JUDGMENT S.P. Bhargava, J. This appeal arises out of a suit for possession of 134.11 acres of Bhogra lands situate at mouza Salhepali, Tahsil Gharghoda, details whereof are given in the plaint. The suit was dismissed by the Second Civil Judge, Raigarh, on the ground that it was not maintainable. The plaintiffs have, therefore, come up in appeal. One Ayodhyasingh was admittedly the Zamindar of mouza Salhepali at the relevant time. Up to 22-9-1942, one Samru was the Gaontia of the village, Salhepali, and was in possession of the suit lands, recorded in the revenue papers as Bhogra lands. The plaintiffs' case was that Samru was ejected from his Theka of mouza Salhepali under the orders of the Tahsildar, Gharghoda, on 22-9-1942 on the ground that he had failed to pay the arrears of land revenue. This order of eviction was obtained by Ayodhyasingh. In pursuance of the order, Ayodhyasingh took poseession of all the suit lands through the Nazir of the Tahsil Court, Gharghoda, on 6-10-1942. This is shown by Exh. P-7 and Exh. P-8 on record. After obtaining possession of lands, Ayodhyasingh granted a patta of the village under a registered instrument to plaintiff No. 1 Harischandra on 7-10-1942. This patta is Exh. P-10 on record. Mutation was sanctioned by the Tahsildar in favour of Harischandra on 5-8-1948 and his name was recorded in the Khasra of the village for the year 1949. Two Khasra papers of the village for the year 1949 are Exhs. P-1 and P-2 on record. The plaintiffs alleged that Garbhoosingh (defendant No. 1) and Ghandarai (deceased) who was originally defendant No. 2 forcibly took possession of the lands on 16-6-1949 with the help of some other persons. Ghandarai is represented in the suit by his minor Jankiprasad (respondent No. 2). The plaint as laid originally was by plaintiff No. 1, Harischandra, and he claimed possession of the lands in suit in his Gaontia right on the ground that the previous Gaontia having been ejected from his theka also lost his Bhogra lands. Ghandarai is represented in the suit by his minor Jankiprasad (respondent No. 2). The plaint as laid originally was by plaintiff No. 1, Harischandra, and he claimed possession of the lands in suit in his Gaontia right on the ground that the previous Gaontia having been ejected from his theka also lost his Bhogra lands. Subsequently, however on 14-10-1952 the plaintiff, No. 1 made an application for leave to amend the plaint to introduce the plea that the suit lands had been settled by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Raigarh, under section 54 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (No. 1 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Abolition Act') with him and his two brothers. The plaintiff No. 1 was permitted to amend the plaint. The suit lands were settled by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Raigarh, under his order, dated 26-8-1952, which is Exh. P-6 on record. Harish Chandra's two brothers are the plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3. The defendants denied that the plaintiff was ever the gaontia of mouza Salhepali. They further denied that Ayodhyasingh or plaintiffs were ever in possession of the suit lands between 22-9-1942 and 16-6-1949. The defendants farther contended that Samru was the gaontia of the village and defendant No. 2, the deceased Ghandarai was his co-sharer. It is alleged by the defendants that at the time of the passing of the Abolition Act, Samru's son Panchamsingh was the gaontia. Therefore, after Samru's death, Ghandarai and Panchamsingh are alleged to have been in possession of the suit lands in their own rights. It was urged that Ayodhyasingh had no right to alienate the lands under the Wazib-ul-arz. Lastly, it was contended that after the passing of the Abolition Act, this suit was not maintainable on behalf of the plaintiffs because the lands in question never formed part of their personal cultivation. They always remained in the personal cultivation of the suit lands. The trial Court found that Ayodhyasingh was the Zamindar of the village Salhepali in 1942. He had transferred the village to plaintiff No. 1 under Exh. P-10, dated 7-10-1942 and as a result of the transfer, the plaintiff No. 1 became the gaontia of the village and entitled to the suit lands; that the plaintiff was put in possession of the suit lands immediately after the document (Exh. He had transferred the village to plaintiff No. 1 under Exh. P-10, dated 7-10-1942 and as a result of the transfer, the plaintiff No. 1 became the gaontia of the village and entitled to the suit lands; that the plaintiff was put in possession of the suit lands immediately after the document (Exh. P-10) was executed in his favour and mutation was effected in the name of the plaintiff. The