JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. The plaintiff in a suit for recovery of a piece of immovable property, with past and future profits, which has been allowed by the learned District Munsiff of Palghat, but dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge on appeal has preferred this Second Appeal. 2. The suit property belonged to Muttathil tarwad. There were three tavazhies in the tarwad. For purposes of convenient management and enjoyment of the properties�, the three tavazhis entered into an arrangement in 1896 by a document called Nischayapathram or Karar�, under the terms of which the suit property came to the possession of the tavazhi of Padmanabha Menon. The plaintiff was born subsequently in that tavazhi, which will be referred to hereinafter as the plaintiff's tavazhi. Ramakrishan Iyer, the father of defendants I and 2, obtained a decree against Padmanabha Menon in Small Cause Suit No. 1347 of 1907, attached the suit property, brought it to sale in execution and purchased it himself on 7-9-1914. Padmanabha Menon having died, the plaintiff's maternal grandmother, mother and sisters were impleaded to represent the plaintiff's tavazhi before the sale in execution took place. The sale was duly confirmed on 9-10-1914. Ext. B1 is the sale certificate issued to the said Ramakrishna Iyer. Thereafter, Ramakrishna Iyer instituted a suit for possession of the suit property against the plaintiff's tavazhi and their lessee. The plaintiff's tavazhi contended in that suit that they had no saleable interest in the property under the Nischayapathram of 1896, and therefore the plaintiff did not get any right in the property by virtue of his court-purchase so as to entitle him to maintain an action for recovery of the property. The case went up in Second Appeal before the High Court of Madras whose judgment is proved in this case as Ext. A2, and is reported in Damodara Menon v Ramakrishna Iyer (A. I. R. 1925 Madras 624) It was held therein: Even granting for arguments sake that Ext. 1(Nischayapathram or Karar) evidence a maintenance arrangement, that would not prevent the plaintiff from claiming the possession of the properties under Ext. A (sale certificate). In the case of an ordinary maintenance arrangement, under which property is placed in the possession of the maintenance holder a person obtaining a decree against him can proceed against the interest of the maintenance holder in the property. The arrangement under the Karar Ext. A (sale certificate). In the case of an ordinary maintenance arrangement, under which property is placed in the possession of the maintenance holder a person obtaining a decree against him can proceed against the interest of the maintenance holder in the property. The arrangement under the Karar Ext. 1 can be varied, by a subsequent arrangement between the members of all the tavazhis. But solong as the arrangement under the Karar is in force the right of the tavazhi under the Karar is alienable. It is quite open to all the members of all the tvazhi to put an end to the Karar, in which case an alience of the right of the tavazhi would have delivered up possession of the property alienated as the alienor's interest in it has ceased. The contention that there is no saleable or transferable interest in the Karar is not sustainable. That suit was therefore decreed and in execution thereof Ramakrishna Iyer reduced the property to his actual possession. 3. In 1933, some members of Muttathil tarwad instituted a suit for partition of the tarward treating the Nischayapathram of 1896 as a maintenance arrangement and ignoring the court sale in favour of Ramakrishna Iyer. The plaintiff's tavazhi was impleaded as defendants 16 to 24, the plaintiff being the 17th defendant and the present appellant, his sister, being the 18th defendant in that suit. Ramakrishan Iyer, the auction purchaser, was impleaded as the 63rd defendant. The judgment of the trial court in that case is proved here as Ext. B3. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the arrangement of 1896 amounted to an outright partition and in that view dismissed the suit. Defendants 25 to 50 appealed to the District Judge, Calicut whose judgment is Ext. A8 in this case. The learned District Judge affirmed the finding that the document of 1896 was a partition and not a mere maintenance arrangement. He however, gave a decree for partition of the properties which were left in common for all the tavazhis by the document of 1896. Defendants 25 to 50 carried the matter in Second Appeal before the High Court of Madras, whose decree is proved as Ext. He however, gave a decree for partition of the properties which were left in common for all the tavazhis by the document of 1896. Defendants 25 to 50 carried the matter in Second Appeal before the High Court of Madras, whose decree is proved as Ext. B 6 in this case, and judgment reported in Ammalu Amma v Vasu Menon (A. I. R. 1944 Madras 108) The High Court found the Nischayapathram of 1896 to be only a maintenance arrangement not amounting to a partition and therefore passed a preliminary decree for partition of all the properties involved in that suit. The final decree in that case is Ext. A1 dated 11-4-1949 as per which the suit property was allotted to the plaintiff's tavazhi. It appears that the plaintiff's tavazhi did not seek to execute that decree. On the other hand, the plaintiff, as representative of his tavazhi, has, in the circumstances