Judgment. -The appellant, Sri Nellaippar Devasthanam, Tirunelveli, sued as plaintiff to recover an amount due on a promissory note executed by the then Executive Officer of the defendant-Devasthanam under the following circumstances. The Zamindar of Uthumalai was and perhaps is the hereditary trustee of the defendantDevasthanam. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board took action under section 57 of Madras Act (II of 1927) and framed a scheme of administration for the defendant temple. Apparently, one of the charges against the hereditary trustee was that he had misappropriated a sum of nearly Rs. 80,000 belonging to the temple funds. Under this scheme, an Executive Officer was appointed and certain powers were conferred upon him and certain duties imposed upon him. With the sanction of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board, the Executive Officer of the defendant-temple borrowed a sum of Rs. 2,500 from the plaintiff-temple, which temple had also been authorised by the Board to advance the loan, for the purposes of launching a suit against the hereditary trustee to recover the moneys misappropriated by him. The hereditary trustee filed a suit O.S. No. 10 of 1950, District Court, Tirunelveli, under sub-section (7) of section 57 of 1927 Act to have the order of the Board settling a scheme for the defendant-temple set aside. In this suit, the Sub-Court, to whom the suit was transferred and where it was numbered O.S. No. 133 of 1951, made an order on 17th November, 1953, appointing the hereditary trustee as the receiver. The suit, however, was not disposed of till 1956 by the Sub-Court. The Sub-Court effected certain modifications in the scheme and an appeal from the decision of the Sub-Court is still pending on the file of this Court. It, however, appears that the High Court ordered the continuance of the hereditary trustee as receiver till the disposal of the appeal. In the course of the administration of the temple, the Executive Officer paid a sum of Re. 1 towards the suit promissory note debt on 27th January, 1954. The suit was filed within three years of the date of this payment, this payment being relied upon to extend the period of limitation. Notwithstanding the appointment of the hereditary trustee as receiver, the suit was laid by the plaintiff-temple against the defendant-temple represented by its Executive Officer. 1 towards the suit promissory note debt on 27th January, 1954. The suit was filed within three years of the date of this payment, this payment being relied upon to extend the period of limitation. Notwithstanding the appointment of the hereditary trustee as receiver, the suit was laid by the plaintiff-temple against the defendant-temple represented by its Executive Officer. The hereditary trustee intervened and contended that in view of his appointment as receiver, he was entitled to represent the temple and that the suit as laid could not be maintained. The receiver was allowed to come on record. His contentions were that the Executive Officer was not competent to borrow the amount and had no authority for such borrowing. Nor, according to him, was the plaintiff itself competent to lend the money. He attacked also the competency of the Executive Officer to make any payment towards the suit promissory note and keep it alive. The further contention was that the suit as laid against the defendant-temple, represented by its Executive Officer was not validly laid and that it was only on the date when the hereditary trustee was allowed to come on record as representing the temple that the suit should be deemed to have been properly laid, which date, according to him, was beyond three years from the date of the endorsement of payment of Re. 1 extending the limitation. On the issues that were framed, the learned District Munsif of Tirunelveli held against these contentions and decreed the suit. On appeal, however, the learned District Judge of Tirunelveli, while holding that the suit promissory note was true, valid and binding on the defendant, held that the appointment of the receiver virtually abrogated the appointment of the Executive Officer under the scheme, and that, therefore, the Executive Officer had no longer any authority to. acknowledge the debt. Even apart from that, the learned District Judge felt that the Executive Officer should have had specific authority from the Board for so acknowledging the liability. On this ground, he held that the suit was not in time. He further held that the date on which the receiver was impleaded, that is, 16th October, 1957, being more than three years after the date on which the debt was acknowledged, the suit was barred by limitation. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff-temple appeals. On this ground, he held that the suit was not in time. He further held that the date on which the receiver was impleaded, that is, 16th October, 1957, being more than three years after the date on which the debt was acknowledged, the suit was barred by limitation. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff-temple appeals. The points that arise for consideration are clear from the above. They are, whether notwithstanding the appointment of the hereditary trustee as receiver, the Executive Officer of the defendant-temple could validly acknowledge the debt, and whether the suit as laid against the defendant-temple, represented by its Executive Officer, was properly instituted. The learned District Judge appears to have thought that the appointment of receiver by Court in effect removed the Executive Officer appointed under the scheme from his office. That was principally the ground upon which he came to. the conclusion that the Executive Officer could not acknowledge the liability on 27th January, 1954 and could not also properly represent the temple in the suit. It seems to me that this view cannot be supported either by the provisions of the Act or on the basis of decided authority. Under section 57 (7) of the Act (II of 1927), “the trustee or any person having interest may within six months of the date of such publication institute a suit in the Court to modify or set aside such order.” This provision enables the trustee to question the propriety of the framing a scheme of administration for the temple. It is common ground that in the present case, a scheme was framed on 4th March, 1950, and the suit was filed by the hereditary trustee under the provisions of this section. The Hindu Religious Endowments. Act of 1927 was repealed and replaced by Madras Act (XIX of 1951). Section 58 of this Act empowers the Deputy Commissioner to frame schemes for the proper administration of religious institutions. Under section 103 of this Act, a scheme settled under 1927 Act shall in so far as it is not inconsistent with this Act be deemed to have been made by the appropriate authority under the corresponding provisions of the 1951 Act. An aggrieved party is given a right of suit and under section 62 (1), a suit to set aside a scheme framed under section 58 of the new Act is competent. An aggrieved party is given a right of suit and under section 62 (1), a suit to set aside a scheme framed under section 58 of the new Act is competent. It has been pointed out that under section 103 of the new Act, a scheme framed under section 57 of the old Act is deemed to be a scheme framed under section 58 of the new Act. Section 62 of the new Act contains an important provision relating to the power of the Court in which a suit is laid to set aside or modify a scheme. This provision is in these terms: “And the Court may modify or cancel such order, but it shall have no power to stay the Commissioner’s order pending the disposal of the suit.” In plain words, therefore, this section places a restraint upon the powers of the Court and it states that till the final disposal of the suit, the order of the Commissioner framing the scheme shall not be stayed. The question is whether in the light of this specific prohibition the appointment of the hereditary trustee as receiver has. any effect upon the administration of the temple by the Executive Officer appointed under the scheme. The learned District Judge observed: “In this case, what the Court has done is not to stay any order but to appoint altogether a different person and that too after hearing both sides.” If what the learned District Judge means is that the Court shall not pass an order to the effect that the order framing the scheme is stayed or the operation of the scheme is stayed, but that in other respects, the Court is competent to make some order in variation of the terms of the scheme, I am unable to agree. The expression “ shall have no power to stay the Commissioner’s order” is compendious and what the Act aims at is to postpone whatever relief the Court is called upon to grant to the stage of final determination of the suit. The expression “ shall have no power to stay the Commissioner’s order” is compendious and what the Act aims at is to postpone whatever relief the Court is called upon to grant to the stage of final determination of the suit. The dominant intention behind this provision is that when a competent authority has in the interests of the administration of the religious institution taken certain steps in the framing of a scheme and provided for the management of the institution in a particular manner while the aggrieved party is no doubt competent to approach the Court and question the validity of the order or the propriety of the provisions of the scheme the Court is prevented from, in a manner of speaking, pre-judging the issue and making any interim order varying the provisions for the management of the institution. It is true that under Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court has unquestioned powers for the appointment of a receiver in a stated set of circumstances. But it has nevertheless to yield to a statutory prohibition of the nature contained in Act (XIX of 1951). It seems to me therefore that the mere fact of the appointment of the hereditary trustee as receiver, with nothing more, cannot be inferred as having the effect of staying the operation of any portion of the scheme It appears that in this case though the Executive Officer was in fact appointed he was not able to take possession of the temple itself. In so far as the possession of the temple is concerned, which apparently remained all along with the hereditary trustee, the order appointing him as receiver might no doubt have been effective. But when the Court did not specifically deal with any of the other clauses of the scheme where under the Executive Officer had been conferred powers of management, the receiver did not derive any authority from the Court’s order appointing him as such to interfere with the Executive Officer’s management of the institution. The decision in Muthuswami Gurukkal v. Ayyaswami Thevar,1, dealt with an analogous case where the ban imposed by section 62 (1) of Act (XIX of 1951) came to be considered. The decision was that the Court had jurisdiction to grant the relief of interim injunction and that its jurisdiction was not barred by reason of section 62 (1) of the Act. The decision was that the Court had jurisdiction to grant the relief of interim injunction and that its jurisdiction was not barred by reason of section 62 (1) of the Act. The learned Judges observed: “If the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil Court is to be ousted, it must be by the express words or by necessary intendment of the statutory provision on which reliance is placed. The ban imposed by section 62 (1) can be applied only to the extent warranted by the language o that statutory provision. The rest of the jurisdiction of the civil Court, that for instance regulated by rules 1 and 2 of Order 39, will remain intact. It is neither desirable nor even possible to devise a formula of universal application to define the precise scope of the ban imposed by section 62 (1) of Act (XIX of 1951). We can concern ourselves in these appeals only with the question whether the reliefs asked for by the plaintiffs-appellants fell within the mischief of the statutory ban imposed by section 62 (1).” In that case, the relief that had been asked before the Deputy Commissioner was a declaratory one that certain persons were the hereditary trustees of the temple. That relief was refused and the suit was to establish that right and to set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner. In so far as that order of the Deputy Commissioner was concerned, it related only to a question of status of the parties, whether they were hereditary trustees or not. Obviously, in such a suit no question of possession of the lands was ever before the Deputy Commissioner and the order of the Deputy Commissioner had no relation to such possession of the lands. In the suit that was laid by the persons claiming to be hereditary trustees, the relief that was asked for was an injunction restraining the other persons from interfering with the possession of lands. It was in this context and confining themselves to these facts that the learned Judges who decided the above case proceeded to observe: “What the appellants now seek is that their possession of the temple lands should not be interfered with by the trustees, defendants 1 to 3, till the disposal of the suits. It was in this context and confining themselves to these facts that the learned Judges who decided the above case proceeded to observe: “What the appellants now seek is that their possession of the temple lands should not be interfered with by the trustees, defendants 1 to 3, till the disposal of the suits. The grant of such a relief will not amount to stay of the operation of the Commissioner’s order till the disposal of the suits within the meaning of section 62 (1). There was no direction of the Deputy Commissioner in his order which related to the lands or of any of the other properties of the temples. There could not have been such a direction in proceedings under section 57 (b) of the Act. The order of the Deputy Commissioner would be left intact even if the restricted interim relief now asked for by the appellants is granted.” It is clear from the above facts that the grant of a temporary injunction that was asked for in that suit had no effect upon the Deputy Commissioner’s order which had been made under section 57 (b) of the Act and accordingly the restraint imposed upon the Court by section 62 (1) of the Act was not attracted. This decision is not an authority for the proposition that the mere fact that the hereditary trustee was appointed as receiver overruled the provisions of the scheme to such an extent that the appointment to the Executive Officer under that scheme became null and void. It follows that the competency of the Executive Officer remained unaffected by the appointment of the receiver and he could take such steps in relation to the administration of the temple as contemplated under the scheme in so far as they did not interfere with the receiver appointed by Court. Though several contentions were raised about the lack of sanction for the loan, it is clear from the records that the Hindu Religious Endowments Board as the proper authority, authorised the Executive Officer of the defendant-temple to obtain this loan. It also authorised the plaintiff-temple to advance the loan. This contention that the loan was not incurred on proper authority was virtually abandoned during the course of the hearing. It also authorised the plaintiff-temple to advance the loan. This contention that the loan was not incurred on proper authority was virtually abandoned during the course of the hearing. It was however alleged that even under the terms of the scheme the Executive Officer had no authority to acknowledge the liability on 27th January, 1954 by the payment of Re. 1. I am not satisfied that the learned District Judge was right in concluding that the Executive Officer had no such authority. It seems to me that where the loan had been obtained and the liability had been incurred under proper sanction and further when the Executive Officer under the provisions of the scheme was competent to receive the moneys due to the temple, make disbursements on behalf of the temple and be in custody of all the properties of the temple it is straining the language to say that in making the payment in partial discharge of the loan which had been validly incurred, the Executive Officer exceeded his authority. Clause 8 of the scheme for instance says: “The funds of the temple shall be deposited in any of the banks approved under the Board’s bye-laws in the name of the temple, and the bank account shall be operated upon by the Executive Officer from time to time as the exigencies of the administration may require.........” When the Board had approved of the incurring of the debt for the purposes of the temple and the Executive Officer had been conferred the powers of dealing with the moneys belonging to the temple on behalf of the temple, it seems to follow that the Executive Officer was equally competent to make payments in discharge of such loans. To hold otherwise would be utterly out of tune with the various provisions of the scheme prescribing