JUDGMENT : The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar, J. 1. An industrial dispute between the appellant Messrs British India Corporation Limited and its employee, J.V. Dass was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal by the Government of Uttar Pradesh on January 31, 1957. This dispute related to the termination of the services of Dass, and arising out of it two issues were referred for adjudication: (1) Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably terminated the services of Shri J.V. Dass? If so, to what relief is he entitled? (2) Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably deducted Rs 875 from the provident fund account of Mr Dass? If so, to what relief is he entitled? 2. The Tribunal has answered the first question in favour of the respondent, but it did not think it appropriate to direct his reinstatement. That is why it ordered the appellant to pay the respondent by way of compensation the amount specified in the award. This part of the award is challenged by the appellant in its appeal by special leave (Civil Appeal No. 96 of 1959). The second issue has been answered by the Tribunal in favour of the appellant, and this part of the award is challenged by the respondent by his appeal by special leave (Civil Appeal No. 148 of 1959). 3. It appears that the respondent was employed by the appellant at Kanpur and had been posted to look after the accounts and allied matters of Lal Imli Club which was a place which afforded amenities to the officers of the appellant. On the night of March 24, 1953, a girl named Prem Nandni was kept in the Club premises. In the morning of March 25, 1953, the police recovered the girl and a criminal case of kidnapping and wrongfully confining this girl was instituted against ten persons including the respondent. The respondent was then arrested on the same day, but was subsequently released on bail. The appellant refused to take him on work after his release on bail. The criminal case ended in an order of acquittal in favour of the respondent. After the criminal case commenced the appellant thought it expedient to hand over the charge of the duties of the respondent to some other person. The appellant refused to take him on work after his release on bail. The criminal case ended in an order of acquittal in favour of the respondent. After the criminal case commenced the appellant thought it expedient to hand over the charge of the duties of the respondent to some other person. It was then discovered by the new clerk, who took charge, that the cash was short, various vouchers had been forged, the cash-book and registers were not up-to-date and there was misappropriation by the respondent. When the respondent was confronted with this position, he threw himself on the mercy of the management of the appellant and prayed that he may be paid for his dues up to the end of March 1953 so that he would resign and leave the job at his own request. He also offered to reimburse the amount misappropriated. The appellant generously decided to accept this offer and so the respondent?s salary up to the end of March 1953 was paid to him as well as bonus for the year 1952. This payment was made on April 11, 1953. At his request the appellant also paid the respondent Rs 2000-15-0 on the 10th of June, 1953, as amount due to him under the provident fund account after deducting Rs 875 towards the reimbursement of the misappropriated amount. This was done as agreed to by the respondent. After the respondent thus received these amounts he began to allege that he was dismissed by the appellant without a proper enquiry and sought for relief in that behalf. It is in consequence of the complaints made by the respondent in regard to his alleged wrongful dismissal and illegal deduction of Rs 875 from his provident fund that the present dispute has been referred for industrial adjudication. 4. The Tribunal has found that no charge-sheet was given to the respondent nor was any inquiry held by the appellant as required by the Standing Orders; so that if the termination of the respondent?s service amounts to his dismissal, it would be illegal. This position is not in dispute. 5. The Tribunal also found that in terminating the service of the respondent Standing Order 21 has not been complied with. This position is not in dispute. 5. The Tribunal also found that in terminating the service of the respondent Standing Order 21 has not been complied with. This Standing Order provides that any permanent clerk desirous of leaving the Company?s services shall give one month?s notice in writing to the Manager unless he has a specific agreement providing for a longer or shorter notice. There is no notice given by the respondent and no writing has been taken by the appellant from the respondent showing that he agreed voluntarily to retire from service on the terms specified above. That being so, the termination of the respondent?s service must be held to have taken place without complying with the requirements of the Standing Orders. That raises the question as to whether the said termination is capricious, improper or illegal. The Tribunal has answered this question in the affirmative and the appellant contends that this finding is unreasonable and not supportable in law. 6. Mr Coldwell, who gave evidence for the appellant, has stated on oath that the respondent agreed voluntarily to retire and repay to the Club the amount which had been misappropriated. If Mr Coldwell?s evidence is believed, it appears that the respondent felt overwhelmed by the discovery made in his absence in regard to his misconduct and he was anxious to get his provident fund amount and leave the employment of the appellant. The respondent, however, contends that he wanted a loan to defend himself in the criminal case and he was coerced into receiving a part of the provident fund and under duress he agreed to the deduction of Rs 875. It is significant that the story of duress and compulsion has been rejected by the Tribunal, and so what survives is the fact of the said deduction legitimately made and the payment of the balance of the provident fund and salary to the respondent. All the complaints that the respondent made began after he received the amount and so not much value can be attached to those complaints. The deduction of Rs 875 and the payment of the balance of the provident fund are admitted, and so the question which immediately arises for decision is: what does this transaction indicate? All the complaints that the respondent made began after he received the amount and so not much value can be attached to those complaints. The deduction of Rs 875 and the payment of the balance of the provident fund are admitted, and so the question which immediately arises for decision is: what does this transaction indicate? It is conceded that Rules 24 and 28 of the provident fund rules do not permit or authorise the payment of a part of the provident fund to the respondent. Indeed the respondent case is that he asked for a loan and when it was refused he submitted to the course suggested by the appellant. In other words, it is admitted that loan was refused and the respondent took back the money as in full satisfaction of his dues under the provident fund and under the item of his salary. If the theory of duress is rejected, as it must be, then the admitted fact about these payments very strongly corroborates the testimony of Mr Coldwell that the respondent offered to retire and resign, and so the moneys due to him were paid after deducting Rs 875 for reimbursing the amount misappropriated by him. In fact, though the respondent made some allegations against the appellant in his correspondence subsequent to the receipt of the amounts, he has admitted that his services have been terminated which means that the termination of service had taken place before the said amounts were paid to him, and that is consistent with the appellant?s case. In our opinion, there is no doubt that the appellant case is true and that all the admitted facts irresistibly lead to the conclusion that faced with the problem of defending himself in a criminal trial the respondent decided to leave the job and so took away his provident fund for meeting his expenses. If the respondent had not offered to resign or retire the appellant would not have returned the provident fund to him. All complaints made by the respondent subsequent to the receipt of the amount can hardly have any value. We would, therefore, reverse the finding of the Tribunal and hold that the respondent himself voluntarily resigned his service, and the fact that no writing was taken in that behalf does not make the termination of his service either capricious, improper or illegal. We would, therefore, reverse the finding of the Tribunal and hold that the respondent himself voluntarily resigned his service, and the fact that no writing was taken in that behalf does not make the termination of his service either capricious, improper or illegal. On this view of the matter the appeal preferred by the appellant must be allowed and that preferred by the respondent must be dismissed. 7. In the result both the issues referred for adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal will be answered in favour of the appellant. There will be no order as to costs.