JUDGMENT Gurtu, J. - This second appeal has been referred to a Bench by a learned single Judge of this Court. 2. The Appellant Mahangi was the Defendant in a suit for partition brought by Phailoo Plaintiff No. 1 and Madan Plaintiff No. 2. The Plaintiffs are the maternal grandsons of Sital. The Defendant Mahangi is the son of Moti. Hanuman was the father of Moti and Sital. It appears that Hanuman made a gift or a house, of which partition is sought, to his sons Moti and Sital. Moti died leaving Mahangi as his sale heir and Sital died leaving his widow Payagi and four daughters including Smt. Rama, Smt. Bittan and Smt. Piare. All the three named daughters have sons. Payagi entered into possession of the house jointly with Mahangi and as heir of Sital. The Plaintiffs are the sons of Smt. Rama. Smt. Payagi and all the four daughters of Sital executed a gift deed on 25-11-1946 in respect of the half portion of the house in favour of the Plaintiffs and delivered joint possession to them along with the Defendant Mahangi. The Plaintiffs then filed a suit for partition claiming a half share (Share of Sital). The suit had been defended on various grounds. It was dismissed by the trial Court but decreed on appeal. 3. We are now concerned only with one ground, namely, the plea taken by the Defendant Mahangi that he was in any case entitled to the benefit of S. 4 of the Partition Act. This plea was negatived by the lower appellate court. 4. When this appeal was first listed before us we asked for answers to certain issues which we remitted to the lower appellate court. We may mention that findings on these issues have now come. It has been found that Mahangi and Smt. Payagi were residing together in the house on 25-11-1946 and that Mahangi and Smt. Payagi did not have a common mess or common worship. It has also been found that Phailoo and Madan were not residing in the house in question on 25-11-1946. 5. S. 4 of the Partition Act runs as follows:- 4. It has also been found that Phailoo and Madan were not residing in the house in question on 25-11-1946. 5. S. 4 of the Partition Act runs as follows:- 4. (1) Where a share of a dwelling house belonging to an undivided family has been transferred to a person who is not a member of such family and such transferee sues for partition, the Court shall, if any member of the family being a a Share-holder shall undertake to buy the share of such transferee, make a valuation of such share in such manner as it thinks fit and direct the sale of such share to such share-holder, and may give all necessary and proper directions in that behalf. (2) If in any case described in Sub-section (1) two or more members of the family being such shareholders severally undertake to buy such share, the court shall follow the procedure prescribed by Sub-section (2) of the last foregoing section. 6. It well be observed that in order to attract S. 4, (A) a share of dwelling house belonging to an undivided family, (B) has to be transferred (C) to a person who is not a member of such family, (D) and such transferee must sue for partition. 7. In this case it is no longer in dispute that the dwelling house belonged to an undivided family composed of Payagi the widow and of Mahangi. On the date of the gift to the grand-sons no right in the daughters of Payagi (by Sital) had accrued, because Payagi was still alive and they merely joined because all of them or some of them, according to the provisions of the Hindu Law, would have been entitled to hold daughter's estates after the death of Payagi. The undivided family QUA the dwelling house did not comprise these daughters. It is not even clear as to where they were residing. 8. It is not necessary to constitute an undivided family QUA the dwelling house that there should be a common worship. It is now well-settled that the word "family" as used in S. 4 ought to be given a liberal and comprehensive meaning and it includes a group of persons related in blood who live in one house under one head of management. It is now well-settled that the word "family" as used in S. 4 ought to be given a liberal and comprehensive meaning and it includes a group of persons related in blood who live in one house under one head of management. It is not restricted to a body of persons who can trace their descent from a common ancestor and it is not necessary for the members to constitute an undivided family that they should constantly reside in the dwelling house, nor is it necessary that they should be joint in mess. It is sufficient if the members of the family are undivided QUA the dwelling house which they own and it is the ownership of the dwelling house and not the actual occupation which brings the operation of the section into play, and the object of the section is to prevent the transferee of a member of a family who is an outsider from forcing his way into a dwelling house in which other members of his transferor's family have a right to live. See Sultan Begam v. Debi Prasad 5 ALJ 352 and Nil Kamal Bhattacharjya and Another Vs. Kamakshya Charan Bhattacharjya and Another, AIR 1928 Cal 539 and Salimullah v. Faqir Ullah 1947 AWR (HC) 245. 9. In this case Payagi was the widow of Sital who was related in blood with Mahangi, both being the son or descendant of Hanuman. Under the Hindu Law the wife acquires the same Gotra as that of her husband, and she is considered to be Ardhangani (half of the body of her husband) and thus by marriage relationship, it could be said that she became a member of the same family as the Defendant Mahangi. (As pointed out in Salim Ullah v. Faqir Ullah 1947 AWR (HC) 245) the word "family" is a word of a most wide and flexible description, and as also pointed out there was nothing in the Partition Act to warrant the suggestion that the term "family" was intended to be used in a narrow or restricted sense and that it was confined to a body of persons who could trace their origin or descent from a common ancestor. It was even doubted whether relationship by blood is absolutely necessary. 10. But the real dispute before us (was not that this was not the dwelling house belonging to the undivided family of Mahangi. It was even doubted whether relationship by blood is absolutely necessary. 10. But the real dispute before us (was not that this was not the dwelling house belonging to the undivided family of Mahangi. Rather the dispute) is whether Phailoo and Madan were strangers. On behalf of the Plaintiffs it is said that Phailoo and Madan, being daughter's sons of Payagi and Sital, are members of the undivided family and therefore are not strangers. On the other hand, on behalf of the Defendant the contention is that a transferee can only be said to be a member of the undivided family QUA the dwelling house of he has an interest in the dwelling house on the date of the transfer and if he has no such interest in the dwelling house, then, even though he may be related by blood to the undivided family, he would still be a stranger. The contention on behalf of the Defendant is that S. 4 requires, in order that a transferee may not be considered to be a stranger, that he be a person who is a member of 'such' family; it is contended that the word 'such' relates back to the words "undivided family" and that the true construction of S. 4 is that if a transferee is one of the owning members of the undivided family of the dwelling house at the date of the transfer, then alone he would not be considered to be a stranger. 11. The contention advanced on behalf of the Defendant has been fully accepted in Sheodhar Prasad Singh and Others Vs. Kishun Prasad Singh and Others, AIR 1941 Patna 4 . In that case the Defendant 7 and 9 the transferees from one of the co-owning members of the undivided family were descended from the same remote common ance for and it was said that they were therefore also members of the undivided family even though at the date of the transfer they were not co-owners. It was argued that the words "such, family" in S. 4 meant no more than the family already referred to in that section-without the qualification "undivided". It was argued that the words "such, family" in S. 4 meant no more than the family already referred to in that section-without the qualification "undivided". The learned Judge pointed out that this interpretation was opposed to the plain grammatical meaning of the section and also to the logic of the situation; and that one could understand why the section should not apply where one out of say three members of an "undivided family" within the meaning of the section transfers his share to one or the other of two, for in such a case the third member can have no possible reason for saying that he should be a preferential purchaser. But where the transfer is to a person who is not a member of the undivided family, the remaining members will have a grievance if they are required to share the undivided house with a person brought in against their will or without their consent; and that it was for this reason the law enabled them to buy the transferee out. The learned Judge observed that although the aforesaid Defendant No. 7 was descended from Khushi Narain, he could not accept the contention that he was a member of "such family" within the meaning of the section. 12. This point of view was accepted in the case of Jaffar Shah v. Smt. BIBI Gulla AIR 1943 Pesh. 79. In that case the partition was sought by Smt. Bibi Gulla who was the wife of Mohammad Shah. She had been given in dower 8/40th share in the house in question at the time of her marriage. The house was at the date of marriage the joint property of Mohd. Shah and his brothers and sisters. There was some litigation regarding the said dower share. Eventually, it was decided by compromise that she had a 7/40th share in the undivided house by way of dower. When she sought partition of this share, it was pleaded by the Defendants that she was not a member of the undivided family at the time of the transfer to her share in the undivided house. This plea was accepted. The learned Judge observed that the words "undivided family" in S. 4 should not be confused with the generic term "family" and that the term "undivided family" meant undivided QUA the dwelling house in question. This plea was accepted. The learned Judge observed that the words "undivided family" in S. 4 should not be confused with the generic term "family" and that the term "undivided family" meant undivided QUA the dwelling house in question. Approving of Dhavle, J.'s judgment in Sheodhar Prasad Singh and Others Vs. Kishun Prasad Singh and Others, AIR 1941 Patna 4 the learned Judge came to the conclusion that Smt. Bibi Gulla was a stranger at the date of the transfer to her by way of dower and did not belong to the undivided family consisting of her husband Mohammad Shah and his brothers. The benefit of S. 4 of the Partition Act was therefore allowed by the learned 13. In Salim Ullah v. Faqir Ullah 1947 AWR (HC) 245, the Plaintiffs the transferees were original owners of the dwelling house in question more directly than the Defendants, but it was the Defendants who had been allotted the house at some prior partition. The learned Judge observed that the quondam character of the relationship of the Plaintiffs could not be taken into consideration. 14. In Bhuban Mohan Guha and Another Vs. Brojendra Chandra Ghose and Others, AIR 1941 Cal 311 , the transferees were members of the family of the person to which the property originally belonged, a man by the name of Ram Kamal Guha. He, however, sold the same to his cousin Golak Nath Guha. On the death of Golak Nath, the property was inherited in equal shares by Golak's two sons Kashi and Harish. In the year 1309 B.S. Harish sold his share of the property to the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff obtained possession of at least a portion of the property and then instituted a suit for partition. The Defendants in the action, the other members of the undivided family QUA the house claimed the benefit of S. 4 of the Partition Act. It was observed that in 1309 B.S. the particular dwelling house belonged to the undivided family consisting of Kashi and Harish and that of that family neither the Plaintiff nor the husband of Defendant No. 1 (the Vendees) were members and that therefore at the time of the purchase the second requirement of S. 4 was satisfied. It will be observed that the fact that the Plaintiff was in possession on the date of the suit did not avail the Plaintiff. It will be observed that the fact that the Plaintiff was in possession on the date of the suit did not avail the Plaintiff. It will be seen that the Plaintiff was also related to Kashi and Harish who were the descendants of Golak Nath Guha for Ram Kamal Guha was the cousin of Golak Nath Guha. The relationship, however, did not suffice. 15. In Nil Kamal Bhattacharjya and Another Vs. Kamakshya Charan Bhattacharjya and Another, AIR 1928 Cal 539 the Plaintiff transferee was a great-grand-son of Kebal Krishna and the Defendant co-sharer who had sold a part of his share to the Plaintiff was a descendant of Kamalakanta brother of Kebal Krishna. The other Defendants who along with the transferring Defendant constituted the undivided family QUA the dwelling house were also descended from Kamalakanta. There was thus a relationship of the Plaintiff with all the Defendants, constituting the undivided family QUA the dwelling house, although it was through the common ancestor Chardra Sekhar and not directly through any of the defendants. The Plaintiff was considered to be an outsider. The learned Judge observed that the Plaintiff had no right to live in the house apart from the light under the purchase and this clearly made the Plaintiff a stranger to the family. It would therefore appear that a right to live in the house apart from the right created by the transfer, was taken to be the test whereby a non-stranger is distinguished from a stranger. 16. It seems to me that an interpretation which ignores the word "such" occurring before the word "family" cannot be correct interpretation. The word "such" clearly relates back to the undivided family to whom the dwelling house belongs and therefore the words "a person who is not a member" mean a person who is not one of the members who have a right in the dwelling house and constitute the undivided family on the date of the transfer QUA the dwelling house. S. 4 aims at preventing the introduction of outsiders into an undivided family dwelling home. S. 4 aims at preventing the introduction of outsiders into an undivided family dwelling home. A relation with whom a member of the undivided family has not already been living as is the case here may be as obnoxious to the members of the undivided family as a complete stranger, and the benefit which the section is intended to bestow, namely, to assure a peaceful existence to the members of the undivided family QUA the dwelling house and to enable them to avoid living with those with whom they have not been living all the time would not accrue if it were held that a member of such a family meant a mere member whether he had a previous right to live or not to live before the transfer in his favour. On the whole therefore I am of the view that the Defendant was entitled to the benefit of S. 4 of he Partition Act. Dwivedi, J. 17. I agree to the order proposed by my learned brother, I would however prefer to rest my opinion on a narrower ground. When this appeal was first heard by us, we framed some issues and remitted them to the lower appellate court for findings. One of the issues was whether the Plaintiffs were residing in the disputed house on November 25, 1946, and if so, with whom and since when. The finding of the lower appellate court is that they were not residing in the disputed house on the said date. It is also apparent from the discussion on this issue that the lower appellate court's view is that they have never resided in the house. 18. The Plaintiffs have not challenged this finding and the view of the lower appellate court. The express and implied findings of the lower appellate court inevitably lead to the result that the Plaintiffs are not members of the undivided family of the Defendant and Mst. Payagi, the donor, for it has been held in the several cases that a family includes a group of persons related in blood, who live in one house under one head or management. 19. Payagi, the donor, for it has been held in the several cases that a family includes a group of persons related in blood, who live in one house under one head or management. 19. By The Court - We partly allow this appeal, set aside that part of the learned Judge's order which relates to a partition by metes and bound of the Plaintiff's share and in substitution thereof we direct that the share transferred to the Plaintiffs shall be sold to the Defendant Mahangi who should undertake to buy the share of the transferee upon a valuation of such share being made in such manner as the Civil Judge thinks fit. The Civil Judge will give all necessary ancillary orders in this regard. Parties will bear their own costs.