JUDGMENT M.C. Desai, J. - This is a defendants appeal from a judgment of our brother Upadhya allowing the respondent's appeal and decreeing her suit. 2. The respondent is the owner of a house in Kanpur and the appellant was admittedly its tenant. On 27-3-1953 the respondent applied to the District Magistrate's, Kanpur, for permission to eject the appellant from the house. The District Magistrate's (he was really a subordinate officer authorised by the District Magistrate's, Kanpur, to perform his functions under the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, No. III of 1947) issued a notice to the appellant to show cause why the respondents application be not granted, but he was not present in his office when he took up the application for consideration on 10-7-1953 and he ex-parte granted permission to the respondent. The appellant reached the office soon after the order was passed and applied to the District Magistrate's for setting aside the ex-parte order. On 11-7-1953 the respondent, through a lawyer Sri Shukla, gave notice to the appellant terminating his tenancy with effect from 5-8-1953 and calling upon him to quit before that date. The notice was admittedly received by the appellant, but he did not vacate the house on or by 4-8-1953 and on 5-8-1953 the respondent instituted the suit, giving rise to this appeal, for his ejectment. On 25-9-1953 the District Magistrate's revoked the permission granted ex parte to the respondent and thereafter the appellant filed his written statement contesting the suit on the ground that after the revocation of the permission the suit could not proceed and that the notice to quit given by the lawyer and not signed by the respondent was invalid. The trial court rejected the pleas of the appellant and decreed the suit. On appeal a Civil Judge dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the notice to quit was not valid. On second appeal, our brother Upadhya held that the notice was valid and rejecting the appellants contention that after the revocation of the permission the suit could not proceed and could not be decreed, allowed the appeal and restored the trial court's decree. 3. On second appeal, our brother Upadhya held that the notice was valid and rejecting the appellants contention that after the revocation of the permission the suit could not proceed and could not be decreed, allowed the appeal and restored the trial court's decree. 3. Three questions arise in this appeal, (1) whether the revocation of the permission affected the further proceedings in the suit and barred its being decreed, (2) whether the District Magistrate's had the jurisdiction to revoke the permission at all and (3) whether the notice to quit was invalid because it was signed not by the respondent but by a lawyer. 4. I start with the first question. Under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for a purpose other than agricultural or manufacturing purpose is a lease from month to month, terminable on the part of the lessor by 15 days notice, expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. It is not in dispute in the present case that the lease granted by the respondent to the appellant was for a purpose other than agricultural or manufacturing, that the tenancy commenced on the 5th of a month and ended on the 4th of the next month and that there was no contract or local law or usage to the contrary. Section 108 (b), (q) lays, down that in the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary the lessee is bound, on the determination of the lease, to put the lessor into possession of the property. If he fails to do so a right at once accrues to the landlord to enforce the obligation and to sue him for ejectment. There was nothing in the contract or the local usage to the contrary. Even apart from this provision the possession of a lessee after the termination of his lease becomes unlawful and he can be sued at once for ejectment. The Transfer of Property Act contains absolutely no restriction on the landlords right to terminate the tenancy by a notice given under Section 106 or on his right to enforce the obligation imposed upon the tenant by Section 108(b), (q) or to sue him for ejectment on the termination of his lease within the period prescribed by the law of limitation. The U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for the first time imposed a statutory restriction on his right of suing him for ejectment. Prior to the enforcement of this Act some restrictions were imposed upon his right by executive orders passed in pursuance of the powers conferred by the Defence of India Act and Rules. Section 3 of the Act is the only section that deals with eviction of tenants; it reads as follows (immaterial portions are omitted):- "(1) Subject to any order passed under sub-Sec. (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate's, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds: .......... (2) Where any application has been made to the District Magistrate's for permission..........and the District Magistrate's grants............the permission, the party aggrieved by his order may within 30 days from the date on which the order is communicated to him apply to the Commissioner to revise the order. (3) The Commissioner shall hear the application...... as far as may be, within six weeks from the date of making it, and he may ....... alter or reverse his order.......... (4) The order of the Commissioner ........shall, subject to any order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F, be final." 5. Section 7-F authorises the State Government to call for the record of any case granting permission for the filing of a suit for eviction and make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice. Section 17 authorises the State Government to make rules to give effect to the purposes of the Act. The State Government has made no rule regarding suits for eviction and permission to be granted by District Magistrate's. This is the state of Sections 3 and 7-F as they exist today. In Section 3, as enacted originally, the words "Subject to any order passed under sub-Sec. (3)" and sub-Secs. (2), (3) and (4) did not exist; they were added by the Amendment Act (no. 24 of 1952). Section 7-F was enacted for the first time in 1952. Sub-Secs. (2), (3) and (4) were subsequently amended by the Amendment Act (no. 17 of 1954), but the amendments are immaterial in the present case. (2), (3) and (4) did not exist; they were added by the Amendment Act (no. 24 of 1952). Section 7-F was enacted for the first time in 1952. Sub-Secs. (2), (3) and (4) were subsequently amended by the Amendment Act (no. 17 of 1954), but the amendments are immaterial in the present case. Except as provided by the Act, the right of a landlord under the Transfer of Property Act and the general law to sue his tenant for ejectment remains intact. The only restriction that is imposed by the Act on the right is that he cannot sue without the District Magistrate's permission (unless the suit is based on one or more of certain grounds, and the respondents suit was not based on any of the grounds.) Prior to the enforcement of the Act (I ignore the executive orders mentioned above) she had an absolute right to sue the appellant for ejectment as soon as she terminated his tenancy. After the enforcement of the Act she could sue him only with the District Magistrate's permission. The restriction imposed by the Act was solely on her right to file a suit in a civil court; once the suit was filed, the subsequent proceedings continued to be governed, as before, as regards substantive law by the Transfer of Property Act, the Contract Act etc. and as regards adjective law, by the C.P.C., the Evidence Act etc. The Control of Rent and Eviction Act does not profess to govern the subsequent proceedings at all; it does not lay down in what circumstances the suit could be decreed, or in what circumstances it could not be decreed, notwithstanding the provisions of the substantive and adjective laws. It means that once a suit is filed with the District Magistrate's permission and the civil court takes cognizance of it, the permission exhausts itself and its existence or non-existence ceases to be of any consequence in the further proceedings. Section 3 does not require the permit to remain valid or in existence upto the passing of the decree and does not lay down that no suit can be decreed unless the District Magistrate's permission remains operative upto the date of the decree. It simply imposes a condition on a civil courts taking cognizance of a suit; after it takes cognizance it has to proceed as if Section 3 did not exist at all. It simply imposes a condition on a civil courts taking cognizance of a suit; after it takes cognizance it has to proceed as if Section 3 did not exist at all. The bar imposed by the section is removed if the landlord was armed with a District Magistrate's permission and once it was removed and a civil court took cognizance of his suit, there could not arise any question of its being reimposed; it would be too late to close the door of the civil court after he has gained entrance into it. The bar is similar to the bar imposed by the Limitation Act on the filing of a suit or an appeal; the suit or appeal must be filed before the period of limitation expires and this provision is never interpreted to mean that it must be decreed or allowed also before the limitation expires. There is no justification whatsoever for treating the provision in Section 3 differently and saying that the bar is not only on the filing of a suit but also on decreeing it. As I pointed out in Ram Pukar Singh v. State, 1953 ALJ 660 a sanction required by Section 195, Cr. P. C., and other provisions for prosecution for certain offences is relevant only at the time of the courts taking cognizance of the offence and a District Magistrate's permission required by Section 3 is exactly like a sanction and is relevant only at the time of the civil courts taking cognizance of the suit. The Control of Rent and Eviction Act is in the nature of an exception to the Transfer of Property Act and the C.P.C.; only those matters which come within its restrictive provisions will be governed by them and other matters must continue to be governed by the Transfer of Property Act and the C.P.C. The restriction imposed by Section 3 being by its express words confined to the filing of a suit must not be extended to cover other stages in the suit and the proceedings after the filing of the suit. There are no words either in Section 3 or in any other section which might be interpreted to mean that the existence of a District Magistrate's permission is a condition precedent to the passing of a decree in the suit. There are no words either in Section 3 or in any other section which might be interpreted to mean that the existence of a District Magistrate's permission is a condition precedent to the passing of a decree in the suit. Section 14 lays down how pending suits filed before the enforcement of the Act are to be decided, but there is no such provision laying down how suits filed with a District Magistrate's permission are to be decided and they must be decided in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act, the C.P.C. etc. It follows that the respondents suit could be decreed even though the District Magistrate's revoked the permission after the suit was filed and the trial court took cognizance of it. 6. The only matter with which a civil court is concerned is the existence or non-existence of a District Magistrate's permission; if there is a permission, it will take cognizance of the suit and if there is no permission, it will refuse to do so. Subsequent revocation by a District Magistrate's of the permission granted by him is neither one thing nor the other and is no concern of the civil court. A District Magistrate's (or any other authority) has been conferred no power to interfere with the progress of the suit pending in a civil court after it has validly taken cognizance of it; he has been conferred no power to bring about an abrupt termination of the suit by revoking the permission granted by him and acted upon by the civil court. He may have the power to revoke the permission, but he can effectively do so only so long as it has not been acted upon and a civil court has not taken cognizance of the suit. If he revokes the permission and then a suit is filed on the basis of the permission, the civil court must refuse to take cognizance of the suit on the ground that after the revocation the permission ceased to be existing. Even if it erroneously takes cognizance of the suit (in ignorance of the fact of revocation), it must on being subsequently apprised of the fact hold that the suit could not be entertained by it at all and must reject the plaint on that ground. Even if it erroneously takes cognizance of the suit (in ignorance of the fact of revocation), it must on being subsequently apprised of the fact hold that the suit could not be entertained by it at all and must reject the plaint on that ground. But if a suit was instituted with the permission which was operative on the date of the filing of the suit, it cannot on a subsequent revocation by the District Magistrate's (or any other authority) give retrospective effect to the revocation and hold that the permission did not exist on the date of the filing of the suit. A District Magistrate's has certainly been given no right to revoke a permission with retrospective effect so as to affect prejudicially a right to a decree acquired by the landlord. A landlord may be said to acquire a right to a decree only when he files a suit; after such a right has vested in him it cannot be taken away by subsequent revocation of the permission, certainly not without an express provision to this effect. It seems to me that after a civil court has taken cognizance of a suit filed with a District Magistrate's permission, it should refuse to receive any evidence about the subsequent revocation for the simple reason that the existence or non-existence of a permission is irrelevant in the further proceedings. Jurisdiction validly acquired cannot be taken away by a subsequent happening in the absence of express words to that effect. In Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. A. Nageshwara Rao, A.I.R. 1956 SC 213 the Supreme Court held that if a suit is filed with the District Magistrate's permission, subsequent withdrawal of the permission cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court. 7. All that is required by Section 3 is the existence of a District Magistrate's permission; there are no words qualifying the permission. So long as it is a permission for the plaintiffs suing the defendant for his eviction from an accommodation, the civil court must take cognizance of the suit without going into the question whether the permission was valid or final or not or how it was obtained. So long as it is a permission for the plaintiffs suing the defendant for his eviction from an accommodation, the civil court must take cognizance of the suit without going into the question whether the permission was valid or final or not or how it was obtained. The law itself has not divided permissions into two classes, one of valid or of final permissions and the other of invalid or of provisional permissions and has not laid down how a permission should be put in one class or the other on the other hand it treats all permissions alike as belonging to one class. The State Government could have prescribed the procedure to be followed by a District Magistrate's before granting a permission but has not done so through any rule made in exercise of the power conferred by Section 17; therefore there arises no question whatsoever of a civil courts going into the question how the permission was obtained from the District Magistrate's or whether it was final or provisional. This confirms that its sole concern is with