JUDGMENT S.B. SEN, J. 1. This is an appeal filed by the appellant Dinanath against his conviction under S. 307 and S. 377, I.P.C. and sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment on each count running concurrently. 2. The prosecution story is that Abdul Rashid, a boy of about 14 years of age, was working in a Motor-workshop of Hai Miya on a salary of Rs.15/-. The appellant Dinanath met him on 24-2-1959 near the Siyaganj Railway gate, Indore and offered him a salary of Rs. 60/- per month if he would work in his 'Pan' and cycle shop which he was running at Kumarkhadi a suburb of Indore. The boy agreed. The accused-appellant told him that he was going to Ujjain in search of his servant who had run away with his cycle and that he would be glad if he would accompany him. The boy consented and both of them started towards Ujjain, on a cycle which the appellant was having at that time. When they were five or six miles away from Ujjain, they started by a different route in order to reach earlier. This shorter route passed through a jungle. On the way the accused, against the will of the boy, committed unnatural offence. He also bit his cheeks. On these allegations the accused was prosecuted for offence, in addition to those for which he has been convicted, under S. 324, I P.C. The latter offence, however, has not been found to be established and he has been acquitted of the same. 3. The age of the boy has not been seriously challenged in appeal. Khatunbi (P.W. 4) mother of the boy has given out his age to be about 14 or 15. Dr. Sahastrabuddhe (P. W. 1) has also opined that the boy was 14 of 15 years old. His conclusion is based on height, weight, teeth and hair of the witness and X-ray report Ex. P/2. According to the report also which it based on oscification of the bones, the boy was less than fifteen. There is, therefore, no doubt that the boy was less than sixteen years and was a minor so far as offence under S. 367, I. P. C. is concerned. 4. Regarding the enticement, the evidence is that of P. W. 8-Abdul Rashid. He has given out that the accused offered him a job of Rs. There is, therefore, no doubt that the boy was less than sixteen years and was a minor so far as offence under S. 367, I. P. C. is concerned. 4. Regarding the enticement, the evidence is that of P. W. 8-Abdul Rashid. He has given out that the accused offered him a job of Rs. 2/- per day and on that he agreed to leave his old job and join him. He has also deposed that on his request he accompanied him on his cycle to Ujjain. 5. The prosecution has next to establish that the boy was taken out of the lawful guardianship. The mother of the boy P. W. 4 Khatunbi has deposed that she was incharge of her children as her husband used to be away on work; that she was not consulted before this boy was taken by the accused. The question, therefore, is whether it was a taking out of the legal guardianship. In this case it is contended on behalf of the accused that though the boy was a minor he was given freedom of working in some shop. The accused offered him also the work in his 'Pan' and cycly shop. It has not been established by the prosecution that the accused had no such shop and that the appointment was a hoax. Therefore, the counsel argued, as the boy was free to take any job, there was no taking out of the lawful guardianship. I think, this argument is not sound. A minor is always under the guardianship of either the parents or some other person to whom the minor is entrusted. It is not the case of the accused that he had taken permission of his previous employer or his parents. The taking of the boy amounts to taking him out of the lawful guardianship as contemplated in S. 361, I.P.C. One who wants to employ a minor without the permission of his guardian must do so at his peril and it is no defence that a boy who was allowed to work in a particular place can be taken out from his job by another person without the permission of his guardian or his employer. The offence, therefore, of kidnapping is complete. 6. So far as the offence under S. 377, I.P.C. is concerned, the evidence is that of the boy only. The offence, therefore, of kidnapping is complete. 6. So far as the offence under S. 377, I.P.C. is concerned, the evidence is that of the boy only. There may be some cases where corroboration of the complainant is necessary. But in this case the circumstances corroborate the testimony of the boy. There is no doubt that the boy went with the accused. They were seen together by P. W. 2, Parasram at his shop at Bareli on the Indore-Ujjain road. At the motor-stand at Ujjain, they were also seen together by P.W. 5, Shivlal Constable. Further, there is medical evidence to show that there was an abrasion on the annus and the medical opinion is that it was due to unnatural intercourse. The first-information-report which was lodged on his return to Indore corroborates this testimony. I, therefore, do not see any reason to disbelieve the story as given out by the boy. 7. So far as Section 367, I. P. C. is concerned, it is necessary to establish that the boy was kidnapped in order that he may be subjected to unnatural lust. It is true that the boy was kidnapped, it is also true that he was subjected to unnatural lust but it may not be that the boy was kidnapped for that purpose. If that was so, it was not necessary that the boy should have been taken to Ujjain. At the time of taking that may not be his intention The desire might have cropped up subsequently. Therefore, though the boy was kidnapped and subjected to unnatural intercourse, it cannot be said with certainty that at the time of the taking, he had the required intention as contemplated in S. 367, I. P. C. I, therefore, do not think that the accused can rightly be convicted under S. 367, I. P. C. 8. From the above discussion, I hold that the conviction of the accused under S. 377, I, P. C. is proper, but so far as his conviction under S. 367, I P. C. is concerned it is set aside and instead he is convicted under S. 363. From the above discussion, I hold that the conviction of the accused under S. 377, I, P. C. is proper, but so far as his conviction under S. 367, I P. C. is concerned it is set aside and instead he is convicted under S. 363. I. P. C. Under Section 363, I. P. C. he is sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment and the same is also the sentence in respect of S. 377 I.P C Looking to the circumstances that the boy had undoubtedly consented to go with the accused, both the sentences are to run concurrently. 9. With the aforesaid modification, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed