JUDGMENT Bhargava, J. This appeal is against the judgment and decree of First Civil Judge, Sagar, decreeing the plaintiff's suit for damages in full for a sum of KB. 5,150-12-0. The plaintiff carries on the business of importing and selling potatoes at Sagar in the name and style of 'Abdul Aziz, Abdul Gaffar'. His telegraphic address is 'Roshan Manzil'. The defendant is a dealer in potatoes at Simla, one of the main centers for exporting potatoes. The defendant's telegraphic address is 'Honesty'. After ascertaining rates from the defendant, the plaintiff booked an order for 201 bags of Big Bengal Phool (seed) Potatoes telegraphically on 29-11-1955. The defendant replied the same day by his telegram (Ex. P-7) saying "Received. Purchased 201 Bengal Phool 30-10-0 billycut. Will take 4-5 days. If required immediately may sent by quarter parcel." The cost of getting goods by quarter parcels is higher. The plaintiff therefore, in reply asked the defendant to send the potatoes by goods train. On 5-12-1955, the defendant sent another telegram (Ex. P-8) to the plaintiff saying that the receipts in the market (Amdani) were very low and promising dispatch within four or five days. On the same day, the defendant sent another letter (Ex. P-9) to the plaintiff stating therein that the potatoes will be dispatched within five to seven days. The defendant did not do anything up to 12-12-1955. So, the plaintiff sent one telegram on 12-12-1955 and another one on 14-12-1955 requesting early dispatch of the said potatoes. The defendant again kept quiet. So the plain tiff sent a telegraphic notice through his counsel, Shri B. L. Seth, on 20-12-1955 demanding the goods to be sent immediately. The plaintiff followed his demands by his letter sent by registered post on 23-12-1955. Finally, he sent another notice through his counsel charging the defendant with breach of contract on 3-1-1956 claiming damages on the basis of the price of each bag of potatoes being Re. 60 at Sagar at the relevant time. The plaintiff thus claimed damages at the rate of Rs. 25-6-0 per bag allowing the margin of Rs. 4 per bag for the incidental costs. The damages on this basis worked at Rs. 5,100-12-0. The plaintiff claimed another item of Rs. 50 being the amount of expenses for sending telegrams and notices, etc. Thus, the plaintiff brought a suit for the recovery of Rs. 5,150-12-0 as damages from the defendant. 25-6-0 per bag allowing the margin of Rs. 4 per bag for the incidental costs. The damages on this basis worked at Rs. 5,100-12-0. The plaintiff claimed another item of Rs. 50 being the amount of expenses for sending telegrams and notices, etc. Thus, the plaintiff brought a suit for the recovery of Rs. 5,150-12-0 as damages from the defendant. The defendant denied the claim on many grounds. He contested that no contract between the parties had been concluded as his acceptance was merely conditional. It was urged that at Simla there prevailed a trade custom to the effect that unless and until advance amount was paid at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per wagon, the contract could not be said to have been formed between the parties. It was also urged that the goods were not appropriated towards the contract. A further plea to the same end was that the defendant had offered alternatives to the plaintiff by his telegram, dated 29-11-1955, and the contract could be completed only after selection of one of the two methods suggested, which was not done early. Lastly, it was contended that even if it be held that the defendant committed breach of contract, this breach was committed on 9th or 10th of December 1955 when the defendant failed to load the goods according to what he had stated in his telegram (Ex. P-7) of 29-11-1955. It was urged that the plaintiff bad failed to make appropriate pleading with regard to the date of the breach of contract and no evidence was given in the case, to prove the rates which were then prevailing in the market on the date of the alleged breach of contract. He also stated that the Sagar Court had no jurisdiction as the cause of action wholly arose at Simla. On these grounds, the defendant pressed for dismissal of the plaintiff's suit. He also stated that the Sagar Court had no jurisdiction as the cause of action wholly arose at Simla. On these grounds, the defendant pressed for dismissal of the plaintiff's suit. The very same grounds have been reiterated before us but the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has emphasized the under-mentioned three grounds in particular: That the Sagar Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit; That there was no concluded contract between the parties; That the pleadings in the case were inadequate in respect of the date on which the breach of contract was alleged to have taken place, and no evidence was given with regard to the rates prevailing in the market on the date of breach of contract on the basis of which alone the damages could be awarded. Taking up the first contention first, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the admitted relationship between the parties is that of principal and commission agents. The defendant (commission agents) was required to render all services in pursuance of the agreement at Simla. The telegram for the purchase of 201 bags of Big Bengal Phool (seed) Potatoes having been sent from Sagar to Simla and the defendant having accepted the offer of purchase at Simla, the agreement, if at all it was formed, was made at Simla. He relied upon the view taken in the case of Shah Ganpat Pasu and Co. v. Gulzarilal 1958 MPLJ 708 : 1968 MPC 598. The point for consideration in that case was as to whether any part of the cause of action had arisen at Kareli where the plaintiff resided. It was admitted that the defendant-firm carried on business as commission agents at Bombay. Further, it is clear from para. 10 of the judgment that in that case, the business was wholly done at Bombay and there was no allegation in the plaint that the account was to be rendered at the place of residence of the plaintiff or the money was to be paid there. In the absence of any allegation to that effect, it was inferred that the accounts were to be rendered and money was to be paid at Bombay. In the absence of any allegation to that effect, it was inferred that the accounts were to be rendered and money was to be paid at Bombay. It was further held that the talk with Raoji who gave himself out to be a representative or partner of the defendant-firm to do business with the plaintiff, which was alleged to have taken place at Kareli, was no part of the cause of action because if the plaintiff did not prove any part of the talk which took place with Raoji, his suit could not fail. The principle decided in that case has no application to the facts of the instant case. In the first place, it has to be appreciated that the transaction in dispute was a biltycut transaction. In the case of Hazarimal v. Gulabchand 1956 NLJ 645, it was explained in paragraph 10 of the judgment: Bilti is a Hindi word for a railway receipt. Bilticut refers to the rate agreed. A biltycut rate includes the coat of bagging or container,, weighing, transport to the railway station, loading in wagons, if this is to be done by the consignor and station charges till the Bilti is issued. Thus the price agreed is to be paid for the goods loaded in wagons at the unitary rate agreed..... In such contracts, the amount of price is payable at the place of the purchaser. The learned Judge who decided this case emphatically remarked that the common course of business pursued in such cases is that even without an express agreement, the payment of price is to be made at the place where the Bilti (R. R.) is required to be Bent. In a biltycut transaction, credit is not given to the buyer for the price and the payment is to be made against delivery of the railway receipt. This could only be done at Sagar and not at Simla. In a suit on contract the cause of action arises at any of the places (a) where the contract was made, (b) where the contract was to be performed or performance thereof was to be completed and (c) where in performance of the contract any money was expressly or impliedly payable (vide Hazirimal's case 1955 NLJ 646). In a suit on contract the cause of action arises at any of the places (a) where the contract was made, (b) where the contract was to be performed or performance thereof was to be completed and (c) where in performance of the contract any money was expressly or impliedly payable (vide Hazirimal's case 1955 NLJ 646). There is a clear allegation made in paragraph 9 of the plaint that the goods were to be delivered under the contract at Sagar and the defendant finally failed to deliver them there. This position is established overwhelmingly by the evidence that has been adduced in the case. Vishwanath (P. W. 1) who was a munim of the plaintiff-firm and who was acquainted with all the details of this transaction and the plaintiff Abdul Aziz (P. W. 2) himself furnished evidence on this point. No evidence to the contrary has been produced on behalf of the defendant. Therefore, firstly it is clear that there was an express contract to pay the price at Sagar at the time of obtaining the Bilti. Even if this conclusion could be shown to be ' erroneous, it is clear that one of the most important incidents of a biltycut transaction is the payment of price at the place where the Bilti is to be sent. So, in either view it is clearly established that in the instant case, the price was payable at Sagar expressly or impliedly and so part of cause of action arose there. Sagar Court, therefore, had jurisdiction to try this suit and we hold accordingly. With regard to the second point, Shri Dabir argued that the contract between the parties was not a concluded one and, therefore, it could not be acted upon. His argument was that the contract was merely in the stage of formation because purchase of 201 bags and their dispatch constituted but one direction in the telegram sent by the defendant on 29-11-1955. In our view, the telegram, dated 29-11-1955, which has been quoted in extenso above does not in any manner indicate an unconcluded agreement. It effectively says that 201 bags were purchased as desired by the plaintiff. In our view, the telegram, dated 29-11-1955, which has been quoted in extenso above does not in any manner indicate an unconcluded agreement. It effectively says that 201 bags were purchased as desired by the plaintiff. Merely seeking directions as to whether the plaintiff required the dispatch of the goods by a more speedy method or by the ordinary method, does not militate against, and is not derogatory of the agreement being taken to be a concluded one. Further, the defendant's telegram, dated 5-12-1955, clinches this matter. Unequivocally he has said in reply to the plaintiff's request to send the potatoes by goods train that he would be sending them within four to five days. We are, therefore, of the view that the contract was fully concluded and we hold accordingly. The third point that was argued by Shri Dabir is that according to the defendant's telegram (Ex. P-8) in which