the powers and duties of the Executive Officer. It is argued on behalf of the respondent that such a power cannot be inferred. Reliance has been placed upon Chidambaram Pillai v. Veerappa Chettiar1, and other cases of like nature. In this case, a promissory note was executed by a person describing himself merely as the executor of the estate of A. In a suit brought on the promissory note, a decree was sought against the estate. Reliance has been placed upon Chidambaram Pillai v. Veerappa Chettiar1, and other cases of like nature. In this case, a promissory note was executed by a person describing himself merely as the executor of the estate of A. In a suit brought on the promissory note, a decree was sought against the estate. That was refused, the learned Judge holding that only the executor and his heirs were liable and the estate of which he was executor cannot be made liable. Sadasiva Iyer, J., observed in passing that a power to manage the properties and to sell them for discharge of debts does not give a power to renew or acknowledge debts. In a similar manner, in Subbakkal v. Venkata Chetti1, it was held that where a guardian appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act, who was specifically enjoined to obtain the permission of the Court to make certain payments, made payments without the orders of the Court, such payments were not enough for purpose of saving limitation under section 19 and section 21 of the Limitation Act. It would be noticed that in both of these decisions there was a specific restraint placed upon the persons making the acknowledgment. But that is not the case here. Here, in my opinion, the terms of the scheme give full powers to the Executive Officer to make such payments in discharge of loans lawfully obtained. The view taken by the learned District Judge that the Executive Officer had no authority to make this acknowledgment is, in my opinion, incorrect. Nor am I impressed with the further argument advanced before me that the suit against the temple should be deemed to have been laid only on the date when the hereditary trustee was brought on record which was beyond three years from the date of the acknowledgment, and for that reason the suit must fail. It is clear that the suit was against the temple. It was represented by a person, i.e., the Executive Officer, who was competent to represent it under a specific provision in the scheme. Clause 7 provides that the Executive Officer shall represent the temple in all legal proceedings. The learned District Judge in coming to the conclusion that the suit should be deemed to have been instituted against the temple only on 16th October, 1957 has not considered the effect of this clause. Clause 7 provides that the Executive Officer shall represent the temple in all legal proceedings. The learned District Judge in coming to the conclusion that the suit should be deemed to have been instituted against the temple only on 16th October, 1957 has not considered the effect of this clause. He seems to have thought that when the High Court confirmed the order of appointment of the hereditary trustee as receiver pending disposal of the appeal, the necessary result was that the Executive Officer’s power was taken away. He does not say so in such clear terms, but that is the underlying idea. Even the order of the High Court left the Executive Officer intact. The learned Judge stated: “I do not therefore think that the Executive Officer should be brought in at this stage. The proper thing, therefore, would be to impose stringent conditions on the conduct and administration of the present receiver while allowing him to continue to function as such......” Far from interfering with the management of the institution by the Executive Officer, the High Court only allowed the receiver to continue to a certain extent and in so far as matters specified in that order were concerned. If, therefore, clause 7 of the scheme was not abrogated and the Executive Officer was lawfully authorised to represent the institution in legal proceedings, notwithstanding that he was replaced by the hereditary trustee at a later stage in the suit, the suit as laid was properly instituted. In support of this, several decisions, of which two alone need be referred, may be mentioned. In Saraspur Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. B.B. & C.I. Ry. Co.2, the suit was laid against the railway, the title of the defendant being “The Agent, B. B. & C. I. Railway.” The suit was dismissed on the ground that it was badly framed. The learned Judge held that it was only a mis-description in the title of the railway and that the suit was really against the railway. In Nanakchand Mukandi Lal v. East India Railway3, it was held that notwithstanding that the suit was directed against the Agent of the railway, since the plaint showed that the plaintiff’s claim was against the railway company as such, the suit had been properly instituted. These cases are not directly in point. In Nanakchand Mukandi Lal v. East India Railway3, it was held that notwithstanding that the suit was directed against the Agent of the railway, since the plaint showed that the plaintiff’s claim was against the railway company as such, the suit had been properly instituted. These cases are not directly in point. Nevertheless, they establish the principle that the suit claim could not be defeated for such technical reasons. Even apart from that, I have held that on the date when the suit was laid, the Executive Officer properly represented the institution. In the result, the judgment and decree of the District Judge are set aside and those of the learned District Munsif restored. The appellant will be entitled to its costs throughout. K.S. ------ Appeal allowed.