mentioned above, instituted this suit for recovery of possession of the suit property with past and future mesne profits from defendants 1 and 2 who are the sons and heirs of Ramakrishna Iyer and the3rd defendant who is a lessee of the property under them. 4. The defendants 1 and 2 contended that the Nischayapathram of 1896 was an outright partition,and therefore Padmanabha Menon's tavazhi got absolute right in the suit property which passed to their father, Ramakrishna Iyer, under the court sale of 1914. They and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as absolute owners in their own right for well over 12 years before the institution of this suit and therefore the suit as barred by adverse possession and limitation. Ramakrishna Iyer died before the institution of the Second Appeal which gave rise to Ext. B6 decree, and therefore, so far as these defendants are concerned, the final decision in that suit was Ext. A8, the decision of the District Court which declared the Nischayapathram of 1896 to be an outright partition of the tarwad and that was res judicata in the present suit. Their further contention was that if the decision in Ext. B6 is found to be binding on the defendants the plaintiff's right to recover the property lay in execution of that decree and a suit for the purpose, like the instant one, was barred by Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. 5. Their further contention was that if the decision in Ext. B6 is found to be binding on the defendants the plaintiff's right to recover the property lay in execution of that decree and a suit for the purpose, like the instant one, was barred by Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. 5. The learned District Munsiff repelled all the contentions of the defendants and decreed the suit in toto. The defendants appealed to the Sub-Court, Palaghat, and the learned Subordinate Judge held that if the decision in Ext. A8 had to be treated as final so far as Ramakrishna Iyer was concerned, then the rule of res judicata might operate against the present plaintiff; but since Ramakrishna Iyer had no other valid plea in answer to the suit than the plea of partition by the Nischyapathram of 1896 which was urged by the contesting members of the tarwad, the decision in Second Appeal in the suit and the final decree which followed the same, are binding on defendants 1 and 2 as per Explanation VI to Schedule 11, C. P. C.; the plaintiff was entitled to execute the final decree against defendants 1 and 2 ; and that therefore this suit was not maintainable by reason of Section 47 C. P. C. The Second Appeal is by the plaintiff. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that Section 47 C. P. is no bar to the present suit and as such, as per the finding of the court below, he is entitled to a decree in this case. According to him, the plaintiff in this case having been the 17th defendant, and Ramakrishna Iyer the 63rd defendant in the prior suit were on the same array of parties in that suit. In the appeal also they both were in the array of respondents. Having thus been in the same array of parties to the suit�, and as such the bar of Section 47 has no application to the instant case. This contention cannot be accepted, The final decree in the prior suit allotted the suit property to the plaintiff's tavazhi being defendants 16 to 24 therein. That property was in the possession of the 63rd defendant who claimed it adversely to the tarwad and denied the right of every member of the tarwad (inclusive of plaintiff's tavazhi) to demand a share therein. That property was in the possession of the 63rd defendant who claimed it adversely to the tarwad and denied the right of every member of the tarwad (inclusive of plaintiff's tavazhi) to demand a share therein. When the court found it to be partible among the members of the tarwad, it was deciding a question between the 63rd defendant on one hand and all the members of the tarwad, irrespective of their position in the suit as plaintiffs or defendants, on the other hand. When the court allotted the suit property by its final decree to the share of the plaintiff's tavazhi, that is defendants 16 to 24 in that suit, that decision or award was really one in favour of the plaintiff's tavazhi against the 63rd defendant therein. In this view, the plaintiff's tavazhi was the decree-holder and the 63rd defendant was the judgment-debtor in that case. A proceeding to recover the property in pursuance to that decree is a proceedingin execution, discharge or satisfaction of that decree. Any question arising in relation to the recovery of the suit property pursuant to that decree is a proceeding in execution, discharge or satisfaction of that decree. Any question arising in relation to the recovery of the suit property pursuant to that decree is a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and is between plaintiff's tavazhi on one side as decree-holders and 63rd defendant on the other as the judgment debtor. The present suit being for recovery of the property by the plaintiff's tavazhi against the legal representatives of the 63rd defendant in pursuance of that decree relates therefore to a question between a party to the suit and the legal representatives of another, and concerns the discharge or satisfaction of that decree. It is therefore well within the bar of Section 47 C. P. C. 7. In Mangayya v Sriramulu (24 M. L. J. 477) it was held that the expression between parties to suit� in Section 47 C. P. C. was used normally to connote between parties opposed to each other in the suit but not necessarily to mean between parties who are plaintiff and defendant respectively in the suit, In a partition suit, for instance parties who are co-defendants are often arrayed against each other. In such a case a question between then relating to the execution of the decree would fall within Section 47 C. P. C. In Sriran Nathuji v Co0-operative Society No.55, Chamber (A. I. R. 1949 Nagpur 398) it is held: When the dispute, though between parties ranged on the same side, is such as to affect a party ranged on the opposite side, it falls within S. 47. The decision in Kalipada Mukerji v Basanta Kumar Dutta (A. I. R. 1932 Calcutta 126) is also to the same effect. In the light of the above rulings it must be held that the parties having been at variance, with regard to the title to the suit property, in the prior suit, and the question having been adjudged in that suit, its effectuation has necessarily to be sought in execution in that case only; and Section 47 would bar a fresh suit for what could have been achieved by such execution. The learned Sub-Judge's view in this respect is correct and is affirmed hereby. 8. Apart from the bar of Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, this suit has necessarily to fial on account of the decision in Ext. A8. 9. Ramakrishna Iyer, the auction purchaser was the 37th respondent in the appeal before the District Court in the prior suit. The judgment of the appellate Court, evidenced by Ext. A 8, was pronounced on 21-9-1938. Ramakrishna Iyer died on 26-9-1938, long before the Second Appeal was filed in the High Court. Ext. B6 shows that Ramakrishna Iyer was sought to be impleaded as the 36th respondent in the second appeal. The references in Ext. B6 to him are thus: 36. Adithiapuram Gramam Narayana Pattar's son Ramakrishna Pattar (died). XXX The 3rd and 36th respondents having died and no legal representatives having been brought on record within the time prescribed by law. This reference may imply that Ramakrishna Iyer might have died after the institution of the Second Appeal. But, it is very clearly proved in this case that Ramakrishna Iyer died within five days of the decision of the case y the Subordinate Judge and long before the filing of the Second Appeal. It has also been found so by the trial court; and that finding has not been challenged before me. No dead person can be a party to a legal proceeding. It has also been found so by the trial court; and that finding has not been challenged before me. No dead person can be a party to a legal proceeding. The Second Appeal, so far as it was against Ramakrishna Iyer, instituted long after his death, cannot be deemed to be an appeal against him at all. As regards Ramakrishna Iyer the appeal has to be deemed non est. With regard to him the proceedings in the prior suit ended with the decision of the District Court, evidenced by Ext. A8. That is final so far as Ramakrishna Iyer and the present defendants, who are his legal representatives, are concerned. It would then be res judicata on the matter and would bar the present case of the plaintiff. 10. The above said hurdle was sought to be got over by the learned counsel for the appellant by reliance on Explanation VI to section 11 C. P. C. and the ruling in Gopalakrishnayya v Venkatratnam (A. I. R. 1927 Madras 1088). It may at once say that the ruling last cited has not application to the instant case. It was enacted in 3 and 4 William IV, Chap. 41, Section 23, dealing with the procedure before the Privy Council, that In any case where any order shall have been made in any such appeal as last aforesaid, the same shall have full force and effect notwithstanding the death of any of the parties interested therein. Under this provision, even though a party before the Privy Council might have died pending the appeal, the order or decision by the Privy Council in the case would, nevertheless, have full force and effect], and was to be carried out by the courts in India. This was a special provision with regard to the Privy Council appeals, and it had no application to appeals in the High Courts in India to which the procedure prescribed by the Indian Code of Civil Procedure applied. By virtue of Rule 11 of Order XXII C. P. C, if a respondent died pending an appeal the appeal in Indian courts would certainly abate. Besides, even the provision relating to Privy Council appeals quoted above provided only that if a respondent, who was a party to the appeal, died pending the appeal the decision given in the appeal would bind his legal representatives. Besides, even the provision relating to Privy Council appeals quoted above provided only that if a respondent, who was a party to the appeal, died pending the appeal the decision given in the appeal would bind his legal representatives. It did not go to the extent of providing that, if a party to the decision in court below died before the institution of the Privy Council appeal and his legal representatives had not been made a party to the privy Council appeal, still the decision given by the Privy Council would be binding on him and his legal representatives. Here, Ramakrishna Iyer was no party to the Second Appeal, he having died long before the Second Appeal was instituted. Putting one's name, after one is dead, in the arry of parties to a suit or appeal is not impleading him in the proceedings; such naming has absolutely no effect in the eye of law and has only to be ignored altogether and so no question of abatement arises in his case. It follows that the dictum in Gopalakrishnayya v Venkataratnam (A.I.R.1927 Madras 1088) has no bearing to the facts of this case. 11. Next, we have to consider the effect of Explanation VI to Section 11 C. P. C. The contention in this respect is that Ramakrishna Iyer, the auction purchaser, had common cause with some of the members of the tarwad, who opposed the suit on the ground that the Nischayapathram of 1896 was an outright partition which conferred absolute rights on the tavazhis to the properties respectively allotted under it, and therefore, even though he was not eo nominee a party to the Second Appeal, he must be deemed to claim under the parties who urged the same contention in the Second Appeal and the decision in the Second Appeal must be held binding on him by virtue of Explanation Vi to Section 11 C. P. C. 12. Explanation VI to Section 11 C. P. C. reads: Where person litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.� In order to attract the Explanation it is not enough if the plea of the party is shown to be identical with that urged by another in an earlier suit, but it must be clearly made out (1) that the right claimed by the party is one which he has in common with that other who fought the earlier litigation, and (2) that the other person has urged in the earlier proceedings nit only on his behalf but also on behalf of the person sought to be bound by those proceedings. If the party in the earlier suit had only urged his own claim in respect of a right which was common to him and others, he cannot be said to have claimed it on behalf of the others. To such cases Explanation VI to Section 11 C. P. C. cannot be attracted. The language of this Explanation seems dangerously general, and therefore courts have to be very careful in applying it. It should not be applied to any case which did not come strictly within its very wording. See the observations in this respect of Edge C. J. in Ram Narain v Bisheshar v Subbamma ( I. L. R. 10 All.411) and of Sir John Wallis C. J. in Gopalacharyalu v Subbamma ( I. L. R. 43 Madras 487) who declared: I should certainly hesitates to hold that any litigation had been bona fide within the meaning of the Explanation in which there had been a substantial departure from the accepted rules as to the joinder of the parties. 13. In Somasundara Mudali v Kulandaivelu Pillai (I. L. R. 28 Madras 457 FB) three out of the four brothers who were reversioners of a deceased Hindu sued to recover the entire property from the defendant who claimed to be the adopted son of the deceased. 13. In Somasundara Mudali v Kulandaivelu Pillai (I. L. R. 28 Madras 457 FB) three out of the four brothers who were reversioners of a deceased Hindu sued to recover the entire property from the defendant who claimed to be the adopted son of the deceased. The trial court, negativing the plea of adoption set up by the defendant, gave a decree to the plaintiff for the recovery of the entire property, holding that the fourth reversioner could afterwards obtain his share on partition from his brothers. But the High Court modified the decree and limited the plaintiffs right to recovery of their ¾ share only in the property. In a subsequent suit by an assignee of the fourth reversioner against the alleged adopted son for recovery of his share in the property, the defendant's plea of adoption was contended to be barred by res judicata on the basis of Explanation VI to Section 11, as the question had already been tried between him and the other reversioners who claimed the right to the property in common for themselves and the fourth reversioner. The full Bench of the Madras High Court held that the bar of res judicata was not available because the plaintiffs in the prior suit had not been suing on behalf of the other members of the family though they too were impleaded as defendants in that suit, but were merely claiming a decree for themselves. It was held, where a co-sharer sues for his own share impleading the other co-sharers as supplemental defendants but not claiming any relief for them the decision is not res judicata against them although they were parties to the suit. 14. In Gopalacharyalu v Subbamma (42 I. L. R. 42 Mdras 487), two agraharamdars sued the zamindar and the receiver of the estate for a declaration that the Kattupadi payable by the agraharam to the estate was only Rs.650/- joining all the other agraharamdars as co-defendants in the case. The suit was decreed by the trial court but the decree was reversed by the District Court which found the correct amount to be Rs. 714 odd. The High Court upheld the District Court. Pending appeal Rukmani Amma, one of the agraharamdar defendants, died and her representatives were not brought on record. The suit was decreed by the trial court but the decree was reversed by the District Court which found the correct amount to be Rs. 714 odd. The High Court upheld the District Court. Pending appeal Rukmani Amma, one of the agraharamdar defendants, died and her representatives were not brought on record. In a subsequent suit by the Zamindar against the agraharamdars it was contended by the legal representatives of the deceased Rukmani Amma that the decision in the prior suit fixing the amount of the Kattupadi was not res judicata against them. It was held by Sir John Wallis C. J. that the plaintiffs in the previous suit were litigating on behalf of themselves and all the other agraharamdars whom they joined as defendants, and the decree they obtained in the Musiff's Court was on behalf of all the agraharamdars including Rukmani Amma. She ramined ex parte because the relief had been claimed on her behalf also by the plaintiffs, and the matter came within Explanation VI to Section 11. 15. The next case that comes up in category is Kumarandy Kudumban v Venkatasubramonia Iyer (A. I. R. 1927 Madras 645) which laid down: Where a party sets up his own individual right which happens to be common to him and others he cannot be said to be litigating on behalf of the others. It is not necessary that in order to attract the provisions of Explanation VI the suit should be a representative suit, for if it is a representative suit under O. I. Rules 8 no question can arise as to the binding nature of the decision in suit, not is it necessary that the party should be sued in a representative capacity. But the person litigating must put forward a right common to him and others not only on his behalf but on behalf of the others as well. If he simply puts forward a right alleged to be common to him and others, that would not make him a representative of the others. The word bona fide in Explanation VI could only apply to a litigation where every attempt is made to bring all the persons interested before the court. If he simply puts forward a right alleged to be common to him and others, that would not make him a representative of the others. The word bona fide in Explanation VI could only apply to a litigation where every attempt is made to bring all the persons interested before the court. The meaning of due care and caution cannot be applied to one who puts forward his own right as one of a body of persons who have equal rights with himself...It cannot be said that in the previous suit any attempt was made to bring before the court all the persons who were interested in the fishery right to order to contest the claim put forward by the plaintiff. On a careful consideration of the whole case I hold that the decision in the previous suit does not operate as a bar to the present suit. 16. Abdul Karim v Tara Prasad (51 C. W. N. 452) referred to the Explanation and held: There is no representative capacity unless the claim is made not on behalf of the objector only but on behalf also of the other persons concerned. The explanation VI itself makes this clear. A person who claims a right for himself which happens to be common to him and others is not within the principle. 17. Marudamithu Pillai v Radhakrishna Chetty (A. I. R.1945 Madras 118), where a claim suit under Order XXI Rule 63 had been filed by a creditor against the claim order holding that the gift by the debtor in favour of his wife and a subsequent sale by her in favour of the claimant were true and it terminated against the creditor and subsequently another creditor filed a similar suit against the same claimant and it was contended that the earlier decision operated as res judicata under Explanation VI to Section 11, it was held that the creditor in the earlier suit could not be deemed to have been litigating on behalf of the general body of creditors and the decision therein would not operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent claim suit by another creditor in respect of the same property. 18. In Mt. Prem Latha v Mt. 18. In Mt. Prem Latha v Mt. Janka (I. L. R. 1951-II Allahabad 328 at 361) where the suit was by one co-owner against a person in unauthorized possession of the property and the suit not framed as a suit on behalf of the other co-owner also, Desai J.observed: Even if the words. ˜where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others™ are not restricted to a suit in which the procedure mentioned in Order. I, rule 8, Civil Procedure Code has been followed, the instant suit is not a suit to which they would apply. The respondents are owners of one-half share in the property; they have nothing to do with the other half owned by Madho Singh. The right to the property is not one which can be said to have been claimed in common for themselves and Madho Singh. Their claim is distinct from that of Madho Singh and they can enjoy their share separately from Madho Singh. It seems to me that the explanation refers to a private right which is indivisible and not such a private right as the right of ownership in property which is capable of separate enjoyment by its various owners. I have therefore, no doubt that Madho Singh would not be bound by the decree in the present suit.� 19. These rulings make it clear that for a plea of res judicata to be supported by Explanation VI to Section 11 C. P. C., the plea must have been advanced in the earlier case not only on behalf of the litigant there but also on behalf of the litigants in the subsequent suit who are sought to be bound by the decision in the prior suit. It is not shown in this case that any person has contested the partition suit on behalf of the auction purchaser, Ramakrishna Iyer. The plaintiff's tavazhi was only contesting the claim of the auction purchaser in the trial court, and when the matter was decided there in favour of the auction purchaser they began to keep aloof and remain ex parte in the subsequent proceedings in appeal and Second Appeal. The other members in the tarwad never conducted the suit on behalf f the auction purchaser who was a mere stranger to them. The other members in the tarwad never conducted the suit on behalf f the auction purchaser who was a mere stranger to them. All that is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the auction purchaser's contentions were the same as those advanced by the contesting defendants in that case, namely that the Nischayapathram of 1896 was a deed of outright partition. That such a contention was common is not a ground on which one can invoke the application of Explanation VI to Section 11 C. P. C. 20. If the Explanation VI to Section 11 C. P. C. cannot avail to make the decision in Ext. B 6 binding on the defendants 1 and 2, it cannot be held against them under any other provision of law, they or their predecessor being no party to it. It then follows that as the plaintiff's tavazhi and the defendants 1 and 2 are concerned, the decision of the District Court in Ext. A 8 was the final decision in that case. Ext. A8 must then be deemed to be res judicata between them. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff's tavazhi and the auction purchaser were arrayed on the same side a defendants in the partition suit. But that would not affect the question of res judicata. If prsons, arrayed on the same side, set disputes between them which have necessarily to be decided in order to grant a decree in the case, that would be an issue between the parties within the meaning of Section 11 C. P. C. In the partition suit, the plaintiff treated the suit property as belonging to the tarwad and as available for partition among the members of the tarwad, and the 63rd defendant auction purchaser contested the same. In order to adjudge the availability of the suit property as an item of properties partible in the case this contention had necessarily to be resolved. The plaintiff's tavazhi represented by defendants 16 to 24 in that suit supported the claim of the plaintiff therein and claimed their share in the suit property also to be allotted to them in that suit. It follows therefore that in order to decree a share to the plaintiff's tavazhi the validity of court-sale in favour of Ramakrishna Iyer had necessarily to be adjudged. It follows therefore that in order to decree a share to the plaintiff's tavazhi the validity of court-sale in favour of Ramakrishna Iyer had necessarily to be adjudged. Hence this question was really and materially one between Ramakrishna Iyer on the one part and the plaintiff's tavazhi and other members of the tarwad on the other part, in the partition suit. 21. It was next contended on behalf of the appellant that on the construction of the Nischayaoathram of 1896 the ruling in Ammalu Amma v VaSU Menon (A. I. R. 1944 Madras 108) must be reckoned as a precedent, and being exactly in point must be followed in this case to hold that document as a maintenance arrangement only. In support of thos position Sabu Madho Das v Mukand Ram (A. I. R.1955 Supreme Court 481) was relied on. That the decision in Ammalu Amma v Vasu Menon should be viewed as a precedent in this case cannot, and was not, disputed by therespondent. But the question still remains whether in the presence of a decision between the parties, which would be res judicata between the, its effect can be got over with the aid of a precedent on the matter. In other words, the question is, can the effect of res judicata be got over by showing that the decision was incorrect in law. 22. The rule of res judicata is a rule of estoppels by which the issues once decided between the parties not be allowed to be re-agitated in a court of law. It has nothing to do with the correctness or otherwise of the decision. 23. In Mohanlal v Benoy Krishna (A. I. R. 1953 Supreme Court 65), it has been held: There is ample authority for the proposition that an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as re judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates are res judicata. A decision in the previous execution case between the parties that the matter was not within the competence of the executing court, even though erroneous, is binding on the parties.� 24. It follows therefore that the decision of the District Court in Ext. A decision in the previous execution case between the parties that the matter was not within the competence of the executing court, even though erroneous, is binding on the parties.� 24. It follows therefore that the decision of the District Court in Ext. A8 to the effect that the Nischayapathram of 1896 was an outright partition conferring absolute title to the properties on the respective allottees having become res judicata between the plaintiff's tavazhi and the auction purchaser Ramakrishna Iyer, the subsequent reveral of that judgment by the decision by the High Court to which Ramakrishana Iyer was no party cannot affect its force as res judicata in the matter. As between parties, the Nischayapathram of 1896 has therefore to be taken as a partition only. If so, by the court purchase of 1914, Ramakrishna Iyer and after him the defendants 1 and 2 have acquired full ownership over the suit property and the plaintiff who was a party to that decision cannot now be heard to say the contrarywise. 25. In the result, the Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. ORDER The learned counsel for the appellant prays for permission to appeal from this judgment. As it raises a question of law with regard to the scope of Explanation VI to Section 11 C. P. C., ;leave is granted.