he promised to dispatch the goods within four to five days, the breach must have taken place on the 10 of December 1955 at the latest, that it was incumbent, therefore, on the plaintiff to be his claim for damages in relation to this date, that the plaintiff has failed to do so, and that there were no allegations made in the plaint indicating as to what the market price on 10th December 1955 was. He stated that in fact, the damages have been claimed on the basis of dates subsequent to this crucial date. Shri Dabir relied upon the following observations contained in Mohanlal and another v. Gangaram 31 NLR 260 :- It is for the plaintiff to plead and prove the fact on which he relies to show the quantum of damages. Aa he has failed to prove the fact which would entitle him to damages, his claim for damages must fail. These observations were made in the context of an agreement for the sale and purchase of (sic) made on 4tb December between the parties, the buyer agreeing to have the purchased goods measured on the following day, i, e. the 5th December. This allegation was not controverted in the pleadings. It was also clear that there was no subsequent appropriation to complete the sale. The seller, however, alleged in his plaint that the cause of action accrued on the 19th December, when the defendants made a 'final breach'. This allegation was not controverted in the pleadings. It was also clear that there was no subsequent appropriation to complete the sale. The seller, however, alleged in his plaint that the cause of action accrued on the 19th December, when the defendants made a 'final breach'. Subsequently, the plaintiff stated in his pleadings that the breach took place on 5th or 6th December. Considering these facts, Pollock J. remarked, It seems to be the seller' case that the breach of contract occurred on the 5th December, but it has been argued on his behalf that the breach occurred on the 19th. It is admitted that the rate prevailing on the fifth December was the same as prevailed on the previous date when the contract was made, and there is no evidence to how what was the rate on the lst and made the observations, referred to above, in the sentence following. In the present case, no definite date for the dispatch of goods was fixed as a term of contract and, therefore, the buyer could only insist on the goods being sent within a reasonable time. There is, definite evidence given to show that in the whole of the month of December prices at Simla and Sagar of the Big Bengal Phool Potatoes were higher. No contradiction or inconsistency in dates of alleged cause of action is also involved. Shri Dabir stated that he was supported in his submission by the view taken in Firm, Bachhraj Amolahchand v. Firm, Khubchand Naningdas 1848 NLJ 681 : ILR 1948 Nag 867 : AIR 1949 Nag 199, but that case also does not help the appellant. We find ourselves unable to agree with Shri Dabir. In the first place, the telegram (Ex. PS) does not definitely fix the date on which the loading of goods was to be made. It only indicates the expectation of the defendant of that date. It would further be seen that the defendant's letter {Ex. P-9) which was sent on this very date 5-12-1955 states a different period. Therein, it is stated that the wagon will be dispatched within 5 or 7 days. If the statement in the telegram (Ex. It only indicates the expectation of the defendant of that date. It would further be seen that the defendant's letter {Ex. P-9) which was sent on this very date 5-12-1955 states a different period. Therein, it is stated that the wagon will be dispatched within 5 or 7 days. If the statement in the telegram (Ex. P-8) to the effect "Reed, Amdani very low dispatching in four five days-Honesty-" constituted an essential portion of the contract, this portion would not be written in a different manner in the letter that was posted on the same day by the defendant. We, therefore, infer that the period stated in Exs. P-8 and P-9 does not represent the last date on which the dispatch of wagon was settled between the parties but' it merely gives out the expectation of the defendant to be able to send the wagon to the plaintiff within the period specified. The Second important point to consider is that before the defendant indicated by his conduct that he was not going to perform the contract, the relation that was subsisting between the parties was admittedly that of principal and commission agents as distinguished from that of a buyer and seller. In this situation, the plaintiff could rely that the agent will faithfully perform his obligations and carry through the instructions given by the plaintiff as contemplated in sections 212 and 213 of the Contract Act. There was nothing to suggest even in a remote manner on the 10th December that the contract had been broken by the defendant. The plaintiff, therefore, rightly Bent his telegrams on 12th and 14th December 1955 to the defendant requesting him to dispatch the goods in question. Unfortunately, these telegrams have not been produced by the defendant and he has chosen to deny them. But, we find that the statement of Vishwanath (P. W. 1) is more convincing on the point and we rely upon the fact of these telegrams having been Bent as stated by him. After these telegrams were sent, it is significant to note that the defendant again chose to keep quiet over the matter and did not indicate his refusal in any manner to the plaintiff. After these telegrams were sent, it is significant to note that the defendant again chose to keep quiet over the matter and did not indicate his refusal in any manner to the plaintiff. The result was that in the particular situation created by the defendant, he could not even on 20th December 1955 when he went to his lawyer to get a notice by telegram given to the defendant, finally say that the defendant had broken the contract. He could then expect that owing to one reason or the other, the defendant might have just delayed Bending the goods. The wagon asked for might not have been available arid the dispatch depended upon the availability of the wagon. On 3-1-1956, finally the plaintiff by continued silence of the defendant was constrained to come to the conclusion that the defendant did not intend to perform the contract and had broken it. In these circumstances,' our view is that we will not be justified in pinning the plaintiff to the rate prevailing in the market on 10th December 1955 or thereabout and we feel that in the circumstances of the case, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to expect delivery even up to 23-12-1955 when he Bent his notice by registered post demanding delivery. Further whatever may be the view that we take with regard to the date of breach of contract, the position in this cape is that the defendant has failed to show that the rates were more favorable to him on 10th than what they were on subsequent dates. The plaintiff as P. W. 2 has clearly deposed in paragraph 13 of the statement that the rates of Big Bengal Phool Potatoes at Sagar in the month of December 1955 and January 1956 were Rs. 60 to Rs. 62 per bag. He is corroborated in his statement by his munim Vishwanath (P. W. 1) who has deposed in paragraph 10 of his deposition that at Simla itself, the price of this type of potatoes on 19-12-1955 was Rs. 45-14-0 per bag and on 23-12-1855 it had risen to Rs. 4S-8-0 per bag. The plaintiff's another witness Mohammad Usman (P. W. 3; establishes that in the month of December, the price of Bengal Phool Potatoes at Simla was ranging from Rs. 42 to Rs. 45-14-0 per bag and on 23-12-1855 it had risen to Rs. 4S-8-0 per bag. The plaintiff's another witness Mohammad Usman (P. W. 3; establishes that in the month of December, the price of Bengal Phool Potatoes at Simla was ranging from Rs. 42 to Rs. 45 per bag and in paragraph 8 of his statement, be has clearly stated that this quality of potatoes was selling at Sagar in the month of December at the rate of Rs. 60 per bag. To the same effect is the statement of Pdnnalal (P. W. 4) who has proved by himself the purchase of this quality of potatoes at the rate of Rs. 60 per bag in the month of December at Sagar from Abmad Kunjra. Sukhlal (P. W. 5) is an agriculturist who had gone to Simla to purchase seed potatoes of the quality in question in the month of December 1955. He has deposed that the price for this was Rs. 44-4-0 biltycut. Rs. 4 per bag is the amount of expenses that are incurred in bringing potatoes from Simla to Sagar. Evidence on this point is furnished by Vishwanath (P.W.I), Abdul Aziz (P. W. 2) and Sukhlal (P. W. 5). None of these witnesses has been (sic) -ex a mined to show that the statement of ruling price made by them with regard to the Sagar prices or the incidental expenses of transport, etc., is wrong. With regard to the damages, the established principle is that the person suffering from breach of contract should receive by way of damages enough to enable him to buy similar goods in the open market. The evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff furnished good material on the basis of which this conclusion can be arrived at that in the entire month of December 1955 and in the beginning of the month of January 1956, the price of the particular quality of potatoes in question was as claimed by the plaintiff. The view of the learned Judge of the trial Court, therefore, is correct on this point also and he was justified in assessing the damages at the market rate in Sagar at the rates proved, i. e, Rs. 60 per bag, The plaintiff has alleged all the essential facts in his plaint. The view of the learned Judge of the trial Court, therefore, is correct on this point also and he was justified in assessing the damages at the market rate in Sagar at the rates proved, i. e, Rs. 60 per bag, The plaintiff has alleged all the essential facts in his plaint. It was impossible for him to state categorically the particular date on which the contract was broken by the defendant. "We are not in a position to find any fault with the averments made in the plaint and the pleadings are not defective. Shri Dabir faintly argued that the contract did not subsist between the parties unless some advance amount was paid according to the custom prevalent in the market at Simla. This argument has only to be mentioned to be rejected because, firstly, the point was never emphasized during the stage of negotiations or subsequently when the plaintiff demanded early delivery. Secondly, the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendant themselves have admitted that the alleged custom is not invariable. It cannot, therefore, be recognized as a trade usage. It was also urged that as the plaintiff did not send money nor did he go himself to Simla or send some one else to Simla to examine the goods, it was not incumbent on the defendant to dispatch the goods before they were appropriated. We have already stated that no question of appropriation arose in the instant case. We entirely agree with the reasons assigned by the learned trial Judge in repelling the contentions of the defendant. No other point was pressed before us. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed