Judgment N.L.Untwalia, J. 1. The plaintiff-appellant in this Miscellaneous First Appeal filed a title suit for redemption of a zarpeshgi bond dated the 17th May, 1901, in respect of 1 bigha 17 kathas of land. The bond had been executed by one Abul Hussain who was a Khatib of Jama Maszid at village Markan. The plaintiff filed the suit, claiming to be the present Khatib. The first defendant in the suit was Abu Mohammad, respondent No. 1. He was the mortgagee. Singhasan Bind was impleaded as the second defendant in the suit as the suit plot was recorded as kasht batai of Muthu Bind, father of Singhasan Bind, in the Revisional Survey record-of-rights. The suit was contested, but the learned Munsif gave a decree to the plaintiff. Singhasan filed an appeal in the lower appellate Court. A compromise petition was filed in the appeal on the 12th April, 1958, alleging that the mortgagee Abu Mohammad had given the suit land to the appellant for cultivation, but he had learnt that the appellant could not acquire any right to cultivate the land during the subsistence of mortgage, and, therefore he approached the respondent for a compromise and said that he would have no connection with or interest in the land and the appeal would be dismissed and the respondent would forego his claim for costs and mesne profits. There will be no necessity of any delivery of possession as the plaintiff Khatib had taken possession of the land. The appeal had been transferred from the Court of the District Judge to the Additional Subordinate Judge, 6th Court, for disposal on the 24th March, 1958. The date of hearing fixed in the appeal was the 16th April, 1958. The compromise petition was ordered to be put up, therefore, by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge on the 16th April, 1958. Since defendant No. 1, who was respondent No. 2, in the appeal, had not joined in the compromise petition, some defect was pointed out and the lawyer for respondent No. 1 was heard in the matter on the 16th April, 1958. The case was directed to be put up on the 17th April, 1958, in the presence of the appellants lawyer. On the 17th April, 1958, nobody turned up, and the case was adjourned to the 25th April, 1958. The case was directed to be put up on the 17th April, 1958, in the presence of the appellants lawyer. On the 17th April, 1958, nobody turned up, and the case was adjourned to the 25th April, 1958. On this date the appellant filed a petition, for time to file a petition challenging the compromise petition. As I shall show that the facts are in dispute between the parties in regard to the terms, it will be of some importance to note that only a time petition was filed on the 25th April, 1958, and later on, on the 30th April, 1958 an objection petition was filed objecting to the recording of the compromise chiefly on the ground that in the presence of certain persons named in paragraph 4 of the petition "it was decided that the plaintiff respondent would pay to the appellant a sum of Rs. 700.00 and the latter would forgo his claim to the land in suit and it was also decided that as the aforesaid sum was not available to the plaintiff-respondent then, he would pay to the appellant the money in ten days and the terms would be mentioned in the compromise petition and the same will be filed in the Court." It was further asserted in the 5th paragraph that "that accordingly the appellant and the respondent No. 1 came to Chapra and respondent No. 1 got a compromise petition drafted and written by his clerk Hanif Mian and the appellant who is illiterate in good faith put his thumb-mark on the said compromise petition. The compromise petition was not read over and explained to the appellant" It is further stated in the subsequent paragraph that the appellant (defendant No. 2) approached the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) on the 23rd April, 1958, and the 24th April, 1958, for payment of the said sum of Rs. 700/-. But the money was not paid, and at this he got enquiries made at Chapra on the 24th April, 1958, and learnt from his lawyer on the 25th April, 1958, that me term of payment of Rs. 700.00 had not been mentioned in the compromise petition. 700/-. But the money was not paid, and at this he got enquiries made at Chapra on the 24th April, 1958, and learnt from his lawyer on the 25th April, 1958, that me term of payment of Rs. 700.00 had not been mentioned in the compromise petition. Them lastly it was asserted in the 12th paragraph that "the appellant most respectfully submit that the plaintiff-respondent practised fraud upon the appellant by having got a compromise petition filed against the terms arrived at between the parties at the intervention of their well-wishers." In a nut-shell, therefore, the compromise is being attacked on the ground that the alleged term regarding the payment of Rs. 700.00 was fraudulently not inserted in the compromise petition. 2. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has enquired into this matter and has held that the appellants case set out in the objection petition is acceptable. In that view of the matter he has refused to record the compromise. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 in the Court below has, therefore, come up to this Court in appeal. 3. In the beginning I entertained some doubt as to whether the Court could enquire into the matter alleged in the objection petition under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure where the factum of compromise was not denied and it was only asserted on behalf of the second defendant that by practising fraud all the terms agreed upon between the parties had not been incorporated in the compromise petition. Some cases were cited before me on behalf of both sides where a clear distinction has been drawn between a case of fraud having been practised on the parties and fraud practised on Court and I was inclined to take the view that this was a case where no fraud is alleged to have been practised on Court, but simply On the party, and, therefore, it is beyond the scope of enquiry under Order 23 Rule 3. Even on the face of the objection petition filed on behalf of defendant No. 2 the Court had no alternative but to record it because the compromise on the face of it was lawful and the disputes between the parties in relation to the suit had been adjusted wholly. Even on the face of the objection petition filed on behalf of defendant No. 2 the Court had no alternative but to record it because the compromise on the face of it was lawful and the disputes between the parties in relation to the suit had been adjusted wholly. But feeling some difficulty in taking a decisive view in regard to this question of law I proceeded to hear learned Counsel for the parties and to examine for myself the facts of the case. After having carefully examined them and the evidence in regard to this matter I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that the Case of Singhasan Bind is not correct and the learned Additional Subordinate Judge has committed a gross error in refusing to record this compromise. 4. * * * 5. * * * 6. * * * 7. In my opinion, therefore, the compromise petition was drafted as instructed by the parties and incorporated all the terms of compromise between them. Singhasan gave his thumb-impression after understanding the terms of the compromise as is the case of plaintiff Md. Daud, and Singhasans lawyer Satynarayan Babu also must have appended his signature to the compromise petition on reading it. I may state here that the compromise petition is only about a page in length. Satyanarayan Babu has been examined in this Case to support the case of Singhasan. 8. In view of my finding on the first question in regard to which the learned Additional Subordinate Judge has given no finding as stated above, I hold that I am not prepared to believe the evidence of A.Ws. 1 to 3 or as a matter of that of A.W. 5 that Md. Daud had agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 700 to Singhasan by way of compensation for the lands in dispute. I may further observe that the terms between the parties had been reduced to writing, and this new term which is being introduced now seems to me inconsistent with the tenor of the draft of the compromise petition, and, therefore for that reason also, even if it would have been a case for enforcing this contract such evidence would not have been admissible under Section 91 of the Evidence Act. Be that as it may, on the question of fact, however, I have no doubt in my mind that the case of Singhasan is not true. 9. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge in a considerable portion of his judgment has discussed matters which, in my opinion, are not quite relevant. It is well known that tardids which are filed in such cases are not actually the written-statements of the parties and are not to be governed by the same strict standard which is applicable to the case of pleadings. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has said that the facts alleged in the objection petition were not denied in the tardid filed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. I have looked into the tardid. In my opinion, reading the tardid as a whole, the denials are there, but specific denials, as remarked by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, are not there. I shall, therefore, assume in favour of Singhasan that a part of his case was not denied by the plaintiff respondent. According to the case of Singhasan the compromise was arrived at on the 10th of April, and the compromise petition was drafted on the 12th. Somewhere in the evidence it was suggested on behalf of the plaintiff that the compromise had actually been arrived at on the 11th of April. In my opinion, this matter is of no consequence in this case. The second matter is that it was not denied on behalf of the plaintiff that the compromise petition was drafted and drawn up by his karpardaz. That also may be accepted. Then, the fact that the compromise was arrived at through the intervention of three or four persons named in the fourth paragraph of the objection petition also seems not to have been specifically denied. But I am not prepared to accept their evidence with regard to the terms of the compromise petition which, in my opinion, were well known to Singhasan and his lawyer Satyanarayan Babu. Another comment is that neither the scribe nor respondent No. 1 was examined in support of the plaintiffs case. A petition was filed before the learned Additional Subordinate Judge that respondent No. 1 was ill. Be that as it may, on considering the evidence adduced on behalf of Singhasan himself I find that he has failed to establish any fraud in this case. Mr. A petition was filed before the learned Additional Subordinate Judge that respondent No. 1 was ill. Be that as it may, on considering the evidence adduced on behalf of Singhasan himself I find that he has failed to establish any fraud in this case. Mr. Sinha appearing for him contended before me that the onus to establish that there was a lawful compromise between the parties was on the plaintiff-respondent because the petition had been filed on his behalf. There is no doubt that the initial onus is on the party which asserts that there is a compromise in the case between the parties. But, on the facts of this case that onus stood discharged as soon as it was found that the compromise petition bearing the thumb impression of Singhasan was there and it was signed by the lawyers for both parties. Thereafter, Singhasan attempted to wriggle out of this compromise on the ground of fraud. It is well established by now that the onus to establish fraud is on the party which alleges it and that charge has to be proved like a criminal charge. In my opinion neither there was any allegation nor the materials have been brought on the records of this case to show that any fraud was practised on Singhasan at the time he gave the thumb-impression on the compromise petition. If that be so there is no scope for thinking that the alleged term of payment of Rs. 700 was omitted from the compromise petition by practising the alleged fraud. 10. In the result I allow this appeal with costs, set aside the order of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge refusing to record the compromise and direct that the appeal pending before him shall be disposed of in terms of the compromise petition as between defendant No. 2, appellant before him, and plaintiff-respondent No. 1 and shall be dismissed as against defendant No. 1, respondent No. 1 as the latter had not joined the compromise petition and defendant No. 1 appellant in the Court below was not seeking any relief as against him in regard to the disputed land.