioner is not a person aggrieved by Exts. P2 and P3 within the meaning of the 'Order'. 2. The learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 raised a preliminary objection, that the petitioner has no locus standi for two reasons, first, that the petitioner's wife and not the petitioner, is the owner of the land, and second, that the petitioner is not a person aggrieved by Exts. P2 and P3 within the meaning of the 'Order'. The petitioner claims to be in management on behalf of his wife and it seems to me, on a reading of Clause.4A of the 'Order', that no interest, much less a proprietory interest, in the land is necessary, to bring home to the Collector, that interference by him is called for. The second reason was attempted to be developed in the following manner. The 'Order' was promulgated in pursuance of S.3 (1) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act X of 1955) which provides that "If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity it may, by Order provide for regulating the production therein" and S.3 (2) (b) reads: "Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-, section (1) an Order made thereunder may provide for bringing under cultivation any waste or arable land, for the growing thereon of food crops generally or of specified food crops, and for otherwise maintaining or increasing the cultivation of food crops generally, or of specified crops". It was not disputed before me, that the State Government had the power to promulgate the 'Order' under the aforesaid provision. Clause.3 and 4A of the 'Order' empower the Collector by notice, to call upon the holder of any occupied waste or arable land to cultivate it with food-crops in the one case, and to cultivate a land which was under paddy cultivation during the preceding three years with paddy only, in the other. The argument was, that Clause.4A confers no right on the owners of an adjoining land to move the Collector for taking action under it. A Collector who is empowered to take action under the above Clauses, can act only on his being informed of a situation demanding interference by him. The argument was, that Clause.4A confers no right on the owners of an adjoining land to move the Collector for taking action under it. A Collector who is empowered to take action under the above Clauses, can act only on his being informed of a situation demanding interference by him. The information may be furnished to him, either, as conceded by the learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 by the subordinate staff under him, or as I think, under Clause.4A, by a person whose land lies in contiguity with the other which is attempted to be converted, which conversion would prejudicially affect the cultivation of paddy in his land, as is claimed by the petitioner in this case. The omission in Clause.3 and 4A to specify or to provide in what manner or through what process, the Collector may be moved to take action, does not, it seems to me, debar either the subordinate Officers of the Collector, or persons who would be affected prejudicially, from complaining to the Collector. Clause.4A is designed also to guard against any decrease in the production of foodgrains, if not to ensure its increase; it does not matter, whether the decrease is in respect of the land which is converted or of the land which adjoins it and which is prejudicially affected. The petitioner is aggrieved, that the petitioner's land is prejudicially affected by the conversion. This has not been negatived by the order impugned. I overrule the preliminary objection. 3. On the merits it is clear, that both Exts. P2 and P3 proceed upon a misconception. As noticed, there had been cultivation for two crops in each of the years 1132, 1133 and 1134. There is no force in the argument, that there had not been cultivation'during' those years, as no cultivation was begun in the month of Medom 1134, for raising the Kanni crop of 1135. On the argument, if pushed to the logical extreme, the interval between one harvest and the commencement of the cultivation for the next crop, would also have to be excluded. I have no hesitation in rejecting the argument as quite untenable. For a seasonal cultivation like paddy, in the case of a double-crop land as in the present case, where both crops have been harvested during the year, the reasonable view is, that the cultivation during that year is complete. I have no hesitation in rejecting the argument as quite untenable. For a seasonal cultivation like paddy, in the case of a double-crop land as in the present case, where both crops have been harvested during the year, the reasonable view is, that the cultivation during that year is complete. If, as I hold, this is the correct interpretation, the requisite condition of "cultivation during the last three years", viz., 1132, 1133 and 1134, has been fulfilled in this case. Exts. P2 and P3 cannot therefore be supported. 4. The learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 then raised a contention challenging the validity of Clause.4-A, as imposing an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right under Art.19 (1) (f). I have already held, that the 'Order' was promulgated, only to promote the object of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. It is true, that, as pointed out, no procedure has been prescribed, by which the provisions in Clause.3 and 4A are to be administered. This however, is not an insurmountable objection, for it only means, that the demands of natural justice have to be met. This will of course necessitate, a notice to the party and an opportunity to him for explanation. It was suggested, that in case of land which is not suitable for cultivation with paddy, it would be imposing a heavy burden to compel a party to raise that crop. In Clause.3 of the 'Order' which relates to occupied waste or arable land proposed to be left in fallow, there is provision by sub-clause (3), that the party may show to the satisfaction of the Collector, that the land is not capable of being cultivated or is not being cultivated. There is no analogy with Clause.4-A, as ex hypothesi, the land, in a case governed by that clause, has been cultivated with paddy during the last three years and ought, except in a very extraordinary case to be capable of being cultivated again with paddy. No other ground was suggested, to induce me to hold, that Clause.4A imposes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right. Clause.4A cannot be struck down. 5. On the above grounds, Ext. P3 is quashed, and the case will go back to the Collector for being disposed of, in due course of law. I make no order as to costs.