JUDGMENT : Gajendragadkar, J. 1. This appeal by special leave arises out of an industrial dispute between the appellant, the Management of Jokai (Assam) Tea Company Limited, and the respondents, its workmen, represented by the Assam Chah Karamchari Sangha, Dibrugarh. The appellant is a sterling concern and it owns 15 tea gardens in the State of Assam. Prior to 1950 the appellant used to pay a nominal sum as bonus to its subordinate staff in the tea gardens but in 1950 it paid one month's salary as bonus. In that year disputes arose between the various tea companies in Assam including the appellant and their clerical and other staff regarding the quantum of bonus payable to them. Negotiations then took place between the parties, and after protracted discussions an agreement was ultimately reached on October 1, 1955, between the Indian Tea Association of which the appellant is a member, and the Sangha representing all the employees. 2. Meanwhile the respondent Union moved the State Government for reference of the issue as to bonus payable to its members for the years 1951 and 1952 for adjudication. Thereupon conciliation proceedings were held by the Conciliation Officer, Lakhimpur, Dibrugarh. Subsequently a similar dispute as to bonus for the year 1953 was also raised and it became the subject-matter of conciliation proceedings. A settlement was then arrived at between the parties which resulted in an agreement on January 21, 1955. The present dispute arises in regard to bonus for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956; the respondent Union claims that the said bonus has to be paid by the appellant under the earlier agreement of January 21, 1955, whereas according to the appellant it is the subsequent agreement which is applicable and under which the claim for bonus must be adjudged. Since the parties were unable to settle this dispute two issues were referred for adjudication by the Assam Government. Issue 1 was whether the workmen of the appellant are entitled to claim bonus in respect of the year 1954 and subsequent years in terms of the agreement of January 21, 1955; and the second issue was whether the appellant was justified in offering bonus to the workmen concerned in terms of the agreement executed on October 1, 1955. Issue 1 was whether the workmen of the appellant are entitled to claim bonus in respect of the year 1954 and subsequent years in terms of the agreement of January 21, 1955; and the second issue was whether the appellant was justified in offering bonus to the workmen concerned in terms of the agreement executed on October 1, 1955. The Tribunal has held that it is the earlier agreement of January 21, 1955, under which the bonus has to be paid and not the latter. The appellant feels aggrieved by this decision and so has come to this Court by special leave. 3. Two points have been urged before us by Mr Sen on behalf of the appellant. He contends that the reference is invalid inasmuch as it purports to refer not only the pending dispute as to bonus for the year 1954 but also a dispute in regard to bonus for subsequent yea Rs. Mr Sen reads the reference as involving the consideration of the claim for bonus which the employees of the appellant may make not only for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956 but for all years in future; and his argument is that such a hypothetical reference for an indefinite number of years in future is incompetent. It may be conceded that it would not be open to the State Government to refer such a dispute for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal and an Industrial Tribunal cannot make a declaration that the employer is liable to pay a certain amount of bonus for all years to come. It is well-settled that a claim for profit bonus arises only after it is found that for the relevant year the employer has made profit, and that after allowing for prior charges available surplus remains in his hands for the purpose of distributing a part of it as bonus to its employees. Therefore the very character of the claim for bonus postulates available surplus, and that can have reference to the relevant year which is over; but in our opinion the challenge to the validity of the reference on the ground urged by Mr Sen proceeds on a misconstruction of the question referred for adjudication. Therefore the very character of the claim for bonus postulates available surplus, and that can have reference to the relevant year which is over; but in our opinion the challenge to the validity of the reference on the ground urged by Mr Sen proceeds on a misconstruction of the question referred for adjudication. In the context the words "subsequent years" obviously refer to the years 1955 and 1956 which had ended on May 20, 1957, on which date the reference was made; in other words, the reference has asked the Industrial Court to decide the employees' claim for bonus for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956; thus read there is no infirmity in the reference, and so the argument that the reference is invalid cannot succeed. 4. Then, as to the principal point in issue between the parties, Mr Sen contends that the view taken by the Tribunal proceeds on a misconstruction of the agreement on which the employees rely. He argues that in construing the terms of this agreement if the Court finds that there is an ambiguity or that the words are not clear then it would be open to the Court to consider the surrounding circumstances which may throw light on the intention of the parties. If the agreement is ambiguous, or its terms are not clear, then it may be open to us to draw on extrinsic evidence for the purpose of considering the document within permissible limits. This position cannot be disputed. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Aggarwala, for the respondents, has argued that at the highest the question involved is one of construing a document, and it cannot be treated as a substantial point of law on which this Court should interfere with the conclusion of the Tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution. In support of this argument Mr Aggarwala has relied on the observations made by Viscount Haldane in Albright v. Hydro-Electric Power Commission, (1923) AC 167 at p. 169. "It has been the policy of Their Lordships' Board", observed Viscount Haldane, "not to entertain applications which will prevent the decision of the Supreme Court being final on general questions connected with the mere construction of agreements which do not raise either far reaching questions of law or matters of dominant public importance. "It has been the policy of Their Lordships' Board", observed Viscount Haldane, "not to entertain applications which will prevent the decision of the Supreme Court being final on general questions connected with the mere construction of agreements which do not raise either far reaching questions of law or matters of dominant public importance. Here there was an individual agreement; it may have been construed rightly or wrongly by the Supreme Court of Canada, but it is an individual agreement, and the decision turned upon a question of construction". With these observations the Privy Council refused to interfere with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. We do not think that on principle this view can always be applied to appeals in industrial matters coming to this Court under Article 136. It cannot be denied that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 is very wide though it is fairly well-settled that in exercise of the said jurisdiction this Court does not ordinarily interfere with the conclusions of fact, or even with points of law which have no general importance, but it would not be safe to extend the test applied by the Privy Council to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to all decisions reached by the Industrial Tribunal which are not subject to review or reconsideration by any Appellate Tribunal. Therefore we cannot entertain the objection raised by Mr Aggarwala in the form of a preliminary objection against the competence of the appeal. 6. That takes us to the construction of the agreement. Mr Sen has invited our attention to the correspondence that passed between the parties before the agreement was reached, because he contends that the document is ambiguous and it would be legitimate for us to consider the previous correspondence that led to the execution of the document. The agreement in question was signed by Mr Ingram, Superintendent of Bokel Division, on behalf of the appellant. The agreement in question was signed by Mr Ingram, Superintendent of Bokel Division, on behalf of the appellant. The letter written by the appellant to Mr Ingram on August 28, 1954 (Annexure, O') has been relied upon by Mr Sen for the purpose of showing that the authority conferred on Mr Ingram in settling the dispute in the negotiations that were pending between it and the respondents was limited to the dispute for bonus for the years 1951, 1952 and 1953; in other words, Mr Sen contends that it was not open to Mr Ingram to agree upon any general principles for the settlement of the bonus dispute for any years in future. This letter sets out the items on which authority was given to Mr Ingram, in pursuance of the discussion which the appellant's Director Mr Wilson had with Mr Ingram at Bokel in the preceding week. It says "the following confirms our discussion with you at Bokel last week concerning the way in which the Jokai Board wish to deal with the Union's demand for bonus for each of the years 1951, 1952 and 1953". Then several paragraphs follow which summarise the points on which parties ultimately settled their dispute. It is no doubt true that the first part of the letter refers to the three years in question; but clause 4 of the letter specifically says that the company is agreeable to accept the principle that bonus for the Indian staff may be linked with profits and is prepared to reach a settlement with the Union on the terms of a fixed percentage of profits. Clause 6 is also important; it says that in the event of the company making a loss it must be definitely agreed by the Union that no bonus would be payable. These two clauses in substance are reproduced in the agreement, and we will have occasion to refer to them when we consider the agreement itself. If these two clauses suggest that the appellant was agreeable to accept the principle for settling bonus disputes in general then the reference to the three years in the first part of the letter would not help Mr Sen's argument that the authority given to Mr Ingram was limited to the settlement of the disputes for the three years in question and no more. The letter written by the respondents' Union on September 23, 1954 (Annexure B') has also been relied upon by Mr Sen for the purpose of showing that the agreement is limited to the three years in question. At the top of the letter the subject-matter is mentioned as "Subordinate Staff Bonus for 1951, 1952 and 1953", and that according to Mr Sen determines the scope and extent of the negotiations. On the other hand, para 1 in this letter in substance corresponds to paragraphs 4 and 6 in the letter addressed by Mr Wilson to Mr Ingram, and the result of this document is just the same as that of the other. 7. We must now consider the agreement itself. It is true that the agreement bears the heading "Subordinate Staff Bonus for 1951, 1952 and 1953", and Mr Sen is undoubtedly entitled to contend that the heading is a relevant and material fact in considering the scope and effect of the agreement in question; but the effect of the heading cannot be exaggerated. If there are some terms in the agreement which clearly indicate that the agreement was not confined to the three specified years, then the operative portion of the agreement cannot be controlled merely by reference to the three years in the heading. While giving due effect to the heading we must attempt to harmonise the whole document and try to give effect to all the relevant and material terms. The preamble to the agreement says that "the following are the agreed and accepted terms and conditions governing the payment of bonus to the subordinate staff" of the appellant. This preamble is clearly of a general character and not confined to any particular period such as the three years mentioned in the heading which follows this paragraph. The document consists of eight paragraphs and it evolves a formula which is stated thus: Individual Basic Salary on 1st January x Total Bonus declared at 2½ % gross profits for the year Total Company monthly basic salary on 1st January. Clause 1 of the agreement reproduces the principle which was substantially contained in paras 4 and 6 of Mr Wilson's letter to Mr Ingram. It says "it is agreed to accept the principle that bonus be linked to the Annual Profits of the Company, not of individual gardens, in the shape of a fixed percentage. Clause 1 of the agreement reproduces the principle which was substantially contained in paras 4 and 6 of Mr Wilson's letter to Mr Ingram. It says "it is agreed to accept the principle that bonus be linked to the Annual Profits of the Company, not of individual gardens, in the shape of a fixed percentage. In the event of the Company making a loss for a particular year, no bonus will be payable for that year, as in the case of the Covenanted Staff". Clause 2 provides that the percentage which is to be related to the profits for calculating the quantum of the bonus payable to the staff in a particular year will be 2 = % of the gross profits of the company for that year, those profits to be the same as those which govern the payment of commission to the Covenanted Staff. Clause 3 provides that all members of the staff including artisans there specified will be entitled to participate in the scheme. Under clause 4 a condition as to the capacity in which the employee must have served the company for eligibility to take bonus is specified. Under clause 5 an employee, who would otherwise be eligible for bonus, but was subsequently dismissed or discharged for misconduct is disqualified. Clause 6 makes provision for the payment of bonus to an employee who is retired or discharged for no fault of his own. Clause 7 works out the company's gross profits for the years 1951, 1952 and 1953 at Rs. 2,75,778; and clause 8 prescribes the formula already set out; that in substance is the nature of the agreement. 8. Mr Sen has relied on the heading of the agreement and his whole argument before us has been that the said heading determines the nature, scope and effect of the agreement. The Tribunal was, however, not inclined to accept this argument because it held that the preamble to the document, and clause 1 in particular, are clearly against the appellant's case. It is obvious that at the time the agreement was signed the appellant and the respondents both knew that no loss had been incurred during the three relevant year Rs. The Tribunal was, however, not inclined to accept this argument because it held that the preamble to the document, and clause 1 in particular, are clearly against the appellant's case. It is obvious that at the time the agreement was signed the appellant and the respondents both knew that no loss had been incurred during the three relevant year Rs. s In fact it is significant that clause 7 of the agreement has calculated the profits for the three years in order that the bonus payable to the respondents should be determined according to the agreed formula. Now when everybody concerned knew that for the relevant years profits had been made where was the necessity to provide in para 1 what would happen if the company made a loss for a particular year? It would in that case have been purposeless to say that in the event of the company making a loss for a particular year no bonus would be payable for that year. This recital can be relevant and material only if the agreement purported to provide for a formula which would govern the payment of bonus even for subsequent years In our opinion, the inclusion of this condition in the agreement is decisively in favour of the view taken by the Tribunal. If the appellant's argument is accepted then this term is absolutely superfluous and completely out of place. Coupled with this term is the general scheme and tone of the agreement which suggest that the vexed question of bonus was attempted to be solved by the parties by mutual agreement by adopting the formula specified in the agreement. Therefore, in our opinion, it is not possible to accept Mr Sen's argument that the Tribunal has misconstrued the agreement when it came to the conclusion that for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956 bonus had to be worked out under the principles laid down in the said agreement. Therefore, in our opinion, it is not possible to accept Mr Sen's argument that the Tribunal has misconstrued the agreement when it came to the conclusion that for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956 bonus had to be worked out under the principles laid down in the said agreement. It is true that a subsequent agreement had been entered into between the tea companies and all their employees; but it is common ground that by an express term included in the said agreement it has been provided that if there is any other agreement between the tea company and its employees which is more beneficial to the employees the employees are entitled to claim the benefit of it and the subsequent agreement does not prejudice their rights in that behalf; and so, if on a construction the earlier agreement is held to be applicable to the years in dispute then there can be no doubt that the Tribunal was justified in making the award under appeal. 9. There is no doubt, and indeed Mr. Aggarwala has fairly conceded, that the formula may be changed either by consent or at the instance of either of the parties if there is a change of circumstances or there are other reasons justifying the demand for its modification. 10. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.