JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, J. - This is an appeal by the Municipal Board, Kanpur against an order of acquittal passed in appeal. Indra Mohan Respondent was prosecuted by the Municipal Board, Kanpur on the following allegations. 2. One Food Inspector visited the factory of Indra Mohan accused on 30th May, 1956 and found that the Respondent was manufacturing and selling icecream at the factory without a licence. Indra Mohan was, therefore, prosecuted u/s 16 read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for the manufacture and sale of ice cream without a licence. The accused pleaded not guilty. He filed a written statement. The main point raised in defence was that, no licence is needed for the manufacture and sale of icecream. This plea was overruled by the learned Magistrate. Indra Mohan accused was convicted u/s 16, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and was fined Rs. 200. 3. Indra Mohan appealed. That appeal came up before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur. He accepted the contention raised on behalf of Indra Mohan that, no licence was required for the manufacture or sale of icecream. Indra Mohan accused was, therefore, acquitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 16th January, 1960. The present appeal by the Municipal Board, Kanpur is directed against the order of acquittal dated 16th January, 1960. 4. Mr. A.R. Man Singh appearing for Indra Mohan Respondent raised a preliminary objection that, the present appeal is incompetent. This objection appears to be well founded. The Learned Counsel pointed out that, the Municipal Board, Kanpur is no longer in existence. The present appeal was filed on 1st April, 1960. Some time before 1st April 1960, a Corporation was established at Kanpur. So the local authority in existence at Kanpur is the Municipal Corporation, Kanpur; and not the Municipal Board, Kanpur. The present appeal has been filed in the name of an institution, which was not in existence on the date of the filing of the appeal. It is true that the complaint was filed in June 1956 by the Municipal Board, Kanpur. But that body was not in existence on 1-4-1960. 5. The present appeal has been filed in the name of an institution, which was not in existence on the date of the filing of the appeal. It is true that the complaint was filed in June 1956 by the Municipal Board, Kanpur. But that body was not in existence on 1-4-1960. 5. Sub-section (3) of Section 417, Code of Criminal Procedure provides for appeals by complainants against orders of acquittal, Section 417(3), Code of Criminal Procedure runs thus: If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave ... the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court." It will be noticed that, the word 'complainant' has been used twice in Section 417(3), CrPC. Section 417(3), Code of Criminal Procedure makes no provision for the death of a complainant. It, therefore, appears that under this provision it is only the complainant, who is entitled to file an appeal. As already pointed out, the complainant in the present case was the Municipal Board, Kanpur, which is no longer in existence. It, therefore, appears that it was not practicable to file an appeal u/s 417(3). Code of Criminal Procedure on 1st April 1960. The appeal as filed was incompetent. 6. We have, however, heard the Learned Counsel for the parties on the question of law, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge in appeal. That question of law is likely to arise frequently in prosecutions under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. It will, therefore, be convenient to decide that question of law in the present case. Mr. B.S. Darbari appearing for the Appellant suggested that, the present appeal may be treated as a revision. This request may be granted. We, therefore, propose to treat the present appeal as a criminal revision. 7. The main question argued before the learned Sessions Judge was whether any licence is needed for the manufacture or sale of icecream. That point arises u/R. 50 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. This request may be granted. We, therefore, propose to treat the present appeal as a criminal revision. 7. The main question argued before the learned Sessions Judge was whether any licence is needed for the manufacture or sale of icecream. That point arises u/R. 50 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 50 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules runs thus: (1) No person shall manufacture, sell, stock, distribute or exhibit for sale any of the following articles of food except under a licence: (a) milk or skimmed milk or separated milk, (b) milk products, including Khoa, cream, Rabri. Dahi, etc.; (c) Ghee, (d) butter. .... 8. It will be seen that under Rule 50 quoted above, a person desiring to manufacture and sell a milk product must obtain a licence for the purpose. It appears that on 30th May 1956, Indra Mohan accused did not possess a licence for the manufacture or sale of icecream. The question, therefore, arose whether it was obligatory for the accused to hold a licence for the manufacture or sale of icecream. The learned Sessions Judge has held that no licence was necessary. 9. Mr. A.R. Man Singh pointed out that, the word 'icecream' is nowhere mentioned in Rule 50 quoted above. Clause (b) of Rule 50 is: milk products' including Khoa, cream, Rabri, Dahi, etc. Four specific articles have been enumerated in Clause (b), as examples of milk products. The four words are followed by the word 'etc.'. The word 'etc.' is an indication that there may be other milk products, which have not been expressly mentioned in Clause (b). The expression "milk product" has not been defined in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act or in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. The expression 'milk product' should mean an article produced from milk. It is well known that icecream is prepared from milk. There should, therefore, be no difficulty in classifying icecream as a milk product. 10. Icecream has been defined in Rule A-11-11 given in Appendix B to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules: Ice cream means the frozen food made with cream, milk or other milk products sweetened with sugar or honey and with or without (a) egg, (b) fruits, (c) nuts, (d chocolates, (e) stabiliser not more than 0.5 per cent of the finished products, and (f) permissible flavour or colour. Under this definition, the basic substance for the manufacture of ice cream is cream, milk or other milk product. Now, according to Rule 50 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, cream itself is a milk product. So when the definition of ice cream is read along with Rule 50, it becomes clear that, the basic substance for the manufacture of ice cream is either milk itself or a milk product. As explained above, ice cream is usually manufactured from pure milk. So ice cream is a product from milk. The matter is further clarified by the definition of ice cream given in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. It is, therefore, clear that, ice cream is a milk product within the meaning of Cl. (b) of Sub-rule (i) of Rule 50 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. The learned Sessions Judge was wrong in his view that, ice cream is not a milk product, and that no licence is provided under the rule for the manufacture or sale of ice cream. We are of opinion that, ice cream is a milk product within the meaning of Clause (b) of Rule 50, and a person desiring to manufacture and sell ice cream ought to bold a licence as prescribed by Rule 50, Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. 11. Thus we find that the basis of the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge is erroneous. It appears that the learned Sessions Judge did not discuss other aspects of the case. He will have to discuss various other questions of fact and law, that arose or are likely to arise in the appeal filed by Indra Mohan against the order of conviction dated 28th April 1958. We are hearing the criminal appeal as a revision. In revision we cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. All that we can do is to remand the appeal to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur for disposing of the appeal after discussing the various questions of fact and law, which arise in the case. 12. The criminal appeal (treated as revision) is allowed. The order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions judge, Kanpur, on 16th January 1960 is set aside. 12. The criminal appeal (treated as revision) is allowed. The order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions judge, Kanpur, on 16th January 1960 is set aside. Criminal Appeal No. 265 of 1958 filed in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Kanpur is remanded for rehearing according to law in the light of this judgment. The appeal may be heard either by the learned Sessions Judge, Kanpur, or may be transferred to any Additional Sessions Judge of Kanpur.