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1960 DIGILAW 343 (ALL)

Mani Ram v. Sub Divisional Officer, Baghpat, District Meerut

1960-11-23

JAGDISH SAHAI

body1960
JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - The Petitioner had filed an election petition before the sub Divisional Officer, Baghpat, u/s 12-C of the UP Panchayt Raj Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The learned Sub Divisional Officer dismissed the petition on Dec. 11, 1957 with costs. In addition he awarded a sum of Rs. 200 as special costs against the Petitioner to the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. It is against that order that the present petition has been filed. The only question that arises for consideration is whether the learned Sub Divisional Officer had the jurisdiction to pass an order awarding special costs. No other question has been raised in this petition. 2. Rules have been framed under the Act and are referred to as the Rules hereinafter. R. 25(2) reads as follows: 25(2). If the Sub-Divisional Officer after hearing finds in respect of any person whose election is called in question by the petition, that his election was valid, he shall dismiss the petition as against such person and may award costs at his discretion and in case he finds the application to be altogether frivolous he may also order that the security deposit shall in part or whole be forfeited to the Sabha concerned. 3. A perusal of the Act and the Rules clearly reveals that the Act taken together with the Rules provides a complete code with regard to the matters contained therein. It is common ground that there is no provision either in the Act or in the Rules under which special costs could be awarded and in order to support the impugned order Learned Counsel for the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 had to fall back upon the provisions of S. 35A CPC. Learned Counsel for the Respondents has placed reliance upon R. 25(1) which reads as follow: 25(1). Subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules contained in this Chapter every election petition shall be tried by the Sub Divisional Officer, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the CPC, to the trial of suits". It has been contended that this provision makes the whole of the CPC including S. 35A applicable to the trial of a petition under the Act and consequently the learned Sub Divisional Officer had the jurisdiction to award Rs. 200 as special costs. It has been contended that this provision makes the whole of the CPC including S. 35A applicable to the trial of a petition under the Act and consequently the learned Sub Divisional Officer had the jurisdiction to award Rs. 200 as special costs. This argument ignores the words "as nearly as may be" occurring in R. 25(1). These words in my opinion, clearly indicate that, the rulemaking authority fully realised that it was not possible to make the entire CPC applicable to proceedings under the Act, because in several matters the Act was self contained and itself has provided its own procedure and substantive law and so far as the provisions of the CPC are inconsistent with "what was provided in the Act or the Rules they could not be made applicable. In my judgment in as much as this question of cost has been fully provided for in R. 25(2) the provisions of that rule should be treated as exhaustive and it must be held that the Legislature did not confer on the election tribunal created under the Act the power to order the payment of special costs. I have reached this conclusion for two reasons. The first one is that the Act and the Rules are special provisions and if there is a conflict between the provisions of the Act and the Rules on the on hand and the provisions of the CPC or the other the former and not the latter would prevail. The second reason for coming to the conclusion is that the Rules exhaustively deal with matters of cost. It would be noticed that R. 25(2) provides for the awarding of costs and in cases when the ejection tribunal comes to the conclusion that the petition was entirely frivolous it has been provided that the security deposit shall in part or whole be forfeited to the Sabha concerned. For the situation for which S. 35A has been enacted in the CPC , R. 25(2) has been framed in the Rules In other words, the counterpart of S. 35 A. GPC is Rule 25(2) in the Rules. In asmuch as the remedy against frivolous petition has been fully provided for by the Rules themselves, recourse to the CPC cannot be had. In the case of Inamati Mallappa Basappa Vs. In asmuch as the remedy against frivolous petition has been fully provided for by the Rules themselves, recourse to the CPC cannot be had. In the case of Inamati Mallappa Basappa Vs. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa and Others, AIR 1958 SC 698 it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the Representation of People Act being a self contained Code covering the trial of election petitions the provisions of Or. 23 R. 1 CPC would not apply to he proceedings in connection with the (sic)ria of an election petition notwithstanding S. 90(1) of the Representation of the People Act. In my opinion the Act and the Rules also provide a complete Code for the trial of election petitions under the Act and consequently the provisions of S. 35A, CPC, would not apply. 4. Learned Counsel for the Respondents invited my attention to the case of Harish Chandra Bajpai Vs. Triloki Singh, AIR 1957 SC 444 and has submitted that in that case some of the provisions of the CPC, were made applicable to the proceedings before an election tribunal created under the Representation of People Act. The provisions of the CPC that were made applicable in that case were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Representation of People Act itself. In other words, the provision of the CPC were not used to cover a field or ground which did not already stand covered by the provisions of the Representation of People Act itself. In the present case I have already held above that the question of costs and the situation contemplated by S. 35A, CPC, has been fully provided for by R. 25(2) of the Rules. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another Vs. The State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 . In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that even though in the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 48 of 1949 there was no provision for an appeal would still lie because the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been made applicable to the trial under the Ordinance. That case is also distiuguishable on the ground that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were used only in respect of the matters on which the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 48 of 1949 was silent. 5. That case is also distiuguishable on the ground that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were used only in respect of the matters on which the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 48 of 1949 was silent. 5. There is another question which requires consideration and that is as to what is the exact scope of R. 25(l), in other words as to what do the words "every election petition shall be tried" used in that rule mean. Does the word "trial" include judgment also, or it only means the hearing i.e., the stage from the examination of the parties under Or. 10 R. 10 CPC, to the arguments of the parties ? Learned Counsel for the Respondents placed reliance upon the case of Bhusan Saran Vs. Onkar Singh and Others, AIR 1956 All 715 and contended that in that case which was under the Municipalities Act it was held, that the word "hearing" occurring in S. 23 of that Act was wide enough to cover the entire stage of trial and not only a particular stage beginning with the examination of parties under Or. 10 CPC and ending with the argument in the case. In the first place hearing obviously cannot include the judgment. After the stage of hearing is over the stage for judgment comes. In the case of The Public Prosecutor Vs. Chockalinga Ambalam and Others, AIR 1929 Mad 201 it was held that trial does not include the stage of judgment. In the present case, however, it may be noticed that in sub R. 2 of R. 25 it has been clearly stated that "if the Sub Divisional Officer after hearing finds ... he shall dismiss the petition....". This would show that the word "hearing" has been used for a stage before the stage of judgment or order, The case of Bhusan Saran Vs. Onkar Singh and Others, AIR 1956 All 715 is no authority for the proposition that in the stage of hearing judgment is also included. Special costs have been awarded in the judgment. Consequently it cannot be said that they were , awarded at the stage of hearing. Onkar Singh and Others, AIR 1956 All 715 is no authority for the proposition that in the stage of hearing judgment is also included. Special costs have been awarded in the judgment. Consequently it cannot be said that they were , awarded at the stage of hearing. Besides the words shall be tried "in accordance with the procedure applicable under the CPC." used in R. 25(1) clearly shows that it is only the procedural provisions and not the substantive ones of the CPC which have been made applicable to the trial of an election petition under the Act. The question whether or not costs can be awarded is a matter relating to substantive law and not to procedural law. It affects the powers of the tribunal itself and does not operate only in the field of procedure i.e., the manner in which the trial is to take place. Inasmuch as the application of the CPC in my opinion is confined only to the procedure to be followed at the trial of election petitions the learned Sub Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to award special costs. 6. The result is that the petition is allowed and the order of the learned Sub Divisional Officer to the extent to which it awards special costs u/s 35A, CPC, is quashed. In other respects the order of the. learned SDO stands intact. In the circumstances the parties are directed to bear their own costs.