the existence of a permission on the date of the filing of the suit. 8. The view that take derives considerable support from Durga Prasad v. Rama Kant, 1951 ALJ 285, Lala Ram Rakshpal v. Surendra Nath, 1955 ALJ 372 and Kirpashanker v. Banwari Lal, AIR 1952 Allahabad 414. In the first case Bind Basni Prasad, J. observed at page 286: "With the grant of permission by the District Magistrate's, the bar of the institution of the suit imposed by Section 3 was removed for the plaintiff. Subsequent events cannot re-impose that bar. The grant of the permission under Section 3 created a position so far as plaintiff was concerned so as to make available to him the rights which he has as a landlord under the Transfer of Property Act." 9. At page 287 he laid down that a subsequent event cannot reimpose the bar ("the bar once removed cannot be reimposed"). In the second case our brother Gurtu said at page 373: - "No doubt, as from the date when the permission was cancelled, it ceased to exist; but from that it does not follow that it must be held that the cancellation had the effect of making the previously granted permission non-existent even before the cancellation. In the second case our brother Gurtu said at page 373: - "No doubt, as from the date when the permission was cancelled, it ceased to exist; but from that it does not follow that it must be held that the cancellation had the effect of making the previously granted permission non-existent even before the cancellation. In my view, the previously granted permission must be deemed to have lost its force only on the date on which that permission was withdrawn. Section 3 of the Act, as framed, does not require the continuing existence of the District Magistrate's permission to enable a decree to be passed. All that that section says is that no suit shall be filed without the permission of the District Magistrate's. If the permission exists when the suit is filed, then the suit is in order and, in my view, the cancellation of the permission later would not retrospectively affect the validity of the filing of the suit. The grant of permission does not operate to create any title in the plaintiff; it merely removes a bar to the filing of the suit." In the third case Bind Basni Prasad, J. observed at page 416: - "The limited question which arises in the present case is that if permission has been acted upon and a suit has been instituted on its basis and even a decree has been obtained is it competent for the Controller at that stage to recall the permission. I have no doubt in my mind that he has no such authority. The permission he had granted had spent itself out and if the Controller were given a power to recall the permission at any time it would mean that the Controller can nullify a decree of the civil court by the mere recall of the permission. Certainly it could never have been the intention that by executive orders the decrees of the civil courts could be rendered nugatory." 10. Certainly it could never have been the intention that by executive orders the decrees of the civil courts could be rendered nugatory." 10. Though by the Amendment Act of 1952 powers were conferred upon the Commissioner to cancel a permission granted by a District Magistrate's and upon the State Government to revise a Commissioner's order granting a permission himself or refusing to interfere with a permission granted by a District Magistrate's, the legislature did not amend the restrictive provision contained in sub-Sec. (1), by providing either for a landlords awaiting the Commissioner's order on appeal or of the State Government's order on revision before filing a suit, or for the immediate dismissal of his suit on the permission being cancelled by the Commissioner or the State Government. The restriction imposed by sub-Sec. (1), which has been shown to be one only on the filing of a suit, thus remains one only on the filing of a suit. In other words, the cancellation of a permission by a Commissioner or the State Government acting under sub-Sec. (3) or sub-Sec. (4) has absolutely no effect after the suit has been filed. The addition of the words "Subject to any order passed under sub-Sec. (3)" do not advance the matter any further because they do not at all affect a landlords right to a decree and a civil courts right to go on with the suit in accordance with the provisions of the substantive and the adjective laws. They do not at all deal with the proceeding in the suit after it has been filed. In spite of them the restriction imposed by sub-Sec. (1), shown above to be one only on the filing of the suit, remains one only on the filing of the suit. There is nothing in them or in the provisions of sub-Secs. (2), (3) and (4) to indicate that the legislature ever intended that on a District Magistrate's permission being cancelled by the Commissioner or the State Government the suit, if filed earlier, must be dismissed at once as if it had been filed without a permission. If the legislature had any such intention, it has not been brought out anywhere. There is no reason for thinking that it intended anything more than that if a District Magistrate's permission is cancelled by the Commissioner or the State Government the landlord cannot file a suit after the cancellation. If the legislature had any such intention, it has not been brought out anywhere. There is no reason for thinking that it intended anything more than that if a District Magistrate's permission is cancelled by the Commissioner or the State Government the landlord cannot file a suit after the cancellation. It is not open to this Court just to assume without any words used by the legislature capable of conveying the necessary meaning that the legislature intended that a suit filed while a District Magistrate's permission was in force should be. dismissed as soon as the permission is cancelled by the Commissioner or the State Government. "Intention of the Legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the Legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it;" see Salomon v. Salomon Company, (1897) AC 22 at page 38 per Lord Watson, and Lord Howard De Walden v. Inland Revenue Commissioner's, (1948) 2 All.E.R. 825. The question always is not what the legislature intended to do by the enactment but what is its intention as disclosed by the language employed in the enactment. Sub-Sec. (3) only confers upon a Commissioner a power to cancel a permission granted by a District Magistrate's; it does not deal at all either with the filing of a suit in a civil court or with further progress in the suit and it is meaningless to say that a provision that no suit shall be filed without a District Magistrate's permission is subject to an order of a Commissioner cancelling a permission. Unless his order has some connection with the filing of a suit, the provision relating to the filing of a suit cannot be said to be subject to his order. I consider the words "subject to any order passed under sub-Sec. (3)" completely meaningless an example of legislative jargon. I even doubt if a civil court can take cognizance of a suit filed not with a District Magistrate's permission but with a Commissioner's permission obtained under sub-Sec. (3). I consider the words "subject to any order passed under sub-Sec. (3)" completely meaningless an example of legislative jargon. I even doubt if a civil court can take cognizance of a suit filed not with a District Magistrate's permission but with a Commissioner's permission obtained under sub-Sec. (3). In Munshi Lal v. Shambhu Nath Ram Kishan, 1958 ALJ 584 Upadhya, J. interpreted the words "Subject to any order passed under sub-Sec. (3)" to mean that if a Commissioner cancels a permission granted by a District Magistrate's his order should prevail, that after the cancellation by the Commissioner the permission granted by the District Magistrate's remains without any effect and cannot be relied upon by the landlord and that when Section 3 plainly indicates that the permission of the District Magistrate's is subject to such orders as may be passed by the Commissioner, it is hardly open to a plaintiff to urge that having acted on the permission granted by the District Magistrate's his position cannot be affected if the Commissioner subsequently reverses the order." The view that he took was that a permission granted by a District Magistrate's "was only provisionally given or that it was valid only until it was not cancelled by the Commissioner" and that a landlord is "obviously not justified in hurriedly instituting the suit without awaiting the final decision by the State Government or by the Commissioner about the permission." He thought that otherwise the provisions in sub-Secs. (3) and (4) would be rendered absolutely ineffectual by a landlords instituting a suit without waiting for the Commissioner's and the State Governments order. 11. If a District Magistrate's permission is cancelled by the Commissioner or the State Government under Sub-Sec. (3) or (4) before the landlord files a suit, there is no difficulty in saying that the Commissioner's or the State Governments order must prevail. But with great respect to my learned brother I find it difficult to see that a permission granted by a District Magistrate's is only a provisional permission or that any question of its validity arises or that a landlord should await the Commissioner's or the State Governments order on appeal or revision before filing a suit. But with great respect to my learned brother I find it difficult to see that a permission granted by a District Magistrate's is only a provisional permission or that any question of its validity arises or that a landlord should await the Commissioner's or the State Governments order on appeal or revision before filing a suit. The question whether a permission granted by a District Magistrate's is provisional or valid or not simply does not arise; as pointed out, the civil court, in which a suit is filed, has only to see whether a District Magistrate's permission existed in fact or not. Sub-Secs. (3) and (4) certainly make a District Magistrate's permission subject to the Commissioner's or the State Governments orders but what effect their orders have on a permission already availed of and thereby exhausted is an entirely different question not answered by anything contained in Section 3. There is no obligation upon a landlord to wait for the Commissioner's or the State Governments order and I do not understand how he can be said to be not justified in filing a suit immediately on obtaining a permission from the District Magistrate's. It is also not correct to say that the view that I take will render a Commissioner's or State Governments order "absolutely ineffectual." They will not be rendered ineffectual if they are passed before the suit is filed. The cause of action for a suit of ejectment is the termination of the defendants tenancy by a notice to quit and his failure to deliver up possession. The suit must be brought within a certain time from the accrual of this cause of action; a landlord cannot in any circumstance file a suit after its expiry. He cannot be required to wait for a decision of the Commissioner or the State Government if the period of limitation is expiring. His right to terminate the tenancy by a notice to quit is not at all affected by the provisions of Section 3; it is at his absolute discretion to terminate the tenancy at any time and he has not to obtain a District Magistrate's permission for doing so. The limitation will start running as soon as he terminates the tenancy. His right to terminate the tenancy by a notice to quit is not at all affected by the provisions of Section 3; it is at his absolute discretion to terminate the tenancy at any time and he has not to obtain a District Magistrate's permission for doing so. The limitation will start running as soon as he terminates the tenancy. Since, however, he cannot file a suit unless he has obtained the District Magistrate's permission and since the District Magistrate's may greatly delay the granting of a permission, a landlord usually obtains his permission first and then terminates the tenancy. But the law does not oblige him to do so and he is free to terminate the tenancy first and then apply for a permission, if he is prepared to take the risk of the period of limitation expiring before the District Magistrate's passes orders on his application. If he does obtain his permission before the limitation expires, he cannot be required to wait for the Commissioner's or the State Governments orders because the limitation might expire before they pass orders. Even when he terminates the tenancy after obtaining the District Magistrate's permission, and even though the Commissioner is required to dispose of the appeal as far as possible within six weeks, the latter may take more time and may not be able to pass orders before the limitation runs out. Similarly the State Government may not be able to pass orders before the limitation runs out. A landlord cannot be required to wait so long that his suit becomes barred by time. Since usually a landlord obtains the permission first and then terminates the tenancy by a notice to quit, the tenant usually has time to appeal against the permission before the landlord files a suit. The Commissioner has no power to restrain the landlord from filing a suit, but he can cancel the permission as soon as the appeal is filed and thereby make it impossible for the landlord to file a suit and after hearing the appeal may restore the permission or maintain the cancellation of the permission. Similarly if a District Magistrate's wants to revise the order granting permission, he may cancel the permission and then after hearing the parties grant a fresh permission. Similarly if a District Magistrate's wants to revise the order granting permission, he may cancel the permission and then after hearing the parties grant a fresh permission. That seems to be the only way in which a landlord can be prevented from filing a suit during the pendency of an appeal before a Commissioner or of an application for revision or review filed before the State Government or the District Magistrate's. The argument that the provisions of sub-Secs. (2), (3) and (4) will be rendered otiose unless it is held that the cancellation of a permission on appeal or revision after the filing of a suit must result in the immediate dismissal of the suit, must be rejected. 12. In the Act as originally enacted and prior to its amendment in 1952, there was no provision regarding the permission being cancelled by the Commissioner on appeal or by the State Government on revision; that is why Section 3 did not at all deal with what would happen if the permission was cancelled after the filing of the suit. Since the legislature did not contemplate this contingency, it did not provide for it and only dealt with the filing of the suit. When by the amendment sub-Secs. (2), (3) and (4) and Section 7-F were added, it did not alter the restrictive provision except by using the words "Subject to any order passed under sub-Sec. (3)," which have been shown to be meaningless. This might be a lacuna, but it is not for this Court to remove it. We must interpret the restrictive provision in the same manner in which it would have been interpreted before the amendment. 13. The permission granted by the District Magistrate's in this case has not been cancelled by the Commissioner or the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon them under sub-Secs. We must interpret the restrictive provision in the same manner in which it would have been interpreted before the amendment. 13. The permission granted by the District Magistrate's in this case has not been cancelled by the Commissioner or the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon them under sub-Secs. (2), (3) and (4), but I have dealt with the words "Subject to any order passed under sub-Sec. (3)" in order to show that the addition of these words in sub-Sec. (1) does not affect the interpretation that would have been placed on the provision in sub-Sec. (1) before the addition, that they do not mean that if a District Magistrate's permission is cancelled the suit must be dismissed and that there still exists no provision for dismissal of the suit on the ground that the District Magistrate's permission was cancelled on appeal or revision after the institution of the suit. Further I am of the view that as regards the effect of cancellation of a District Magistrate's permission after the institution of a" suit on further proceeding in the suit, there is no distinction in law between cancellation by the Commissioner or the State Government under sub-Secs. (3) and (4) and cancellation by the District Magistrate's himself in exercise of his own powers. If the former cancellation must bring about immediate termination of the suit, the latter also must because if a District Magistrate's has power to cancel or revoke the permission granted by him, the cancellation by him is as much lawful and effective as the cancellation by the Commissioner or the State Government on appeal or revision. If the cancellation of the permission on appeal or revision had the effect of immediate termination of the suit, I would have to hold that the cancellation or revocation of the permission by the District Magistrate's would have similar effect. Because a decree in a suit for preemption can be granted only if the preemptive right exists not only on the date of the filing of the suit but also on the date of the decree, it was argued that a District Magistrate's permission should exist not only on the date of the filing of the suit but also on the date on which it is to be decreed. This is an instance of false analogy. This is an instance of false analogy. A preemption suit is not decreed unless the right to preemption exists upto the date of the decree because that is the express law. There is no express law that a suit for ejectment cannot be decreed unless a District Magistrate's permission exists on the date of the decree. Preemption is a matter of right whereas the provision in Section 3(1) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act is a procedural provision. If any right is touched by it, it is a landlords right to file a suit, but that right is exercised fully by him as soon as he files one. 14. I have no doubt that the second question must be answered in the affirmative. As pointed out, how a District Magistrate's permission is to be obtained is not provided in the Act or in the Rules. Section 3(1) does not even confer a power upon a District Magistrate's to grant a permission; the subsequently added sub-Sec. (2) indicates that an application has to be made to the District Magistrate's for his permission and he has to pass an order granting or refusing it. So long as there was no provision regarding applying to him for a permission and his granting 48 or refusing a permission, nothing that he did could be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction. In the absence of a provision conferring power of any kind no question of jurisdiction could arise. If he granted permission, the landlord could file a suit regardless of how the permission was granted. If he revoked the permission, the permission ceased to exist and the landlord could not file a suit; again how the permission was revoked was irrelevant. Just as in the former case no question of jurisdiction to grant permission could arise so also in the latter case no question of jurisdiction to revoke the permission could arise. A civil court would not be concerned with the question why the permission was revoked or whether it was validly revoked or not; it was enough for its purposes that it did not exist on the date of the filing of the suit. After the amendment of 1952, it can be said that now a power has. A civil court would not be concerned with the question why the permission was revoked or whether it was validly revoked or not; it was enough for its purposes that it did not exist on the date of the filing of the suit. After the amendment of 1952, it can be said that now a power has. been conferred upon a District Magistrate's to grant a permission and on the analogy of Section 21, General Clauses Act, this power should be deemed to include the power to revoke a permission. I am now dealing only with the power to revoke and not with the effect of revocation. I have already explained that it would be no use revoking, a permission after it has been fully availed of, but that would be a question of the effect of revocation distinct from that of the power of revocation and would have to be considered by the District Magistrate's before deciding to revoke. In the case of Kirpashanker, AIR 1952 Allahabad 414 Mushtaq Ahmad, J. denied a District Magistrate's the power to revoke, the permission granted by him. He was dealing with a case governed not, by the Control of Rent and Eviction Act but by an executive order passed under the Defence of India Act and Rules. I have not seen that order and I do not know whether it conferred any jurisdiction upon the District Magistrate's. The learned Judges observation that when a District Magistrate's granted a permission and thus disposed of the application, he became functus officio and would have no jurisdiction in law to revive the matter on an application by the aggrieved party might have been justified by the words used i in the executive order but has no application in a case governed by the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 15. After the numerous decisions, such as Babu Lal v. Ganga Saran, AIR 1952 Allahabad 48, Kirpa shanker v. Banwari Lal, AIR 1952 Allahabad 414, Mannulal v. Chakradharhar, 1952 ALJ 278 and Shri Krishna v. Additional Commissioner, Allahabad, 1958 ALJ 234, it would be idle to dispute that a District Magistrate's when granting permission acts in an administrative and not judicial or quasi judicial capacity. With great respect I do not agree with . With great respect I do not agree with . the contrary view expressed by a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Bhailal v. Additional Deputy Commissioner, Akola, AIR 1953 Nagpur 89. An administrative, authority lays down its own law and rules of procedure; there is no law governing its rules of procedure. It can revoke an order just as well as it can make it; in the absence of any law forbidding it to revoke an order, nobody can say that revocation of order by it is illegal. Rules contained " in the Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure, which debar criminal and civil courts from revoking or modifying orders passed by them, do not apply to administrative authorities. Even if it be said that a District Magistrate's acts quasi-judicially when granting a permission, it does not necessarily follow that he cannot revoke a permission granted by him or that he becomes governed by an analogy of the rules contained in the two Codes. It has been held in many cases that the proceedings of an administrative officer are open to review or reversal by him self or his successor), see The United States Ex. Ret. Knight v. Lane, 228 US 6 (57 L.E. 709) arid Lane v. The United States Ex. Rel. Mickadiet, 241 US 201 (60 L.E. 956) ("the right to review on proper charges of newly discovered evidence or fraud a previous administrative order, while the property to which it related was under administrative control was of the very essence of administrative authority" per White, C.J., 209) . In Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting' Co., 309 US 134 (84 L.E. 656) Frankfurter, J. stated that the differences in origin and functions between' administrative tribunals and court preclude the wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial and review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts. In an illuminating editorial comment on a recent case in 31 Harvard Law Review, 487, a decision that an administrative authority cannot reverse its previous ruling was disapproved. A second decision of an administrative authority has the same sanctity as its earlier decision and cannot be reversed by a court in the absence of a denial of the due process. In an illuminating editorial comment on a recent case in 31 Harvard Law Review, 487, a decision that an administrative authority cannot reverse its previous ruling was disapproved. A second decision of an administrative authority has the same sanctity as its earlier decision and cannot be reversed by a court in the absence of a denial of the due process. I respectfully agree with the following observations made in the comment:- "The successful application of statutory law by administrative agencies depends almost entirely on the ability of such agencies to discriminate, unhampered by precedent, between settled differences of fact and circumstance. It would be very unfortunate, indeed, to apply the doctrines of stare decisions and res judicata to administrative rulings and the Supreme Court of the United States has so held." A District Magistrate's .power 'to revoke a permission granted by him as been recognised in a number of cases, for instance Babu Lal v. Ganga Saran, AIR 1952 Allahabad 48, C. D. Hans v. Mannu Lal, AIR 1952 Allahabad 432 : 1951 ALJ 479, R.N. Seth v. Girja Shanker, AIR 1952 Allahabad 819, Mannulal v. Chakradharhar, 1952 ALJ 278, Abdul Hamid v. Fatma Begum, 1955 ALJ 132, Mahabir Prasad v. The District Magistrate's of Kanpur, 1955 ALJ 252, Manohar Lal Nadarchand v. Mohanlal Gian Chand, A.I.R. 1957 Pun. 72 and Shri Krishna v. Additional Commissioner, Allahabad, 1958 ALJ 234. 16. Section 106 Transfer of Property Act, lays down that "every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it." The notice given by the respondent to the appellant is headed as "Notice minjanib Shrimati Gayatri Devi, bewa Lala Lakshmi Narain, Jati Vaish, niwasi Hatia Bazar, Shahar Kanpur, marfat Pt. Sheo Kumar Shukla, advocate, Kanpur". Sheo Kumar Shukla, advocate, Kanpur". It is signed by "S. K. Shukla, Advocate." In the body he wrote that he was giving the notice in accordance with the instructions of his client, that she was the owner of the premises and he was a mere tenant, that she wanted the premises for her own occupation, that she had asked him several times to quit but he had refused, that she had obtained a permission on 10-7-1953 from the District Magistrate's for his eviction, that he was already aware of the permission, that his tenancy was being terminated through the notice with effect from 5-8-1953 and that he should quit on or by 4-8-1953 and deliver possession to his client and pay the arrears to hef, failing which he would be sued and he would be responsible for her costs. Shri S. K. Shukla did not appear for the respondent as her counsel in the suit. It was alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint that "by notice dated 11-7-1953 the plaintiff terminated the tenancy of the defendant................but in spite of the service of the notice the defendant has not vacated". The appellant said in his written statement in paragraph 3 that "in para 3 receipt of a notice with incorrect allegations is admitted. The notice is invalid", in paragraph 9 that "the notice given by the plaintiff for the eviction of the defendant was invalid and did hot comply with the provisions of See. 106 and plaintiffs suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground", in, paragraph 10 that "even if the notice served by the plaintiff on the defendant be held to be valid, the plaintiff' is not entitled to evict the defendant, in View of the facts" etc. and, in paragraph 12 that "previous to the last notice-the plaintiff has given another notice" etc. The appellants counsel in the course of the- statement under Or. 10, C.P.C., made on 11-5-1954 "admitted that the notice original. of Ex. 3 was served on the defendant" and that "the original notice was signed by S. K. Shukla." The parties did not produce any oral evidence; so there was no evidence that the respondent had authorised Sri S. K. Shukla to give the notice to quit on her behalf. 10, C.P.C., made on 11-5-1954 "admitted that the notice original. of Ex. 3 was served on the defendant" and that "the original notice was signed by S. K. Shukla." The parties did not produce any oral evidence; so there was no evidence that the respondent had authorised Sri S. K. Shukla to give the notice to quit on her behalf. The notice was signed not by the respondent but by Sri S. K. Shukla; it would be in order if it was signed by him on her behalf. It was vehemently contended by the appellants counsel that in the absence of oral evidence that the respondent had authorised him to sign the notice it could not be said to have been signed by him on her behalf and that his own statement in the notice itself was not sufficient. He also denied that the admissions contained in the written statement and in the statement made under Or. 10, C. P. C., by the appellants counsel were admission of the fact that he had signed it on her behalf. It is not disputed that the respondent could have orally authorised Sri S. K. Shukla to sign the notice on her-behalf and it is not disputed that he signed it. What is contended is that there is no evidence, and there is no admission, that he did so on her behalf. Evidence, admittedly, there is none, but I do not agree that there is no admission also. The pleadings which I have reproduced above, show that it was alleged in the plaint that the notice given by Sri S. K. Shukla was a notice given by the respondent, that the appellant admitted everything that was alleged in the plaint in respect of the notice barring some of the allegations contained in it, that it was admitted in so many words that the notice signed by Sri S. K. Shukla was a notice "given by the plaintiff" or "served by the plaintiff" and that the only ground on which it was said not to be valid was that it did not comply with the provisions of Section 106 and the permission granted by the District Magistrate's was revoked by him. Facts and facts only have to be stated in a written statement and the appellant ought to have mentioned which provisions of Section 106 had not been complied with. Facts and facts only have to be stated in a written statement and the appellant ought to have mentioned which provisions of Section 106 had not been complied with. Certainly paragraph 9 of the written statement cannot be construed as an allegation that all the provisions were not complied with and I am not prepared to assume that only the provision requiring that a notice should be signed on behalf of the landlord was not complied with. If the defence of the appellant had, been the positive defence that Sri S.K. Shukla had not been authorised by the respondent to sign the notice on her behalf, he should have specifically alleged it in the written statement, if he could allege it specifically, there is no reason why he should have left it to be inferred from certain statements. As a matter of fact I do not find anything in the written statement from which this allegation could be inferred. It is because the appellant did not specifically raise the question of Sri S. K. Shuklas authority that the respondent informed the court that she would not lead any oral evidence. Having persuaded her to believe that no oral evidence was necessary, he cannot be permitted to turn round now and plead that oral evidence (on a certain point) was essential. Whether Sri S. K. Shukla was authorised or not is a question of fact which cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal. 17. It is stated in 23 H. L. (3rd edition), page 524, paragraph 1176, that a notice to quit may be given by a 7 landlords agent provided he is duly authorised for that purpose at the time of giving it. The instant case is governed by Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, by which a mere authority to sign on the landlords behalf is enough. It is further stated therein that the tenant must have reason to believe that the notice is binding on the landlord so that he may safely act on it. Similar statement would be found in Foas Landlord and Tenant, 7th edition, page 596 and Hill and Redmans Landlord and Tenant, page 467. This statement only lays down the law regarding the validity of a notice to quit; what should be proved is a different matter dependent upon the pleadings. Similar statement would be found in Foas Landlord and Tenant, 7th edition, page 596 and Hill and Redmans Landlord and Tenant, page 467. This statement only lays down the law regarding the validity of a notice to quit; what should be proved is a different matter dependent upon the pleadings. If a tenant admits that he took the notice, though signed by a person professing to do so under the landlords authority, to be one from the landlord, the requirements of law are fully satisfied and the landlord is under no obligation to prove that he had given the authority to his agent to sign it. This is exactly what I has happened in the instant case. Not only did the appellant admit that he treated the notice as one from the respondent but also he never alleged or even hinted that he ever had any doubt about the authority of Sri S. K. Shukla to sign it. It seems that the contents of the notice themselves satisfied him that Sri S. K. Shukla had been instructed by the respondent to give the notice on her behalf. In Hamida Bi v. Abdul Gaffar, A.I.R. 1933 Ran. 147 it was held that when a lawyer gives a notice saying in it that he does so under instructions from his client, there is a presumption that it is given under his instructions. There was no question of any presumption to be drawn by the tenant; the question was whether he was bound to accept it as true. I am not aware of any presumption that what a man says is true. There may be such a presumption in respect of a statement made on oath or a statement made in the circumstances mentioned in Section 32, Evidence Act, but I do not think there is any such presumption in respect of any ordinary statement. Moreover presumptions are matters for courts, not for litigants. A court may be bound to, or may justifiably, presume a certain fact, but no law compels a litigant to presume a certain fact, and the appellant was not bound to take the notice to be one on the respondents behalf merely because Sri S. K. Shukla said so. I would prefer to rest my decision not on any presumption but on a construction of the pleadings. The third question should be answered in the negative. 18. I would prefer to rest my decision not on any presumption but on a construction of the pleadings. The third question should be answered in the negative. 18. In accordance with my findings I dismiss this appeal with costs. Mithan Lal, J. - In this case three questions which were argued before us have been fully dealt by my learned brother, I with respect agree with him, inasmuch as a suit instituted obtaining permission from the District Magistrate's would not become ineffectual, if such a permission is revoked or cancelled by the authority which granted it. I also agree that once the bar on the institution of a suit or the restriction imposed upon the right of a landlord not to bring a suit without the permission of the District Magistrate's is removed, the same authority, though it may be possessed of a power of cancelling the order on account of the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, yet such a revocation, after the landlord acting upon the permission has filed a suit for eviction, cannot affect the proceedings of the suit, nor can it impose any further bar on the right once exercised. According to my view, this will be so, because there is nothing in law to empower the same authority to nullify the effect of acting on his order and once this is done the power will be deemed to have been exhausted by filing the suit. 2. I also respectfully agree with my brothers conclusions that the notice given by Sri Shukla, a lawyer not subsequently engaged in this case, on behalf of the landlady was a valid notice; but my view is that what is required under the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is that a notice of eviction on behalf of the landlord should be in writing and should be signed by or on behalf of the person giving it. In this case the very notice given by Sri Shukla made it apparent that the notice was given on behalf of his client, who was the landlady. The notice was also signed by Sri Shulka on behalf of the landlady. Both these things, as held in the case of Hamida Bi v. Abdul Gaffar, A.I.R. 1933 Ran. In this case the very notice given by Sri Shukla made it apparent that the notice was given on behalf of his client, who was the landlady. The notice was also signed by Sri Shulka on behalf of the landlady. Both these things, as held in the case of Hamida Bi v. Abdul Gaffar, A.I.R. 1933 Ran. 147 should be enough to raise a presumption that the notice was so given until the contrary is proved that is that the notice was not signed by Sri Shukla on behalf of his client and was also not given on her behalf. The reason for drawing such a presumption is that a Vakil acts upon the instructions received from his client, who goes to the house of Vakil, narrates the facts of the case and then instructs the Vakil to give a notice to a particular tenant for eviction. Under such circumstances a reasonable and legitimate presumption can be drawn that when the notice purports to have been given on behalf of the client, it must have been so given because the court can presume the existence of such a fact having regard to the common course of natural events and human conduct, this will be so on the basis of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, because a presumption is nothing but; an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other, fact. As stated by Holmes, J. in the case of Greer v. U. S., 245 U.S.R. 559 as mentioned in the Xth Edition of Sarkars Law of Evidence at pages 900 and 901." A presumption upon a matter of fact when it is not merely a disguise for some other principle, means that common experience shows the fact to be so generally true that courts may notice the truth". In India it is a common experience that lawyers are approached for giving notices of eviction on behalf of the landlord and consequently such a fact being so generally true that the courts can legitimately draw an inference or presumption that notice puty ported to have been given by the Vakil on behalf of his client should be presumed to be so given. Besides the inferences which my brother has drawn from the pleadings of the parties in this case I think a presumption of law can also be drawn within the meaning of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act that a notice given in the manner, as was done in this case, should be presumed to have been duly given on behalf of the client unless the contrary was proved. 3. I, with great respect's, for the views of my brother, do not agree with him that the provisions of sub-secs. (2) and (3) of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent, and Eviction Act do not have any effect on the continuance of the suit instituted after the order of the Collector passed, under sub-Sec. (1), or that the words, "subject to, any order passed under.sub-sec. (3) of that Act" do not have the effect of completely nullifying the order of the Collector or that the operation of the afore-mentioned restrictive clause continues only as long as a suit on the permission given by the Collector is not filed. 4. Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act lays down "Subject to any order passed under sub-Sec. (3) no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate's be filed in any court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds:" Sub-Sec. (4) lays down: "The order of the Commissioner..........shall, subject to any order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F, be final;" A perusal of the aforementioned sub-section will show that the order of the District Magistrate's is subject to the order of the Commissioner passed in appeal, while R the order of the Commissioner is subject to the order of the State Government passed in revision. Obviously the order passed by the Collector is not final and consequently the restrictive clause cannot be given a limited meaning. The reasons for my views are:- (a) The cardinal rule of construction of Acts of Legislature is that they should, be construed according to the intention of the Legislature. If the words are precise and unambiguous then no more is necessary than to expound the words in their ordinary and natural sense, because that case the words themselves declare the intention of Legislature. If the words are precise and unambiguous then no more is necessary than to expound the words in their ordinary and natural sense, because that case the words themselves declare the intention of Legislature. In cases of restrictive clauses restrictions may be placed as to the specific object, such as, no person shall be imprisoned again for the same offence; or the restrictions I may be on the scope of an Act to keep, the provision within a particular ambit; or restrictions may be on operations of the Act or of any particular provision of the Act; and in that case, the intention of the Legislature obviously is to keep the provisions of the Act within the limits of its object in order not to disturb the existing law beyond the extent of limitation placed by the change. In such a case, the operation of a particular clause will be only limited. In this particular case, the obvious intention of Legislature, by imposing a restriction on the finality of the order of the District Magistrate's was, particularly when provisions for appeal and revision had been made that the permission granted by the Collector for bringing a suit for eviction will only be provisional or a conditional permission, its finality depending upon the orders passed in appeal or revision. Restrictive clauses like the one under discussion have to be interpreted according to the intention of the Legislature. (b) Another principle of law is that no party can be allowed to impair the authority of law by his actions. If we propound the view that once a landlord acting upon the permission given by the Collector files a suit the reversal of that order in appeal or revision cannot affect the further proceedings in the suit, or the plaintiffs right in obtaining a decree, it would mean that in such a contingency the Collectors order becomes final, or, in other words, if a party is clever enough he may at once rush to the court as soon as he obtains the permission from the Collector, and defeat the intention of the Legislature or the purpose of appeal or revision filed by the other party. This cannot be permitted in law, because as said earlier, no party can be allowed to impair the authority of law. This cannot be permitted in law, because as said earlier, no party can be allowed to impair the authority of law. As a matter of fact the permission given by the Collector is only a provisional permission depending upon the result of appeal or revision, and no finality can be attached to such a provision, and a party cannot by his own action make such a permission final by filing a suit for eviction. The order which is a conditional or contingent or a provisional one cannot become final' or be treated to have become final, merely because a party had acted upon it. (c) The restrictive clause was added in sub-Sec. (1) of Section 3 by an amendment of 1952, while new sub-Secs. (2), (3) and (4) as also Section 7-F were added. The obvious intention of this amendment was that the order passed by the Collector shall only be final, if it is not varied or reversed in appeal or revision. While interpreting the law the Court has to give effect to the intention of the legislature which was made too obvious by the said amendment. (d) There is yet another reason and it is that under the ordinary law the order of the lower authority merges into the order of the appellate authority. The appellate order has the effect of completely effecting the order of the lower authority as if that order never existed. This would mean that any thing done in pursuance of the order of the lower authority would necessarily be effected and a party cannot turn up and say that because he has acted upon that order the order passed by the higher authority is nugatory. In such cases it cannot be argued that the order of the higher authority has the effect of cancellation of the order of the lower authority. It cannot also be said that the principle of exhaustion of power will apply, because it would be deemed that the order on which a party has acted never existed. The consequences flowing from the cancellation of the order by the same, authority after it has been acted upon, cannot flow when the order of the. lower authority has been reversed or varied by the competent higher authority. The consequences flowing from the cancellation of the order by the same, authority after it has been acted upon, cannot flow when the order of the. lower authority has been reversed or varied by the competent higher authority. It also cannot be argued that it would amount to re-imposition of restrictions on the right to sue or revival of the restriction which had been taken away by the first order, because as I said earlier it will be deemed that no permission to sue was ever given to the plaintiff, or that the order which granted the permission never existed. The effect of the appellate order would be that the original restrictions on the right to sue continued unabated and the suit which was instituted on the basis of the permission by the first authority would be deemed to have never been validly instituted and the suit is thus bound to become infructuous. (e) Lastly, a restriction imposed on the right of suit of a party does not and cannot be deemed to stand on the same footing as the divesting of a court of its jurisdiction either, by any change in law or by the act of the parties. While in the former case, a suit filed without permission or filed with permission which subsequently is set aside by an order of a competent higher authority, that is, an authority given by law a right to vary or reverse the order of the lower authority, would be an incompetent suit, a suit in the latter case having been instituted in a court having jurisdiction on the date of the institution of the suit will not become an incompetent suit by any subsequent change brought about in the courts jurisdiction. Moreover, in cases of eviction even if the permission granted by the District Magistrate's is set aside in appeal by the Commissioner or in revision by the State Government, the jurisdiction of the same court continues and cognizance of such a suit can be taken when validly instituted. The effect of an order passed by the higher authority is not to take away the jurisdiction of the court but only to make the suit an incompetent suit. 5. To me it seems that the provisional order unless confirmed by the higher authority cannot be deemed to have become final, merely because one of the parties has acted upon that order. 5. To me it seems that the provisional order unless confirmed by the higher authority cannot be deemed to have become final, merely because one of the parties has acted upon that order. When a party has done so he has taken unnecessary risk for which he must suffer. He cannot throw over-board the provisions of the law or the clear intention of the legislature by his action. 6. The above view is fully supported by the view taken by Upadhya, J. in the case of Munshi Lal v. Shambhu Nath Ram Rishan, 1958 ALJ 584 and I, with respect, agree with his view. 7. I, however, concur with the conclusions of my brother Desai, J. that the appeal be dismissed with costs. Stay order is vacated.