Judgment :- 1. This appeal has been filed by the Sanitary Assistant of the Quilon Municipal Council against the order passed by the Court of the Honorary 1st Class Bench of Magistrates, Quilon, acquitting the respondent, 2. The charge against the accused was that on 1-1-59 in his shop in Palace Ward, Quilon he stored gas and manufactured aerated waters without obtaining the requisite licence. Under S.261 of the Travancore District Municipalities Act - Act XXIII of 1116 the Municipal Council may by notification in the gazette prohibit the use of any place within the municipal limits for any one or more of the purposes mentioned in the Schedule III without the licence of the Executive Authority and under S.342 (2) a fee may be charged for every such licence at such rate as may be fixed by the council. In exercise of these powers rates of fees were fixed. Item 1 prescribes a fee of Rs. 6/- for aerated water manufacturing and item No. 53 prescribes a fee of Rs. 12/- for storing gas. 3. According to the accused he is manufacturing aerated waters for which the fee payable by him is only Rs. 6/- and that he has stocked gas only for the purpose of manufacturing aerated waters. There was no case for the prosecution that the accused was storing more than what was actually necessary for the manufacture of aerated waters or that he was storing it for sale or for any other purposes. It is conceded that aerated water cannot be manufactured without gas. In fact only one cylinder containing gas was found in the shop on inspection. The learned 1st Class Bench of Magistrates found the accused guilty and convicted him for manufacturing aerated waters without a licence but acquitted him of the offence of storing gas. According to the prosecution the accused is bound to take out licence for each of the purposes mentioned. 4. S.261 prohibits using of the premises for one or more of the purposes specified in the section. The question therefore for decision is whether the accused could be said to be storing gas. It is only if he can be said to be storing gas which is a distinct purpose that he will be bound to take out a licence for such a purpose. 5. The question therefore for decision is whether the accused could be said to be storing gas. It is only if he can be said to be storing gas which is a distinct purpose that he will be bound to take out a licence for such a purpose. 5. In J.C. Thompson v. Equity Fire Insurance Company (1910 Appeal cases 592) their Lordships had to construe the precise signification of the words "stored or kept". That was a case where Thompson the owner of a building had insured against fire with the Equity Fire Insurance Co. The building was burnt down and the question was whether the policy was avoided by the reason of the presence on the premises at the time of the fire of a small quantity of gasoline. The statutory condition which the Insurance Company relied on was that the company is not liable for loss or damage occurring while gasoline is stored or kept in the building insured. The only storage of gasoline was that which was contained in a stove. The question was whether that would come within the meaning of the word "stored". Their Lordships stated: "It is difficult, if not impossible, to give an accurate definition of the meaning, but if one takes a concrete case it is not very difficult to say whether a particular thing is "stored or kept" within the meaning of the condition. No one probably would say that a person who had a reasonable quantity of tea in his house for domestic use was "storing or keeping" tea there, or (to take the instance of benzine, which is one of the prescribed articles) no one would say that a person who had a small bottle of benzine for removing grease spots or cleansing purposes of that sort was "storing or keeping benzine." Therefore it was held: "that the small quantity of gasoline which was in the stove for the purpose of consumption was not being "stored or kept" within the meaning of the statutory condition at the time when the loss occurred." 6. The same question of the meaning of the word 'storing' arose in Emperor V. Wallace Flour Mill Company (ILR. 29 Bombay 193). The same question of the meaning of the word 'storing' arose in Emperor V. Wallace Flour Mill Company (ILR. 29 Bombay 193). It was held that: "The wording of S.394 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act requires that the premises, in order to attract the operation of the section, should be used for the purpose of 'storing'. The phrase "for the purpose" indicates that it must be the intention of those using the premises to store: that storing must be the object aimed at." Therefore the purpose of storing must be the dominent motive. It is not denied in this case that the cylinder of gas which was found in the accused's shop was kept there for use from time to time for the manufacture of aerated waters and for nothing else. The contention that the keeping of the cylinder of gas was such a use of the premises as to render a licence under the head 'storing gas' cannot be accepted. 7. My attention was also drawn to the Pull Bench decision of this court in Travancore Rayons Ltd. v. Municipal Council, Perumbavoor (1957 KLT.1155) where the question that arose for consideration was whether the manufacturing of rayon yarn and transparent paper are but different types of the same manufacturing product and whether separate licence has to be taken for the same. Their Lordships held: "The fact that the three items fall under the same entry in schedule III would not prevent the demand of separate licences and separate fees so long as they are different purposes, any more than the fact that what is really a single purpose falls within two or more entries would authorise the demand of separate licences and separate fees. The entry itself speaks of the use of machinery for any industrial purpose and if there are more industrial purposes than one, separate licences and separate fees can be insisted upon. As the manufactures are not separately carried on the making of rayon yarn and rayon transparent paper is a single industrial purpose and not separate purposes. Even if they are regarded as separate purposes, it is not disputed that they are carried out in the same factory and it is not said that the licensing of the one involves expenses or services different from or in addition to, the licensing of the other. Even if they are regarded as separate purposes, it is not disputed that they are carried out in the same factory and it is not said that the licensing of the one involves expenses or services different from or in addition to, the licensing of the other. In any view of the matter it would appear that the levy of separate fees would amount to a double levy and cannot be justified." Following these cases I am of opinion that storing gas must be for a distinct purpose and not for the purpose of manufacturing aerated waters. The view taken by the learned Bench of Magistrates that the accused need not take out a separate licence for item No. 53 is therefore correct and the acquittal is perfectly justified. The appeal is therefore dismissed. Dismissed.