ORDER V.R. Newaskar, J. This second appeal ought to fail. The appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent. The plaintiff alleged tenancy as commencing from 1st of every month which had been terminated by a notice to quit with 15 days' notice terminating with the term of tenancy. The plaintiff further alleged grounds under section 4(a) and (g) of the Accommodation Control Act. The defendant contested the suit. He alleged that the tenancy began on 22nd of every month and not on the 1st. The notice to quit was therefore said to be illegal and had not the effect of terminating the tenancy. The grounds under section 4(a) and (g) of the Accommodation Control Act were denied. The findings of the Court below in the first appeal are that the tenancy began on 1st of every month as alleged by the plaintiff and not on 22nd as alleged by the defendant. The existence of ground under section 4(a) of the Accommodation Control Act was held to have been established. On these findings the plaintiff's suit was decreed in appeal although the trial Court had dismissed the suit. This is a second appeal against that decision Mr. Garg, who appears for the appellant, contended relying upon a decision reported in Ram Krishna v. Mohammad Yahia AIR 1960 All 482 , that in the present case the notice demanding rent from the defendant did not allow him sufficient time to save his tenancy from consequences of a default by non-payment of rent. The notice in the present case was given on 8-10-1955 terminating the tenancy by 31-10-1955. Since, according to the learned counsel, law gave the tenant one month's time to make the payment there was no sufficient time given by the landlord's notice to save the tenancy. In my opinion this contention cannot be upheld. The condition with regard to the termination of the tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act stands on different footing than the existence of a ground under section 4(a) of the Accommodation Control Act. There is really no co-relation between the two so as to make one dependent upon the other. A tenancy may be terminated under the Transfer of Property Act either before or after the ground under section 4 becomes available. It is only when both the circumstances co-exist that a landlord's right to claim possession arises. There is really no co-relation between the two so as to make one dependent upon the other. A tenancy may be terminated under the Transfer of Property Act either before or after the ground under section 4 becomes available. It is only when both the circumstances co-exist that a landlord's right to claim possession arises. It cannot be said that they do not co-exist. On the findings of the Court below the tenancy had been terminated by a valid notice to quit under the Transfer of Property Act, since more than 15 days were available to the defendant to vacate the premises by the end of the term of the tenancy. The ground under section 4(a) of the Accommodation Control Act also became available by reason of the default committed by him in paying the arrears within one month from the date of the service of the notice demanding the same. If he had made a payment within one month his statutory tenancy would have continued and it would have continued as long as no ground under section 4 of the Accommodation Control Act would have been available to the plaintiff. That being the position I do not think that the contention put forward on the basis of the authority relied upon has no force. In other respects the findings are those of fact. This appeal is therefore incompetent. It is dismissed. Appeal dismissed