This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Commissioner Kotah dated 3.6.59 whereby he upheld the judgment of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kotah dated 20.5.58 decreeing the suit of the respondent for ejectment of the appellant from the suit land. 2. The facts of the case are simple and not much in dispute, as would be evident from the depositions of the parties. The suit land belonged to one Dewa the maternal grand-father of the respondent, Dewa, it appears, had no son of his own and so brought up both appellant and respondent and got entered in his own life time through a regular mutation as per Kotah law on the subject (to which unit the case relates) his lands separately in the names of both the parties. The suit land was got entered in the Khata of the respondent on 1.2.47. The respondent was a minor at that time and land continued to be managed on his behalf by Dewa himself until he died in Svt. 2013. They all lived together till then and land was also cultivated similarly. The land was, however, entered in the Revenue Records in the Khata of the respondent with the appellant as "Zeli" On death of Dewa, the respondent asked the appellant to quit the land, which was not complied with by the latter. He also refused to recognise the respondent as the Khatedar of the land and pleaded his own title on the basis of his cultivation as "Zeli" (sub-tenant) since long. Both the learned courts below held, relying on 1956 R.R.D. 299, that as no relationship of tenancy or payment of rent had been proved to exist between the parties, the appellant became trespasser the day he retained possession over the land after he was asked to quit the same, and ordered his ejectment. Hence this second appeal. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and examined the record too carefully. The only point urged before us on behalf of the appellant and involved for determination is whether notwithstanding his name having been entered as "Zeli" in the Revenue Records, the appellant could be styled as trespasser and ejected as such. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and examined the record too carefully. The only point urged before us on behalf of the appellant and involved for determination is whether notwithstanding his name having been entered as "Zeli" in the Revenue Records, the appellant could be styled as trespasser and ejected as such. 1954 RLW 672—a Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution—has been cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in this behalf, and it has been urged relying on 1959 RLW 381, 1950 R.R.D. 182 and 1956 RRD 186 that the entry of "Zeli" in the Revenue Record carried a presumption of correctness and must be depended upon. There can not be any dispute about the presumption of correctness of an entry in the Revenue Records unless proved to the contrary as laid down in the rulings relied. But it is always open to interpretation, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, as to what those entries meant and as held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1960 S. C. 195 the precedents on facts can be precedents only on those facts. The appellant was entered as "Zeli" long before the coming into force of the Rajasthan Tenancy or Land Revenue Acts. That entry was, therefore, under the provisions of the Kotah circular No. 3 Sigha Mal and was repeated by that very term only for one year 1956 after the enforcement of the Rajasthan Acts. It is in this context that this entry was to be read and interpreted. In 1954 RLW 672, cited on behalf of the appellants the point for determination was whether an applicant treating the opposite party as "Zeli" could turn out all of a sudden in the High Court and say that the latter was a trespasser and it was decided that he could not be allowed to do so. Whether the mere entry of a person as. "Zeli" would make him a sub-tenant was not at all examined in that case. This examination is very important for vide Sec. 69 of the above referred Kotah Circular every person (other than a mortgagee with possession) cultivating the land of another Khatedar was a "Zeli" and had to be entered as such. Vide sec. "Zeli" would make him a sub-tenant was not at all examined in that case. This examination is very important for vide Sec. 69 of the above referred Kotah Circular every person (other than a mortgagee with possession) cultivating the land of another Khatedar was a "Zeli" and had to be entered as such. Vide sec. 70, such a "Zeli" did not acquire any rights other than those specified in the agreement entered into with the Khatedar of the land. Unless there was an evidence to the contrary, a "Zeli" was deemed vide sec. 74 to be occupying the land only for one agricultural year; and if there was no period fixed as such, af "Zeli" could be. dispossessed from the land on an application of the Khatedar entered in the mutation register before Akshey Teej (somewhere in mother of April) in any year. These provisions went to establish that there could be a "Zeli" entered in Kotah even without there having come into existence a relationship of tenancy and payment of rent between the parties only by his cultivating the land of another Khatedar under any circumstances which did not constitute him, a mortgagee. Admittedly, there has not been alleged, not to speak of proved, any contract of Sub-tenancy or payment of rent between the parties in this case. 4. In 1955 RLW (Revenue Supplement) 91, cited on behalf of the respondent, a learned single Member of the Board, in a case, under Sec. 7 of the R.P.T.O. rejected the application on the ground that the applicant had never stated that he was a tenant of the non-applicant to whom any rent was ever paid and there was no other evidence to prove the relationship of the tenant and the landlord. The applicant in that case had come forward with the plea that he had been cultivating the suit land as a "Zeli" of his maternal-grand-mother a recorded Khatedar. On her death the non-applicant therein had contested mutation and challenged title of the applicant as a heir of the deceased Khatedar. The applicant in that case had come forward with the plea that he had been cultivating the suit land as a "Zeli" of his maternal-grand-mother a recorded Khatedar. On her death the non-applicant therein had contested mutation and challenged title of the applicant as a heir of the deceased Khatedar. But the case has subsequently been decided on the basis of a compromise and a decree given by the court in terms of the compromise by which both the parties were to get their due share in the holdings of the deceased and the applicant had been cultivating some of the land and was recorded as a "Zeli" of the deceased. He was forcibly evicted by the non-applicant and the pray was for reinstatement. The non-applicant bad contested the same on the ground that the court had declared each one of them as owner of his share and they had taken possession thereof (in dispute) as a consequence thereof. Thus a recorded "Zeli" was not allowed protection under the R.P.T.O. as a tenant for want of the establishment of the relationship of the tenancy between the parties. A reference was made in this case to 1953 RLW 223, also relied upon on behalf of the respondent. In this case Ranawat J. ordered the dismissal of the application for reinstatement preferred under sec. 7 of the R.P.T.O. on the ground that the applicants had never gone to the court with the averment that they were sub-tenants of the land and on the other hand their case was that they had purchased the land several years back and were in possession on the basis of that title. Although this decision was only on the point as to which courts would have jurisdiction to try such a case and it was decided that the case would lie to a Civil Court, it indirectly did lay down principle that for getting benefits under a progressive legislation under the R.P.T.O. the applicant must come as a tenant. Although this decision was only on the point as to which courts would have jurisdiction to try such a case and it was decided that the case would lie to a Civil Court, it indirectly did lay down principle that for getting benefits under a progressive legislation under the R.P.T.O. the applicant must come as a tenant. Yet again in 1954 RRD 73, also a case relating to R.P.T.O., although the applicant had himself admitted therein that no contract for payment of rent was ever entered between him and his deceased brother-in-law and that he in fact had never paid any rent to him (the brother-in-law was the Khatedar of the land under dispute and the plea taken on behalf of the non-applicant was that the applicant had been entrusted with the holding for sheer management) and that no contract of the tenancy had ever been entered into between them, the protection of R. P. T. O. was denied to the applicant also on a similar ground. The ratio decedendi in all these cases was that a person seeking protection against ejectment must prove the existence of the relationship of the tenancy between the parties. This would be equally applicable even when a person takes plea of a subtenant in a suit for ejectment. When he could not be entitled to any protection under the R.P.T.O. the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 also did not make any change in his position. On the other hand under sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act a person retaining possession of the land without lawfull authority is liable to ejectment on the application of a parson entitled to admit him as a tenant. Such a person who retains possession should be a trespasser which according to sec. 5(44) means also a person retaining possession of land without authority. It is not the case of the appellant that he was a co-tenant of the respondent, nor is it his case that he had been admitted on the land by the respondent, or the land had been let out to him by the respondent. On the other hand he claims his own title against the respondent against whom he has already lost the mutation case by which the respondent was recorded as Khatedar over the suit-land. On the other hand he claims his own title against the respondent against whom he has already lost the mutation case by which the respondent was recorded as Khatedar over the suit-land. A person denying the title of the Khatedar and continuing to retain possession of land even when asked by the Khatedar thereof to quit the land and not been able to prove any relationship of subtenancy cannot but be called to be occupying the land without any lawful authority and be termed as the trespasser thereon. A trespasser can certainly be evicted under sect. 183 (1) of the Act, and therefore the learned lower courts have, although not very fully making out this point, have rightly decreed the suit against the appellant. There is thus no force in this appeal and it is hereby rejected.