JUDGMENT Pandey, J. The questions referred to this Court under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act are: (1) Whether there was any material before the Tribunal to hold that the sum of Us. 5,67,000 was the income of the assessee-Association from undisclosed sources ? (2) Whether, on a true construction of the adoption deed, the amount of Rs. 11,939 spent by or for Parmanand has been rightly disallowed as an expense of the business of the assessee ? (3) Whether the income of Rs. 44, 511 was the income of the assessee or of the trust ? Two brothers, Mohanlal and Hargovinddas, were members of an undivided Hindu family and carried on an extensive business of manufacture and sale of bidis under the name and style of Mohanlal Hargovinddas, Jabalpur. In the year 1920, Hargovinddas died issueless leaving behind him surviving his two widows, Mst. Ujjabai and Mst. Rukhibai. Thereafter, on 25th November 1921, Mohanlal made a will of the entire joint family property, which he alone owned as the sole surviving coparcener, in favour of his wife Mst. Jadavbai alias Jadibai and his brother's widow Mst. Ujjabai. The material terms of the will are : That after my death my wife Jadibai and Ujjabai the wife of my deceased brother Hargovinddas those two women will be in possession of that property which I shall leave behind and which is my self-earned property. That if any one out of these two women were to die then the woman who will be living out of these two women i. e. Jadibai and Ujibai will alone be entitled to obtain my entire property and the four women will remain together in the same manner as they are doing now. That after the death of these women namely Jadibai and Ujibai the whole of the estate should pass to my second wife Chanchalbai and Rukhibai the widow of Hargovinddas. They shall be joint owners. If any one out of these also were to die or goes away, i. e. remarries according to the customs of the caste, etc. then in that case the woman who sticks to her religion shall be entitled to receive every kind of property. They shall be joint owners. If any one out of these also were to die or goes away, i. e. remarries according to the customs of the caste, etc. then in that case the woman who sticks to her religion shall be entitled to receive every kind of property. None of the women will have the power to spend money out of movable and immovable properties except for necessary expenses and in order to complete works of motet (religion) nor will she have power to spend in a manner not befitting her - position i. e. spend more than a woman of her social status may spend and she will also have no power to waste the property. The trade shall be going on as usual. On 29th November 1921, Mohanlal also died issueless survived by his two widows, Mst. Jadavbai and Mst. Chanchalbai. In 1923, Mst. Chanchalbai and Mst. Rukhibai remarried. On 29th June 1925, Mat. Jadavbai adopted a minor boy, Chandu alias Parmanand, as a son to her deceased husband Mohanlal after making with his natural father an agreement dated 28th June 1925. The material terms of that agreement are as under : The parties hereto of the 1st and 2nd part and the survivor of them shall have during their respective lives both before and after the said minor boy has attained his majority absolute power and control over the whole of the movable and immovable property, estate and effects of which said Mohanlal Ishwardas died possessed and shall be at liberty to manage the same during their respective lives according to their absolute discretion in any manner that they or she may in the exercise of such discretion deemed most advantageous to the estate. The parties hereto of the 1st and 2nd part and the surviving of them shall during their respective lives be absolutely entitled to the income of the said estate provided however and hereby agreed that they will during their respective lives provide the said boy Chandoo with lodging, food, clothes, medical attendance and all other necessaries and will generally maintain and educate him out of the income of the said estate in the manner suitable to the position of the family and will get him married and perform the usual ceremonies of his marriage out of the said income in a manner suitable to the position and responsibility of' the said family. For the better management and protection of the said estate, the interest of the said minor boy Chandoo the parties hereto of the 1st part and 2nd part shall be at liberty to appoint five fit and proper persons to manage the said business of Mohanlal Hargovinddas at Jubbulpore and other places in British India on terms and conditions with such powers as to the said parties may seem proper. After the death of the survivors of the parties hereto of the 1st and 2nd part the said minor Chandoo will be entitled to inherit for his own absolute use and benefit all the movable and immovable property, estate and effect of which the said survivor shall die possessed. The relevant assessment year under the Income-tax Act is 1947-48, the previous year being 5th November 1945 to 24th October 1946. However, the chargeable accounting period for the Excess Profits Tax is 5th November 1945 to 31st March 1946 and for the Business Profits Tax is 1st April 1946 to 24th October 1946. The unit of assessment is an association of persons constituted by Mst. Jadavbai and Mst. Ujjabai, who claim to be the owners of the business carried on in the name of Mohanlal Hargovinddas. It appears that, during the relevant period, the adopted son Parmanand, who had attained majority, took part in the management of that business. On 18th January 1946, Mohanlal Hargovinddas encashed high denomination notes of the value of Rs. 6, 22,000. Out of this amount, Rs. 5,67,000 was held to be assessable income derived from undisclosed sources. Further, a sum of Rs. 11,939 spent out of the proceeds of the business by Parmanand for his personal requirements was not allowed as a business expense falling under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. Also, another sum of Rs. 44,511, being the profits of Gorakhpur shop of the assessee, was treated as income of the assessee and the contention that the income belonged to Mohanlal Hargovinddas Charitable Trust was not accepted. In regard to the encashment of 622 high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each on 18th January 1946, the two ladies disclosed the sources of the amount as under: Sale proceeds of 25 silver bars Rs. 98,284 Sale of old silver coins Rs. 2,50,000 Cash withdrawal from Mohanlal Hargovinddas on 15th October 1945 Rs. 1,50,000 Cash withdrawal from Mohanlal Hargovinddas on 21st November 1945 Rs. 1,000 each on 18th January 1946, the two ladies disclosed the sources of the amount as under: Sale proceeds of 25 silver bars Rs. 98,284 Sale of old silver coins Rs. 2,50,000 Cash withdrawal from Mohanlal Hargovinddas on 15th October 1945 Rs. 1,50,000 Cash withdrawal from Mohanlal Hargovinddas on 21st November 1945 Rs. 1,00,000 High denomination notes in the cash balance of Mohanlal Hargovinddas on 18th January 1946 Rs. 55,000 In the declaration prescribed by clause 6 of the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetization) Ordinance given by Mohanlal Hargovinddas on 18th January 1946, the sources of the money in high denomination notes disclosed were as under: Our being an extensive business, we are required to keep large cash on hand and this we have been doing for a long time and this fact is already on the record of Income-tax Department. Chiefly from banks either in payment of cheques or by exchange of small notes and through sale of gold and silver and received in ordinary course of business. Received from our shops at various times and by sale of gold and silver and represent Stridhan by which the business in Bombay was carried on from 1937 to date, For the assessment year 1946-47, the profits derived as a result of sale of silver bars and old coins mentioned in paragraph 5 above were estimated at Rs. 99,122 and subjected to tax under section 34 of the Income-tax Act. Although that assessment was affirmed in appeal, the Tribunal set it aside on the ground that section 34 ibid was not attracted for the reason that there was no fresh information leading to the discovery that the income had escaped assessment. The Income-tax Officer, who determined the tax for the assessment year 1947-48, held that Rs. 5,67,000 was income derived from undisclosed sources for the following reasons: (i) The two ladies were the owners of the property and the business assets and the withdrawals made by them could not be their Stridhan. (ii) The assessee dealt with the silver bars and old coins in a businesslike manner and sold them in separate lots, thereby making a considerable profit. (iii) The assessee failed to show that the sale proceeds of silver bars and old silver coins and the withdrawals made by them consisted of those high denomination notes which were encashed on 18th January 1946. (iii) The assessee failed to show that the sale proceeds of silver bars and old silver coins and the withdrawals made by them consisted of those high denomination notes which were encashed on 18th January 1946. (iv) There were material discrepancies in the declaration made in connation with the encashment of the high denomination notes and the explanation subsequently put forward. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, in affirming the finding that Rs. 5,67,000 represented income derived from undiscovered sources, elaborated the reasons given in support of that view by the Income-tax Officer and laid emphasis on the absence of evidence to indicate that the sale proceeds of old coins and silver bars and the withdrawals were in high denomination notes. He pointed out that (a) there was no proof to show that the sale proceeds of old coins and silver bars were obtained in high denomination notes and hoarded by ladies, (b) there were no details to show that the withdrawals were in high denomination notes, (c) since it was usual to maintain a record of high denomination notes handled, it was unbelievable that the agents of a firm of the standing of Mohanlal Hargovinddas did not keep even a record of the number of high denomination notes received in the shop and handed over to the two ladies and (d) the assessee failed to produce any letter from the bank concerned to show that high denomination notes were received from it. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal merely accepted the reasons given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and observed that it failed to see why the ladies should keep with them large sums when they got interest on the sums lying to their credit in the business. It is well settled that the question whether admitted or proved facts provide evidence to support the conclusions of fact reached is a question of law : Bomford v. Osborne (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) (1942) 10 ITR (Supp) 27. In other words, when a matter of this kind is raised, the question would be whether the conclusions are based on any evidence or upon a view of facts which may reasonably be entertained: Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow (1955) 28 ITR 579. In other words, when a matter of this kind is raised, the question would be whether the conclusions are based on any evidence or upon a view of facts which may reasonably be entertained: Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow (1955) 28 ITR 579. Accordingly, the Supreme Court observed in Meenakshi Mills v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1957) 31 ITR 28 that, in proceedings under section 66 of the Income-tax Act, a finding on a question of fact is open to attack as erroneous in law when there is no evidence to support it or if it is perverse. In Nilkantha Narayan Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1951) 20 ITR 8 , a big Zamindar had encashed in the relevant accounting year high denomination notes of the aggregate value of Rs. 84, 000. The Zamindar explained that the amount represented the savings from the amounts he had withdrawn for his personal expenses. It was found that the account-books produced for seven years and accepted as genuine showed that the Zamindar had a balance of Rs. 1,84,000. The Patna High Court held that there was no onus on the Zamindar to explain from whom each high denomination note was obtained, that no adverse inference ought to have been drawn by reason of his failure so to do and that there was no material to support the conclusions that Rs. 84,000 represented income from undisclosed sources. A similar view was taken in Chunilal Ticamchand Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1955) 27 ITR 602 : (6) 30 ITR 181 where the learned Judges of the Patna High Court observed : It was stated by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the first place that the books of account did not expressly mention that the high denomination notes were received by the assessee in the course of business dealings. But this is hardly a circumstance which can reasonably be taken into account in deciding whether the cash balance consisted in part of high denomination notes. The possession of high denomination notes did not attract suspicion before the authorities promulgated the Denomination Ordinance. The mere fact that before the date of the Ordinance the assessee did not choose to mention in the account books the receipt of high denomination notes would not suggest that the cash balance was not constituted of the high denomination notes as alleged by the assessee. The mere fact that before the date of the Ordinance the assessee did not choose to mention in the account books the receipt of high denomination notes would not suggest that the cash balance was not constituted of the high denomination notes as alleged by the assessee. The view taken in the last mentioned case was expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Mehta Parikh and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (6). Bhagwati J. observed that the assessee had furnished a reasonable explanation for the possession of high denomination notes of the face value of Rs. 61,000 and there was no justification for having accepted it in part and discarded it in relation to a sum of Rs. 30,000. Venkatarama Ayyar J. observed: I prefer to rest my decision on the ground that the finding of the Tribunal that high denomination notes of the value of Rs. 30,000 represented the concealed profits of the appellant is not supported by any evidence and is, in consequence, erroneous in point of law and liable to be set aside.... To put the matter in a nutshell, the accounts of the appellant have been accepted by the Tribunal as genuine, and it is impossible to say, having regard to the cash balance as shown therein, that the notes in question could not have been included therein. The Tribunal observes that it is unlikely that so many high denomination notes would have been held as a part of the cash on hand for such a large number of days. That, no doubt, is highly suspicious; but the decision of the Tribunal must rest not on suspicion but on legal testimony. Following the two Patna cases, the Allahabad High Court also took the same view in Kanpur Steel Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 32 ITR 56. Finally, approving the view taken in the four cases referred to above, the Supreme Court observed in Lalchand Bhagat Ambica Ram v. Commissioner of Income-tax 37 ITR 288 at p. 297: Nobody had any inkling of the promulgation of the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetization) Ordinance, 1946, on January 12, 1946, and if in the normal course of affairs and situated as the appellant WEB, the appellant kept these large each balances in high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each, there was nothing surprising or improbable in it. 1,000 each, there was nothing surprising or improbable in it. If the appellant had to disburse such large sums of monies at short notices at the different branches of the appellant and also to its be-apparels apart from financing the Government for grain purchase work which it used to carry on, it would be convenient for it to handle these large sums of moneys m high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each and the most natural thing for it to do was to keep these cash balances in as many high denomination notes as possible.... If the entries in the books of account in regard to the balance in Rokar and the balance in Almirah were held to be genuine, logically enough there was no escape from the conclusion that the appellant had offered reasonable explanation as to the source of the 291 high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each which it encashed on January 19, 1946. In the instant case, the Taxing Authorities and the Tribunal accepted that old coins and silver bars were sold for an aggregate sum of Rs. 3,48,284. Indeed, at an earlier stage, the Taxing Authorities had, as shown, actually taxed the profits derived as a result of sale of old coins and silver bars. It was also clear from the account books, which were accepted as genuine, that a part of the surplus cash balance of the shop always remained with the two ladies, that they used to withdraw the surplus from time to time, that they made available funds from that surplus whenever required for the business of the shop and that, in the usual course, they had withdrawn from the cash balance Rs. 1,50,000 on 15th October 1945 and Rs. 1,00,000 on 21st November 1945. In our opinion, these clearly furnish a reasonable explanation as to the source of the high denomination notes of the aggregate value of Rs. 56,7,000. The main ground on which this explanation was not accepted was that the assessee failed to prove on the basis of the entries in account-books that the amount was received or withdrawn in high denomination notes. In our opinion, that fact cannot, in the circumstances of the case, reasonably support the conclusion that the amount of Rs. 5,67,000 was not in high denomination notes. In our opinion, that fact cannot, in the circumstances of the case, reasonably support the conclusion that the amount of Rs. 5,67,000 was not in high denomination notes. Another ground given by the Tribunal was that the ladies were unlikely to keep with them large sums when they got interest on the sums lying to their credit in the business. Besides being contrary to fact, this view ignored that the ladies; were themselves the owners of the business and any entries relating to interest could only be book entries. We also think that the statement in the declaration under clause 6 of the Demonetization Ordinance that the amount was "received from our shop at various times and by sale of gold and silver and represent stridhan by which the business in Bombay was carried on from 1937 to date" is not, in effect, inconsistent with the assessee explanation as to the source of the high denomination notes. The statement clearly discloses that the amount was made up in part of withdrawals from the shop and in part of sales of gold and silver. The fact that the two ladies called the business of sale of gold and silver in Bombay, of which they were the owners, as their stridhan is hardly of any consequence. Also, there is nothing to show that the business of sale of gold and silver carried on in Bombay in the past, as a result of which silver bars were acquired, was not duly shown in the books of account. In these circumstances, that statement could not be used to discredit the explanation as to the source of Us. 5,67,000 which was factually correct. Finally, the view that the two ladies could have acquired the high denomination notes from other sources is mere speculation without any evidence. Our attention was, however, drawn to Chunilal Rastogi v. Commissioner of Income-tax 28 ITR 341 and Sovachand Baid v. Commissioner of Income-tax 34 ITR 650 for the proposition that the finding of the Tribunal on this question was a finding of fact and could not for that reason be questioned before us. We readily accept that a finding of fact, of which it could not be said that it was not supported by evidence or was unreasonable, is not open to challenge in proceedings under section 66 of the Income-tax Act. We readily accept that a finding of fact, of which it could not be said that it was not supported by evidence or was unreasonable, is not open to challenge in proceedings under section 66 of the Income-tax Act. But the two cases relied upon are distinguishable because in those cases the explanation about the source of the amount covered by the high denomination notes was not accepted. In this case, once it is accepted that Rs. 3,48,284 were obtained by sale of old coins and silver bars and Rs. 2,50,000 were withdrawn from the shop, the conclusion must be that the assessee has offered a reasonable explanation as to the source of the high denomination notes. In the circumstances, we are of opinion that the finding that Rs. 5,67,000 representing the value of high denomination notes encashed on 18th January 1947 was income from undisclosed sources is not based upon any material before the Tribunal. The second question relates to Rs. 11,939 which Parmanand was allowed to take from the proceeds of the business in the relevant year. The Taxing Authorities and the Tribunal appear to have assumed that Parmanand was a co-owner of the business. This is not correct. The operation of the will dated 25th November 1921 made by Mohanlal, who was the sole surviving coparcener, was not affected by the subsequent adoption of Parmanand Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Ayyar 54 IA 248 : AIR 1927 PC 139, Udhao v. Bhaskar 1946 NLJ 165 : AIR 1946 Nag 203 : ILR 1940 Nag 425 and Mst. Jhunkaribahu v. PJioolchand 1958 MPLJ 513 : AIR 1958 MP 261 . In the last mentioned case, the entire case-law bearing on the point was exhaustively reviewed and it was held that the theory of relation back laid down in Anant Bhikappa v. Shanker Ramchandra 70 IA 232 : AIR 1943 PC 196 should be confined to the facts of that case. It is no doubt true that, under the will, limitations were placed upon the power of the two ladies to deal with the property bequeathed to them but we think that those limitations should be disregarded as repugnant to the nature of the interest devised by the will. The position which emerges is that Parmanand has no present interest in the business carried on in the name of Mohanlal Hargovinddas. The question however is whether the sum of Rs. The position which emerges is that Parmanand has no present interest in the business carried on in the name of Mohanlal Hargovinddas. The question however is whether the sum of Rs. 11,939 taken out of the proceeds of the business by Parmanand for his personal requirements could be allowed as a business expense falling under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. Parmanand disclaimed being an employee of the two ladies for the purpose of supervising the business. There is also no agreement, express or implied, to remunerate him for supervision of the business which he seems to have voluntarily undertaken. All that is said in support of the claim is that the two ladies decided to give him whatever amount he required for his personal expenses without any limit. In our opinion, this decision of the two ladies is attributable to their obligation to maintain Parmanand in pursuance of the second condition mentioned in the agreement dated 28th June 1925 which they made with his father and it does not, by itself, furnish any ground for holding Rs. 11,939 to be an expense either wholly or exclusively for the purpose of the business. In our view, that payment was made to Parmanand upon non-commercial considerations. That being so, it is not allowable as a business expense. In regard to the third question, it may be noted that the assessee did not produce any evidence before the Income-tax Officer to show that its business carried on in the selling agency shop at Gorakhpur was transferred to the "Mohanlal Hargovinddas Charitable Trust". Evidence was, however, allowed to be produced by the Assistant Commissioner who found that the business was not vested in the trustees under the subsequently executed trust deed dated 10th January 1946. The Assistant Commissioner held that mere opening of separate account-books or preparation of bills in the name of the trust or correspondence with the constituents in that name would not show that the business was transferred to the trust and that there was in fact no convincing evidence to prove that income derived from the Gorakhpur business was the income of the trust. This view was affirmed by the Tribunal. Before us, reliance is placed upon the minutes of the meeting of the trustees dated 10th November 1945 whereat the two ladies "decided to give an agency of their Gorakhpur shop". This view was affirmed by the Tribunal. Before us, reliance is placed upon the minutes of the meeting of the trustees dated 10th November 1945 whereat the two ladies "decided to give an agency of their Gorakhpur shop". It is no doubt true that the trustees claimed to have accepted the agency but it does not appear that the decision of the two ladies was carried into effect. If it were otherwise, the ladies would not have failed to incorporate the business as a part of the property in respect of which the deed dated 10th January 1946 was executed in favour of the Mohanlal Hargovinddas Charitable Trust. Further, it is clear that the main and branch shops of the assessee spent money out of the income of this business for "charitable works". It appears to us that the ladies, who were charitably disposed, did want to apply the income from the business of the Gorakhpur shop for charity but they did not vest the business in trust and also retained control over its income to be applied for charity. In the circumstances, we agree with the Tribunal that the income from the business of the Gorakhpur shop was the income of the assessee. Our answers to the questions referred to us are: (1) There was no material to support the finding that Rs. 5,67,000 was income from undisclosed sources. (2) Rs. 11,939 spent by Parmanand for his personal requirements was not allowable as expense incurred for the purpose of business of the assessee. (3) The income from the business of Gorakhpur shop was the income of the assessee and not of the Mohanlal Hargovinddas Charitable Trust. Since the assessee has succeeded on the main point, it will have its costs, which we assess at Rs. 500, from the Department. Appeal allowed