JUDGMENT B. Mukerji, J. - This is a Special Appeal against a decision given by Mr. Justice Broome in a writ petition which was moved in this Court under Art- 226 of the Constitution by Moolraj Singh. To this petition were arrayed as Respondents the R.C.E.O., Saharanpur, the District Excise Officer, Saharanpur, and Lala Mansa Ram as owner of the premises. 2. The Petitioner Moolraj Singh alleged himself to be the tenant of shop No. 7/1889, Mohalla Ram Nagar Pathanpura, Saharanpur. He alleged that he had been in occupation of this shop since 1954 and that he had been paying rent for these premises to Lala Mansa Ram, the landlord thereof. The Petitioner was at one time a licensee for selling country liquor and other excisable commodities and apparently he did business in the aforementioned premises. Sometime in early 1960 the Excise Commissioner, U.P., found that difficulty had been experienced in certain places in respect of getting accommodation for liquor shops in case the liquor license was not renewed in favour of the old licensee. Liquor licenses are auctioned each year and they are given to the highest bidder at the auction. Therefore, it happens that the same person who was a licensee in one year does not necessarily become a licensee in the succeeding year. In order to assure accommodation for licensed liquor shops District Officers of the State were requested by means of a circular letter emanating, apparently, from the Excise Commissioner to make allotments of premises where Excise shops were to be maintained in favour of the Excise Inspector of the circle concerned or the District Excise Officer. 3. On the 8th February, 1960, the liquor license for the area in which the premises in dispute lay was auctioned for the period 1960-61. According to the Petitioner the auction was closed in favour of Mukand Lal who was the highest bidder. The actual license which must have been granted by the Excise Department in pursuance of the auction purchase has not been filed by any of the parties in this case. So that, the best evidence, as to who was the licensee of the excise shop for the year 1960-61 in respect of the area in question, was not on the record and therefore it could not for certain be held as to who the licensee for the year 1960-61 was. 4. So that, the best evidence, as to who was the licensee of the excise shop for the year 1960-61 in respect of the area in question, was not on the record and therefore it could not for certain be held as to who the licensee for the year 1960-61 was. 4. As we pointed out earlier, the Excise Commissioner had issued a circular letter to all District Officers in Uttar Pradesh to make allotments of premises for excise shops in the name of District Officers or the Excise Inspector of the circle concerned, so that there could be no difficulty for a subsequent licensee to the one who had to go out because of his not succeeding at the auction sale, in obtaining accommodation. 5. On the 8th March, 1960, the District Excise Officer Saharanpur, wrote to the R.C.E.O. drawing his attention to the circumstance that since the existing licensee (liquor license) of Pathanpura and Bhatiari Sarai Excise shops were to cease on the 31st March, 1960, those two shops were likely to fall vacant and, therefore, allotment in respect of those shops should be made in the name of the District Excise officers, so that in future years there may be no difficulty for a licensee in obtaining accommodation for carrying on the liquor shop for which he successfully bids at an auction. This letter of the District Excise Officer does not show as to whether, in fact, the shops had to be allotted to persons in their capacity as licensees of liquor shops. On the 10th March, 1960, the R.C.E.O. made the following order: In exercise of the authority conferred by S. 7(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act No. 111 of 1947 as amended upto date and the powers delegated by the District Magistrate u/s 2(d) of the above Act, I.P. Sahai, R.C.E.O. Saharanpur, hereby order Shri Mansa Ram owner to let out the shop bearing No. 7/1889 Moh. Ram Nagar previously occupied by Sri Mool Raj to District Excise Officer, Saharanpur, allottee up to Zero hours of 31-3-60. For non compliance, without reasonable cause the owner shall render himself liable to legal action u/s 8 of the Act. 6. Ram Nagar previously occupied by Sri Mool Raj to District Excise Officer, Saharanpur, allottee up to Zero hours of 31-3-60. For non compliance, without reasonable cause the owner shall render himself liable to legal action u/s 8 of the Act. 6. What is interesting 15 observe in the aforementioned order of allotment is that there is nothing to indicate in the order that there was any vacancy in respect of the shop which was being allotted. Indeed, the allotment order indicates that Moolraj Singh was in occupation at the time when the order was made and even the order contemplated the continued occupation of the shop by Moolraj Singh upto the Zero hours of the 31st March, 1960. Apart from the letter of the District Excise Officer' referred to earlier (which was filed as Annexure 'C' to the original petition) there was nothing on the record to show that any information of vacancy or likely vacancy had been given either by the tenant or by the landlord to the R.C.E.O. The right of a R.C.E.O. to make an allotment of premises arises only when there is either an actual vacancy or there is a likely vacancy to occur and notice of the fact has been given by either the landlord or the tenant. There is obviously no power in the R.C.E.O. to allot premises which are in the occupation of a tenant, who had continued on the premises for a number of a years, like that Moolraj Singh admittedly did in the present case. 7. Moolraj Singh naturally was perturbed by the order that had been made by the R.C.E.O. on the 10th March, 1960, making an allotment of the premises which had been in his occupation, to the District Excise Officer, and he therefore approached this Court for a writ of certiorari. After the writ of certiorari had been moved by Moolraj Singh, the Appellant before us, namely, Raja Ram approached this Court on the 18th April, 1960, by means of an application with the following prayer: .... that the names of he following applicants may be added to he array of opposite-parties in the above mentioned writ petition: (1) Mukund Lal, son of Lala Ram; and (2) Raja Ram, son of Lala Mithan Lal; residents of Baghpat, Pargana and Tehsil Baghpat, District Meerut. This application was a lowed by Mr. that the names of he following applicants may be added to he array of opposite-parties in the above mentioned writ petition: (1) Mukund Lal, son of Lala Ram; and (2) Raja Ram, son of Lala Mithan Lal; residents of Baghpat, Pargana and Tehsil Baghpat, District Meerut. This application was a lowed by Mr. Justice Jagdish Sahai in the following words: The application is allowed. Let Mukand Lal and Raja Ram be added as Respondents in the petition. After they were added as parties, a counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of Raja Ram on the 21st April, 1960. In this counter-affidavit the position that was taken up by Raja Ram was that he and Mukand Lal having succeeded to the liquor license, which had previously been held by Moolroj Singh who carried on business in the premises in dispute, the premises bearing No. 7/1889 should in the normal course come to heir possession. The counter-affidavit attempted to make out in paragraph 5 that the "Thekedar" (meaning thereby a licensee) entered into possession of the shop as the licensee of the Excise Department and not as a tenant, independently of his rights as a licensee of the Department. There was nothing on the record to show that this contention of Raja Ram was right. 8. The learned single Judge came to the conclusion that there was no vacancy in fact and that the continued occupation of the premises by Moolraj Singh could not be said to be occupation which in any sense attempted to defeat the provisions of the Rent Control and Evict on Act, The learned single Judge rightly pointed out that the Petitioner Moolraj Singh was in occupation of the premises for a long time, for the Petitioner had been in occupation of the premises since 1954 and the fact that he was in occupation of these premises must have been known to the District Magistrate and the other District authorities, inasmuch as, Moolraj Singh carried on a liquor shop in those premises under a license given to him by the Excise Department. The occupation of the Petitioner Moolraj Singh, therefore, was not, in the words of the learned single Judge, either 'underhand' or 'clandestine'. The occupation of the Petitioner Moolraj Singh, therefore, was not, in the words of the learned single Judge, either 'underhand' or 'clandestine'. As we said above, there was nothing on the record on which it could be held that Moolraj Singh occupied the premises by virtue of his being a licensee of a liquor shop, or that he occupied the premises as a licensee from the District Excise Officer or someone else on behalf of the Excise Department. It could not be said that Moolraj Singh was bound to go out of the premises the moment the license of the liquor shop in his favour came to an end. There was, therefore, no actual vacancy in fact, nor could any one on the aforementioned circumstances imagine a 'national vacancy.' The position of Moolraj Singh could not, under the circumstances enumerated above, be that of a rank trespasser who gets on to vacant premises without anybody's permission and with the sole object of defeating the law of control and allotment of premises and tenancies. 9. That an allotment could only be made when there was a vacancy within the meaning of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act is no more res integra for that question was decided as far back as 1952 by a Bench of this Court in Shri Badri Prasad Tripathi v. The District Magistrate 1952 AWR (H.C.) 238 where it was held that: S. 7 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of rent and Eviction Act comes into play only when an accommodation is or has fallen vacant. S. 7(2) is in these words: The District Magistrate may by general or special order require a landlord to let or not to let to any person any accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. The word 'vacant' has been defined by S. 2(h) of the Act and the definition is in these words: 'vacant' where used with reference to any accommodation, includes an accommodation about to fall vacant an intimation whereof has been sent by the tenant or the landlord to the District Magistrate. The word 'vacant' has been defined by S. 2(h) of the Act and the definition is in these words: 'vacant' where used with reference to any accommodation, includes an accommodation about to fall vacant an intimation whereof has been sent by the tenant or the landlord to the District Magistrate. From what has been said above it should be perfectly plain that in the instant case there was no vacancy either in fact or in law, for, factually, the premises where in the occupation of Moolraj Singh and he continued to be in such occupation , and, legally, there was no notice by either the landlord or the tenant of a likely vacancy. If Moolraj Singh had been guilty of some breach of the provisions of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, proper action could be taken against him but that could not give the Rent Control and Eviction Officer the right to make an allotment to another, which right, in our opinion, was dependant only on there being a vacancy as contemplated under the Act. 10. There is yet another equally potent argument to defeat the appeal and that arises out of the fact that the Appellant could not be said to be a person aggrieved by the order which the learned single Judge made quashing the order of allotment which had been made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in favour of the District Excise Officer. It is nobody's case that Raja Ram, the, Appellant before us, was an agent or a nominee of some sort of the District Excise Officer. Raja Ram had not impleaded as a party by Moolraj Singh when he filed his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution: Raja Ram and Mukand Lal came on the record on, an application made by Raja Ram which was granted by a learned single Judge of this Court by his order dated the 20th April, 1960. We have quoted that order in an earlier part of this judgment. The order did not indicate that Mukand Lal and Raja Ram had been permitted to be brought on the record as parties to the writ petition because of any right of theirs was in jeopardy on account of the relief which had been sought by Moolraj Singh by his writ petition. The order did not indicate that Mukand Lal and Raja Ram had been permitted to be brought on the record as parties to the writ petition because of any right of theirs was in jeopardy on account of the relief which had been sought by Moolraj Singh by his writ petition. Raja Ram cannot be said to have derived any interest from the District Excise Officer in whose favour the allotment had been made entitling Raja Ram to either contest the writ petition which was filed by Moolraj Singh, or prefer an appeal to this Court against the decision of the learned Single Judge. It is admitted on all hands that Raja Ram has not been allotted the premises No. 7/1889 situate in Mohalla Ram Nagar Pathanpura, Saharanpur, nor has it been shown that Raja Ram has, by virtue of his right to sell liquor, acquired any interest, either direct or indirect, in the premises aforementioned. The right on which Raja Ram purported to found his appeal was, in our judgment, much too remote to clothe him with the necessary legal right to maintain this appeal. 