JUDGMENT O.H. Mootham, C.J. - This is an appeal by leave from a judgment of Mr. Justice Dhavan dated the 16th October, 1959, dismissing a second appeal. 2. The facts are these: In 1938 the appellant entered into possession of a certain house as the tenant of the respondent. In 1953 the respondent applied to the District Magistrate's under Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for permission to file a suit for the eviction of the appellant. That permission was refused by the District Magistrate's and his order was upheld by the Commissioner on revision. An application was then made by the respondent to the State Government, under Section 7F of the Act, and by an order dated the April, 1955, the State Government allowed the appellant six months time within which to vacate the premises and granted the respondent permissions to file a suit should the appellant not vacate within that period which would end on the 13th October, 1955. It appears that the appellant had no intersection of vacating the house, and on the 22nd September, 1955, the respondent served upon him a notice under Sec, 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy on the expiry a of thirty days from the receipt of the notice. The appellant did not vacate for the premises and the respondent filed a suit for his ejectment on the 1st December, 1955. The trial court held that the notice under Section 106 having been given before the permission to file n the suit became effective, was invalid and dismissed the suit. 3. The lower court however took a different view. It allowed the appeal and passed a decree for the eviction of the appellant and that decree was upheld by Dhavan, J. in second appeal. 4. The appellant's principal contention is that a notice under Section 106 can be given only by a person who, at the time the notice is given, has the right to terminate the tenancy and that right, in a case in which the permission of the District Magistrate's has to be obtained before a suit for the eviction of the tenant can be filed, will arise only upon such permission being granted. In other words, the prior permission of the District Magistrate's under Section 3(1) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act for the filing of a suit for the eviction of a tenant is a condition precedent to the giving of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy. This contention was rejected in the recent case of Janki Prasad Hanuman Prasad v. Pandit Harish Chandra Tewari, AIR 1960 Allahabad 211 but learned counsel invites us to hold that the decision requires reconsideration. 5. Janki Prasad Hanuman Prasad's case was a stronger case than that which is now before us, for in that case the Court held that even if the notice under Section 106 had expired before permission to file a suit for the tenants eviction had been obtained the notice was nevertheless a valid notice. Section 3(1), so far as it is material, provides that "(1) ... no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate's, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds:- and in our opinion it is clear that all that this sub-section does is to place a ban on the filing of a suit for the eviction of a tenant unless certain conditions are fulfilled. It is impossible in our judgment to construe the sub-section as also placing a ban on the termination of the tenancy by a notice under Section 106. It is however contended that unless it be so interpreted an anomalous position will arise, for the effect of terminating the tenancy will be to make the tenant, if he remains in occupation, a trespasser and therefore not entitled to the protection of Section 3 (1). This argument was considered and rejected in Ram Pratap v. Sri Panna Lal, 1956 ALJR 787 on the ground that- "The two Acts"that is the Transfer of Property Act and the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act" have to be read together and the provisions of the general Act will stand amended to the extent of the inconsistency with the special Act. Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act creates a bar to the ejectment of a tenant. Unless the bar is removed, no tenant is liable to be ejected. Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act creates a bar to the ejectment of a tenant. Unless the bar is removed, no tenant is liable to be ejected. It follows, therefore, that although the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been given, the tenant is not liable to be ejected until one of the conditions laid down in Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act is fulfilled. Thus in spite of the expiry of the notice given under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and in spite of the provisions of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant does not cease to be a tenant till the bar to his ejectment laid down in Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act is lifted." 6. It was clearly the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 3(1) to ensure that a tenant shall not be arbitrarily evicted and the Court will not, unless if is compelled to do so, construe the Sub-section in such a way as to enable its purpose to be frustrated by the act of the landlord. In our opinion the true position is that when once the relationship of landlord and tenant has come into existence that relationship continues for the purposes of Section 3(1) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, notwithstanding the fact that the tenancy may previously have been terminated by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is suggested that even for the purposes of Rent Control and Eviction Act a person in occupation of a premises as a tenant ceases to be a tenant on the termination of his tenancy by a notice under Section 106, as thereafter he ceases to be liable to pay rent, and a tenant is defined in Section 2(g) as "the person by whom rent is, or but for a contract express or implied would be payable for any accommodation." Rent is not defined in this Act, and we can see no difficulty in holding that, for the purposes of the Act, it includes the compensation payable for use and occupation by a tenant, who, after his tenancy has been determined, holds over without the assent of the landlord. 7. 7. In the case before us the law imposes two conditions precedent to the filing of a suit for the ejectment of the appellant the landlord must terminate his tenancy by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and he must obtain the permission of the District Magistrate's under Section 3(1) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act. In our opinion it is immaterial in which order these conditions are fulfilled; and with great respect we think the case of Janki Prasad Hanuman Prasad v. Pt. Harish Chandra Tewari was rightly decided. 8. The second submission made on behalf of the appellant is that the order of the State Government under Section 7F of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act is invalid as the State Government did not, prior to the making of that order, call for the record of the case as is required by the section. This point was not urged before the learned Judge, nor is there any material before us which would enable us to express any opinion upon it. 9. In our opinion this appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.