Rajamannar, C.J.- This Civil Revision Petition arises out of an application made to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Sivakasi, by the two petitioners before us, Mohamed Abubucker and Sankaralingam Pillai, under sub-section (5) of section 4 of Act XXV of 1955 (The Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act), as amended by Act XV of 1956. The provision runs thus: “Any cultivating tenant, who, after the commencement of this Act, has been evicted except under the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 3, shall be entitled to apply to the Revenue Divisional Officer within two months from the date of such eviction or within two months from the date of coming into force of the Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection (Amendment) Act, 1956, for the restoration to him of the possession of the lands from which he was evicted and to hold them with all the rights and subject to all the liabilities of a cultivating tenant. The provisions of sub-section (4) shall, so far as may be, apply to such an application.” The petitioners alleged that they had taken the lands on lease from the first respondent till the end of Fasli 1365. The case came up once before this Court ; but it is not necessary to refer to the earlier proceedings. The petitioner’ application was opposed mainly on the ground that they were not cultivating tenants within the meaning of the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’, in the Act. The definition, so far as, it is material, runs as follows: “ ‘Cultivating Tenant' in relation to any land means a person who carried on personal cultivation of such land, under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and includes:- (i) any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement.” Sub-clause (ee), which was added by the amending Act, explains the term ‘personal cultivation’ thus: “A person is said to carry on ‘personal cultivation ‘on a land when he contributes his own physical labour or that of the members of his family in the cultivation of that land.” On a consideration of the evidence adduced before him, the Revenue Divisional Officer held that the two petitioners were not carrying on ‘personal cultivation’, and therefore, were not cultivating tenants, as defined in section 2 (a) of the Act. On this finding, he dimissed the petition. The petitioners seek a revision of this order. On this finding, he dimissed the petition. The petitioners seek a revision of this order. The material facts which emerge from the evidence of the petitioners themselves, have been fully set out in the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer. The first petitioner was merely a financier for the second petitioner. The second petitioner, as P.W. 1 spoke to all he used to do regarding the cultivation of the lands. He used to supervise the lands once in a month. He lives 22 miles away from the land and employs servants to carry on the cultivation. The question is whether these facts would justify the conclusion that the petitioners carry on personal cultivation on the land. When the Civil Revision Petition orginally came up before one of us, attention was drawn to divergent views expressed by learned Judges of this Court. The case was therefore referred to a Division Bench. Balakrishna Ayyar, J., was inclined to take a very liberal view of the definition in Kunchithapatham Pillai v. Ranganatham Pillai1. According to the learned Judge, in order to qualify as a ‘cultivating tenant’ within the meaning of section 2 (a) of Madras Act XXV of 1955, it was not necessary that a person should put his own muscular effort into the soil. The learned Judge observed: “It is not necessary that he himself should plough the field or irrigate it or weed it or harvest it or thrash the grain that the field may yield. It is sufficient if the land is cultivated under his direct supervision and if further he assumes the risk of the cultivation. If he can decide what crops he would grow, when he would grow them and where he would grow them, if he can direct what labour should be employed and when and where and for what purposes, if he can decide what fertilizer he would use and in what proportions, if he can decide and direct when the field should be harvested and how the harvest should be disposed of, if he has direct control over such operations and if further he is not the paid agent in this respect of someone else, he would be a cultivating tenant within the meaning of the Act. The contention of the respondent that, as he does not contribute his physical labour to the cultivation, he is not a cultivating tenant, must fail.” In W.P. No. 426 of 1953, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., was actually dealing with a provision of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Ordinance IV of 1952. But it was necessary for him to deal with the scope of the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ in that Act. The definition was: “Cultivating tenant’ or ‘tenant ‘means a person who contributes his own physical labour or that of the members of his family in cultivation of any land belonging to another, under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and includes the heirs of such person but shall not include a mere intermediary or his heirs.” It was contended before him that, to satisfy the definition of a ‘cultivating tenant’, it was sufficient if the tenant was cultivating the lands as pannai and exercised supervision over the pannaiyal and hired labour and that it was not necessary that he should himself get into the lands and plough or do other agricultural operations. But the learned Judge repelled that contention thus: “Before a person can be a cultivating tenant, he or members of his family must contribute his or their own physical labour. I do not consider that the supervision of panniyals could be characterised as physical labour within the meaning of the definition clause.” The same definition came up for construction again before Rajagopalan, J., in W.P. No. 695 of 1953. The person who claimed to fall within the definition in that case relied on the following acts, namely, supervising the operations in the various fields, giving seeds for cultivation, supplying manure and the other requisites for cultivation, and generally directing the cultivation, maintenance of cattle and their feeding, etc. The learned Judge, after adverting to the fact that the definition does not specify the quantum of physical labour necessary to satisfy the test prescribed by it and that it does not correlate the physical labour to any given agricultural operation, referred to the observation of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., quoted earlier in this judgment, and proceeded to say as follows: “Whether the acts of supervision of cultivation on the part of the lessee themselves involve contribution of his physical labour in the cultivation of the lands must necessarily be a question of fact in any given case. An act of supervision of the cultivation of lands may involve physical labour. Even the payment of wages to a pannaiyal does involve some physical labour. But. what section 2 (d) of the Act requires is "contribution of physical labour in the cultivation of the land". It is neither possible nor desirable to attempt an exhaustive catalogue of all acts of supervision which would constitute contribution of physical labour in the cultivation of the land.” No other decision of this Court bearing on the point was brought to our notice. We looked up several decisions of the English Courts to get, if possible, assistance in construing the definition, particularly with regard to the meaning to be given to the words “contributes his own physical labour.” Though none of the decisions, to which we shall presently refer, related to a provision in pari materia with the provision in the Madras Act some light is thrown on the question, what would constitute “physical labour”. In a very early case, Crofton v. Poole,1a person who was employed to remove furniture, and who, in the course of the employment, procured vans, supplied packing cases and employed men in packing and unpacking and conveyance of the goods, was not considered to be a man using his personal labour. In Morgan v. London General Omnibus Co.,2it was held by the Court of Appeal that an omnibus conductor cannot be said to be engaged in manual labour. Brett, M.R., had no doubt however that a man employed to dig the ground could be a “servant in husbandry”. It seemed to Bowen, L.J., that ‘manual labour’ could only mean ‘labour performed by hand’, and he had no doubt that an omnibus conductor was not engaged in work of that kind. The driver of a tram car was similarly held to be not engaged in manual labour (Cook v. North Metropolitan Tramways Company1. The following opinion of A.L. Smith, J., (as he then was) is valuable:- “The expression used, it should be noted, is not manual work, but manual labour, for many occupations involve the former but not the latter, such as telegraph clerks, and all persons engaged, in writing. The following opinion of A.L. Smith, J., (as he then was) is valuable:- “The expression used, it should be noted, is not manual work, but manual labour, for many occupations involve the former but not the latter, such as telegraph clerks, and all persons engaged, in writing. I cannot see the distinction between driving and other occupations which involve no manual labour though they do involve mannual work.” Lord Esher, M.R., was apparently of opinion that real labour is that which tests one’s muscles and sinews (Yarmouth v. France2). In Hunt v. Great Northern Railway Company3, the principle of the earlier decisions of the Queen’s Bench Division was followed in holding that a railway guard was not a person engaged in manual labour. His duty was described as requiring care, skill, and experience, and the labour which it involved as mental rather than physical. Bound v. Lawrence4, related to a grocer’s assistant, whose duty was to serve customers in a shop, make up parcels for them carry the parcels from the shop to the cart and to bring up goods from the cellar to the shop. The Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of the Queen’s Bench Division, held that he was not engaged in manual labour. Lord Esher, M.R., said: “There can be no manual labour without user of the hand ; but it does not at all follow that every user of the hands is manual labour, so as to make the person who does it a manual labourer.” The following passage in the judgment of Fry, L.J., is instructive: “It is to be observed that it is difficult to imagine any work done by man so purely intellectual as to require no kind of work with the hands ; and the converse is equally true, that there can hardly be work with the hands that requires no intellectual effort. If, then, the words ‘manual labour’ are to have the full significance which could be put on them, they would be extended to every kind of employment. That cannot be the true meaning of the statute, but some more confined interpretation must be arrived at.” In the course of the judgment, the idea of physical exertion occurs as being a relevant factor. That cannot be the true meaning of the statute, but some more confined interpretation must be arrived at.” In the course of the judgment, the idea of physical exertion occurs as being a relevant factor. In Smith v. Associated Omnibus Company5, in holding that the employee there was engaged in manual labour, one material fact that was taken into consideration was that the person had to do work with his hands and feet ; sometimes, the work might be hard, and at other times, less arduous. Clause (ee) of section 2 of Act XXV of 1955 requires that a person should contribute his own physical labour or that of the members of his family in the cultivation of the land before he can be said to carry on personal cultivation on the land. The general principles which can be gathered from the English decisions cited above, appear to be of assistance in deciding what is meant by ‘physical labour’. There is, first, the idea of physical strain, the use of muscles and sinews. There is also the implied distinction between mental or intellectual work and bodily labour. There is also the idea of using one’s hands and feet with the implication that such user is the essential part of the work. An author writing a poem may also use his hand in writing, but, surely, that is only incidental to the main thing, namely, the composition of a work of art. The Head of an Administrative Department may have to walk through several sections of the office on an inspection, and thus be using his feet. He may also undergo a certain amount of physical strain, but, surely, he cannot be said to be doing any physical labour. All that appears from the evidence in the case before us is that one of the petitioners who lives 22 miles away from the land supervises the work of cultivation. We have no hesitation in holding that, on this evidence, the Revenue Divisional Officer was right in holding that the petitioners were not cultivating tenants within the meaning of section 2 (a) of Act XXV of 1955. They were not entitled, therefore, to any of the benfits conferred by the provisions of that Act. The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs. R.M. ------------- Petition dismissed.