JUDGMENT T.C. Shrivastava, J. This first appeal by the State Government is directed against the decree of the 1st Additional District Judge, Chhindwara, in Civil Suit No. 2-B of 1956, decided on 20-8-1957. Thakur Dongarshah was the proprietor of village Chawalpani and other eleven villages. He had executed a lease on 1-12-1947 in favour of the respondent (plaintiff) granting him a right to pluck tendu leaves from the said twelve villages for the period 1-4-1948 to 30-7-1952 for a consideration of Rs. 3,100. Later, on 31-1-1951, Thakur Dongarshah executed another document (Exh. P-5) under which he granted the respondent a right to collect tendu leaves from the said twelve villages during the period 1-4-1953 to 31-7-1955 for a consideration of Rs. 3,200. After the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (No. I of 1951) - hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act - a notification was issued on 26-1-1951 that the villages would vest in the State Government from 31-3-1951. Accordingly, the State Government did not allow the plaintiff to collect tendu leaves during the period of the second lease. The plaintiff's case is that the second lease was binding on the State Government in view of the decision in Firm, Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 108 . Further, on an application by the plaintiff the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, Chhindwara, passed an order on 26-4-1951 under section 6 of the Abolition Act declaring that the lease would not be void after the date of vesting. Accordingly, the plaintiff contends that the lease continued valid. He claimed Rs. 12,000 as damages, interest etc. for being deprived of the tendu leaves during the period of the second lease. The State Government denied the second lease and pleaded that it was not binding on them. The fact that the respondent was prevented from collecting the tendu leaves was admitted; but the extent of damages was denied. The trial Court held that the second lease was binding on the State Government and assessed damages, interest etc. at Rs. 12,000 and decreed the claim accordingly. The State Government has, therefore, preferred this appeal. The fact that the respondent was prevented from collecting the tendu leaves was admitted; but the extent of damages was denied. The trial Court held that the second lease was binding on the State Government and assessed damages, interest etc. at Rs. 12,000 and decreed the claim accordingly. The State Government has, therefore, preferred this appeal. Several suits of the present nature were instituted against the State Government on the decision in Chhotabhai's case AIR 1953 SC 108 in which it was held that such leases were binding on the State Government. Similar questions were considered in Ananda Behera v. State of Orisaa AIR 1956 SC 17 and in Shantabai v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 532 . In the latter case, it was held that the State had not acquired or taken possession of any contractual rights of the ex-proprietors and was within its rights to decline to be bound by the agreements. It was also held that if the so-called leases were merely licences, then they had come to an end on the extinction of the title of the licensors. The matter was directly considered recently by the Supreme Court in Mahadeo v. State of Bombay AIR 1959 SC 735 in which the provisions in sections 3 and 4 of the Abolition Act were considered. The conclusion reached in that case is that the trees were items of proprietary rights and a right to collect tendu leaves or any other forest produce was a transfer of an interest in proprietary rights. As under sections 3 and 4 of the Abolition Act the rights of a proprietor or any person claiming through the proprietor passed to the State, the rights of the so-called lessees who claimed by virtue of any such contract with the ex-proprietor also passed to the State. Accordingly, it was held that the decision in Chhotabhai's case AIR 1953 SC 108 "was apparently given per incuriam, and cannot therefore be followed". Shri A.P. Sen for the respondent pointed out that the lease deeds in Mahadeo's case AIR 1959 SC 735 did not only transfer tendu leaves but also granted the right to remove timber as also the right of making certain constructions in the forest. Under these circumstances, it was held to be a transfer of interest in immovable property. Shri A.P. Sen for the respondent pointed out that the lease deeds in Mahadeo's case AIR 1959 SC 735 did not only transfer tendu leaves but also granted the right to remove timber as also the right of making certain constructions in the forest. Under these circumstances, it was held to be a transfer of interest in immovable property. He contends that in the present case these considerations do not arise and the lease deed is not a transfer of interest in property. We have perused the lease deed (Exh. P-5) and find that except mentioning the right to collect tendu leaves, no other rights are granted under that document. There is, therefore, room to contend that it is not a transfer of interest in property. However, that makes the position of the respondent worse; for, as observed in Shantabai's case AIR 1958 SC 532 , if the document is held to be a licence only, then the extinction of the title of the licensor puts an end to it. The State Government is, therefore, absolved from all liability under the document. It is expressly mentioned in Exh. P-5 that if the licensee is obstructed by anyone from collecting leaves, the licensor will indemnify him. This clause was obviously put in the