JUDGMENT M.A. Ansari, C.J. 1. This appeal is by the writ petitioner, whose prayer to vacate the orders by the Board of Revenue, dated Madras, November 23, 1955, and by the Government of Madras dated April 24, 1956, has been disallowed by a learned Judge of this Court. The circumstances culminating in the writ petition, can be briefly stated. 2. The office of the Headman and Village Munsiff of Sivapuram Amsom had to be filled, which the appellant had also applied to be nominated to, on the grounds of his being the nephew of the last incumbent and of his having other necessary prescribed qualifications. He had further claimed to have, some time earlier, acted as Adhikari to be a permanent resident of the Amsom, and to be paying land revenue. Others had applied as well, including the 3rd respondent to this appeal; and the appointing authority, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kozhikode, selected the appellant to be the Adhikari, by order of January 23, 1955. The other claimants appealed, and the Appellate authority, the Collector of Malabar, had, by his order dated April 19,1955, confirmed the appointment. The 3rd respondent pressed his claim before the Board of Revenue, and his petition for this purpose was filed on July 18, 1955. 3. It is common ground now that both the appointment as well as the conferment orders, were not covered by the Madras Hereditary Village Officers Act, 3 of 1895, though the writ petition had originally claimed them to be so governed, and that the appellate order was covered by the Board's Standing O.156(3). It is further admitted that at the time the revision petition against the appellate order was filed, there were no provisions authorising such a revision to the Board. Provisions later, under B. S. O. 156A, had been made through the notification of October 10, 1955. We would quote the whole of the new Order. The order reads thus : "156-A. -- Powers of revision.- 1. Provisions later, under B. S. O. 156A, had been made through the notification of October 10, 1955. We would quote the whole of the new Order. The order reads thus : "156-A. -- Powers of revision.- 1. Notwithstanding anything contained in Order No. 156(3) and (4), the Government in respect of an order passed by the Board of Revenue and the Board of Revenue in respect of an order passed by any authority subordinate to it, may either suo motu or on the application of an aggrieved party and for reasons to be recorded in writing, annul, modify, reverse or remit for reconsideration such order on any of the following grounds, namely :-- (i) that the order is vitiated by illegality, material irregularity, obvious error resulting in miscarriage of justice or want of jurisdiction; or (ii) that the Board of Revenue or any authority subordinate to it, as the case may be has acted in contravention of any existing instructions on the subject or had failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it; or (iii) that a. punishment not contemplated in the rules is imposed on a Village Officer, for example, debarment from future appointment permanently or for a specified period; or (iv) that the punishment imposed on a Village Officer is out of proportion to the gravity of the offence: Provided that this Standing Order shall apply only to permanent appointment or punishment of Village Headman and Karnam : Provided further that no order prejudicial to any party shall be passed unless he has had a reasonable opportunity of making his representations. 2. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions or elsewhere the Government or the Board of Revenue, as the case may be, shall have power to stay the execution or suspend the operation of any order pending the exercise of the powers under this Standing Order. 3. An application which does not satisfy any of the grounds specified in items (i) to (iv) of clause (1), or which is made more than sixty days after the date of receipt of the order against which it is made shall be rejected in limine. 4. 3. An application which does not satisfy any of the grounds specified in items (i) to (iv) of clause (1), or which is made more than sixty days after the date of receipt of the order against which it is made shall be rejected in limine. 4. Applications for revision which were pending before the Board of Revenue or the Government, as the case may be, on the 17th January 1955, or which were preferred before the date of issue of this Standing Order and after the 16th January 1955, shall be deemed to have been made under this Standing Order : Provided, however, that nothing contained in the Standing Order shall affect the finality of any order passed by the Board of Revenue or the Government in any application for revision, before the date of issue of the Standing Order." It is clear that B. S. O. 156A(4) make the new provisions retroactive, and this retroactivity is challenged in this appeal. But, to continue the narration of facts, the Board set aside the appellant's appointment orders, and directed the 3rd respondent to be appointed to the office. This order is dated November 23, 1955, was passed inspite of the appellant's objection about the Board's having no jurisdiction to interfere with the Collector's order. The appellant has repeated C the objection in the writ petition, and had also attacked before the Government the rejection of his claim, by another petition, which was rejected. This rejection order is dated April 24, 1956, and has been included in the complaint of being ultra vires. As already mentioned, the learned Judge of this Court has not accepted the arguments urged for vacating the aforesaid orders. The appellant, after abandoning the plea of the appointments in the case being regulated by the Madras Hereditary Village Officers Act, 3 of 1895, had argued before him that there being no provision for appeal or revision against the order of the Collector, the interference in the case by the Board, was without jurisdiction ; but the learned Judge has rejected the argument on the ground of the Board having been vested with the power under B. S. O. 156A(4) to entertain revision against the Collector's order, and the exercise of the power by the Board in the case was legal. The reason pressed before us for allowing the appeal, is slightly different; for the appellant's learned Advocate had pressed the argument that the retroactive operation given to the Board under B. S. O. 156A, was beyond the power of the enacting authority, and, therefore, conferred no jurisdiction on the Board, in whose exercise the Collector's order in the case could be vacated. For proper appreciation of this argument, it becomes necessary to state the circumstances, under which B. S. O. 156A appears to have been promulgated. 4. The situation arising from the orders made by the Collectors in exercise of the Madras Hereditary Village Officers Act, 3 of 1895, being final, was considered in Nagarathnammal v. Ibrahim Saheb (1955-11 MLJ 49) and the decision of the Full Bench was given on December 3, 1954. It was firstly held that, where a statute, or rules framed thereunder, vest a discretion in the Officer subordinate to the Government, then the discretion must be exercised by the Officer, cannot be exercised by the Government, and that the power of superintendence, which the Government may claim, cannot be invoked to justify H interference with the statutory discretion of its subordinate Officers. With this part of the decision we are not concerned in this case; but Balakrishna Iyer J. who delivered the judgment of the Bench, while observing that it was open to the Board of Revenue to provide the rules and act in the nature of a supervisory authority over subordinate Revenue Collectors, has further held that, where a rule provided for any specific matter when an individual case came up before the Board, it would not be open to the Board to decide that case in any manner it thinks fit in contravention of the existing rule. The relevant part of the judgment by the learned Judge reads as follows: ''But even with reference to matters not governed by statutory provisions or rules but governed only by the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue, the passage we have extracted above is liable to be misunderstood. The relevant part of the judgment by the learned Judge reads as follows: ''But even with reference to matters not governed by statutory provisions or rules but governed only by the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue, the passage we have extracted above is liable to be misunderstood. We are unable to subscribe to the view that where a rule already exists and provides for any specific matter, still when in individual case comes up before the Board, it is open to the Board, notwithstanding the existence of that rule, to decide that cases in any manner it thinks fit, even in contravention of the existing rule. In other words the Board cannot ignore the existing rule by treating the order made in that particular case as an amendment of the rule. That the Government or the Board has the power to amend the rule, B should make no difference, both are bound to dispose of the matters that come up before them in accordance with the rules at the time in force on the subject. We doubt whether the learned Judges anticipated that such a construction would be placed on their observations. We only want to make it clear that such a construction would not be right. The Board possesses both the power to frame rules and the power to pass orders in individual cases. But when a case comes up, for which provision already exists under the rules in force, that case must be disposed of in accordance with the rules. No doubt, it is open to the Board to revise or amend the rules it has framed. But till the rules are revised or amended, the existing rules must be honoured and given effect to. We wish to emphasise the position that the decision in any given case must be in accordance with the rules in force on the date of the decision. Otherwise, the difference between what may be by way of analogy called legislative (rule-making functions of the Board) and its judicial and quasi judicial functions, would be blurred and the door thrown open to charges of arbitraiiness. Otherwise, the difference between what may be by way of analogy called legislative (rule-making functions of the Board) and its judicial and quasi judicial functions, would be blurred and the door thrown open to charges of arbitraiiness. What we have said about the Board also applies to the Government." This judgment was followed by a decision of another learned Judge of the same Court in Writ Petition No. 609/1953, where the aforesaid observations of the Full Bench concerning the non-hereditary Village Officers' appointment, were treated to be binding, and the writ petition was allowed. This decision is dated January 17, 1955 and it is clear that the respondent's petition against the appellant's p appointment in the Board of Revenue on July 18, 1955, was contrary to the existing judicial decisions. The B. S. O. 156A was promulgated through notification of October 10, 1955; and by B. S. O. 156A(4), retroactive operation has been given to that order. In these circumstances, the question arising for decision in this appeal, is how far the aforesaid retroactivity is intra vires ? 5. We respectfully agree with the learned Judge of the Madras High Court that the Judicial function of an executive authority should not be confused with its legislative power; for, the exercise of the former is subject to the conditions, which cannot be applied when the other is being used. The distinction between the two has been drawn by Justice Homes in Prentis v Atlantic Coast Line Company (211 US 210) in these words:- "A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislature on the other hand, looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its powers." Therefore, whenever an administrative body changes existing conditions by a new rule to be applied to all or to some subject to its powers, the exercise would be legislative, and the exercise of the power is circumscribed by several conditions. One is that the power must be delegated to the executive and this is amply borne out by the following observation by Mukherjea C. J., in Ram Jawaya v State of Punjab ( AIR 1955 SC 549 at p. 556) :-- "The Indian Constitution has not indeed recognised the doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute rigidity, but the functions of the different parts or branches of the Government have been sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can very well be said that our Constitution does not contemplate assumption by one organ or part of the State, of functions that essentially belong to another. The executive indeed can exercise the powers of departmental or subordinate legislation when such powers are delegated to it by the legislature." 6. The next is that the delegated power of legislation must be canalized, and should not be unconfined and vagrant. The third is that giving retroactive operation to a rule, is an insignia of plenary powers; and the instrument conferring the authority to legislate should, expressly or by necessary implication, authorise use of such a power to legislate. The appellant's learned advocate in support of the last proposition, has relied on a number of decisions to show that delegated authorities, in the absence of express authorisation, cannot frame rules with retroactive operation. In Stewart v Brojandrakishore (AIR 1939 Cal. 628) Narasinga Rau J., has held that unless the parent Act itself clearly authorise the issue of a notification with retrospective effect, it must be presumed that such a notification is forbidden. Bhargava J, in Modi Food Products v Commissioner of Sales Tax ( AIR 1956 All. 35 ) has observed that a legislature can certainly give retrospective effect to a piece of legislation passed by it, but an executive Government, exercising subordinate and delegated legislative powers, cannot make legislation retrospective in effect, unless that power is expressly conferred by the enactment. In Bohgalal v Mohanlal ( AIR 1957 Bom. 130 ) it has been held that the legislature could not have been intended to press the State Government to issue a notification, which if retrospective effect was given to it, would seriously undermine the social and economic life of the people. In Bohgalal v Mohanlal ( AIR 1957 Bom. 130 ) it has been held that the legislature could not have been intended to press the State Government to issue a notification, which if retrospective effect was given to it, would seriously undermine the social and economic life of the people. Similarly in Elizabeth Antony v George ( 1957 KLT 306 = 1957 KLJ 54 ) a learned Judge of this Court has held that the subordinate delegated authority, unless and until the power is expressly conferred on it by the parent enactment, does not get such a power. The notification with retrospective operation in Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1959 Punjab 453) was held invalid due to the absence in the parent Act of power to issue notification with retroactive force. The proposition, therefore is well settled and apparently flows from the rule that delegation of authority to legislate should be defined in order to escape its being treated as vagrant. 7. The learned Government Pleader has sought to distinguish the aforesaid cases on the ground of their dealing with the power of framing statutory rules, and not being applicable to orders made in exercise of administrative powers and concerning administrative matters. The argument, we are afraid, is without force. It is not disputed that modern opinion looks with approbation on the executive, legislative and judicial powers being vested in one administrative authority ; yet, exercise of each power is governed by its own rules. Thus the exercise of the quasi judicial power, though for administrative purposes, is circumscribed by conditions; and one such condition is that the inquiry, declaration, investigation, or enforcement must be according to existing rules. It follows that a petition seeking exercise of revisory powers, is bad due to the absence of any rule then authorising use of such a power, and the defect cannot be cured by exercise of judicial or administrative power. It further follows that to legalise such a petition the administrative authority must have delegated enact-ing power to frame rules with retrospective operation, otherwise the effort would be futile. Such is the inevitable consequence of our Constitution having assigned enacting power to the legislature. It further follows that to legalise such a petition the administrative authority must have delegated enact-ing power to frame rules with retrospective operation, otherwise the effort would be futile. Such is the inevitable consequence of our Constitution having assigned enacting power to the legislature. We do not hold that framing rules with retrospective operation in administrative matters, cannot be done by the Revenue Board ; but we do think that any subsequent validation of what, at its inception be bad, amounts to exercise of legislative power with retroactive operation, and to exercise it, the Board, according to the decisions referred to, must have express authorisation. In other words, we hold that delegated legislative power is required, with retroactive operation, to save acts invoking administrative jurisdiction as well; and neither quasi judicial nor administrative power can confer validation on what be originally void. Therefore, the authorisation essential to save B S. O. 156A(4), must be shown, and the plea of its being on administrative matters, would not save it. 8. Now, coming to the facts of the case, the position is this. According to the law declared by a properly constituted court, the orders by the Collectors, when appointing persons to hereditary nonstatutory Village Officers, were final, because of the absence of any rule conferring revisory powers on the Board, and any effort to get them varied would be asking exercise of what would be arbitrary power. That decision was given in December, 1954; and inspite of such a pronouncement, the third respondent had filed a revision petition in July, 1955. That revision petition was, therefore, legally bad, and B. S. O. 156 A (4) tries to save it by providing the filing to be deemed to be under B. S. O. 156 A. This, in our opinion, amounts to subsequent validation, because the notification for the order was issued in October, 1955, and would be proper only when made in exercise of the authority to enact with retroactive forces The learned Government Pleader has not drawn our attention to any such authority, and it follows that B. S. O. 156 A (4) is ultra vires. We further think that the form, in which the impugned rule been framed, makes no difference; for, B. S. O. 156A(4) provides for a legal fiction, and the power to create such a fiction is essentially legislative. We further think that the form, in which the impugned rule been framed, makes no difference; for, B. S. O. 156A(4) provides for a legal fiction, and the power to create such a fiction is essentially legislative. Therefore, a quasi judicial order has been vacated in exercise of quasi judicial powers, which the authority did not legally possess, when the orders vacated were passed. This has been done in exercise of power later conferred, and that conferring is not shown to our satisfaction to be justified legally. 9. The third respondent's learned advocate has argued that a party, to be entitled to the benefit of Article 226, must not only raise before the lower tribunal the objection to its jurisdiction, but must further insist on its being adjudicated -upon. In support of this position, he relies on the observation of Chagla C. J., in G. M. T. Society v. Bombay State ( AIR 1954 Bom. 202 ). We do not think the passage relied upon supports the argument that the party aggrieved must insist on this objection to the jurisdiction being decided upon. We feel that the objection of a party not being deligent, is fully met if the party has fairly raised the question of jurisdiction before the lower tribunal; for, then, it cannot be said that, armed with a plea, the party had allowed the tribunal to adjudicate, nor the omission in such a case can fairly be said to be of the party. 10. The next objection is about the appellant's being precluded due to his having filed the petition to the Government under the very provision, which he challenges. We think filing the aforesaid petition, is to be attributed to the appellant's complying with the well known rule of exhausting all the reliefs before administrative authorities, before invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226, and the appellant has not become disentitled to relief under the Article. 11. It, therefore, follows that the appeal is allowed, and the orders of the Board of Revenue of November 23, 1955, and of the Government of April 24, 1956, are vacated. The writ petition is accordingly granted with costs, one set against the third respondent.