JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. This is a petition by the hereditary trustees of a Devaswom, to quash an award made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which may be referred to briefly as the 'Act.' The complaint of the petitioners is, that as hereditary trustees, they were not served with notice under Section 9(3) of the Act, and that the award is therefore bad and has to be set aside. The notice under Section 9(3) was issued by the Collector to the Executive Officer of the Devaswom, appointed under a scheme framed pursuant to the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926. Clause 7 of the Scheme provided inter alia, that "the Executive Officer shall represent the temple (Devaswom) in all legal proceedings." Decided cases under Section 9(3) have made it clear, that unless the omission of the Collector to serve notice on any of the parties mentioned in Section 9(3) of the Act is wilful, or fraudulent, or perverse, it does not vitiate the award. The petitioners have not alleged in the affidavit, that the Collector had notice that the petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest are the hereditary trustees of the Devaswom. The respondents' counter affidavit has set out facts to show, that the Collector had bona fide believed, that the Executive Officer could represent the Devaswom in these proceedings as well. The learned counsel for the petitioners invited my attention to a copy, which he had in his file, of what purports to be a notification issued under Section 5A of the Act, and in which, there is a reference to one Krishnan Mannadiar as registered holder and he contended, that the omission to issue notice to him or to his successors-in-interest, was sufficient to constitute a violation of Section 9(3) of the Act. These facts were not set out in the affidavit in support of the petition, and it is not known, what answer the respondents would have had to make, concerning them. 2. These facts were not set out in the affidavit in support of the petition, and it is not known, what answer the respondents would have had to make, concerning them. 2. Section 9(3) provides, that "the Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on the occupier (if any) of such land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested herein, or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, as reside or have agents authorised to receive service on their behalf, within the revenue district in which the land is situate." Assuming that the Collector did not serve notice on Krishnan Mannadiar or any of his successors-in-interest, the counter affidavit shows, that the Collector bona fide believed, that the Executive Officer was entitled to act for the Devaswom, within the meaning of Section 9(3) and if this was so, there has been sufficient compliance with the provisions of that Section. But it was contended for the petitioners, that clause 7 of the scheme empowers the Executive Officer to represent the Devaswom only "in all legal proceedings" and that proceedings under the Act are not such proceedings. Reliance was placed on Abboy Naidu v Kaniappa (AIR 1929 Madras 175) where the words 'legal proceedings' occurring in Section 19 of the Indian Penal Code came up for construction, in relation to the definition of a 'Judge.' It was ruled, that the President of a Local Government Board could not be deemed to be a Judge within the meaning of Section 19, as he did not exercise any judicial function in "any legal proceeding." I am not prepared to lay down, that a provision in a scheme like the one before me, should be construed in the same manner as Section 19, I. P. C. has been interpreted. This expression, which finds a place in a document should be understood, as a common man would read or understand it. However this be, in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary the words 'legal proceedings' have been defined to mean "any civil or criminal proceeding or inquiry in which evidence is, or may be, given." It cannot be disputed that under the provisions of this Act, and in pursuance of Section 9(3), when objection is raised before the Collector, he is competent to receive evidence and come to a conclusion upon it. I therefore hold, that the words 'legal proceedings' occurring in clause 7, are wide enough to take in proceedings under the Act; if so, the Executive Authority appointed under the scheme is fully competent to represent the Devaswom. In any event, the Collector must be deemed to have acted bona fide in taking that view. 3. The learned counsel drew my attention to the decision in Laxmanrao Kristrao v Provincial Government of Bombay (AIR 1950 Bombay 334) where Chagla C. J. laid down, that while Section 9(3) makes it mandatory, that notice must issue to the occupant of the property, the omission to issue notice to a person interested is not fatal, unless it is wilful or fraudulent or perverse. On the facts, that case is distinguishable because the plaintiff had a separate interest which ought to have been represented. Here, admittedly, the property belongs to the Devaswom and the petitioners do not claim any interest apart from the Devaswom. The question is only, who can represent it. ' 4. I come to the conclusion, that the Collector bona fide believed the Executive Authority to be entitled to represent the Devaswom within the meaning of Section 9(3) and nothing having been stated in the affidavit, or established in the case, to make out that the Collector acted wilfully or fraudulently or perversely in omitting to issue notice to the petitioners, I hold, that the award cannot be quashed. The petition is therefore dismissed, but I make no order as to costs.