trial Court also held that Samru was the gaontia of the village on 22-9-1942 and he did possess the suit lands as his Bhogra lands. It further found that Panchamsingh and Ghandarai never became gaontia of the village and did not become entitled to the suit lands. It also found that Samru was dispossessed on 6-10-1942. The learned Judge of the trial Court held that Samru lost the rights as gaontia and consequently the suit lands in 1942, and that the plaintiffs were validly granted the gaontia rights by Exh. P. 10 and that they took possession of the lands accordingly. It also held that the plaintiffs were wrongly dispossessed by the defendants on 16-6-1949. The grant of the patta to the plaintiffs by the Additional Deputy Commissioner was found proved but it was held to be invalid under section 54 of the Abolition Act. The suit was, however, dismissed on the ground that it could not be maintained by the plaintiffs as they ceased to be the gaontias after the Abolition Act. It is important to note that the lower Court clearly held that Zamindar Ayodhyasingh's act in creating the plaintiffs as gaontias of the village was not in contravention of any previous Wazib-ul-arz of State and, therefore, was legal and valid. Shri Jakatdar, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that Samru in fact was never ejected and possession was never given to Ayodhyasingh by him. However, there is overwhelming oral and documentary evidence to show that Samru was dispossessed on 6-10-1942. Documentary evidence consists of Exhs. P-7 and P-8 in this respect. Milan (P.W. 3) establishes delivery of possession in his presence to Ayodhyasingh without hindrance by anyone. After the execution of the patta (Exh. P-10) in favour of Harishchandra by Ayodhyasingh, possession was obtained by Harishchandra, on 8-10-1942. This fact is proved by Harishchandra himself as P.W. 1 and by his witnesses, Chandansingh (P.W. 2) who is also an attesting witness to Exh. After the execution of the patta (Exh. P-10) in favour of Harishchandra by Ayodhyasingh, possession was obtained by Harishchandra, on 8-10-1942. This fact is proved by Harishchandra himself as P.W. 1 and by his witnesses, Chandansingh (P.W. 2) who is also an attesting witness to Exh. P-10, and Briju (P.W. 4) as well as Sharabhu (P.W. 5). Exh. P-4 was emphasized by Shri Jakatdar to show the conclusion that after Samru's death, Panchamsingh had become the gaontia of the village. Reliance was placed upon this observation: However, taking into consideration the fact that present Gaontia is a minor and default in payment of land revenue has been made by his father, I grant him six months' time to pay the entire amount of the arrears from the date of the order......made in the judgment of the Diwan of Raigarh State, dated 12-12-1946. It would, however, be seen that the sentence occurring in the judgment cannot be interpreted out of its context. The proceeding in which the judgment (Exh. P-4) was ultimately given had admittedly started in the life-time of Samru and Ghandarai. The statement to the effect that minor was the gaontia is merely in that context that the previous gaontia was Samru and on his death his legal representative Panchamsingh was brought on record in his place. Discussion in the judgment of the Diwan did not indicate any fresh appointment of Panchamsingh as the gaontia but these words were used merely to describe the right that was contested against Samru. Further, it would be seen that this order, dated 12-12-1946, does not by any stretch of reasonable imagination show that Samru was not evicted from his theka. The mere filing of an appeal does not in law operate as a stay. The judgment only indicates that even after the eviction proceedings had been taken against Samru, the appeal continued. Further, Exh. P-5 clearly points out that Samru was ejected from the village on 22-9-1942 by the Tahsildar and finally on 19-7-1947 by the Diwan. 19-7-1947 is an important date because it shows that six months time that was allowed in the judgment (Exh. P-4) by the Diwan, was not availed to his advantage by Panchamsingh. Further, Exh. P-5 clearly points out that Samru was ejected from the village on 22-9-1942 by the Tahsildar and finally on 19-7-1947 by the Diwan. 19-7-1947 is an important date because it shows that six months time that was allowed in the judgment (Exh. P-4) by the Diwan, was not availed to his advantage by Panchamsingh. In these circumstances, the conclusion reached by the lower Court that Samru was evicted from his theka of mouza Salhepali on 22-9-1942, that the possession of the suit lands was taken from him by Ayodhyasingh on 6-10-1942 and that on execution of Exh. P-10, possession was transferred to Harischandra (plaintiff No. 1) on 8-10-1942, are correct conclusions. We further agree with the lower Court that upto the date when defendant No. 1 and Ghandarai (deceased) obtained possession of the suit lands by committing trespass, the plaintiffs were in possession. The various findings of the lower Court would indicate that the entire controversy turns on the construction of section 54 of the Abolition Act. Section 54 of the Abolition Act reads as under:- 54. (1) Where any land not included in the home-farm was under the personal cultivation of a proprietor, the Deputy Commissioner may in accordance with the rules made by the State Government in this behalf, reserve to such proprietor the rights of a raiyat in the whole or part of such land and shall determine the revenue thereon. (2) Where the proprietary rights held by an under-tenure vest in the State under section 3, the Deputy Commissioner may reserve to such under-tenure the rights of a raiyat in the whole or part of the home-farm land and shall determine the revenue thereon. The lower Court has drawn a distinction between 'personal cultivation' and 'physical possession'. Having come to the conclusion that defendant No. 1 and Ghandarai (the original defendant No. 2) had made a trespass on the land on 16-6-1949 the lower Court has come to the conclusion that as from that day onwards in any event, the cultivation done on the suit lands was not that of the plaintiffs, they could not be validly granted any raiyati patta under the provisions of section 54 of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondents has also in his arguments before us emphasized this aspect. The learned counsel for the respondents has also in his arguments before us emphasized this aspect. Shri Jakatdar contended that admittedly, the plaintiffs had lost their possession on the date the Abolition Act came into force. The cultivation that was done on the land on the Abolition Act coming into force did not belong to the plaintiffs and, therefore, they could not be entitled to any rights under section 54 of the Abolition Act. We find ourselves unable to agree with this view. 'Personal cultivation' in section 54 indicates not merely bodily possession of the land but constructive possession and also the right to possess against a trespasser. If a wrong doer takes possession of the property, steps to exclude him from possession can certainly be taken and the cultivation of the wrong-doer in these circumstances cannot clothe him with any rights. His cultivation has to be deemed on behalf of the rightful owner. The Abolition Act does not aim at the extinguishment of the title of the rightful possessor by mere act of trespass. Nowhere has it been said so. The initial condition under section 54 of the Abolition Act was fulfilled to the satisfaction of the officer concerned in this case. The patta was issued by him on 26-8-1952. This patta does not admit of a collateral attack. It could not be attacked in defence. In Mahabir v. Ramnarayan AIR 1959 Pat 406 , their Lordships of the Patna High Court considered the effect of section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act which conferred the right of a statutory settlement on the intermediary of the Bakasht land in his khas possession on the date of the vesting of the estate in the Government. Interpreting the term 'khas possession', their Lordships said: ....'khas possession' does not imply actual bodily possession and it includes also constructive possession and a mere right to possess. If the land had been all along in khas possession of the intermediary and if he is dispossessed by a trespasser........before the date of vesting, the land will be deemed to have been settled with the intermediary because in the eye of law in the event of a decree for possession being given to him by evicting the trespasser be will be deemed to be in possession on the date of the vesting. Therefore, the trespasser though in actual possession on the date of vesting gets no right. The view taken in Mahabir v. Ramnarayan AIR 1959 Pat 406 was based upon the Full Bench decision taken in the case of Sukhdeo Das v. Kashi Prasad AIR 1958 Pat 630 . In the Full Bench decision, it was observed: To give a harmonious and consistent meaning to different provisions of section 8 which is a cardinal principle of construction the words 'khas possession' must include also constructive possession. If the Legislature intended by using the expression 'khas possession' to mean actual physical possession then different provisions of section 6 become self contradictory since the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c) are clearly destructive of that meaning. Thus, the words 'khas possession' do not mean actual physical possession; it only means possession of land by cultivation or by carrying on horticultural