Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in a proceeding under the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) is the appellant in this second appeal. The appellant executed a usufructuary mortgage, evidenced by Ext. D1 in favour of one Ammukutty Amma on 28-1-1952 for a sum of Rs. 2000/-. The latter assigned the mortgage to the respondent on 8-9-1953 by Ext. D2; and on the same day the appellant executed a Puravaippa Ext. D3 for Rs. 1000/- in his favour. 2. The appellant filed a petition in the Munsiff's Court of Alleppey for redeeming Ext. D1 mortgage under S.11 of the Act depositing a sum of Rs. 1000/- along with the application. The respondent mortgagee contended that the amount under the Puravaippa forms part of the mortgage debt in this case and as such unless that amount is also covered by the application, the application cannot be sustained. Both the courts below have accepted the objection and rejected the petition of the appellant. This second appeal is against those orders. 3. The short question that arises for decision in this case is whether the subsequent mortgage created by Ext. D3 dated 8-9-1953 is consolidated with the earlier mortgage Ext. D1. The learned Subordinate Judge took the view: "The mortgage amount had been consolidated with the puravaippa amount and hence the mortgage and puravaippa deeds have to be redeemed simultaneously and not separately". It is in this view that the petition was found unsustainable by the courts below. 4. Ext. D3 has been read in extenso at the Bar. D1. The learned Subordinate Judge took the view: "The mortgage amount had been consolidated with the puravaippa amount and hence the mortgage and puravaippa deeds have to be redeemed simultaneously and not separately". It is in this view that the petition was found unsustainable by the courts below. 4. Ext. D3 has been read in extenso at the Bar. It provides: [1] That the amount advanced under it is secured on the equity of redemption in the property remaining after the earlier mortgage in favour of the executee; [2] that the mortgagor will pay interest at the rate of one per cent on this amount of further charge every month, and if any default is committed in due payment of the interest that interest will be treated as a principal amount and further interest is to be paid on the same as well; and [3] that in case of any default in due payment of interest, the mortgagee will be entitled to demand payment of the amount of the subsequent mortgage together with all the interest accrued thereon and the mortgagor will be bound to pay the same forthwith even though the term fixed in the deed has not then expired and if such payment is not made the mortgagee will further be entitled to realise the same as a charge on the equity of redemption in the property" 5. These clauses make it evident that the amount of subsequent mortgage covered by Ext. D3 has been kept separate by the mortgagor and right has been reserved for the mortgagee to recover that amount as a separate item and apart from the original mortgage debt. This negatives the plea of consolidation of the two mortgages in this case. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on a provision in the deed of subsequent mortgage Ext. D3, which stated that the mortgagor would pay the amount under it as well as any arrears of interest accrued thereon at any time after two years of date when the original mortgage amount was being paid. I am of opinion that this provision by itself does not amount to a consolidation of the two mortgages, especially in view of the clauses in the document of subsequent mortgage which have been referred to in Para.4 above. I am of opinion that this provision by itself does not amount to a consolidation of the two mortgages, especially in view of the clauses in the document of subsequent mortgage which have been referred to in Para.4 above. These clauses, taken together, only indicate that if the mortgagor has been regularly paying the monthly instalments of interest as stipulated in the deed, the mortgagee can demand payment of the subsequent mortgage only at the time indicated therein, but if the mortgagor commits default in payment of interest the mortgagee can immediately demand the amount of the subsequent advance. 6. A mere undertaking by the mortgagor to pay the money advanced on a subsequent mortgage along with the amount of the earlier mortgage is merely an indication of the time fixed for payment of the same, and does not amount to a consolidation of the two mortgage debts together, so as to preclude the redemption of one without the simultaneous redemption of the other. See Gaya Dio Singh v. Bar Koran Singh (AIR. 1914 Oudh 23) and Jai Narain v. Gokul Singh (AIR. 1937 Oudh 321). If there are other provisions in the later deed enabling the mortgagee to recover the later debt apart from the earlier mortgage debt, the above construction only becomes unimpeachable. It follows therefore that the appellant is entitled to redeem the mortgage evidenced by Ext. D1, without at the same time redeeming the further charge created by Ext. D3. In this view the order of the courts below cannot be sustained. It is therefore reversed. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent raised a contention as to the maintainability of this Second Appeal. According to him no second appeal would lie in a proceeding under S.11 of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act because there is no specific provision for any appeal or second appeal in the matter concerned anywhere in the Act. To this, the reply of the learned counsel for the appellant is that a proceeding under S.11 is a decree as is expressly stated in sub-section 3 of S.11 itself. I accept the view expressed by the learned counsel for the appellant. If an order under S.11 of the Act is a decree it follows that an appeal, and a second appeal, will lie against the same under circumstances indicated by the Code of Civil Procedure for suits. I accept the view expressed by the learned counsel for the appellant. If an order under S.11 of the Act is a decree it follows that an appeal, and a second appeal, will lie against the same under circumstances indicated by the Code of Civil Procedure for suits. It may also be noted that in the court below this respondent had not taken any objection to the maintainability of the first appeal from the order of the Munsiff. I hold that the Second Appeal in this case is maintainable. 8. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed with costs throughout. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent seeks leave to appeal against this judgment. Leave is granted. Allowed.