11. Mr. S.B.L. Gaur, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, strenuously contended that since the Appellant was a party to the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution he had a right of appeal and that it did not, in his case, matter whether strictly he could be said to be a party aggrieved or not the point, shortly put, would amount to this, namely, the mere fact of a person being a party gives him a right of appeal. In our view, this bald proposition on which reliance was placed by Mr. Gaur was not sound. We know that there may be and there are a large number of cases where there are proforma parties and there are parties against whom no relief is claimed. In such cases there could be no right of appeal unless the person appealing had been aggrieved by the order sought to be appealed against. We have already pointed out earlier that the Appellant was not originally a party to the petition and no relief had been claimed against him. Even after the Appellant had been made a party at his own request no relief had been granted against him by the learned single Judge. We have already pointed out earlier that the Appellant was not originally a party to the petition and no relief had been claimed against him. Even after the Appellant had been made a party at his own request no relief had been granted against him by the learned single Judge. Therefore, the Appellant could not in any sense be said to have been aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge. 12. In Nirmal Singh V. Zamir Uddin 1937 AWR (HC) 260 a Bench of this Court consisting of Chief Justice Sulaiman and Bennet, J. held that "Where in a suit no relief had been claimed by the Plaintiff against the proforma Defendant, the pro forma Defendant has no right of appeal........." 13. In Nand Lal Pal v. Naresh Chandra Deb Goswami AIR 1917 Pat 585 a Bench of the Patna High Court held that in order that a person may have a right of appeal it must be shown that he had been adversely affected by the decree sought to be appealed against. Jwala Pd., J. specifically pointed out in the aforementioned case that "No person has a right of appeal from a decision unless his interest is prejudicially affected by it." 14. A similar view was taken by the Bombay High Court in Motilal Kanji and Co. Vs. Natvarlal M. Jhaveri, AIR 1932 Bom 78 . 15. In Ex parte Sidebotham. In re Sidebotham LR (1880) XIV Ch. D. 458 at p. 465 Lord Chief Justice James, in regard to who can be deemed to be a person aggrieved, said this: But the words 'person aggrieved' do not mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something. 16. The view expressed in ex parte Sidebotham's case LR (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458 at p. 465 was approved and applied In re Burn In Ex parte E.N.D.E. v. Dawson, H.T. McCellan and the Trustee LR (1932) Ch. 257. 17. Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 16. The view expressed in ex parte Sidebotham's case LR (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458 at p. 465 was approved and applied In re Burn In Ex parte E.N.D.E. v. Dawson, H.T. McCellan and the Trustee LR (1932) Ch. 257. 17. Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 4, Succinctly summarises the law on the subject, "who would be a person aggrieved in order to give him a right of appeal," at page 561, first column. This is what is slated: The mere fact that a person may be hurt in his feelings or be disappointed over a certain result, or be subjected to inconvenience, annoyance, or discomfort, or even expense, does not constitute him a party 'aggrieved', since he must be aggrieved in a legal sense. To render a party aggrieved by an order, so as to entitle him to appeal therefrom, the right invaded must be immediate, not merely some possible, remote consequence, or mere possibility arising from some unknown and future contingency, although it has been held that an immediate pecuniary damage is not always prerequisite to the right of appeal. At page 559 of the same volume of Corpus Juris Secundum the general proposition is stated thus: Broadly speaking, a party or person is aggrieved by a decision when, and only when it operates directly and injuriously upon his personal, pecuniary, or property rights. 18. Mr. Gaur relied on the decision of The The Province of Bombay Vs. Western India Automobile Association, AIR 1949 Bom 141 . This decision did not run counter to the decisions cited by us above and did not, in our opinion, support Mr. Gaur's contention. 19. We have indicated earlier that the Appellant was not in any manner directly affected or prejudiced by the order which had been made by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, in our judgment, the Appellant was not a 'person aggrieved' and could not sustain the present appeal. 20. Mr. Gaur wished to raise a few more questions, e.g., he wished to argue that the Petitioner, Moolraj Singh, had no right to file the writ petition that he did, because he was not an allottee under any valid order of allotment; and secondly, he wished to contend that the petition was in any event premature. In the view which we have taken it was not necessary for us to hear Mr. Gaur on those questions or decide those questions. 21. In the view which we have taken it was not necessary for us to hear Mr. Gaur on those questions or decide those questions. 21. For the reasons given above, we have seen no force in this appeal which we dismiss but under the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.