deed, as it was executed four days after the date of vesting had been notified. The parties expected that difficulty would be created in the way of the licensee by the State Government. This clause gives a right to the licensee to claim damages from the licensor. As the deed (Exh. P-5) stands, the transaction creates nothing more than a contractual obligation against the ex-proprietor. The State Government is not bound by it. Shri A.P. Sen further contends that if the transaction is treated as a transfer of proprietor's interest, it has been validated by the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, Chhindwara, under section 6 of the Abolition Act and cannot, therefore, be challenged by the State Government. Sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Abolition Act is as follows: Where on the application of the transferor or the transferee, the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that any transfer of property referred to in sub-section (1) was made by a proprietor in good faith and in the ordinary course of village management, he may declare that the transfer shall not be void after the date of vesting. Sub-section (1) of section 6 provides that all transfers made by the ex-proprietor after the 16th March 1950 shall be void as from the date of vesting. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that if the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that any transfer after that date is made by the proprietor in good faith and in the ordinary course of village management, he may declare that the transfer shall not be void after the date of vesting. Acting on sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Abolition Act, the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, Chhindwara, granted a declaration to the respondent as regards the second lease. It will, however, be noticed that the transfer itself was made on 31-1-1951 whereas the notification under section 3 of the Abolition Act fixing the date of vesting was made on 26-1-1951. Under sub-section (1) of section 6 the proprietary interest in the village passed to the State Government only from the date of vesting which was fixed as 31-3-1951. Shri A.P. Sen contends that before the date of vesting the ex-proprietor had full right to transfer any interest in the property. This contention ignores the provisions in sub-section (2) of section 3 which is as follows: After the issue of a notification under sub-section (1), no right shall be acquired in or over the land to which the said notification relates, except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the State; and no fresh clearings for cultivation or for any other purpose shall be made in such land except in accordance with such rules as may be made by the State Government in this behalf. It will be observed that although the vesting of the proprietor's interest in the village has been postponed to the date of vesting, he has been prohibited under sub-section (2) of section 3 from making any transfer of any interest in his property from the date of the notification itself. The consequence of the provision in sub-section (2) is that the power to make a transfer was taken away from the ex-proprietor and every other person from the date of the notification under sub-section (1) and it was only the State Government which could make a grant or enter into a contract in writing transferring any interest in the property liable to vest under sub-section (1). Accordingly, the transfer made by Thakur Dongarshah, the ex-proprietor, in the present case was not effective and nothing passed to the respondent under Exh. P-5. Shri A.P. Sen further contended that the transfer made under Exh. P-5 is a continuation of the first transfer, both forming one transaction, and therefore it should be deemed to have been made in 1947. He relies upon the following observations in Nirbheram Deosibhai v. The State of Madhya Pradesh M.P. No. 500/54, D/- 20-2-1958 (1958 MPLJ 162): The learned Advocate-General conceded that between the time the first agreement came to an end and the second agreement began the rights of the proprietors were lost. But there is no hiatus between these two events. The law does not take into account a fraction of a day, and between the two agreements there is no dividing line. In fact, subsequent agreements are merely a continuation of the term and, therefore, for all practical purposes there is one agreement running right through. It appears to us that these observations were made with reference to the particular facts in that case. Exh. P-5 in the instant case does not refer to the earlier lease deed made in 1947. There is nothing in the deed to show that the two were intended to be one transfer. Further, there is a gap between the period of the two leases. On no construction therefore can they be treated to be one single lease. Exh. P-5 obviously is an independent transfer. As it was made after the date of notification under section 3(1), it is ineffective to create any rights in favour of the respondent. The State Government was not, therefore, bound by the contract made by the ex-proprietor with the respondent and was within its right in preventing the respondent from removing the tendu leaves during the period of the second lease. The action of the State Government does not amount to a tort and the respondent had no right to claim any damages. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the decree of the trial Court is set aside. Instead, it is ordered that the suit be dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed