JUDGMENT Shiv Dayal, J. This second appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment on a tenant and for recovery of arrears of rent. The defendant admitted to be the plaintiff's tenant, but did not admit that he was in arrears of rent. The validity of the notice of eviction was challenged. The trial Judge passed a decree for eviction and also for Rs. 30 as arrears of rent. The learned Additional District Judge, Gwalior has maintained the decree for arrears of rent, but has dismissed the plaintiff's suit in respect of ejectment on the ground that a reasonable time was not given to the defendant to vacate. It has been found by both the Courts below that the defendant was in arrears of rent. The lower appellate Court has also held that section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable to this case inasmuch as the tenancy commenced at a time when the Transfer of Property Act or any law corresponding to it was not in force in the then Gwalior State within the territories of which the suit property was situate. The only point raised by Shri Naokar is that the dismissal of the suit is erroneous inasmuch as no notice at all was necessary. This contention must be accepted as it is supported by the observations of their Lordships in the case of Namdeo v. Narmadabai : 1953 SCR 1009 : AIR 1953 SC 228 , where it is laid down that the provisions contained in section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act are not based on any principles of equity, justice and good conscience, but are merely procedural and arbitrary, which do not apply to leases effected at a time when the Transfer of Property Act was not in force. It is also laid down: The cause of action for the suit can arise simultaneously with the presentation of a plaint. It seems that the attention of the first appellate Court was not invited to this pronouncement of the Supreme Court. Shri Naokar tells me that he did, but I do not find any reference in the judgment. Moreover, the notice was issued by the plaintiff on the 24th December 1953 and was received by the defendant on 6th January 1954. He was required to vacate on the 31st January of that year. The suit was instituted on the 12th February. Shri Naokar tells me that he did, but I do not find any reference in the judgment. Moreover, the notice was issued by the plaintiff on the 24th December 1953 and was received by the defendant on 6th January 1954. He was required to vacate on the 31st January of that year. The suit was instituted on the 12th February. It cannot, therefore, be said that "reasonable time" was not given to him to vacate. Further more, the plaintiff stated in paragraph 4 of the plaint that in his notice dated 24th December, 1953, he demanded arrears of rent from the defendant. It was admitted in paragraph 4 of the written statement that the notice was received by the defendant on January 6, 1954. The learned Additional District Judge has observed that since the notice was received on 6th January and the date of ejectment was fixed as 31st January the notice was shorter than one month as required in section 4(a) of the Accommodation Control Act. It seems to me that two things have been mixed up. A notice for ejectment under section 106, Transfer of Property Act must expire with the end of the month of a tenancy and its duration must be at least 15 days. The plaintiff's notice complied with this requirement inasmuch as the tenancy was from month to month according to the Gregorian calendar and it was served on the defendant more than 15 days before the 31st January. As regards notice for the purposes of section 4 of the Accommodation Control Act, all that the plaintiff has to show is (1) that a demand was in fact made in the notice and (2) that the defendant did not pay the arrears within one month of the receipt of the notice. In this case, the notice was received by the defendant on the 6th January and the suit was instituted on February 12, 1964. It was not the defendant's plea that he had paid rent or had tendered it on or before the 6th February. Thus the hurdle of section 4 of the Accommodation Control Act was crossed. In this case, the notice was received by the defendant on the 6th January and the suit was instituted on February 12, 1964. It was not the defendant's plea that he had paid rent or had tendered it on or before the 6th February. Thus the hurdle of section 4 of the Accommodation Control Act was crossed. Section 4(a) does not lay down any duration for the notice; all that is to be seen as a matter of fact is whether the defendant actually failed to pay rent within one month of the receipt of notice, To put it differently: (1) the notice for eviction (even assuming that section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act applied to this case) gave the cause of action for the suit for ejectment; and (2) failure on the part of one defendant to pay arrears of rent within one month removed the impediment to the institution of the suit as provided in section 4(a) of the Accommodation Control Act. As pointed out in Shyamlal v. Umacharan 1960 MPLJ 1002 , section 4 does not furnish to the landlord any additional grounds for ejectment nor are his rights under the Transfer of Property Act enlarged. Section 4 is indeed a disabling provision which creates an impediment to the institution of a suit and is got over only when one of the grounds enumerated in the section itself exists. But as soon as that hurdle is surmounted the rights and liabilities of the parties as regards ejectment have to be determined by applying the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. What section 4 of the Accommodation Control Act bars is the institution of a suit and not the determination of tenancy. In this connection Chhotelal v. Abdullabhai AIR 1952 MB 121, may also be seen. This appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court in so far as it dismissed the plaintiff's suit in respect of ejectment are set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored. The appellant shall get his costs throughout. Appeal allowed