operations thereon without the intervention of tenants. The lands not under cultivation, though in khas possession of an intermediary, are outside the scope of section 6. On a true construction of this section,..........therefore, khas possession of an intermediary in sub-section (1) of this section, simply means cultivating possession of the intermediary either in his own right or on behalf of others. ***** Now on textual interpretation of sub-section (1) of section 6, as is contended by Mr. Das, the lands will be deemed to be settled with that trespasser. A trespasser has obviously no right in the land. Under the existing law of the land, proprietors of the tenure-holders, as the case may be, who were in possession prior to their wrongful dispossession were in law entitled to possession by eviction of the trespasser. The same point came up for consideration in Daya Ram v. Maheshwar F.A. No. 13/57, D/- 28-4-60 1960 MPLJ 205 ) before a Division Bench of this Court. In that case, the finding given by the trial Court which resulted in dismissal of the plaintiff's suit was that the patta that was granted by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, Raigarh, was void. The reasoning of the trial Court was that the lands were not under the personal cultivation of Mst. Apuchha (defendant No. 9), and, therefore, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, had no jurisdiction to act under section 54 of the Abolition Act to settle these lands with Mst. Apuchha. The reasoning of the trial Court was that the lands were not under the personal cultivation of Mst. Apuchha (defendant No. 9), and, therefore, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, had no jurisdiction to act under section 54 of the Abolition Act to settle these lands with Mst. Apuchha. The view that the lands were not under the personal cultivation of Mst. Apuchha was based on the finding that in the year 1944-45, Danardan had wrongfully dispossessed her. Dealing with this point, the learned Judges of the Division Bench observed as under:- We cannot agree with this view of the trial Court. It is a finding of the trial Court that Mst. Apuchha was wrongfully dispossessed and, therefore, the possession of Danardan or of defendants Nos. 1 to 8, did not ripen into a title by adverse possession. The defendants Nos. 1 to 8 were mere trespassers and if the right of a person who is entitled to be in lawful possession is extinguished by a trespasser, who has not completed 12 years possession, it will be patting premium on wrongful acts. "Personal cultivation" appearing in section 54 of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act means one's own cultivation. But if one is prohibited from doing his own cultivation by a wrong-doer, the authorities ought to ignore the trespasser and ascribe the cultivation by the wrong-doer to the true owner by holding it to be his (true owner's) cultivation. Therefore, we hold that Mst. Apuchha ought to be considered as in personal cultivation of the lands in raiyati rights under section 54, Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act. We are in respectful agreement with the views expressed above, and hold accordingly. We may refer to the interpretation put by this Court of the word 'possession' in section 45 of the Abolition Act. Sections 43 and 54 relate to the same subject in the context of 'Central Provinces' and 'merged territories' respectively. In Mahendrakumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh S.A. No. 298/57, D/- 14-10-59 (1960 MPLJ 66), one of us (Shrivastava J.) held that the word "possession" in section 45 was comprehensive enough to cover the case of a holder who was dispossessed by a trespasser. Further, in Pt. In Mahendrakumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh S.A. No. 298/57, D/- 14-10-59 (1960 MPLJ 66), one of us (Shrivastava J.) held that the word "possession" in section 45 was comprehensive enough to cover the case of a holder who was dispossessed by a trespasser. Further, in Pt. Biharilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh S.A. No. 221/57, D/- 23-8-60, a Division Bench of this Court took the same view expressing itself as follows:- ...We are of opinion that a larger meaning should be assigned to the word 'possession' in section 46(1) of the Act so as to include within the ambit of that section every person who on the date of vesting held or was entitled to hold any land as an absolute occupancy or occupancy tenant even though, on that date, he was not in actual physical possession of such land.... 'Possession' in section 54 of the Abolition Act must be similarly interpreted. We have no doubt that a person who is wrongfully dispossessed by a trespasser must be deemed to be in possession for the purposes of that section. It was further contended by the respondent that the present suit was hit by the decision in the case of Chhotekhan v. Mohammad Obedullakhan 1953 NLJ 254 : AIR 1953 Nag 361 : ILR 1953 Nag 702. In our opinion, however, that decision does not govern the present controversy. This very objection was raised in the case of Rahmat Ullah Khan v. Mahabirsingh 1956 NLJ 1 : AIR 1956 Nag 132 : ILR 1955 Nag 983. Sinha C.J. (as he then was) dealing with a similar argument observed in paragraph 8 of his opinion as under:- It was next contended that this suit must fail in limine in view of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (No. 1 of 1951) as interpreted by a special Bench of this Court in Chhota Khan v. Mohammad Obedullakhan 1953 NLJ 154 : AIR 1953 Nag 361 : ILR 1953 Nag 702. In my opinion, that decision cannot govern the present controversy. The special Bench was dealing with suits instituted by a lambardar, sadar-lambardar, or proprietor in his character as such, for possession of land of the nature of abadi site, or for pre-emption, or in respect of grass land. In my opinion, that decision cannot govern the present controversy. The special Bench was dealing with suits instituted by a lambardar, sadar-lambardar, or proprietor in his character as such, for possession of land of the nature of abadi site, or for pre-emption, or in respect of grass land. The special Bench by a majority held that as soon as the plaintiffs in those cases lost their character as proprietor, lambardar or sadar-lambardar as a result of the Act aforesaid, they could not continue the suit. That case did not relate to recovery of khudkasht lands, possession of which had been wrongfully denied to the plaintiff by the defendant in possession. It was further observed therein: To give effect to the argument raised on behalf of the appellant in this case would be to bold that if a proprietor has been wrongfully dispossessed of a part of the property being khudkasht, the defendant trespassing upon the property can claim to continue his trespass. A distinction has to be made between a suit brought by a proprietor in his character as such for possession of property which the law..........then in force authorised him to claim by a suit for the benefit of the entire body of proprietors and a suit based upon trespass upon his individual rights obtained by him irrespective of his character as such. We accordingly hold that the Additional Deputy Commissioner rightly granted a patta to the plaintiffs and their right as raiyats of the land cannot be challenged. It was further emphasized before us that the plaint, as laid in the beginning, was based on gaontia rights. Subsequently, by an amendment the cause of action was based on the raiyati rights also. Shri Jakatdar argued that this could not be permitted to be done and as no gaontia rights remained with plaintiff No. 1 on the enactment of the Abolition Act, the suit ought to be dismissed. We are of opinion that the submission of the learned counsel has no substance. The amendment having been incorporated in the plaint itself could not be ignored at the later stages of the suit and, therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to relief even if they cannot succeed on the basis of their rights as gaontia, as pleaded by them. We are of opinion that the submission of the learned counsel has no substance. The amendment having been incorporated in the plaint itself could not be ignored at the later stages of the suit and, therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to relief even if they cannot succeed on the basis of their rights as gaontia, as pleaded by them. Further, under Order 7, rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, also, the subsequent event could be considered to do complete justice between the parties and to shorten litigation between them. The defendants themselves rely on the subsequent enactment of the Abolition Act in the year 1951, the cause of action being of the year 1919. Obviously, it is not fair that they should be permitted to take advantage of the enactment so far as they are concerned but the very same Act should not be looked into inasmuch as it confers a benefit on the plaintiffs. Such a course, to say the least, would be unjust. We, therefore, overrule this objection also. The result is that all the objections raised by the respondents fail. We accept the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the lower Court. It is decreed that the defendants shall deliver possession of the suit lands (134.11 acres) situate in mouza Salhepali Tahsil Gharghoda details whereof are given in the plaint to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs will also be entitled to their full costs in both the Courts. Appeal allowed