JUDGMENT T.C. Shrivastava, J. - The suit out of which this first appeal arises was filed by the appellant for recovery of Rs. 5,598-9-6 being the amount detained wrongfully out of the octroi duty by the respondent. It was dismissed by the 2nd Civil Judge (Class I), Jabalpur, and the plaintiff has therefore come up in appeal. The plaintiff-company had a depot within the limits of the Jabalpur Corporation for storing cigarettes. The cigarettes were partly sold in Jabalpur City and were partly exported outside. To avoid the difficulty of paying octroi duty on the cigarettes brought within the limits of the Corporation and claims for refund, an agreement (Exh. P-19) was entered into between the parties. According to this agreement, the appellant-company was to submit on the 10th of every month a statement of all imports made within the limits of the Corporation as also the details of the goods exported outside. The amount of octroi duty payable after deducting the amount claimable as refund was to be paid to the Corporation. At the time of importing the goods, a declaration separately for those goods which were to be kept for temporary detention for being exported and those goods which were to be consumed within the limits of the Corporation had to be filed by the appellant. According to the appellant-company, it was entitled to a refund of Rs. 28,072-12-0 on account of goods imported and exported during the period February 1953 to December 1954. After adjusting the refunds made by the Corporation before the suit and also allowing the refund of Rs. 3,570-1-0 made after the suit, the appellant-company claimed a sum of Rs. 5,598-9-6. According to the defendant-respondent, the plaintiff-company was entitled to a refund of only three-fourth of the octroi duty on consignments which were declared to be for temporary storage within the limits of the Corporation but part of which was consumed within the local limits before export. Calculating on this basis, the defendant Corporation contended that whatever was due for refund had been paid. It was further pleaded by the defendant that the suit for recovery of the amount of refund was barred under section 175(3) of the City of Jabalpur Corporation Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation Act). Calculating on this basis, the defendant Corporation contended that whatever was due for refund had been paid. It was further pleaded by the defendant that the suit for recovery of the amount of refund was barred under section 175(3) of the City of Jabalpur Corporation Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation Act). Before we consider the merits of the contentions advanced by the parties, we may refer to the facts which give rise to the claim for refund. Exhs. P-2 to P-18 are the declarations which were furnished by the appellant-company at the time of importing the goods. In these declarations the appellant has declared separately about the goods which were intended for local consumption and goods which were intended for export. There is no dispute regarding the octroi duty levied on the goods which were intended for local consumption. The dispute relates only to duty paid on those goods which were exported outside the limits of the Corporation. It is not necessary for us to go into the details of the export in view of the statement of Durga Prasad Pande (P.W. 2), who is the Chief Officer of the plaintiff-company at Jabalpur. From paragraphs 11 to 13 of his statement, it is clear that the company used to take out goods from the consignments which were declared to be for the purpose of export whenever a necessity arose. In such cases, the Corporation has allowed only refund of three-fourth octroi duty on the whole consignment, whereas, according to the witness, full refund should have been allowed on the part of the consignment which was exported. The witness admits that in accordance with the accounts as explained in Exh. D-9, the company is not entitled to any refund if refund on the value of the full consignment is allowed at three-fourth only. It is thus clear that the difference between the parties on the question of refund arises on account of the interpretation put by them on the agreement and the octroi rules for refund in the case of a consignment which was declared to be for purposes of export but part of which was sold within the limits of the Corporation. The relevant clause in Exh. The relevant clause in Exh. P-19 on this subject is clause 1 which runs as follows: The Jabalpur Corporation will accept payment of the full amount of the octroi duty accrued due to the Jabalpur Corporation in any one month on all imports into the Jabalpur Corporation less (1) refund due to the Firm of the full amount of octroi on exports from the Jabalpur Corporation of such stocks as are expressly declared by them at the time of import to be for bona fide temporary storage and temporary detention to the satisfaction of the Jabalpur Corporation; (2) refund due to the Firm of three-fourth of octroi on exports from the Jabalpur Corporation of such stocks as are not so declared by the Firm at the time of import. The rule for refund is rule 29 of the Rules for the Collection and Refund of Octroi Duty in the Jabalpur Municipality. Sub-rule (1) of rule 29 deals with consignments imported without any declaration but subsequently exported within two months. Subject to certain conditions, a refund of 3/4th of the octroi duty paid is allowed on these consignments. Sub-rule (2) deals with exportation of goods imported under declaration and is as follows: On the exportation of goods imported under declaration made under rule 9(c) duty paid thereon at the time of import shall be refundable in full, provided it is proved to the satisfaction of the Chief Executive Officer that any portion of such goods has not been sold, consumed or used during the period of its temporary detention and that the goods are the same on which duty was paid at the time of import. We may state that sub-rule (2) was introduced in rule 29 by an amendment made on 20-5-1952. Before the amendment, refund of octroi duty was permissible only to the extent of 3/4th of the duty paid. The agreement Exh. P-19 was entered into between the parties under rule 10(b) which enables the Committee, subject to such conditions and safeguards as may be found necessary, to permit in writing any trading or manufacturing firm to import dutiable articles without paying duty at the outpost. Such an agreement is entered into between the parties to facilitate recovery of the duty as well as payment of refunds. The appellant considers Exh. P-19 as an 'agreement' and the respondent calls it only an 'arrangement'. Such an agreement is entered into between the parties to facilitate recovery of the duty as well as payment of refunds. The appellant considers Exh. P-19 as an 'agreement' and the respondent calls it only an 'arrangement'. The difference, however, is not material, as Exh. P-19 was intended only to facilitate recovery of duty and payment of refund in accordance with the rights of the parties created by the relevant rules. The power of the Corporation to impose taxes or duties cannot arise on the basis of an agreement; nor can the power of refund as allowed to parties by rules be modified in this manner. The agreement or arrangement, whatever we may call it, must be only to work out the rights of the parties according to the provisions in the Corporation Act and the rules made thereunder. Under clause 1 of the agreement Exh. P-19, quoted above, we find that the appellant was entitled to a refund of the full amount on such stocks as "are expressly declared by them at the time of import to be for bona fide temporary storage" and refund of three-fourth amount on such stocks as are not so declared. The declaration regarding temporary storage and detention obviously means that the stocks were declared to be for the purposes of export. Under rule 29(2) the duty paid at the time of import on such consignments is refundable only if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Chief Executive Officer (i) that any portion of each goods has not been sold, consumed or used during the period of detention, and (ii) that the goods are the same on which duty was paid. Thus, the right to refund arises only on these two conditions being satisfied. By using the words "to the satisfaction of the Jabalpur Corporation" in clause 1 of the agreement, the parties obviously intended to give effect to these two conditions contained in rule 29(2). Even if that was not the intention, rule 29(2) would supersede the agreement and the right of refund would be subject to these two conditions. The second condition was satisfied in the case of the exports in dispute. However, the first condition was not satisfied inasmuch as admittedly the company sold part of the goods from the consignment within the limits of the Corporation. The second condition was satisfied in the case of the exports in dispute. However, the first condition was not satisfied inasmuch as admittedly the company sold part of the goods from the consignment within the limits of the Corporation. They thus acted contrary to the declaration and violated condition No. (i) in rule 29(2). For this purpose, the goods in each consignment covered by the declaration should be treated as one unit and if any part of these goods is sold within the limits of the Corporation, the right of refund would be restricted to three-fourth of the duty paid on the remaining goods which were exported. The interpretation put by the Corporation on rule 29(2) is, in our opinion, correct. We hold that neither under clause 1 of the agreement Ex. P-19 nor under rule 29(2) were the appellant-company entitled to the full refund when only part of the goods covered by the declaration was exported. Shri A.P. Sen for the appellant contended, in the alternative, that rule 29(2) is ultra vires of the powers of the Corporation inasmuch as by refusing to refund octroi duty on the portion of the consignment exported the Corporation is in effect imposing octroi duty on goods which were not sold, consumed or used within the limits of the Corporation. He relied upon the decision in Empress Mills v. Municipal Committee, Wardha AIR 1958 S.C. 841. The rules for imposition of octroi duty and refund thereof were framed under the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, and were continued under the Corporation Act under section 3(2) thereof under which any rule made or tax imposed under the Municipal Act is deemed to have been made or imposed under the Corporation Act in so far as it is not inconsistent with the Act. The rules for imposition of octroi duty were framed under section 66(1)(c) of the Municipal Act which gave power to the municipality to impose a tax on "goods brought within the limits of the municipality for sale, consumption or use within those limits". The corresponding power in the Corporation Act is in section 120(1)(e). The rule regarding refund was framed under section 85 of the Municipal Act which enables the Provincial Government to regulate the refund of taxes and to impose limitation on refunds. The corresponding power in the Corporation Act is in section 120(1)(e). The rule regarding refund was framed under section 85 of the Municipal Act which enables the Provincial Government to regulate the refund of taxes and to impose limitation on refunds. In the Corporation Act the same rule-making power exists under section 448(2)(t) where also the power to limit refunds is mentioned. The rules for imposition of octroi duty and limiting refunds are therefore to be deemed to be rules under the Corporation Act. The liability to pay octroi duty accrues as soon as goods are brought within the limits of the Corporation. Without the rules for refund, there could be no right to claim back any part of the duty paid. Thus the right to tax granted by the Corporation Act is complete as soon as the goods cross the octroi barrier. There is therefore no scope for the argument that the Corporation has no power to tax goods which are brought within its limits and are subsequently exported. An independent right arises in favour of the person who pays the octroi duty to claim a refund if it is permissible under the rules. In this matter the Legislature has granted power both under the Municipal Act as well as the Corporation Act to the State Government to make rules limiting the amount to be refunded. Acting under this power, the State Government has framed rules imposing certain conditions on refund as also a limit on the amount which can be refunded. These restrictions were considered necessary for facility of administration and to avoid evasion of the tax. The rules being within the power granted by the statute, it cannot be contended that rule 29(2) which restricts the refund of full amount only under certain conditions is ultra vires. The decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the appellant was in the context of a terminal tax on goods or animals imported into the limits of the municipality. That tax was imposed under section 66(1)(c) of the Municipal Act. There is no corresponding section in the Corporation Act, as this power of taxation no longer exists in List II. That tax was imposed under section 66(1)(c) of the Municipal Act. There is no corresponding section in the Corporation Act, as this power of taxation no longer exists in List II. Interpreting the word "import" their Lordships observed that it did not mean merely bringing into of goods within the municipal limits but meant "incorporating and mixing up of the goods imported with the mass of the property in the local area". Shri A.P. Sen contends that unless the goods, which were brought within the limits of the Corporation, were mixed or incorporated with the mass of property in the local area, it could not be considered to be an "import" within the limits of the Corporation. This argument does not help the appellant for the simple reason that the word "import" is not used in section 66(1)(c) of the Municipal Act [or the corresponding section 120(1)(e) of the Corporation Act]. The words used there are "brought within the limits of the municipality". As we have said, the right to tax such goods accrues as soon as they are brought within the limits of the Corporation and therefore the meaning of the word "import" as given in the decision relied upon has no relevance. The imposition of the octroi duty at the time when the goods were brought within the limits of the Corporation was valid and in not allowing refunds of the duty paid under a power given by the rules framed under the Act the Corporation is not detaining the amount wrongfully. Apart from the merits of the case, Shri R.S. Dabir for the respondent contends that the suit for refund of the octroi duty is barred under section 175(3) of the Corporation Act which provides that: No refund of any tax shall be claimable by any person otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules thereunder. On the wordings of this section, refund of octroi duty paid can be claimed only in accordance with the rules and therefore the only remedy of the appellant was to apply to the Corporation for relief. Shri A.P. Sen for the appellant contends that there is no remedy provided under the Act against the order which may be passed by the Corporation refusing refund. Shri A.P. Sen for the appellant contends that there is no remedy provided under the Act against the order which may be passed by the Corporation refusing refund. In discussing this point, the trial Court has referred to section 83 of the Municipal Act and has observed that the appellant should have followed the remedies under that section. It is rightly contended that the appellant could not take recourse to that section. The Corporation Act provides no appeal specifically against orders refusing to give refunds. However, section 415 of the Corporation Act gives a right of appeal in case of all orders passed by any Corporation Officer or the Chief Executive Officer. An appeal against an order refusing to grant refund would be tenable under this section and therefore the appellant cannot complain that there is no remedy provided against the Corporation's refusal to refund octroi duty. The claim for refund of amount alleged to have been recovered by the municipality wrongfully for octroi duty was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in City of Jabalpur Corporation, Jabalpur v. Bata Shoe Company Ltd. First Appeal No. 138 of 1952 decided on 25-10-1957. After reviewing the decisions on the point, it was held that a civil suit for recovery of the amount was barred except in cases where it was not authorized by the provisions of the Act. In Singhai Tantilal v. City of Jabalpur Corporation 1960 MPLJ 54 the same point was again considered and it was held that the suit was maintainable only in cases where the right to recover the tax did not exist, that is, where the municipal committee acted beyond the powers conferred on it by law. It is thus clear that the appellants could not maintain the suit unless it could be shown that the recovery of the octroi duty was ultra vires or the refusal to refund was contrary to the rules. As we have held above, the Corporation acted according to the rules in refusing to refund one-fourth of the octroi duty paid on goods exported out of the consignments which were partly sold within the limits of the Corporation. We hold that the question wholly related to refund and the suit was barred under section 175(3) of the Corporation Act. As we have held above, the Corporation acted according to the rules in refusing to refund one-fourth of the octroi duty paid on goods exported out of the consignments which were partly sold within the limits of the Corporation. We hold that the question wholly related to refund and the suit was barred under section 175(3) of the Corporation Act. To support the maintainability of the suit, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the claim was really for recovery of amount which was deposited with the Corporation and not for refund of the octroi duty. We may only state that the suit as originally brought was for refund of octroi duty and this was what was stated in the notice which was given to the municipal committee. It was only by an amendment that this aspect was introduced. From the agreement Ex. P-19, the declarations made at the time importing the consignments and the accounts sent by the company to the Corporation, we have no doubt that the claim was for refund of octroi duty paid. The trial Court has also held that the suit is barred by time, as it was not filed within six months from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. In this connection, the trial Court has referred to section 48(2) of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. The corresponding section in the Corporation Act is section 412. That section provides that "no suit shall be instituted against the Corporation in respect of any act done in pursuance of execution or intended execution of this Act......unless it is commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action." This section is practically the same as section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act, the only difference being that the words "any act done in pursuance of execution or intended execution of this Act" are used for the words "anything done or purporting to be done under this Act". These words do not make any material difference. These words do not make any material difference. In City of Jabalpur Corporation, Jabalpur v. Bata Shoe Company Ltd. First Appeal No. 138 of 1952 decided on 25-10-1957 the question about the applicability of section 48 of the Municipal Act was discussed and it was held in paragraph 13 of that judgment that that section applies to assessment of taxes and even if the assessment is wrongly done, the act would be governed by the words "purporting to be done." We need not take recourse to the words "purporting to be done" or the corresponding words ''intended to be done" as the act of the Corporation in refusing to refund the amount in the instant case is well within the rules regulating the refund. The refusal, therefore, is an act done under the rules framed under the Corporation Act and the suit should have therefore commenced within six months from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. The claim is, therefore barred by time. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed